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<\/p>\nAlexander Rahr is one of Germany’s leading foreign policy experts. He worked at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) for twenty years, where he held managerial positions and played significant roles in shaping German foreign policy. Specializing particularly in German-Russian relations, Rahr is known for his work on Eastern European policies. His analyses, which bring intellectual depth to politics, have earned him respect in both academic and decision-making circles. Rahr, a recipient of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, has also drawn the German public’s attention to the Eurasian region with his perspectives on the area. We conducted an exclusive interview with Alexander Rahr at his home in Berlin. We asked him about the new federal government in Germany and the prominent issues.<\/p>\n
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Q:<\/em><\/strong> What will be the biggest challenges and tests for the new government?<\/em><\/p>\n A:<\/strong> The biggest challenge, to put it simply, will be to present a different image from the traffic light coalition [traffic light coalition, referring to the previous SPD-Greens-FDP government] and not to be internally divided like them. That in itself is already a difficult task. And I am sure that the first major dispute will erupt over the issue of migration in the summer months. Especially if the CDU, along with Interior Minister Dobrindt, is serious about closing borders and deporting people. In that case, the danger of the coalition collapsing would immediately arise, because the SPD would oppose it. I believe such disagreements will also occur in defense and militarization policies. Individuals within the SPD who come from the peace movement will oppose such extensive armament. In short, it would surprise me if this government lasts 4 years.<\/p>\n The German economy cannot be fixed by \u2018militarizing\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n Q: <\/em><\/strong>Germany has been in a recession for some time. In this context, I’d like to ask: With the new government, is the aim to stimulate the economy by prioritizing military spending, in other words, to achieve economic dynamism through a kind of militarization? Is this possible? Because this seems like a transformation. Germany is no longer the leader in the automotive sector as it once was. Could it now be seeking to fill this gap with the defense industry?<\/em><\/p>\n A:<\/strong> Yes, this is the plan of the Merz government [referring to a hypothetical future government led by Friedrich Merz of the CDU] and the elites. This situation quite surprises me, because I don’t recognize such a Germany. But when I read Spiegel and other news sources, I come across things that confirm what you’re saying. German economic circles, especially the government and parties, believe that an arms race\u2014which is the policy Reagan pursued 40 years ago of \u201cexhausting the Russians through an arms race\u201d\u2014will lead to a major economic breakthrough. They think that large-scale European armament will bring new orders, new companies will be established, new financial resources will be created, and most importantly, Europe will thereby strengthen, intimidate others, and gain more influence in the world.<\/p>\n This is a rather traditional perspective. However, it is very dangerous and ignores certain realities. This viewpoint completely underestimates the Russian economy; because it is still believed that Russia can be defeated with sanctions, but this will not happen. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that the response to large-scale militarization by Germany or Europe will be for the rest of the world\u2014China, for example\u2014to start arming itself. China will no longer be so peaceful. Other countries seeing Europe arm itself will initially think it’s against Russia, but then they will realize it could also be against China and other countries, and they will prepare themselves accordingly. This is not a good development for the global economy. On the contrary, it could lead to the formation of new blocs in the world and the end of globalization.<\/p>\n When we look at Germany’s internal dynamics, I think there’s a great deal of living in a fantasy world here too. Because Germany’s biggest problems are neither in Russia nor in the Ukraine crisis; they are not externally sourced. Germany’s real problem\u2014which experts have been pointing out for years\u2014is deindustrialization. This process is quite advanced. For Germany to become a strong industrial country again, it needs to regain its potential, but not through armament. We need to produce things that people genuinely need and rebuild the infrastructure. Bridges are crumbling, roads are deteriorating, railways aren’t working, airports aren’t functioning properly. All of this cannot be fixed with a defense industry. We are no longer living in the 1930s.<\/p>\n The government will make major cuts in social spending<\/strong><\/p>\n Secondly, the largest item in Germany’s state budget is social spending. 43% of the German budget is allocated to social payments such as pensions for retirees\u2014whose numbers are increasing\u2014the long-term unemployed, students, and special pension rights for mothers. So, social spending in Germany is extremely high. You cannot simultaneously try to rapidly expand the defense industry, make Europe the world’s strongest military power, and maintain these social budgets and the social safety net at the same level. They will have to make cuts. And it is precisely at this point that we will reach the limits of society’s tolerance. Of course, it’s not possible to borrow indefinitely. The money allocated to armament will not generate enough tax revenue to cover the deficits in social spending. This means that there will be cuts in social benefits, or people in Germany\u2014especially retirees\u2014will have to forgo many things they are accustomed to in the coming years.