Connect with us

Middle East

Saudi crude exports from Yanbu plunge 40% as Yemeni strikes force reliance on costlier routes

Published

on

Crude oil shipments from Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu Port on the Red Sea coast have dropped by 40% over the past few days.

According to data published on July 26 by maritime intelligence firm Vortexa, the Riyadh administration has begun utilizing the SUMED pipeline in Egypt and alternative transit routes in an effort to bypass the naval blockade declared by forces aligned with Sanaa.

The sharp decline in shipment volumes follows retaliatory operations and the enforcement of a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia by the Yemeni Armed Forces, operating under the Ansarallah movement.

Riyadh has maintained military strikes and blockade measures against Yemen for nearly 12 years.

A Sunday report by maritime intelligence firm Windward, drawing on Vortexa data, noted that Saudi Arabia has established a new logistical framework to maintain its export flows. “Saudi Arabia has created an alternative export route functioning via the SUMED pipeline and the Cape of Good Hope,” the report stated. The agency reported that this shift has driven up transportation costs by approximately $9 per barrel.

The market analysis report provided the following assessment regarding the operational mechanics of the transition:

“Saudi crude shipments have not stopped; they have been split into two distinct routes. Tankers berthing at Yanbu Port are now operating with their AIS signals completely turned off. Vessels are concealing their locations to avoid inclusion on Ansarallah’s target list. Saudi Arabia has established an alternative export route operating via the SUMED pipeline and the Cape of Good Hope. Although this route increases costs and transit times, it demonstrates that the market is capable of adapting to changing conditions.”

Saudi Arabia previously activated a similar alternative route via Yanbu during the initial phase of the US-Israel war, following Iran’s first blockade measures directed at the Strait of Hormuz.

At the time of the Windward report’s release, satellite imagery published by SoarAtlas revealed the ongoing situation at Saudi Aramco’s Jizan Oil Refinery. Massive fires triggered by attacks carried out by the Yemeni Armed Forces were shown to be persisting at the $12 billion facility. Images captured on Saturday documented dense black smoke continuing to billow from a giant oil storage tank at the site.

The Yemeni Armed Forces publicly announced their latest military operations against Saudi Arabia on July 25. They stated that the strikes were executed in response to the Saudi-led coalition resuming aerial bombardments against the Yemeni port city of Hodeidah.

An official statement issued by the Yemeni military under the Ansarallah-led administration provided the following details:

“In response to this overt and criminal aggression, the Yemeni Armed Forces carried out two specialized military operations. In the first operation, sensitive Saudi Aramco facilities in Jizan were targeted with dozens of ballistic missiles and drones. In the second operation, sensitive Saudi Aramco facilities in Yanbu were struck using ballistic and cruise missiles alongside unmanned aerial vehicles.”

Spokespersons for the Yemeni military emphasized that the strikes were “precise” and “direct,” while residents in the city of Yanbu were reported to have heard explosions over the weekend. In the early hours of Saturday, Saudi airstrikes had targeted fuel storage facilities and telecommunications infrastructure in Hodeidah.

Mahdi al-Mashat, President of the Ansarallah Supreme Political Council, issued a warning to the Saudi Arabian leadership in a statement on July 27. “We say to the Saudi enemy that those offering you false hopes will be of no avail. Anything short of an end to the aggression and the complete lifting of the blockade is mere fantasy,” al-Mashat said.

In line with their naval blockade decision, the Yemeni Armed Forces have also targeted two Saudi oil tankers with missiles in recent days. The Sanaa administration officially initiated its maritime restrictions on July 20 under the stated principle of “a blockade for a blockade.”

This latest phase of heightened tension began in early July when Saudi Arabia launched an airstrike targeting Sanaa International Airport for the first time after a prolonged hiatus. Yemeni forces responded by striking Abha Airport in Saudi Arabia with missiles and drones. The attack marked the Yemeni military’s first direct retaliatory strike inside Saudi territory since 2021.

The Saudi-led coalition initially intervened in Yemen in 2015 after Ansarallah took control of the capital, Sanaa, and ousted the Riyadh-backed government. The United Arab Emirates joined as a principal coalition partner, while the UK, the US, and Israel provided logistical support.

During peace negotiations conducted between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 2023, the parties came close to a final agreement before talks stalled. Nevertheless, those contacts effectively served to freeze large-scale combat operations for an extended period.

The air and sea blockade enforced by Saudi Arabia for over a decade has deepened the humanitarian crisis, particularly due to commercial flight restrictions imposed on Sanaa International Airport. These measures have prevented critically ill and injured civilians from traveling abroad for medical treatment, while the coalition’s military intervention has driven widespread famine and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. Prior to Riyadh’s latest airstrikes, Yemeni forces had been conducting a general mobilization aimed at expelling coalition elements from the country.

