Opinion
Cold winds in the Modi-Trump friendship
When Trump was sworn in for his second presidency in January, India was leading the pack among countries with the most positive expectations for its relationship with America. However, that doesn’t seem to be the case. It’s true that there has always been an air of optimism in the relationship between the two countries. And frankly, this optimism is fueled by a high level of bipartisan consensus in Washington on deepening bilateral ties. Even more visibly, there’s the belief that Modi and Trump share compatible worldviews. Both are strong populist leaders who view China and radical Islam as existential threats. And both are, at their core, economic nationalists. Moreover, India is in a unique position: it is neither an ally nor an adversary of America. Consequently, it wasn’t subjected to Trump’s wrath like others were.
However, Trump, who is now trying to broker another ceasefire in Ukraine, is leveling harsh threats against India over its trade with Russia. He said that because Delhi’s “massive” oil purchases are financing the “Russian War Machine,” it would face tariffs far heavier than the 25% imposed last week.
Historically, India purchased most of its oil from the Middle East, including Iraq and Saudi Arabia. But things changed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. India, the world’s third-largest crude oil importer after China and the US, began to snap up Russian oil, which was being sold at discounted prices following its shunning by some in the West. Before the war in Ukraine, Russia accounted for only 0.2% of India’s oil imports, but it has since become its largest supplier, providing a share of between 35% and 40%. In July alone, Moscow supplied 36% of the crude oil imported by India, which is then refined into fuels like gasoline and diesel.
And yes, amidst all the sanctions, New Delhi remains one of the leading buyers of Russian crude, and over 50% of India’s active military platforms are of Russian origin. And yes, what’s even more ironic is that amidst the war and sanctions, Delhi, which buys Russian oil on the cheap, is exporting it at a profitable price to Europe—the very continent that cannot buy it due to Trump’s sanctions.
As Trump said, again in a social media post, he accused India of buying “large quantities” of oil from Russia and then “selling it on the Open Market for big profits.” He added, “They don’t care how many people the ‘Russian War Machine’ is killing in Ukraine…”
Furthermore, there is the threat of a 200% tariff on pharmaceutical imports, which is significant for India as a leading supplier of generic drugs to the US, and a 10% tariff on BRICS member countries for pursuing “anti-American” policies. Washington also announced that it has imposed sanctions on some Indian entities and individuals for trading with Iran.
IN SHORT, the developments of the last week or two, in particular, both show how sentimental Delhi’s expectations for the bilateral relationship were and call the Modi-Trump friendship into question. It seems that this time, Trump has started to brandish a bigger stick. And remember, while threatening to impose 25% tariffs on India, he used some harsh and mocking language that did not sit well with Delhi at all: he described India as a “dead economy,” for example. And he portrayed it as a country that does “very little business” with the US and has the “heaviest and most egregious non-monetary Trade Barriers of any country.” This could just be a bluff aimed at securing a profitable deal for America in the midst of trade negotiations, given that Trump’s style of address is now well-known. Or it could be a warning to India.
Frankly, the “reciprocal” tariffs Trump announced in April had given rise to cautious optimism in Delhi, with the belief that they would allow for some trade diversion from China and other countries whose supply chains are heavily exposed to China, especially in South and Southeast Asia. India’s Commerce Minister, Piyush Goyal, for instance, had described Trump’s tariffs as a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.” Corroborating this view, Apple announced it was shifting its iPhone production for the American market from China to India.
Amid expectations that India would be one of the first countries to sign a trade deal with America, Delhi maintained its positive attitude. So much so that some circles in Delhi even held the view that Trump’s tariffs could be a “blessing in disguise,” acting as a catalyst to accelerate India’s much-needed economic reform agenda. Let me add a similar note here from Indian history by pointing out that previous external shocks, from the 1991 balance of payments crisis to the economic sanctions following its 1998 nuclear tests, had triggered the country’s first generation of reforms.
Now, the mood seems to have shifted. Cold winds are blowing in the Modi-Trump friendship and/or India-America relations. In fact, the mood had already changed with Trump’s stance on the recent India-Pakistan conflicts. Although Delhi denied it, Trump’s claim in May to have mediated a ceasefire between the two countries, coupled with his efforts to deepen relations with Pakistan by hosting Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir at the White House in June and making resource and cryptocurrency deals with Islamabad, had triggered the chill between Delhi and Washington. The fact that Trump announced a trade deal with Pakistan on the same day he announced tariffs on India was the salt in the wound.
Trump may appear to have reversed the US’s more conciliatory approach towards China from his first term, but Delhi now fears that Washington might seek a “deal” with China. Let me say this very clearly: despite the deepening India-America relations, or no matter how deep they become, there is always a fear of strategic abandonment in both countries. However, let me also state clearly that Trump’s recent outbursts will not change the overall trajectory of the bilateral relationship. In other words, the relationship will continue with two steps back for every one step forward. Or we could call it a “cautious embrace.” But on Delhi’s side, the inclination for this has undoubtedly diminished. Even if a trade deal is reached, Delhi’s deep-seated, long-standing mistrust of America has once again been reinforced.
