Opinion
Reviewing the Halfway Progress of the Trump Administration’s Trade War
On July 31, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung confirmed that a trade agreement had been reached with the United States. U.S. tariffs on Korean automobiles will be reduced to 15%, and Korea will not further open its rice and beef markets to the U.S., but it has pledged to invest $350 billion in U.S.-controlled investment projects.
On the same day, the Trump administration agreed to extend the tariff agreement with Mexico for 90 days. Meanwhile, it threatened to impose a 25% tariff on India starting August 1 and announced it would not extend the final deadline for negotiations with other trade partners. Although the U.S. has not yet reached new agreements with major trading partners such as Mexico, Canada, India, and China, the trade war—considered epic in scale—can be said to be halfway through, with the Trump administration appearing to have won a superficial victory. However, there remain many uncertainties in the subsequent implementation.
Three rounds of the China-U.S. trade war have concluded without a final solution. On July 29, China and the U.S. concluded their third round of talks in Sweden. China’s Ministry of Commerce representative and Vice Minister Li Chenggang announced that, after a day and a half of negotiations, the trade teams from both countries had in-depth, candid, and constructive exchanges on major issues of mutual concern, based on the consensus reached during the June 5 call between the two heads of state. Li also emphasized that both sides would continue to promote the timely extension of the mutually suspended 24% tariffs and China’s countermeasures. The China-U.S. economic and trade teams will maintain close communication to promptly exchange views on trade issues and continue to promote stable and healthy development of bilateral trade relations.
On May 12, China and the U.S. held the first round of talks in Geneva and achieved a major initial result of “mutual tariff cancellation”: the U.S. promised to cancel 91% of the tariffs imposed under two executive orders on April 8 and 9; China reciprocated with a 91% cancellation; both sides agreed to suspend the 24% tariff for 90 days, retaining only 10% tariffs. This result provided a much-needed cooling down of the China-U.S. trade war that had flared up when Trump returned to office.
On June 12, the two sides completed the second round of talks in London, but no specific content was disclosed. The media only emphasized that the two sides had reached a consensus in principle on measures to implement the consensus of the leaders’ phone call and consolidate the results of the Geneva trade talks. The third round of talks held in Stockholm also did not yield any substantive breakthroughs, and both sides remain in a stage of bargaining and haggling.
While China-U.S. trade negotiations are moving forward with difficulty, the Trump administration has successfully broken through three major trade negotiation barriers within ten days, particularly reaching agreements with the EU and Japan, which can be considered symbolic victories. This has also created new pressure for China and other trading partners who have yet to compromise.
On July 28, the U.S. and the EU announced a comprehensive new trade agreement with a baseline tariff rate of 15%, covering key goods such as automobiles, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals. The EU pledged to purchase $750 billion worth of energy products from the U.S. and added a $600 billion investment plan. This agreement marks a major compromise from the EU.
Previously, on July 23, the U.S. had reached a similar agreement with Japan, stipulating a uniform 15% tariff on most Japanese goods exported to the U.S., and Japan committed to a $550 billion investment in the U.S.
Although the U.S.-EU and U.S.-Japan tariff battles appear to involve mutual compromise, the U.S. has clearly benefited. For the EU, the 15% rate is significantly higher than the previous average of 4.8%, but lower than the punitive 30% the U.S. had threatened or the briefly implemented 20% rate. This “comprehensive uniform tariff” applies to most EU-manufactured goods, including automobiles that previously faced tariffs as high as 27.5%. For key sectors like pharmaceuticals, the U.S. also agreed to rates below 15% and retained the option for future interventions.
For Japan, although the 15% baseline tariff rate is slightly higher than the previously briefly implemented 10%, it is far lower than the 25% proposed by the U.S. before July. This tariff rate stabilizes Japan’s core automobile industry, which accounts for about one-fourth of its exports to the U.S., and has strategic significance for consolidating Japan’s manufacturing, especially the production and export of automobiles and auto parts.