Middle East

Pezeshkian condemns Western nuclear double standards at UN

Published

on

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian accused Western governments of applying double standards regarding nuclear weapons and regional security during his address to the United Nations General Assembly.

Stating that silence prevails over Israel’s nuclear arsenal, Pezeshkian said the Tehran administration is subjected to continuous inspections and sanctions.

Emphasising that the atomic bomb and other weapons of mass destruction in the region are under Israeli control, Pezeshkian said: “I repeat: The nuclear bomb is in Israel, the inspectors are in Iran. Israel kills, Iran is subjected to sanctions.”

Recalling that Israel is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and has shut its doors to international inspectors, the Iranian President noted that billions of dollars in weaponry continue to flow to the Tel Aviv administration regardless.

Displaying photographs from the rostrum of Iranians killed in US and Israeli bombardments, Pezeshkian said: “We are not terrorists, we are victims of terror.”

Stating that Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed on the first day of the war, Pezeshkian maintained that Tehran’s senior leadership was targeted without any legal basis or evidence.

Declaring that the US military bombed the Shajara al-Tayyiba Elementary School in the city of Minab, Pezeshkian brought before the General Assembly the children killed in that attack, as well as the scientists, women, and children who died in a sports hall struck by cluster munitions in the city of Lamerd. Stating that Iran retaliated against the attacks, Pezeshkian noted that Tehran’s forces did not target civilians.

Stating that Iran does not seek regional hegemony and has not launched a war against any neighbour in the past 200 years, Pezeshkian said they developed their military capabilities for deterrence rather than offensive purposes.

Explaining that they built defence systems to show that bombing Iranian cities will not go unanswered, Pezeshkian said: “We say clearly that we will not ask permission from anyone to defend our country.”

Emphasising that the Tehran administration cannot be forced into surrender through the pressure of war, the Iranian President said the door to negotiations remains open, though they will not compromise on their right to defence.

Addressing the peaceful nature of their nuclear programme, Pezeshkian said this technology cannot remain the exclusive privilege of select nations.

Noting that nuclear energy is a vital requirement across fields ranging from medicine to agriculture, and industry to electricity generation, Pezeshkian stressed that they adhere to the principle of “neither nuclear weapons nor deprivation of nuclear knowledge”.

Stating that they do not view nuclear weapons as a security element, Pezeshkian said the issue cannot be resolved by military methods, adding that the solution lies in an agreement that protects the legitimate rights of the Iranian people and provides international guarantees for peaceful activities.

Turning to developments in the Strait of Hormuz, Pezeshkian announced that while Tehran ensures the security of the waterway, it will not remain silent if its own rights of navigation are obstructed.

Accusing Western nations of dispatching weapons to the region through the same corridor while blocking routes to Iranian vessels, Pezeshkian said the permanent deployment of foreign navies in the region will not bring maritime security.

Stating that lasting peace cannot be established in West Asia without a just resolution to the Palestinian issue, Pezeshkian said people displaced from their land and whose homes are bombed are exercising a legitimate right to self-defence, adding: “You cannot call someone a terrorist when they defend themselves.”

Stating that regional problems must be resolved without foreign intervention, Pezeshkian stressed that alliances forged with any foreign power must not be turned into a pretext for war against neighbours.

Adding that economic sanctions have turned into a mass weapon that directly strikes civilians and the poor, Pezeshkian warned that operating international law solely in the interest of the powerful will fuel global instability.

The Iranian President concluded his address to the General Assembly with the words: “Either we establish security together, or we endure insecurity together. Peace that is not for everyone is not peace; justice that does not encompass everyone is not justice.”

Continue Reading

Middle East

Palestinian factions confront legitimacy crisis at Istanbul talks

Published

on

A meeting organised in Istanbul by the Palestinian Dialogue Group has revealed that the election debate points to a crisis far larger than the ballot itself.

Elections are back on the agenda in Palestine. Yet a question looms larger than whether ballot boxes will be set up: can Palestinian politics overcome years of accumulated legitimacy crises?

At the gathering in Istanbul on 12 September, two figures close to Fatah and Hamas, an independent Palestinian researcher, and a journalist came together around the same table. Hosted and moderated by the head of the Palestinian Dialogue Group, Sadiq Abu Amer, the meeting included Mamoun Sweidan, who serves as an adviser at ministerial and gubernatorial rank in the Palestinian Presidency Court; Prof. Dr Maher Hamed Al-Houli, adviser to the head of the Hamas Political Bureau; and independent researcher and journalist Majed Azzam.

For Palestinian observers, one of the most striking aspects of the meeting was the gathering of senior figures from Fatah and Hamas circles in a debate of this scale for the first time.

To summarise the mood of the gathering in two sentences: the cause faces grave peril. Yet there is no magic formula to overcome the hurdles.

