The repercussions of the new global trade war initiated by Donald Trump continue. In early April, he announced “reciprocal tariffs” on countries worldwide, ranging from 10% to as high as 49%. In this scenario, almost all countries would face a 10% tariff when selling goods to America. However, some specific countries, including India, experienced a special tariff shock. While Trump imposed a 34% tariff on China, for example, he announced tariffs exceeding 40%, almost reaching 50%, for some other Asian countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Laos. For India, this tariff was 26%. This means that even New Delhi, which had lowered tariffs on thousands of goods, recommended tariff reductions on half of its $23 billion imports, initiated trade talks, increased imports by $3 billion, and created nearly 500,000 job opportunities with over $40 billion in investment, could not escape the 26% (discounted) Trump tariff.<\/p>\n
Tariffs are taxes imposed by a country on goods imported from another country. Donald Trump believes that American goods are unfairly tariffed by trade partners, which harms American companies. This is why he announced these controversial new tariffs to level the playing field. He escalated the trade war by increasing customs duties on China, which retaliated with a 125% tariff, to 145% (and announced today – April 16 – that he has raised it to 245%), while giving the rest of the world a 90-day pause. Yes, Trump’s trade war is now a duel between America and China. And now, Chinese President Xi Jinping is on a Southeast Asia tour to take measures against Trump’s tariffs. When elephants fight, the grass gets trampled. Yes, I know; the elephant is a favorite metaphor for India, but in this duel, the question is: Will India be the grass? Or, alternatively: Will it be a winner as a major swing country in the duel between these two? Let me state at the outset what I will conclude with: Frankly, this duel between America and China has opened up many possibilities for all swing countries, but New Delhi is one of the biggest and most important of them. Frankly, Delhi seems to be in a more advantageous position against Beijing, its biggest rival in trade. To be a winner, it needs to recommit itself to that Covid-era reform idea.<\/p>\n
While evaluating crises often seems like a facile approach, it is generally a rational strategy in world politics. However, Delhi has not fully capitalized on such opportunities recently. Especially after Covid, many of the promises remained unfulfilled, and there were no tangible results from the proposed agricultural laws and labor codes. For example, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in 2021 that the government would unconditionally transfer all business areas except strategic ones to the private sector, but there has been no mention of any privatization other than the Air India sale, which has been ongoing since 2017. There is still no word on the long-awaited reforms in the country. The Indian government had proposed a new economic agenda around two ideas: Atmanirbhar (self-reliance) and Make in India (domestic production model). Under this economic agenda, large amounts were allocated to production-linked incentives, and ease of doing business was promised. The first was partially implemented because production stagnated. However, some production-linked incentives were received, the most prominent being for iPhones. In the midst of the US-China trade war, this could strengthen New Delhi’s hand. Apple may now start shifting its production from China to India. This is at least a good example of a “plus one” against China. Taiwanese-based Foxconn has already moved some of its factories in China to India and started iPhone production. When it comes to ease of doing business, yes, India’s ranking has risen, but at a snail’s pace.<\/p>\n
At least, given the Trump tariffs, there may be opportunities for New Delhi in American markets where China cannot compete. We mentioned Apple phones as the first example. However, when you look at the list of products Beijing exports to America, it is not difficult to estimate that there will be tens of billions of dollars worth of export possibilities available. The questions are: How quickly can India ramp up new production to turn this duel to its advantage? If customs duties are significantly reduced, is Indian production robust enough to survive? And what does the Indian government plan to do to ensure this? While subsidies are the first thing that comes to mind, they are expensive, and Trump may find them unfair and object. I am quoting the view of the US Trade Representative’s office on this matter verbatim: “India provides a wide range of subsidies and support to the agricultural sector, including credit subsidies, debt waivers, crop insurance, and input subsidies (such as fertilizer, fuel, electricity, and seeds) at both the central government and state government levels. These subsidies, which are a significant cost to the government, reduce the cost of production for India’s producers and have the potential to distort the market where imported products compete.”<\/p>\n
