Connect with us

Europe

US secures multi-billion-dollar energy and AI deals at Three Seas summit in Dubrovnik

Published

on

A struggle for influence is intensifying between the European Union and the United States in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, with the “Three Seas Initiative” (3SI) emerging as a primary arena for this geopolitical contest.

An analysis published by German Foreign Policy reveals that Western European nations and the EU are increasingly positioning renewable energy as a strategic counterweight to US liquefied natural gas (LNG) deliveries in the region.

At a 3SI summit convened in late April in the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik, representatives from the Trump administration met with officials from the 13 EU member states that comprise the initiative. The parties agreed on a series of new projects spanning energy supply, pipelines, artificial intelligence (AI), and digital infrastructure.

The immediate focus of these talks centred on new natural gas interconnectors for South-Eastern Europe and a massive AI project in Croatia carrying an estimated investment volume of €50 billion.

Originally established to modernise and expand infrastructure between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, the initiative has increasingly transformed into a vehicle for American power projection in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

Energy policy remains the critical battleground: whilst the Trump administration seeks to lock in long-term US LNG export markets, the EU is pushing to pivot the region towards renewable energy. Notably, investments targeting renewable energy systems were also approved during the Dubrovnik proceedings.

A brief history of the Three Seas Initiative

The Three Seas Initiative was launched in 2015 by Polish President Andrzej Duda and Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, holding its inaugural summit in Dubrovnik in August 2016. The platform comprises 13 EU member states stretching from the Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) through the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and Austria, down to Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece.

Albania, Montenegro, Ukraine and Moldova have subsequently associated themselves with the platform.

The initiative derives its name from its geographical objective: linking the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas through the territory of its member countries.

The creation of the 3SI was heavily driven by the United States. US strategists drew direct inspiration from an interwar Polish foreign policy concept formulated by Marshal Józef Piłsudski. Piłsudski’s “Intermarium” plan sought to unite Eastern European nations—spanning from the Baltic states to Yugoslavia and Romania—into a geopolitical bloc designed to act as an anti-Soviet bulwark.

In late 2014, the US think tank the Atlantic Council, collaborating with Central Europe Energy Partners (CEEP)—a lobby group representing energy companies in Poland, Lithuania and Romania—published an influential analysis. The report focused on developing a “North-South Corridor” extending from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic and Black Seas.

The founding documents of the Three Seas Initiative explicitly reference this American strategic blueprint.

Washington has spent years utilising the 3SI to consolidate and expand its influence over the participant states. The cornerstone of this strategy is energy policy, specifically aimed at substituting imports of Russian pipeline gas with US-sourced LNG.

A North-South corridor to bypass the East-West axis

To achieve this geopolitical shift, the Three Seas Initiative seeks to expand the infrastructure of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe by adding robust north-south transport and energy links. Since 1990, infrastructural development in the region had run predominantly on an east-west axis, prioritising integration with Germany at the heart of the EU.

Constructing a north-south network will not only facilitate the distribution of US LNG imported via Adriatic and Baltic ports, but also foster a more autonomous regional infrastructure. By reducing reliance on road and rail networks terminates in Germany, the project threatens a significant dilution of Berlin’s economic and political leverage in the region.

Following the EU’s commitment to phase out Russian gas imports entirely by 2027, the strategic weight of LNG terminals and their corresponding north-south pipelines has steadily grown.

This structural dependency is visible within Germany itself. According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, approximately 96% of the LNG imported via German North Sea and Baltic terminals in 2025 originated from the US. This US supply accounts for 10.3% of Germany’s total gas imports.

German-American friction in South-Eastern Europe

The struggle for influence in Eastern Europe, and the decisive role of energy transit within it, was recently illustrated by a leadership crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina surrounding the German diplomat Christian Schmidt, the international community’s High Representative.

Schmidt’s eventual resignation was precipitated by intense political maneuvering between certain Western European nations—led by Germany—and the Trump administration, which has been actively pursuing gas and raw material agreements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Having successfully pressured Schmidt to step down, the US proposed Italian diplomat Antonio Zanardi Landi as his successor. The nomination served to drive a wedge between EU member states, with Germany opposing Washington’s preferred candidate whilst Italy offered its support. President Trump warned that Washington would halt financial assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina if the US plans were thwarted.

The move aligns with a new US strategy for South-Eastern Europe submitted by the Trump administration to Congress in May. The updated policy pivots away from “democracy promotion,” focusing instead on security and securing market access for American corporations.

Historically, Bosnia and Herzegovina has relied on Russian natural gas delivered via the TurkStream pipeline. Washington aims to replace this supply with US LNG imported through a terminal on the Croatian island of Krk.

The proposed infrastructure plans involve constructing a new pipeline extension into Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be built by US engineering firm Bechtel alongside AAFS Infrastructure and Energy. Schmidt had increasingly been viewed by US officials as an obstacle to these plans.

A victory for the Trump administration at the 3SI summit

In late April, Dubrovnik hosted the 10th anniversary summit of the 3SI alongside an aligned Business Forum. The event drew high-level participation, including seven presidents and prime ministers from 3SI member states, numerous cabinet ministers, and senior representatives from the Trump administration.