28 November: An election or a political turning point?

According to the timetable of the Palestinian Central Elections Commission, elections for the 132-seat Legislative Council are scheduled to take place on 28 November 2026 across the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

Candidate registrations will run from 26 September to 7 October, followed by the election campaign between 6 and 26 November.

If the polls go ahead, Palestinians will elect a new Legislative Council for the first time since 2006.

However, although the election timetable has been announced, political and on-the-ground conditions remain uncertain.

The new reality emerging in Gaza following the war, whether voting can be conducted in East Jerusalem, the Fatah-Hamas divide, and the future administration of Gaza represent core obstacles facing the vote.

The Central Elections Commission continues its preparations. Contacts are underway in Gaza with civil society organisations, political groups, and local actors, alongside inspections of prospective polling centres.

Yet criticism focuses on the very same point: preparations started late, and the feasibility of the 28 November timetable remains disputed.

It is precisely here that the election debate ceases to be a technical matter.

A legitimacy crisis accumulated over two decades

In Palestine, the problem is not merely when ballot boxes will be placed.

A new Legislative Council has not been elected since 2006. The Fatah-Hamas rift has become entrenched. The renewal of Palestinian political institutions and the transfer of power through the ballot box have failed to materialise.

For this reason, the planned elections are no ordinary vote.

If ballot boxes are re-established after a gap of nearly two decades, the issue will not merely be the selection of new lawmakers. Whether the Palestinian political system can regain legitimacy will also be put to the test.

Yet holding elections will not eliminate division on its own.

The fundamental question is this:

Will Palestinians respect the election outcomes even when the results fall outside their own political calculations?

Sweidan: “We went from a national committee to a Peace Council”

The future of Gaza took centre stage in Mamoun Sweidan’s address.

Sweidan explained that following the war, the idea of creating a “national committee” composed of Palestinians to govern Gaza had been raised.

Stating that this committee needed to be formed within the institutional framework of the Palestinian National Authority, Sweidan noted that the political factions, foremost Fatah and Hamas, could not agree on representation quotas for the body.

The problem, in short, was this: everyone wants a national committee, but no consensus can be reached on who will sit on it and in what proportions.

According to Sweidan, prolonged delays eventually pushed the issue into a different arena.

Instead of a national committee, a dynamic emerged in which an international mechanism assumed a greater role in Gaza’s future.

At this point, Sweidan criticised Hamas.

In his view, the initial concept of a national committee established by Palestinians drifted towards an externally shaped “Peace Council” model.

This question lies at the heart of the debate:

Will Palestinians decide Gaza’s future, or will decision-making mechanisms shift increasingly into the hands of external actors?

Al-Houli: “We must not abandon elections”

Prof. Dr Maher Hamed Al-Houli, adviser to the head of the Hamas Political Bureau, argued that elections must not be abandoned.

Al-Houli noted that the election call should be approached positively. However, he stressed that Palestinians must base their decisions on the broader national interest rather than external pressures.

Recalling the 1996 and 2006 elections, Al-Houli maintained that those polls were fair and transparent.

He stated that both Palestinian factions and the international community must respect the results emerging from the ballot box.

Another topic Al-Houli highlighted was societal participation.

He noted that families, clans, mukhtars, opinion leaders, and reconciliation figures could assume a more active role in the electoral process.

He suggested that these actors should not only guide voters to the polls, but also play a part in resolving disputes between Fatah and Hamas. He added that they could even participate in the elections through independent candidates or electoral lists.

Al-Houli’s approach thus shifted the election discussion to another dimension:

Will a new election merely refresh the old political structure, or will it open the path for new actors to enter politics?

Azzam: “In my view, elections will not take place”

Independent researcher and journalist Majed Azzam took a more distant view of the electoral timetable.

Stating that he was speaking neither pessimistically nor optimistically, but offering a realistic and objective assessment, Azzam said: “In my view, elections will not take place, and I am saddened by this.”

Azzam’s primary objection rests on an assertion broader than the election date itself.

According to him, electoral rhetoric could be a “smoke grenade” concealing an entirely different political process.

Azzam raised the claim that preparations are underway to form the Palestinian National Council through appointment rather than through elections.

If this claim proves true, the direction of the debate changes completely.

The question then ceases to be “When will elections occur?” but rather “If elections do not take place, how will the Palestinian political system be reconstituted?”

Can there be an election without Gaza?

The fate of Palestinian elections cannot be separated from Gaza.

The commission is proceeding with technical preparations. However, the destruction wrought by the war in Gaza, the dispersal of the population, infrastructure breakdowns, and disputes over future governance pose severe challenges to the electoral process.

Alongside this, the question of East Jerusalem remains unresolved.

Consequently, 28 November is not merely a matter of ballot boxes.

Under which political framework Gaza will be governed, how election results will be implemented there, and how relations between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas will be structured are all components of the same equation.