<\/p>\n Borrowing currently seems attractive to the incumbent governments in Europe and America. But they forget that they have to pay substantial interest. This money is not earned; it is borrowed, and high interest must be paid on it. This interest can only be covered by income generated by the economy. And a large part of this income will be spent just to pay this interest. Consequently, this trajectory could lead to a major social crisis in Germany. Germany has not experienced large-scale mass protests in the last 30 years. The German people have always been a satiated, or at least relatively satiated, populace. Here, compared to some European countries, no one is hungry. But let me say this: if care is not taken, this situation can change rapidly within a few years. If Germany does not reorient itself towards the \u201csocial\u201d priorities that formed the basis of the social market economy in the past, and instead focuses solely on armament, then the problems we will face will become clearly apparent.<\/p>\n The AfD could be banned by the current establishment parties<\/strong><\/p>\n Q: <\/em><\/strong>I’d like to come to the topic of the AfD\u2026 In your opinion, is it still possible for this party to be banned in the future, or will the German elites or the system try to integrate the AfD? Could the party eventually be drawn into the system and perhaps become a governing partner with the CDU? What would need to happen for this? For example, scenarios such as the party splitting by dissociating from figures like Bj\u00f6rn H\u00f6cke and adopting a more \u201cconformist\u201d line are being discussed. What are your thoughts on this?<\/em><\/p>\n A:<\/strong> I can offer you three possible scenarios on this matter. First scenario: Politics continues with a \u201cmuddling through\u201d approach. Meaning, problems are patched up with temporary solutions, some things are attempted to be fixed, but they break down again after a while. Managing the situation this way can be sustained for a few more years as long as the money lasts and the public tolerates it. But at some point, this scenario will become unsustainable.<\/p>\n Second scenario: The \u201cBrandmauer\u201d [firewall, meaning a strict refusal to cooperate with the AfD] collapses, and the CDU is forced to enter into a coalition with the AfD. This could happen particularly at the state level. Furthermore, I think a formation like Sahra Wagenknecht’s party could re-emerge, strengthening particularly in East Germany. Even if this doesn’t happen, another similar left-leaning party could emerge. This could also be an answer to your question about whether the AfD will split: the AfD won’t split, but a different party might be born. This new party could, under certain conditions, become a coalition partner with the AfD in states like Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt, or Saxony. If this model works, similar developments could occur in other states. This is a very plausible development scenario for Germany within the next 20 years.<\/p>\n The third scenario is this: The AfD could be banned by the current establishment parties or elites. I think such a culture of prohibition is quite possible in Germany; serious fear can be instilled in the public through the fear of Russia or the threat of fascism. German society, due to its historical past, is very sensitive to such fears and could support such a ban. However, other countries will not approach this situation in the same way. If Germany moves towards such a policy of prohibition, it could lose its leadership position in Europe. Because I don’t think other European countries will follow the same path.<\/p>\n German politics awaits a post-Trump US<\/strong><\/p>\n Q: <\/em><\/strong>What will German foreign policy be like in the new era? Relations with the US and Germany’s role within Europe are among the most keenly anticipated and debated topics.<\/em><\/p>\n A:<\/strong> German foreign policy is still in an impasse, and the new government doesn’t have much time to decide what to do. With Merz, the world not only gains a new German chancellor, but Europe also gains a new leader. Although this may seem like a somewhat arrogant approach from Germany’s perspective, it is perceived and expressed similarly in other European countries. Hopes are pinned on Germany. To put it simply, steps such as the European Union’s future militarization plans, internal reforms, and gradual disengagement from America can only happen under German leadership.<\/p>\n The UK is no longer in the European Union and does not have the massive budget that Germany will have if it abandons its debt brake [a fiscal rule limiting structural government deficits] in the coming years. France, on the other hand, is in economic decline. Therefore, the burden of European leadership rests on Germany’s shoulders, and Europe must now redefine its own direction. This is now Merz’s responsibility. The real question is: To what extent will he and his new team be able to achieve this? Personally, I have my doubts, but objectively speaking, it is clear that Merz needs to set a direction in three fundamental areas.