However, it should not be overlooked that India also maintains extremely close, friendly, and strategic relationships with countries with which America and the West have a difficult history, including Russia and Iran. And America may have started to question why it has done so much for Delhi; recall the civil nuclear deal or the support for India’s G20 presidency or its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council—recall all of it. Trump may now be trying to tell Delhi, “Your free pass is expiring; it’s time to fall in line.” In other words, as I said at the beginning, he is starting to wield the stick more forcefully. Trump has likely had his fill of India’s “strategic autonomy” mantra [a core principle of Indian foreign policy], or is about to. Of course, Delhi is aware of this, which has led to discussions about the revival of the long-dormant RIC (Russia-India-China) trilateral and Modi’s probable attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in China this month. If Delhi realizes that its relationship with America is not as special as it perceived, the cold winds in bilateral relations could blow even stronger.
The Modi administration, currently engaged in tough negotiations with Trump’s team for a trade deal that balances India’s protectionist system with opening its market to more American goods, is thoroughly displeased with Trump’s statements. It is also uneasy about reports that India is willing to open up to some American agricultural products, a politically sensitive issue for Modi, who faced a year-long farmers’ protest a few years ago.
Considering Modi’s carefully crafted strongman reputation, many expected India to react harshly to Trump’s tariff threats…
The main opposition, Congress, for example, sharply criticized the government: “Trump is talking nonsense against India and Modi is listening silently,” it said, asking, “Why is Modi so afraid of Trump?” in a Hindi post on the party’s social media platform. Another Congress post stated, “Tariffs are being imposed. Negotiations are going nowhere. But Asim Munir, the man behind the Pahalgam terror attacks, is having lunch at the White House… This is what happens when foreign policy focuses on image-building instead of national interests.” Jairam Ramesh, Congress General Secretary in charge of Communications, mocked the BJP’s past slogans and diplomacy, saying the US’s actions exposed the failure of an image-driven foreign policy.
However, a very cautious response came from India’s Commerce Minister, Piyush Goyal, who said the two countries were working towards a “fair, balanced, and mutually beneficial bilateral trade agreement.” India’s Ministry of External Affairs also stated in response that it would take all necessary steps to protect and promote national interests and that the effects of the tariffs were being examined.
The view that Trump’s words are purely a pressure tactic is likely being taken into account… Trump is trying to play hardball in the negotiations… This is the general conclusion reached in Delhi circles.
Meanwhile, five rounds of negotiations have been held between the two countries so far. For the next round of talks, a US delegation will arrive in India on August 25. The talks will continue until August 29.
Ashok Malik, a former policy advisor to India’s Ministry of External Affairs, had said, “This is a testing period for the relationship”; we will see how the duo fares in this test. If you ask me, I am neither too optimistic nor too pessimistic. It may sound like a very political answer, but that is the political nature of this duo’s relationship; the “cautious embrace” continues… However, India has already begun to question the value of its strategic cooperation with Washington. Many in New Delhi are asking why Washington is deepening ties with Pakistan, a country that actively undermines India’s security, especially after decades of meticulous work to build the India-US relationship. Although some are drawing hopeful conclusions from this, especially in the context of the RIC trilateral, do not forget that India has a sensitive and risky relationship with China. And the primary rationale for the closer India-US relationship was simple: India is the only democratic power in Asia with the capacity to balance China’s growing assertiveness. Frankly, this rationale is still valid, and the need is becoming more urgent by the day. Washington cannot afford to alienate its reliable—and, until now, coddled for this very reason—partner in Asia.
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
Opinion
The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues
BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.
Allan Wilson, Journalist
Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.
“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”
Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.
For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.
The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.
“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.
A statue, a warning
The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.
The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.
For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”
Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.
The shrinking window
Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.
This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.
Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.
A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.
The international dimension
The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”
Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.
For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.
“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.
This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.
-
Middle East2 weeks agoTrump’s Board of Peace drafts first Gaza base contract
-
Diplomacy2 weeks agoUS lawmakers seek terrorist designation for Polisario Front
-
Europe2 weeks agoCDU unrest raises doubts over Merz’s future as chancellor
-
Diplomacy2 weeks agoNATO faces severe structural and logistical deficits, Professor Erenel warns
-
Diplomacy2 weeks agoTürkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan set to sign defence pact
-
America2 weeks agoWealthy Americans drive surge in New Zealand golden visa demand
-
Interview5 days agoDaniel Davis warns US strategy fails against Iranian defense grid
-
Diplomacy2 weeks agoTürkiye, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia defense agreement: An attack on one will be considered an attack on all