Anyway, America was generally a duty-free economy, which provides Delhi with a $45 billion trade surplus. It is also true that America produces very little that it can export to India. The top two items in the export basket are mineral oils and precious stones. Manufactured goods, machinery and appliances, electrical, and optical equipment have a value of less than $8 billion. In contrast, India exports electrical and pharmaceutical products, which are the top two products on the export list, and the value of these products is more than three times higher, at $26.5 billion. Most of the rest that Delhi buys from America are agricultural products. This is exactly what Trump wants to boost. This directly benefits his farmer base as well. Everything Delhi grows on farms, from walnuts to edible oil, is tariffed at significant rates. Fish, meat, and dairy products are taxed so high that it is almost impossible for America to export them. And this is the only thing America produces in exportable surpluses.<\/p>\n
The trade issue seems to be almost entirely limited to manufacturing and agricultural products, which means that services, which account for about 40% of India’s exports to America, are not included. Since none of them cross the border, they are not subject to customs duties. Somewhere in the article, I said that Delhi, which lowered tariffs on thousands of goods, could not escape the Trump tariff. Agriculture is critical for Trump, and Delhi must have realized that it cannot conduct trade by neglecting agriculture and lowering taxes on machinery, boilers, electronic devices, and precious stones, I think. If you look at the India section in the US Trade Representative’s report on restrictive practices of different countries, you can see that agricultural products are marked as non-tariff barriers. Also, the idea that India is an important partner and that the personal friendship between Modi and Trump will bring a special exemption to Delhi is often thought or repeated; however, looking at Trump’s attitude towards his other allies, I don’t think he thinks that way at all. Trump is playing hardball and is very likely to continue playing hardball. Lowering customs duties on non-agricultural goods was the easy part. However, considering Delhi’s traditional insecurities and protectionism, can India open up to milk and meat imports, for example? Furthermore, is milk and dairy production or meat production self-sufficient? Considering Delhi’s production protectionism and historical hesitations regarding agriculture, its task seems difficult. Perhaps the opportunity for agricultural reforms missed during the Covid crisis deserves a second chance for Delhi, and perhaps this superpower trade war, where its best friend and worst rival are showing their hands, is telling it that now is the perfect time.<\/p>\n
Rhetoric such as being the fastest-growing major economy or the fifth largest and soon to be third, surpassing Japan and Germany, and the discourse of a manufacturing revolution that has been said to be coming for the last decade but has not yet materialized – or even gone backward – is certainly noteworthy. However, New Delhi, which seems to have moved away from the hard-won economic freedoms of the early 90s, appears to have returned to the belief that growth can be achieved through top-down methods. Higher tariffs have been seen returning in the last decade. You might be buying the world’s most expensive steel from India, for example. In the late 90s, the finance minister of the time said he had brought tariffs down to almost ASEAN levels. Increasingly powerful oligarchs are dividing market share and sectors. Does it work? Is the idea that state patronage will lead India to a manufacturing and export utopia coming to fruition? Take a look at government data: Despite the Make in India domestic production model, where Delhi invested over $26 billion in strategically important sectors to benefit from the exodus from China, the share of manufacturing in the Indian economy has declined compared to the service and agricultural sectors. Or, after the 10-year period of the Make in India initiative, you see that the share of manufacturing in India’s GDP in 2023-24 is exactly the same as in 2013-14: 17.3%. And it tends to be even lower this year. The contribution of manufacturing to job creation was slightly lower in 2022-23 compared to 2013-14; it was 10.6% in 2022-23 while it was 11.6% in 2013-14. Furthermore, while the real success in smartphone production may deserve celebration, the share of exports in its GDP has fallen from 25% in 2013-14 to 22.7% currently. Consequently, the growth rate of Delhi’s share in global exports has also slowed down.<\/p>\n
Praveen Khandelwal, a Delhi-based businessman and ruling party member of parliament known for his lobbying activities, may be saying that the high tariff imposed on imports from China to America presents a significant opportunity for India’s trade and industry, and that they want to use this advantage against Beijing in most sectors, including electronics, auto parts, textiles, and chemicals. However, Delhi is dependent on Beijing for parts and equipment, lacks skilled labor, and incentive programs are also insufficient in many sectors where Delhi is competing with Beijing. The Chinese economy, which is five times larger than the Indian economy, is still a formidable competitor. In India’s case, Trump’s tariffs could be softened, or perhaps even completely removed (?); but in return, Delhi may need to offer more than the “tiny concessions” I mentioned in a previous article. It is clear that America expects more than “tiny gains.” While other countries that experienced a special tariff shock are trying to enter into negotiations for reciprocal tariff reductions during the 90-day grace period, New Delhi has already been at the negotiating table with America for some time, but this time Trump is a tough friend. The scale of Indian strategic vulnerability will be revealed by time.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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