In recent days, I had the opportunity to set out from Shanghai\u2014one of China\u2019s most vibrant and intellectually rich cities\u2014and revisit Hangzhou and Beijing. These cities are home to China\u2019s most prestigious universities and provide an ideal setting for gauging the pulse of academic circles. With Donald Trump\u2019s re-election in the United States reigniting trade wars through heightened tariffs, the growing turbulence in the international system, and China\u2019s position in this emerging world order, I engaged in extensive conversations with Chinese academics. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, these scholars offered candid insights into China\u2019s foreign policy and the global balance of power. The questions are mine, while the responses come directly from these academics.<\/p>\n
From Shanghai to Beijing: China\u2019s academic community speaks<\/strong><\/p>\n China\u2019s role in the international system has been a frequent topic of debate in both the West and the East in recent years. The escalating trade wars spurred by Trump\u2019s tariffs and a world order shaken by conflicts like Ukraine-Russia and Palestine-Israel have once again placed China under the global spotlight. During my discussions with leading academics from universities in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Beijing, I sought to understand how China views this chaotic landscape and where it positions itself within it.<\/p>\n \u2018China keeps its distance from conflicts, but it\u2019s a strategic choice\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n The first striking aspect of China\u2019s foreign policy is its cautious stance toward conflicts beyond its borders. According to the academics, China justifies this approach with its principles of \u201cnon-interference in other countries\u2019 internal affairs\u201d and \u201cnon-involvement in disputes between third parties.\u201d However, I posed a pointed question: \u201cIsn\u2019t the root cause of these wars the power vacuum in the international system? If the U.S. were as strong as it once was, would conflicts like Russia-Ukraine or Palestine-Israel be as widespread? Doesn\u2019t China bear some responsibility for the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world order? If so, how logical is it for China, as a partial architect of this turbulence, to stand on the sidelines?\u201d<\/p>\n One academic responded decisively: \u201cYes, it benefits China. The U.S. is no longer as powerful as it once was and is steadily weakening. Constantly engaged in wars, the U.S. is losing both prestige in the international community and economic ground. This situation works against the U.S. and in China\u2019s favor.\u201d I countered with an objection: \u201cBut doesn\u2019t it seem like China is losing ground too? Russia and Iran paid heavy prices in Syria over the years, yet China couldn\u2019t even economically support Syria\u2019s reconstruction. Had it done so, might the Assad regime have survived? With Russia tied up in Ukraine and Iran clashing with Israel, Assad was left unsupported and fell. Moreover, groups like the Turkistan Islamic Party have gained strength in Syria and may soon have the capacity to establish a state. Can anyone guarantee that these groups won\u2019t one day target China\u2019s Xinjiang region?\u201d<\/p>\n The academic acknowledged my concern: \u201cYes, what you say is partly true. Assad had lost the support of his people, and a leader who loses that support will inevitably fall, one way or another. But for China, the real threat isn\u2019t the jihadist groups themselves\u2014it\u2019s the powers backing them. If China is ever forced to fight\u2014and that would truly be a last resort\u2014it would confront not the terrorist organizations, but the forces behind them. China doesn\u2019t approve of Russia\u2019s approach in Ukraine and is pursuing a different path.\u201d<\/p>\n \u2018Russia made a mistake, China doesn\u2019t favor proxy wars\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n Curious about this \u201cdifferent path,\u201d I pressed further: \u201cWhat do you mean?\u201d The academic\u2019s response was striking: \u201cRussia, with the largest landmass in the world, claimed its goal in Ukraine was to counter groups attempting ethnic cleansing of Russians\u2014which was a legitimate concern. But it did what it swore it wouldn\u2019t: it annexed the territory of a sovereign state. China, on the other hand, hasn\u2019t launched a military operation even in Taiwan, which is internationally recognized as part of our territory. That\u2019s because the people of Taiwan are our people; we seek peaceful reunification, and it will happen eventually. If an operation over Taiwan occurs, it won\u2019t be between China and the island\u2014it will be between China and the powers that support it behind. \u00a0China doesn\u2019t engage in proxy wars.\u201d<\/p>\n This response hinted at a red line in China\u2019s approach to conflicts. \u201cSo, does that mean China will ignore global conflicts until they reach its borders?\u201d I asked. The academic clarified: \u201cNo, of course we\u2019ll raise our voice. We\u2019ll stand against imperialism and with the oppressed. But we won\u2019t be drawn into direct conflict as the U.S. wants. We do not want to jump into the trap that set by the U.S..We\u2019re not ready for that now, but we\u2019re preparing. Look at history: Britain won both world wars but lost all its strength. The U.S., entering both wars late, emerged fresh and energetic, securing victory and becoming the architect of the new world order. China is gathering its energy and strength today. Meanwhile, the U.S. is repeating Britain\u2019s mistake\u2014constantly fighting and wearing itself out.\u201d<\/p>\n \u2018Waiting for the right moment is China\u2019s strategy\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n But isn\u2019t there a limit to this \u201cenergy-gathering\u201d strategy? \u201cWhat happens if you lose all strategic points to the U.S. in the meantime?