Opinion
Cold winds in the Modi-Trump friendship
When Trump was sworn in for his second presidency in January, India was leading the pack among countries with the most positive expectations for its relationship with America. However, that doesn’t seem to be the case. It’s true that there has always been an air of optimism in the relationship between the two countries. And frankly, this optimism is fueled by a high level of bipartisan consensus in Washington on deepening bilateral ties. Even more visibly, there’s the belief that Modi and Trump share compatible worldviews. Both are strong populist leaders who view China and radical Islam as existential threats. And both are, at their core, economic nationalists. Moreover, India is in a unique position: it is neither an ally nor an adversary of America. Consequently, it wasn’t subjected to Trump’s wrath like others were.
However, Trump, who is now trying to broker another ceasefire in Ukraine, is leveling harsh threats against India over its trade with Russia. He said that because Delhi’s “massive” oil purchases are financing the “Russian War Machine,” it would face tariffs far heavier than the 25% imposed last week.
Historically, India purchased most of its oil from the Middle East, including Iraq and Saudi Arabia. But things changed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. India, the world’s third-largest crude oil importer after China and the US, began to snap up Russian oil, which was being sold at discounted prices following its shunning by some in the West. Before the war in Ukraine, Russia accounted for only 0.2% of India’s oil imports, but it has since become its largest supplier, providing a share of between 35% and 40%. In July alone, Moscow supplied 36% of the crude oil imported by India, which is then refined into fuels like gasoline and diesel.
And yes, amidst all the sanctions, New Delhi remains one of the leading buyers of Russian crude, and over 50% of India’s active military platforms are of Russian origin. And yes, what’s even more ironic is that amidst the war and sanctions, Delhi, which buys Russian oil on the cheap, is exporting it at a profitable price to Europe—the very continent that cannot buy it due to Trump’s sanctions.
As Trump said, again in a social media post, he accused India of buying “large quantities” of oil from Russia and then “selling it on the Open Market for big profits.” He added, “They don’t care how many people the ‘Russian War Machine’ is killing in Ukraine…”
Furthermore, there is the threat of a 200% tariff on pharmaceutical imports, which is significant for India as a leading supplier of generic drugs to the US, and a 10% tariff on BRICS member countries for pursuing “anti-American” policies. Washington also announced that it has imposed sanctions on some Indian entities and individuals for trading with Iran.
IN SHORT, the developments of the last week or two, in particular, both show how sentimental Delhi’s expectations for the bilateral relationship were and call the Modi-Trump friendship into question. It seems that this time, Trump has started to brandish a bigger stick. And remember, while threatening to impose 25% tariffs on India, he used some harsh and mocking language that did not sit well with Delhi at all: he described India as a “dead economy,” for example. And he portrayed it as a country that does “very little business” with the US and has the “heaviest and most egregious non-monetary Trade Barriers of any country.” This could just be a bluff aimed at securing a profitable deal for America in the midst of trade negotiations, given that Trump’s style of address is now well-known. Or it could be a warning to India.
Frankly, the “reciprocal” tariffs Trump announced in April had given rise to cautious optimism in Delhi, with the belief that they would allow for some trade diversion from China and other countries whose supply chains are heavily exposed to China, especially in South and Southeast Asia. India’s Commerce Minister, Piyush Goyal, for instance, had described Trump’s tariffs as a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.” Corroborating this view, Apple announced it was shifting its iPhone production for the American market from China to India.
Amid expectations that India would be one of the first countries to sign a trade deal with America, Delhi maintained its positive attitude. So much so that some circles in Delhi even held the view that Trump’s tariffs could be a “blessing in disguise,” acting as a catalyst to accelerate India’s much-needed economic reform agenda. Let me add a similar note here from Indian history by pointing out that previous external shocks, from the 1991 balance of payments crisis to the economic sanctions following its 1998 nuclear tests, had triggered the country’s first generation of reforms.
Now, the mood seems to have shifted. Cold winds are blowing in the Modi-Trump friendship and/or India-America relations. In fact, the mood had already changed with Trump’s stance on the recent India-Pakistan conflicts. Although Delhi denied it, Trump’s claim in May to have mediated a ceasefire between the two countries, coupled with his efforts to deepen relations with Pakistan by hosting Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir at the White House in June and making resource and cryptocurrency deals with Islamabad, had triggered the chill between Delhi and Washington. The fact that Trump announced a trade deal with Pakistan on the same day he announced tariffs on India was the salt in the wound.