<\/p>\n The first goal is to completely redefine Germany’s relationship with America. However, this is not as easy as it sounds. For decades, Germany focused more on transatlantic thought\u2014that is, an America-centric approach\u2014than on Europe. Breaking away from America in cultural, civilizational, military, and economic contexts is almost impossible. However, if Europe wants to establish a more autonomous structure and realize the currently targeted vision of becoming a great power, it must do so. Meaning, Europe should become an independent great power alongside America, not subordinate to it. But this will not be easy, as resources may not be sufficient for this goal.<\/p>\n Ideologically, Germany is not ready for this either. When talking about reshaping the transatlantic relationship, it is necessary to emphasize this fact: Germany neither wants to nor can it distance itself from America. Because at the level of civilization, culture, politics, military and security policies\u2014and even historically\u2014it is completely intertwined with America. A large part of the elites in Germany were educated in America; they studied at American universities. Therefore, the prevailing approach in German politics is the expectation that Trump will fail within two years, Democrats will gain a majority in Congress, then two years later Trump will lose power, and a young Biden or a new Obama-like Democratic leader will replace him. This leader will then continue the transatlantic relationship that has existed since 1945. In fact, Germany’s hope and strategy is to invest in this scenario.<\/p>\n That’s why I say Germany’s strategy is contradictory: on the one hand, it aims to be more autonomous, but on the other, it is psychologically unprepared for it. Germany is still waiting, hoping to endure for another two years for Trump to leave the stage, and then hoping everything will return to how it was. Because Germany’s desire is to return to the old \u201cnormal,\u201d the old status quo. In reality, Germany is not at all ready to assume a leadership role in Europe. Indeed, the main question is: Will Europe accept this new leadership claim by Germany under Merz? I am quite skeptical about this. The German or European elites have a desire for European leadership under Merz, but this desire may not be realistic.<\/p>\n The second major problem is Russia. Decisive decisions need to be made on this issue now, but the decisions currently being made are heading in completely the wrong direction. Everything is moving towards the possibility of a war with Russia. Here too, Germans and Europeans are largely living in a fantasy world. They believe they have always won for the last 35 years, that Europe is still strong, and that they can defeat Russia. However, I approach this with skepticism. Because Russia is still a great power and is on its way to becoming a great power again. In my opinion, Germany’s policy should not be directed towards such radical militarization, and it should not spend 500 billion euros on defense. Of course, deterrence can be relied upon, that is true. But at the same time\u2014and this is completely lacking\u2014diplomacy must be pursued, one must sit down with Russia at the table, and a compromise must be sought through negotiation. I believe this: A Europe positioned against Russia will never be stable. This should be the fundamental principle. We need a Europe that includes Russia. Constant conflict with Russia further weakens Europe; it divides Europe, just as it did during the Cold War. We need to see this.<\/p>\n The third decisive issue\u2014after the US and Russia\u2014is Germany’s relations with other states, especially with the Global South in general. Germany wants to redefine its foreign policy in this area. However, this will be very difficult as long as Germany only talks about \u201cvalue-oriented foreign policy\u201d and does not approach the world with a realistic, realpolitik perspective. The Global South, in particular, sides more with Russia than with Europe. At the same time, these countries are striving to form their own power bases and alliances against the West and America. New Eurasian-centered alliances are emerging before our eyes between Russia and China, and Russia and India. Central Asian countries are integrating into Russia’s security pact on the one hand, and China’s \u201cNew Silk Road\u201d [Belt and Road Initiative] strategy on the other.<\/p>\n Yes, I believe the German federal government is not in a good position regarding these three main problems, because it has not yet fully grasped these realities. Germans and German politics are still in the euphoria of the victories of the last 35 years, believing that Europe has always won, is morally superior to others, that value-oriented foreign policy must necessarily apply to other countries and continents, and ultimately that America\u2014especially Trump\u2014will be ideologically defeated and everything will return to how it was. But things will not develop this way.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Alexander Rahr is one of Germany’s leading foreign policy experts. He worked at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) for twenty years, where he held managerial positions and played significant roles in shaping German foreign policy. Specializing particularly in German-Russian relations, Rahr is known for his work on Eastern European policies. His analyses, which […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":9360,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[174],"tags":[1483,9154,2314,319,2320,543,503,683,1886,822,1192],"class_list":["post-9359","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-interview","tag-afd","tag-alexander-rahr","tag-cdu","tag-donald-trump","tag-friedrich-merz","tag-germany","tag-headline","tag-russia","tag-spd","tag-ukraine","tag-united-states"],"yoast_head":"\n