The U.S. has obtained massive import or investment commitments from Europe and Japan. The EU has pledged to purchase over $750 billion in energy products from the U.S. in the coming years, mainly including liquefied natural gas, oil, and nuclear fuel. In addition, the EU has committed to an extra $600 billion investment in the U.S., covering infrastructure, energy system integration, and key industrial chain restructuring. Notably, the EU will also expand its military procurement from the U.S.
Japan has committed to a $550 billion investment plan in the U.S., covering sectors such as manufacturing, automotive supply chain expansion, infrastructure, and high-tech cooperation. In the automobile sector, Japan is accelerating localized production capacity in the U.S. to stabilize its strategic access to the American market.
The U.S. has further opened up the European and Japanese markets. Although the U.S.-EU agreement establishes a unified baseline tariff rate, several “zero-for-zero” exception lists were set, including aircraft and parts, semiconductor equipment, key raw materials, certain agricultural products, and specific chemicals.
Japan will also further open its market, especially for U.S. automobiles, rice, and certain agricultural products. This move responds to Trump’s longstanding complaint that “American products can’t enter the Japanese market.” Although Japan has not reduced tariffs on U.S. goods in this round of negotiations, by adjusting non-tariff barriers and loosening import quotas, it has in effect provided greater market access for U.S. goods. At the same time, Japan has retained regulatory authority over sensitive domestic industries, seeking policy flexibility within its concessions.
In 2024, the top ten U.S. trade partners by total trade volume are: Mexico, Canada, China, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (China), Vietnam, the United Kingdom, and India. Before securing Japan, the EU, and South Korea, the U.S. had already handled the UK, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Considering that EU members such as the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Italy, and France are the 11th to 15th U.S. trade partners, the Trump administration’s trade war has already conquered half the battlefield. Only four tough “bones” remain: Mexico, Canada, India, and China.
Some therefore judge that “Trump has won big,” especially with his trade victories over the EU and Japan. However, legally speaking, the U.S.-EU trade agreement still needs approval from the legislative bodies of the 27 EU member states. So whether this agreement can allow the Trump administration to laugh to the end is still uncertain.
First, almost the entire political and public sphere in Europe is criticizing the new U.S.-EU agreement, especially in France and Germany. French Prime Minister Bérou called the 27th a “dark day” for Europe; far-right leader Le Pen said the EU had suffered a “political, economic, and moral defeat,” signing a “surrender document”; far-left leader Mélenchon called it a “total concession to Trump”; former PM de Villepin said the agreement was “unequal” and likened it to “tribute.” French officials in charge of industry and trade called the trade “unbalanced” and demanded a new round of negotiations. Germany’s Export Association said the deal poses a “survival threat” to many German traders; the Federation of German Industries criticized the EU for making “asymmetrical compromises.”
In addition, the Swedish finance minister accused the new U.S.-EU agreement of harming Sweden’s economy. Spain’s El País said the agreement reinforced U.S.-EU tariff inequality. Hungarian PM Orbán even mocked that Trump “ate EU Commission President von der Leyen for breakfast.” The European Parliament’s trade committee chair Bernd Lange slammed the deal as a “biased” transaction…
On the 28th, the European Commission issued a document stressing that the “handshake deal” between Trump and von der Leyen has no legal effect. The U.S. and EU have not finalized a formal agreement, especially around key points of divergence such as food standards, digital regulations, energy, investment, and steel and aluminum tariffs.
Although the opposition in Japan is not as fierce as in Europe, public opinion has still criticized the Ishiba government for sacrificing the rice bowl to protect the car wheel. Most benefits from the investment in the U.S. are seen to favor the American side. The latest poll by Kyodo News shows that about 78% of the public is dissatisfied with the agreement, with only 11% expressing support. Analysts believe the new U.S.-Japan agreement not only damages Ishiba’s political prestige and the LDP’s ruling foundation but also reminds Japanese society of the long nightmare triggered by the signing of the U.S.-Japan “Plaza Accord”—namely, Japan’s lost decade of growth.