At the forum, the US successfully leveraged multi-billion-dollar energy and technology projects to entrench its footprint in South-Eastern Europe.

US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright declared in Dubrovnik: “The United States is ushering in a new era of cooperation for Central and Eastern Europe. This partnership is built on our mutual support for an aggressive energy expansion agenda.”

To formalise this initiative, Wright, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković and the Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Borjana Krišto, signed a memorandum of understanding to launch the “Trump Peace Pipelines Framework”.

The agreement directly advances the “Southern Interconnection” project, which will link Bosnia and Herzegovina’s gas grid to the Croatian network and the Krk island LNG terminal.

At the summit, Polish Climate and Environment Minister Miłosz Motyka also emphasized the region’s commitment to expanding nuclear energy, calling it the “cornerstone of our new security architecture.”

Parallel to these energy agreements, American investors announced plans to build a massive AI and data centre hub in Croatia. The Pantheon Atlas investment group signed a memorandum of understanding with the Croatian firm Končar Group to construct an AI campus.

The total investment is projected at approximately €50 billion—a sum exceeding half of Croatia’s annual gross domestic product (GDP).

The gigawatt-scale power capacity required to run the data centre is comparable to the electricity demand of a major metropolitan area like Zagreb. To meet its current power requirements, Croatia relies heavily on natural gas, much of which is imported through the Krk LNG terminal.

Foreign policy implications of the energy transition

The Dubrovnik summit also marked the establishment of a new regional infrastructure fund. The vehicle is designed to finance joint investments in hydrogen production, cross-border transport infrastructure, renewable energy systems and electrical grid expansion, with at least €2 billion earmarked for initial projects.

By comparison, more than €4 billion was invested in natural gas infrastructure within the region between 2016 and 2025.

This gradual shift toward renewable energy introduces a distinct foreign policy dynamic. While LNG supplies are overwhelmingly dominated by imports from the US, the hardware and technology required to deploy renewable energy infrastructure do not carry the same transatlantic dependency. In the vast majority of cases, this technology is manufactured and supplied from within Europe itself.

Europe

CDU youth wing urges military deployment against student protests

Published

on

As school strikes against the reintroduction of compulsory military service continue across Germany, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has faced calls to deploy the military against student demonstrations.

The next nationwide school strike in the country is scheduled for 20 November. Like earlier school walkouts, it is primarily directed against the reintroduction of compulsory military service, which is clearly looming on the horizon.

In addition, coalitions of high school and university students are calling for fresh demonstrations this Saturday (31 October). These actions take French student protests as a model, but go even further in opposing mass militarization in Germany.

So far, demonstrations have been announced in just under a dozen cities, and these protests also face the threat of growing state repression.

In Hamburg, for instance, a police spokesperson announced that there would be a “very strong police presence” and that drones would also be deployed against demonstrators.

Going a step further, the Berlin-Mitte branch of the Junge Union (JU), the CDU youth wing, demanded the deployment of the Bundeswehr [German Armed Forces] as a precautionary measure against high school and university student demonstrations “to defend our liberal order.”

Meanwhile, debates over banning political parties are currently underway within conservative circles, echoing developments in France with La France Insoumise (LFI).

Years ago, during his tenure as secretary general of the Christian Social Union (CSU), Federal Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt raised the possibility of banning Die Linke (the Left Party).

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), an influential German newspaper, also recently brought the issue to the fore.

In an editorial, the newspaper asked openly: “Why not ban Die Linke?”

Against this backdrop lies Die Linke’s victory in the Berlin Senate elections. If the party becomes too powerful, the threat of a ban looms.

According to author Jasper von Altenbockum, the Left Party can act as it pleases in Berlin because the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens have not applied the “firewall” strategy against it that the CDU maintains against the Alternative for Germany (AfD).

Describing the party’s lead Berlin candidate, Elif Eralp, as “the vanguard of a movement that sympathises with leftist and Islamist terrorism, shows ‘respect’ to organised criminals, fuels immigrant and radical left antisemitism, and seeks to practice anticapitalism through expropriation,” the author continued:

“If the standards applied to extremism in the AfD were applied to the Left Party’s rhetoric, tactics, and ideology, then a debate on banning the party would emerge, and politicians from the Left Party would be subjected to the same treatment as those at the other end of the ‘horseshoe.’ But that is not the case at all: Left Party politicians are fixtures on morning shows; Left Party politicians determine who may call themselves a democrat and who may not.”

Arguing that the SPD and the Greens in Berlin face the exact same predicament that the CDU confronts in Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, or Saxony, the FAZ author contends that if the Christian Democrats fail to devise a counter-strategy, they will have to accept either a “red-green” coalition in Berlin or a shift of votes toward the AfD.

Continue Reading

Europe

Vučić scrapped plan to hold power after phone warnings, report says

Published

on

Former Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić was preparing to retain power by force following the country’s parliamentary elections, according to a report by the British newspaper The Times, citing politicians and a former commander of a specialised police unit.

However, he abandoned this scenario after receiving phone calls urging him to back down.