Trump may appear to have reversed the US’s more conciliatory approach towards China from his first term, but Delhi now fears that Washington might seek a “deal” with China. Let me say this very clearly: despite the deepening India-America relations, or no matter how deep they become, there is always a fear of strategic abandonment in both countries. However, let me also state clearly that Trump’s recent outbursts will not change the overall trajectory of the bilateral relationship. In other words, the relationship will continue with two steps back for every one step forward. Or we could call it a “cautious embrace.” But on Delhi’s side, the inclination for this has undoubtedly diminished. Even if a trade deal is reached, Delhi’s deep-seated, long-standing mistrust of America has once again been reinforced.
However, it should not be overlooked that India also maintains extremely close, friendly, and strategic relationships with countries with which America and the West have a difficult history, including Russia and Iran. And America may have started to question why it has done so much for Delhi; recall the civil nuclear deal or the support for India’s G20 presidency or its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council—recall all of it. Trump may now be trying to tell Delhi, “Your free pass is expiring; it’s time to fall in line.” In other words, as I said at the beginning, he is starting to wield the stick more forcefully. Trump has likely had his fill of India’s “strategic autonomy” mantra [a core principle of Indian foreign policy], or is about to. Of course, Delhi is aware of this, which has led to discussions about the revival of the long-dormant RIC (Russia-India-China) trilateral and Modi’s probable attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in China this month. If Delhi realizes that its relationship with America is not as special as it perceived, the cold winds in bilateral relations could blow even stronger.
The Modi administration, currently engaged in tough negotiations with Trump’s team for a trade deal that balances India’s protectionist system with opening its market to more American goods, is thoroughly displeased with Trump’s statements. It is also uneasy about reports that India is willing to open up to some American agricultural products, a politically sensitive issue for Modi, who faced a year-long farmers’ protest a few years ago.
Considering Modi’s carefully crafted strongman reputation, many expected India to react harshly to Trump’s tariff threats…
The main opposition, Congress, for example, sharply criticized the government: “Trump is talking nonsense against India and Modi is listening silently,” it said, asking, “Why is Modi so afraid of Trump?” in a Hindi post on the party’s social media platform. Another Congress post stated, “Tariffs are being imposed. Negotiations are going nowhere. But Asim Munir, the man behind the Pahalgam terror attacks, is having lunch at the White House… This is what happens when foreign policy focuses on image-building instead of national interests.” Jairam Ramesh, Congress General Secretary in charge of Communications, mocked the BJP’s past slogans and diplomacy, saying the US’s actions exposed the failure of an image-driven foreign policy.
However, a very cautious response came from India’s Commerce Minister, Piyush Goyal, who said the two countries were working towards a “fair, balanced, and mutually beneficial bilateral trade agreement.” India’s Ministry of External Affairs also stated in response that it would take all necessary steps to protect and promote national interests and that the effects of the tariffs were being examined.
The view that Trump’s words are purely a pressure tactic is likely being taken into account… Trump is trying to play hardball in the negotiations… This is the general conclusion reached in Delhi circles.
Meanwhile, five rounds of negotiations have been held between the two countries so far. For the next round of talks, a US delegation will arrive in India on August 25. The talks will continue until August 29.
Ashok Malik, a former policy advisor to India’s Ministry of External Affairs, had said, “This is a testing period for the relationship”; we will see how the duo fares in this test. If you ask me, I am neither too optimistic nor too pessimistic. It may sound like a very political answer, but that is the political nature of this duo’s relationship; the “cautious embrace” continues… However, India has already begun to question the value of its strategic cooperation with Washington. Many in New Delhi are asking why Washington is deepening ties with Pakistan, a country that actively undermines India’s security, especially after decades of meticulous work to build the India-US relationship. Although some are drawing hopeful conclusions from this, especially in the context of the RIC trilateral, do not forget that India has a sensitive and risky relationship with China. And the primary rationale for the closer India-US relationship was simple: India is the only democratic power in Asia with the capacity to balance China’s growing assertiveness. Frankly, this rationale is still valid, and the need is becoming more urgent by the day. Washington cannot afford to alienate its reliable—and, until now, coddled for this very reason—partner in Asia.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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