Secondly, the implementation of U.S. terms may also be constrained by domestic political and legal challenges. The U.S. Federal Court of Appeals is about to hear a lawsuit concerning the legality of Trump’s taxation powers, and its ruling may shake the legal foundation of Trump’s foreign trade agreements. The U.S.-EU agreement fails to clarify the tariff treatment of American goods exported to Europe, showing that serious asymmetry still exists. The U.S.-Japan agreement has left the American auto industry dissatisfied, believing that it has not substantially improved the U.S. trade deficit with Japan, and the long-standing structural industrial contradictions between the U.S. and Japan remain unresolved.
Thirdly, although Europe and Japan have increased their investment in the U.S., reshoring of U.S. manufacturing faces structural bottlenecks. The Trump administration is vigorously promoting direct investment in the U.S. by Europe, Japan, and other allies—especially in key sectors like semiconductors, automobiles, batteries, and clean energy—to accelerate manufacturing reshoring and restructure the supply chain. However, in practical terms, this strategy faces structural bottlenecks in many aspects such as talent, culture, and regulatory systems, making it difficult to absorb the systemic costs of converting investments in the short term. The most fundamental constraint is the severe shortage of skilled labor in U.S. manufacturing. The gap in engineers and technicians directly limits the implementation of production lines. Cultural differences further intensify friction. The highly efficient execution systems of multinational companies are not suited to the loosely decentralized American management style, creating structural bottlenecks from construction to operation and weakening overall investment returns.
In summary, countries such as Canada, Mexico, and India will face increasing pressure from the U.S. and be forced to fight alone in confronting America’s all-around hegemonic coercion. The outlook for China-U.S. trade negotiations is also not optimistic and is bound to face difficulties arising from the U.S. shift from “comprehensive attack” to “focused attack,” including the Trump administration’s return to the full-pressure tactics of its version 1.0 era.
This week, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) plans to issue a travel health advisory to China due to a rise in “chikungunya virus cases” in China. At the same time, the Republican-controlled U.S. House and Senate announced that a congressional delegation would visit Taiwan in August. This comes right after the Trump administration refused the Taiwan regional leader’s transit passage, a maneuver reflecting both duplicity and inconsistency in U.S. Taiwan policy. It also sends an implicit warning to China: if it doesn’t make concessions at the trade negotiating table, the U.S. will open its geopolitical “Pandora’s box” and unleash a full array of tactics to disrupt China.
From a global and strategic perspective, China-U.S. relations—especially trade relations—are “too big to fail” and serve as the core links of the global industrial, trade, and value chains. China-U.S. trade volume is enormous, with high interdependence, strong economic complementarity, and significant structural differences. With many friction points, deep policy gaps, and strong competitiveness, the China-U.S. trade negotiations are bound to become the biggest, most difficult, and ultimately decisive battleground.
China remains the largest source of goods for the U.S., the biggest market for multinational investment and profits, and the largest consumer market for agricultural products. China not only possesses a vast domestic circulation market, but also retains tremendous external circulation potential. It also has multiple leverage points in its games with the U.S., Europe, and Japan. As the Trump administration secures agreements with other trade partners, it is likely to gain confidence and raise its demands, even using trade negotiations and geopolitical tools alternately or simultaneously to pressure China into making major concessions.
Given these trends, China must maintain strategic clarity, confidence, composure, endurance, and resilience. It must engage with the Trump administration using great wisdom, flexible strategies, and a combination of tactics—negotiating persistently, fighting without breaking ties—in order to ultimately defeat the Trump administration’s blind self-confidence, empty rhetoric, and excessive demands, and force it to recognize reality and accept a relatively fair and balanced bilateral trade agreement, achieving a truly win-win China-U.S. outcome.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
A voice rising from New Delhi: BRICS’s manifesto for a new world order
The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in the Indian capital of New Delhi on May 15, 2026, carries a significance that extends far beyond the confines of routine diplomacy. This gathering culminated in the signing of one of the most comprehensive political documents to date, outlining the vision of the world order that BRICS envisions for 2026. Reading between the lines, the document reveals not merely the proceedings of a ministerial summit, but the contours of a comprehensive alternative vision challenging the Western-centric international system. Indeed, this text must be read as a political manifesto of the shifting balances of power, the accelerating global struggle for influence, and the emerging new world order of recent years.