Spasoje Vulević, the former head of the Serbian police counter-terrorism unit, told the newspaper that 4,000 police officers and 3,000 people whom he described as “thugs” were deployed to central Belgrade on voting day, 25 October.

According to Vulević’s assessment, Vučić was preparing to reject the election results.

Vučić’s spokeswoman denied the claim. Speaking to The Times, she said the police presence in Belgrade was a response to threats of violence from protesters and was unrelated to any attempt to seize power.

Member of the European Parliament Sandro Gozi also said he received alarming messages from diplomatic sources on election day indicating that Vučić was preparing for a scenario involving the use of force.

According to the newspaper, Gozi’s political group issued a statement around 21:00 local time, as initial projections were being released, warning that supporters of Vučić’s party could be mobilized to provoke clashes.

Where did the calls forcing Vučić to back down come from?

Radomir Saičić, a leading candidate from the winning Student List, also argued that plans had been made to alter the results by force if the vote margin between the sides was narrow.

“If the results were close, there were plans to overturn the outcome of the vote by brute force,” Saičić said. “However, according to the information I obtained, numerous calls to him from the police and other figures prompted him to change his mind. They convinced him that executing this plan would end very badly for him.”

Former commander Vulević, on the other hand, was sceptical that police officers could have played a decisive role.

Noting that Vučić personally selected the unit commanders in Belgrade and that these figures were unlikely to oppose him, Vulević said: “I suspect that representatives of European governments called Vučić; these were talks conducted at the highest level.”

European Parliament member Gozi did not confirm the claim that the telephone calls had a decisive effect.

“I cannot rule out the possibility that phone calls took place, but in any case, the vote margin against him was far too large,” Gozi said. “Vučić was stunned.”

According to The Times, roads were closed in Belgrade during the evening, gendarmerie personnel appeared on the streets, and groups of men dressed in black headed toward the city’s Pioneers Park (Pionirski Park).

Vulević claimed these individuals arrived in groups of 20 to 30. However, the newspaper reported that at 21:30, an hour and a half after polls closed, Vučić backed down and his assembled supporters dispersed.

From the Novi Sad collapse to early election defeat

Early parliamentary elections were held in Serbia on 25 October.

According to Election Commission data, after processing results from 8,139 ballot boxes, the Student List secured 52.65% of the vote, while Vučić’s United Serbia coalition remained at 39.22%.

Vučić conceded defeat without waiting for the final results.

“It is obvious that we have lost these elections. The Student List has won,” the politician said, attributing the opposition’s success to support from European countries and the US “deep state”.

Prior to the election, the country was the scene of prolonged mass protests that began after the collapse of a railway station canopy in the city of Novi Sad in November 2024.

Protesters initially demanded accountability for those responsible and an investigation into corruption allegations, before subsequently calling for the government’s resignation.

Having dissolved parliament in September 2026 and announced his resignation from the presidency, Vučić was subsequently nominated as the candidate for prime minister by his party.

Continue Reading

Europe

EU scrambles for takers for remaining €21B in SAFE defence loans

Published

on

The European Commission has until the end of the year to convince EU member states to take up around €21 billion in unused defence loans and support Ukraine’s defence.

The worsening security situation in the Black Sea could encourage Romania to seek additional loans. Bucharest has already secured €16.7 billion under SAFE.

The remaining figure became final after Hungary and Italy significantly scaled back their requests under the EU’s €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) programme.

On Wednesday, after approving Hungary’s spending plan, the final pending application, the Commission announced that it would soon launch a second call for applications.

The situation is very different from August 2025, when Brussels was confident that demand would far exceed the available €150 billion.

Applications from 19 EU countries eventually exceeded that sum by around €40 billion.

Now, national elections and pressure on public finances may make governments reluctant to take on additional debt.

Some EU diplomats told Rapporteur that the conditions for the second round remain unclear, making it difficult to say whether their countries would apply.

The Commission must publish the second call by the end of December. Unlike the first round, where countries could use the loans for national procurement contracts until May 2026, the remaining money must be spent on joint procurement.

Poland benefited from the previous flexibility, securing €43.7 billion, the largest national allocation, and moved quickly to sign contracts.

Warsaw announced that 90% of the money would go to Polish companies.

Brussels also hopes the remaining money will be used to bolster Ukraine’s defence.

In July, during an official visit to the country, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen suggested that around €10 billion in unused SAFE loans could be directed to Kyiv.

Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius mentioned the Freyja anti-ballistic missile project among the initiatives under consideration while discussing the second SAFE call at an E5 meeting in Paris this week.

Military sources told Rapporteur that participation in the second round had been considered under Romania’s previous government, but the proposal would now require a fresh political assessment.

Diplomatic sources in Athens told Rapporteur that Greece has also shown interest. The country had previously made an unsuccessful push to increase its allocation by several billion euros.

Polish Deputy Defence Minister Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka told Polish media this week that Poland was also discussing the conditions for another possible application, while Ireland has shown interest in the remaining funds.

Italy, having already reduced its initial request, is considered unlikely to participate in the second round.

Continue Reading

MOST READ

Turkey