A new generation enters politics

Another critical reality is demographic shift.

Since the 2006 vote, an entire Palestinian generation has reached adulthood. A substantial proportion of these individuals have never cast a ballot in any general election in their lives.

Therefore, if elections take place, a new Legislative Council will not be all that is chosen.

Simultaneously, a new generation of voters will become direct participants in political decision-making for the first time.

For this reason, how youth, independents, and societal actors will be integrated into the political system stands as another major subject within the election debate.

A common goal, divergent roadmaps

It is not possible to say that the Istanbul meeting produced a shared political roadmap.

Sweidan advocates safeguarding Palestinian institutions and national decision-making, arguing that Gaza’s future must be determined within a Palestinian framework. He considers Hamas’s posture to have created fertile ground for external actors to intervene further.

Al-Houli says elections must not be abandoned. In his view, elections should reflect the will of the Palestinian people rather than external pressures, and societal participation must be expanded.

Azzam, by contrast, does not believe elections will be held at all. He suspects that another political restructuring may be underway behind the cover of the election debate.

Where these three approaches converge is far more significant:

The Palestinian cause confronts a profound existential crisis.

The future under debate is not simply that of Hamas or Fatah, but that of the Palestinian political structure as a whole.

Elections are not a magic formula

This remains one of the strongest messages left behind by the Istanbul meeting.

Elections may be vital for renewing legitimacy. Yet they cannot end division on their own.

They may establish a new Legislative Council. Yet they cannot resolve all the problems of the Palestinian political system.

They may bring youth and independents into politics. Yet the factions must accept the outcome of the vote.

For this reason, the significance of 28 November reaches far beyond the ballot box.

If elections are held, a new political space will open before Palestinians.

If they are not held, the question of how to fill the political vacuum will grow even larger.

And perhaps the real question will be this:

Will 28 November mark another milestone in years of ongoing division, or will it herald the beginning of renewed unity in Palestinian politics?

We shall see together.

For now, the only certainty is this: the question of elections in Palestine is no longer merely a question of elections.

Continue Reading

Middle East

Sharaa says 7 October must not shape Israel policy on Syria

Published

on

Syria’s interim President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, addressed relations between Israel and Syria, arguing that they could achieve peace through “security arrangements”.

Speaking at an event organised by the Atlantic Council in New York, where he travelled for the UN General Assembly, Sharaa answered a question regarding relations with Israel.

Sharaa stated that the two countries had held direct talks over the past year. He then said that Israel must first withdraw from the areas in southern Syria that it occupied following the fall of the Assad administration.

Sharaa continued:

“Then we can begin negotiations on security arrangements. If these arrangements succeed, we can reach a lasting peace. The Golan Heights is Syrian territory recognised by the United Nations… Therefore, there is no debate on this matter.”

He was then asked whether he understood the concerns of Israelis following the Al-Aqsa Flood operation carried out by Hamas on 7 October 2023, and what kind of message he had for the Israeli people.

In response, Sharaa said, “I understand what happened to some innocent people on 7 October, but at the same time, it is not possible to base all policies on a single event. At the same time, we must also understand what is happening in Gaza; more than 70,000 people have lost their lives there.”

“It is not appropriate for what happened on 7 October to determine policy towards Syria,” added the former HTS leader, saying, “Israel must change its policy because it is creating problems around itself.”

Recalling that they have established very good relations with the US, the United Kingdom, and Lebanon, Sharaa said, “I believe the problem lies with Israel, not Syria,” and asserted that Tel Aviv’s actions do not bring greater security to Israeli citizens.

While acknowledging that Israel has “legitimate security concerns”, Sharaa rejected the notion that these concerns could justify every action taken by Israel. On the other hand, according to Sharaa, a “historic moment that could be beneficial for all parties” is currently taking place.

The former HTS leader recounted that when President Donald Trump told him that the Golan Heights belonged to Israel, he responded:

“Why do you not give New Jersey to the Israelis? The Golan Heights are not yours to give away, but New Jersey is yours.”

Sharaa then elaborated slightly on this joke, saying:

“I think New Jersey is full of Democrats and they do not vote for Trump, so giving it to the Israelis would be good. At least it is your property. Trump has no ownership over the Golan Heights.”

The discussion then turned to Sharaa’s past, particularly his time with Al-Qaeda.

When asked whether he now explicitly renounced his allegiance to this organisation and the ideology behind it, he did not issue a direct renunciation, but claimed that at that time he was “at a different age and the conditions in the region were different”, explaining that his life experiences stemmed from taking part in the struggle against the Assad administration.

Asked specifically about the 11 September attacks, Sharaa immediately emphasised that he “had nothing to do with it”, stating that he was 13 years old at the time and adding, “I had no awareness of these matters at all.”

Continue Reading

MOST READ

Turkey