The overarching theme dominating the entire document is “The Rise of the Global South.” BRICS members contend that the current international order is unjust, insufficiently representative, and fails to reflect the interests of developing nations. Consequently, they emphasize the urgent need to restructure foundational institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, BRICS now positions itself as the voice of the non-Western world. Today, the global arena is traversing an era in which the post-World War II international system has plunged into a profound crisis of legitimacy and representation. Developments such as the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, the Gaza crisis, global trade wars, the weaponization of sanctions, energy security challenges, and technological competition demonstrate that the current system struggles to mirror contemporary global realities. It is precisely from this premise that the BRICS nations operate, sending a clear message to the world through the New Delhi Outcome Document: “The status quo is no longer sustainable.”
One of the most striking aspects of the document is how clearly it demonstrates that BRICS no longer views itself as a mere platform for economic cooperation. Having long focused primarily on economic development, trade, and finance since its inception, BRICS has now reached a far more ambitious posture. In the New Delhi Outcome Document, issues of security, geopolitical crises, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate policies, energy transition, and international governance reforms occupy a place as central as economics. This indicates that BRICS’s ambition to become a foundational actor in global politics is steadily gaining traction. Reading between the lines, the strongest emphasis emerges on the concept of a “multipolar world.” The core approach of BRICS is animated by the premise that the Western-centric, largely US-led international order, which took shape over the decades following the end of the Cold War, is no longer the sole alternative. Throughout the declaration, the repeated use of phrases like “more just,” “more representative,” “more democratic,” and “more inclusive” international system constitutes a direct critique of the current distribution of global power.
The sections concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council are particularly critical. Indeed, the call for UN reform stands out as one of the most pivotal political segments of the document. BRICS nations explicitly state that the current structure fails to reflect contemporary realities. They contend that Africa, Latin America, and emerging Asian powers are underrepresented in decision-making mechanisms. What is even more remarkable is that China and Russia have reaffirmed their support for India and Brazil to assume greater roles within the Security Council. This state of affairs reveals, first and foremost, the elevation of India and Brazil to global-power status. Secondly, it demonstrates an increasing political cohesion within BRICS. Finally, it illustrates a fundamental questioning of the post-WWII international order.
Another prominent element in the document is the sharp critique of the sanctions policies pursued by the United States and the West. The intensive use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in recent years has engendered collective discomfort among BRICS nations. The text emphasizes that unilateral sanctions violate international law and severely hamper the economic development of developing nations. Although no countries are named directly, this formulation can be read as a potent critique targeted at measures such as US sanctions on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as the embargo on Cuba. This approach is a continuation of BRICS’s long-standing critique regarding the “weaponization of economics.” Indeed, one of the most strategic segments of the declaration emerges here. For BRICS is no longer merely criticizing the existing financial architecture; it is actively endeavoring to construct alternative mechanisms. Initiatives such as cross-border payment systems, trade in local currencies, financial integration, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank can be read as harbingers of a long-term quest to forge an alternative to the dollar-centric global economic structure. While it is premature to speak of a system capable of fully displacing the dollar, the steps taken by BRICS are beginning to demonstrate that the current financial order is not the only option.
Another major political segment of the New Delhi Document concerns the Gaza and Palestine issue. Here, we witness one of the strongest stances BRICS has ever taken on the matter. The document employs highly resolute language regarding Gaza and Palestine, with a notable emphasis on an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Furthermore, South Africa’s legal action against Israel and the rulings of the International Court of Justice are directly recalled in the text. In the face of recent offensives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, BRICS nations have displayed one of their clearest collective stances to date. The call for an immediate ceasefire, the demand for unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, support for Palestinian statehood, and the emphasis on international law stand among the declaration’s most potent political messages. This can be interpreted as an indication of BRICS’s desire to become a more visible and effective political actor in global crises.