\u201d I asked. The academic offered a historical perspective: \u201cAs Chinese, we, like the Turks, prefer to move forward with historical references. During international crises, we focus on resolving our internal issues and border disputes\u2014it\u2019s a form of preparation for the larger battle. Take the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, for example. While the world was fixated on the U.S. and the Soviet Union, we settled our issue with India in one month. No one even noticed. Of course, no Chinese can figure out why the India launched a war with China first. Similarly, in 1979, amidst the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Second Oil Crisis, we are forced to start the Counterattack in Self-Defense on the Sino-Vietnamese Border, we entered Vietnam, achieved our goals swiftly, and withdrew. Timing is important for China.\u201d<\/p>\n In short, while its adversaries fight, China builds its strength, preparing to defend itself when the moment is right. So when might that moment come? \u201cAt what point would China shift from rhetoric to action?\u201d I asked. The answer was clear: \u201cMaybe Iran, or maybe the direct attack from U.S.. Iran is so important for the safety of Central Asia and China. We oppose intervention in a sovereign state. Just as the U.S. supported Ukraine against Russia, we would support Iran anyway.\u201d<\/p>\n \u2018Until 2030, a period of conflict and cooperation\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n The academics also shared a long-term vision for China\u2019s relationship with the U.S. \u201cUntil 2030, China will adopt a strategy of engaging the U.S. without entering direct conflict,\u201d they said. They describe this period as one of \u201cconflict and cooperation\u201d, but maybe the most intense and dangerous period compared with the next 10-20 years. The reasoning lies in China\u2019s domestic priorities: \u201cOur western provinces are still underdeveloped. Until China completes its overall development, it won\u2019t risk a direct confrontation. Militarily, we don\u2019t want to be part of a conflict, nor do we think we\u2019re ready for one. But after 2030, the gap between China and the U.S. will be reduced to a large degree and the balance will be in China\u2019s favor. By then, we believe the U.S. won\u2019t dare risk a direct conflict either. If they do venture into such \u2018madness,\u2019 China will be ready.\u201d<\/p>\n \u2018China won\u2019t kneel to Trump\u2019s tariffs\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n When the topic turned to Trump\u2019s tariffs, the academic was resolute: \u201cWe\u2019ll see it through to the end. In 2018, we didn\u2019t immediately retaliate to the U.S.\u2019s tariffs on China, but things are different now. We didn\u2019t start this trade war, and we won\u2019t bow to the U.S.\u201d<\/p>\n Russia-U.S. agreement and new alliances<\/strong><\/p>\n I also asked about the possibility of a Russia-U.S. deal: \u201cIt was said that China and Russia\u2019s partnership had no limits\u2014does that still hold?\u201d The academic replied: \u201cBut there is a bottom line for the relations. China has never seen Russia as an enemy. We understand the security rationale behind its intervention in Ukraine, but we\u2019ve always supported a sovereign state\u2019s territorial integrity. If Russia strikes a deal with the U.S., that\u2019s their choice. According to the official documents, China has no allies. The only ally China has maybe the North Korea because of the Korean War.\u201d<\/p>\n Finally, I touched on recent developments: \u201cLast month, Russia blamed European states for world wars, avoiding mention of the U.S. Trump suggests he could reach an agreement with Russia. Meanwhile, tariffs seem to be bringing China and Europe closer. Just last week, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited China, emphasizing cooperation. Could we see a China-EU alliance pitted against a U.S.-Russia bloc in the near future?\u201d The academic didn\u2019t rule it out: \u201cThere are no eternal friendships or enmities. It\u2019s possible. And with potential land and rail links between China and the EU, the strategic importance of Central Asia and Turkey grows. Turkey\u2019s geopolitical position and ties with Central Asia could make it a key partner for China.\u201d<\/p>\n Conclusion: China\u2019s strategic patience and future plans<\/strong><\/p>\n This interview with Chinese academics reveals Beijing\u2019s patient, strategic, and long-term approach to the turbulence in the international system. By steering clear of conflicts and building its strength, China aims to avoid direct confrontation until 2030, even 2035, 2049 while completing its development. The academics predict that, post-2030, China\u2019s advantage over the U.S. will grow, preparing it for any potential conflict. A critical key country like Iran or a strategic issue like Taiwan could prompt China to act sooner. In the face of Trump\u2019s trade wars, China stands firm: it won\u2019t back down. Meanwhile, emerging partnerships like Russia-U.S. and China-EU, potentially involving Turkey, hint at a global realignment. Time will tell what role China ultimately plays in this chaotic world.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" In recent days, I had the opportunity to set out from Shanghai\u2014one of China\u2019s most vibrant and intellectually rich cities\u2014and revisit Hangzhou and Beijing. These cities are home to China\u2019s most prestigious universities and provide an ideal setting for gauging the pulse of academic circles. With Donald Trump\u2019s re-election in the United States reigniting trade […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13,"featured_media":8869,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[174],"tags":[567,1300,529,319,2014,891,9005,503,288,8842,683,9004,821],"class_list":["post-8868","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-interview","tag-beijing","tag-central-asia","tag-china","tag-donald-trump","tag-eu-commission","tag-europe","tag-hangzhou","tag-headline","tag-iran","tag-proxy-war","tag-russia","tag-shanghai","tag-us"],"yoast_head":"\n