On the other hand, the text does not entirely gloss over the internal divergences within BRICS. It openly acknowledges that members hold differing views, particularly on Middle Eastern issues. This is significant because today’s BRICS is no longer a bloc comprised solely of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the integration of new members such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, it has evolved into a far more complex geopolitical entity. Interestingly, the document explicitly notes that rather than a unified stance, differing perspectives exist on certain issues. Specifically, it is conceded that members hold divergent positions on matters concerning Iran, the Gulf states, and Yemen. Despite these differences, the bloc’s ability to establish common ground demonstrates an expansion of BRICS’s diplomatic capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the New Delhi process also represents a significant diplomatic triumph for India. While the recent wave of expansion—bringing in Iran, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—has enriched the platform’s geopolitical diversity, it has also rendered collective decision-making processes more intricate. Particularly at a juncture where the war in Iran continues, the deep-seated divergences between Iran and the Gulf states led many experts to predict that BRICS would struggle to find common political ground and that the summit would be fraught with severe diplomatic friction. However, despite all these differences, India succeeded in rallying members with diverging interests and priorities around the same platform, proving that BRICS retains its capacity to generate dialogue rather than fracture. In this context, the outcome in New Delhi is not limited merely to the content of the published joint text. The true, striking success lies in the preservation of a diplomatic arena that enabled members—who find themselves directly opposed on certain issues in an extremely sensitive and polarized crisis environment—to compromise on other matters and continue negotiating under the BRICS umbrella.
Furthermore, one of the document’s most critical messages emerges in the realm of technology. The extensive coverage of topics such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, data security, and cybersecurity is no coincidence. Indeed, the global power struggle of the future will be shaped heavily through technological supremacy. BRICS nations clearly demonstrate their awareness of this reality and their intent to act in unison in the technological race. Particularly noteworthy is their quest to develop alternatives to Western-centric norms in artificial intelligence governance. A distinct approach is also observed in energy and climate policies. Instead of the rapid energy transition frequently championed by Western nations, the concept of a “just energy transition” is prioritized. At the heart of this approach lies the conviction that the economic growth needs of developing nations must not be disregarded. BRICS countries advocate for a balance between environmental responsibility and the right to development. This points to a major fault line that will become increasingly pronounced in global climate debates in the coming years.
When all these headings are evaluated together, the resulting picture is remarkably clear: BRICS is no longer merely a platform for safeguarding economic interests. It is a center of power beginning to articulate its own vision of how the international system ought to operate. At the core of this vision lies the objective of greater representation, sovereign equality, deeper multipolarity, and a stronger voice for developing nations in global decision-making processes.
The New Delhi Document, brought to the table at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, is far more than a mere communique; it is one of the landmark texts of the historic transformation unfolding in global politics. As the world rapidly moves away from a unipolar structure, BRICS is emerging as one of the most powerful political and economic vehicles of this transition. Today, many rules of the international system may still be written by the West. Yet, the message rising from New Delhi is clear: far more actors now demand a seat at the table to rewrite those very rules. BRICS is transitioning from an economic club into a political, diplomatic, financial, and technological powerhouse. Its claim to serve as the collective voice and compass of the Global South is strengthening. It pursues a dual strategy: offering an alternative to Western-centric institutions while simultaneously working to transform them. BRICS is not yet establishing institutions to directly replace the UN, IMF, World Bank, or WTO; rather, it is striving to change the rules and the distribution of power within them.
The 2026 New Delhi Document of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India under its presidency, can be regarded as one of the most comprehensive strategic documents in the twenty-year history of BRICS. The text serves as a political manifesto for an era marked by the sunset of the US- and Western-led unipolar epoch, the demands of rising powers for greater agency, and the accelerating quest of the Global South to establish a permanent weight in the international system.
The essence of the document can be distilled into a single sentence: while BRICS remains a platform that adapts to the rules of the existing international order, it is simultaneously transforming into a global actor that seeks to rewrite them.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
Opinion
NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism
Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.
As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.
In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.
Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.
Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion
NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.
And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.
The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.
The collapse of the Atlantic system
Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.
In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.
Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.
For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.
Opinion
Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing
Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.
For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.
Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.
It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.
The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.
Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.
This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.
For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.
China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.
All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.
The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.
Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.
Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
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