Opinion
The Gaza war is far from over
On October 15, the office of Israeli Defense Minister Katz threatened that if the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) did not abide by the terms of the ceasefire, Israel would resume military operations. On the same day, U.S. President Trump declared that if Hamas did not disarm on its own, “we will disarm them.” What Israel meant was that after Hamas released, as agreed, the last 20 living detainees, it had not yet fully handed over the bodies of the deceased; what the United States meant was Hamas’s refusal to completely lay down its weapons in the future.
Israel’s demand is the first-phase goal of the U.S.–Israel side, while the U.S. demand is the second-phase claim of the U.S.–Israel side. Only one week after Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu together with Trump announced in Jerusalem that “the Gaza war has ended” and ostentatiously convened an “Egypt Peace Summit,” Trump impatiently slapped himself in the face, betrayed the promise of peace, prepared to restart the Gaza fighting, and even threatened to have U.S. forces take the field in person.
Israel has left heavy forces in Gaza ready to move, and it and Hamas accuse each other of not abiding by the first-phase terms of the ceasefire. Together with Trump’s show of force on Israel’s behalf, this indicates that the Gaza fighting, delayed for two years, is far from over.
These latest war remarks came one week after Trump missed out on the Nobel Peace Prize he longed for, fully proving that he has never been a lover, maker, or keeper of peace, but a fame-seeking and inconsistent war-monger, the absolute defender of Israel’s security interests, the supplier of ammunition and fuel to Israel’s war machine that ravages the Middle East, especially the Gaza Strip, and also the initiator of provoking conflict between the United States and Iran. Sincere thanks are due to the Nobel Peace Committee; it still has conscience and a bottom line and did not give the Peace Prize to this White House master who brags that he “ended seven wars.”
Trump is more eager than Netanyahu to disarm Hamas and has also let down Egyptian President Sisi’s award to him of the “Order of the Nile,” representing Egypt’s highest honor. Sisi’s “commendation” of Trump’s so-called peacemaking efforts now appears to have only paused the flames of war and allowed Hamas and Israel to complete the limited goal of a “prisoner exchange,” essentially bailing out the Netanyahu government. By getting back the surviving detainees and the bodies of the dead and easing domestic anti-war pressure, the Netanyahu government could in the second phase act against Hamas without scruple, set about completely eliminating Hamas’s armed forces, let Gaza once again sink into a sea of blood, and allow Palestinians to continue to suffer slaughter in a genocidal process in which 75,000 have died and nearly 200,000 have been maimed.
Trump’s latest war threat has also humiliated many leaders in the Western, Arab, and Islamic worlds who took the stage for him, supported him, and applauded, because the so-called Egypt Peace Summit was nothing but a “political catwalk.” Thankfully, calm observers all understand that the slogan “the Gaza war has ended” is only a pause mark at the two-year node since the outbreak of the “Sixth Middle East War,” a brief intermission in Gaza’s long war, a double act by Trump and Netanyahu: letting Israel use the prisoner-exchange opportunity to adjust military and readiness deployments, win more public support, and continue by means of war to eliminate a Hamas that insists on armed struggle or to leave room for a Hamas that surrenders and hands over its weapons, thereby completing the established strategic goals of “de-Hamasification, demilitarization, and de-extremization.”
In the coastal areas of the Gaza Strip where the Israeli occupation forces have slightly pulled back and somewhat loosened controls, Hamas resurfaced like an “indestructible cockroach” and took to the streets. Its armed members not only safely, orderly, and efficiently brought out from deeply concealed tunnels and returned the 20 living Israeli detainees and successively handed over nine bodies of the dead; they also began to restore comprehensive control over the Gaza Strip, demonstrating that they are the legitimate and sole rulers of this land of slaughter. These measures include but are not limited to: clearing the ruins of war, organizing the distribution of humanitarian supplies, ordering civilian armed groups to turn in their weapons, hunting down those who loot in times of chaos, publicly executing “traitors” who had cooperated with Israel, and even, on the pretext of settling accounts with “traitors,” wiping out new agents supported by Israel.
According to Xinhua News Agency, on October 16, Hamas representatives in Cairo discussed with Egyptian officials post-war security issues in the Gaza Strip and matters such as implementing a ceasefire agreement with Israel, including deploying 1,000 Palestinian security personnel who had been trained in Egypt and Jordan to maintain order in the Gaza Strip under the supervision of the Palestinian National Authority, as well as issues such as Hamas possibly withdrawing from Gaza’s security institutions and disarming in accordance with the U.S. “20-point plan.”
After the Trump administration introduced the “20-point plan” peace proposal and forced the Israeli government to accept it, Hamas, which was bearing all the pressure, announced very flexibly that it would cooperate immediately and stated that it would not seek to participate in the post-war governance of Gaza, but it resolutely refused to lay down its arms, saying this is a national right to resist illegal occupation. This alone means that Hamas and the United States and Israel have formed structural and irreconcilable contradictions, and it also means that the Gaza conflict will inevitably restart as the first phase of the ceasefire agreement ends, namely upon completion of the “prisoner exchange.” The heavily armed Israeli forces, which still control 53% of the Gaza Strip’s area, will launch a final general offensive against Hamas’s remaining forces, and may even receive assistance from U.S. troops.
At the beginning of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” sweeping Israel, Israel’s intelligence services estimated that Hamas had about 20,000 combatants. After two years of war, only then did the remaining Israelis held in detention regain freedom, and Hamas’s guerrilla warfare amid the ruins never ceased, indicating that Hamas still has a considerable force size and resilience; it can even be said that Israel has not completely destroyed Hamas’s labyrinthine tunnel-warfare system. According to reports, during this ceasefire Hamas mobilized as many as 7,000 armed personnel to maintain order in the streets, while how many fighters it actually has who can go into battle is likely difficult to grasp accurately even for Israel’s all-seeing intelligence services.
The chaotic state caused by “unknown enemy conditions,” the wartime pattern of Hamas hiding its forces among the people, and the ground form of “jungle warfare” with mountains of ruins all indicate that Israel’s future strategic general offensive against the Gaza Strip will be extremely brutal, meaning that Hamas—which dealt heavy blows to the “world’s fourth military power” and, within a limited airspace, confronted and maneuvered against it for two years to create a “military miracle” for a non-state actor—will face even more unrestrained, three-dimensional, annihilating strikes from Israel.
However, Hamas is not the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which is based on secularism and nationalism and, after decades of bloody struggle, finally announced it would abandon the claim of national independence and was willing to surrender and disarm to the central government, because the Kurdish issue in Turkey is, after all, a domestic political issue, a minority-rights issue. Hamas, by contrast, is a legitimate resistance organization founded on the bases of theocracy and nationalism. It represents an occupied people whose ancestral land and generational lawful rights have been seized by an alien ethnicity through war and aggression, and it possesses a very strong anti-Israel public-opinion base and a cultural gene of resistance.
Therefore, since its establishment in 1987, sacrificing one’s life for religious faith and national rights has been the entire mission and reason for being of Hamas members. Over 38 years, few core Hamas cadres have clung to life or turned back to “seek” the shore, let alone defected or joined the enemy; on the contrary, most Hamas members have died for the cause, one after another. At the same time, Hamas’s public-opinion base has shifted from thin and marginal to solid and central; its strength has repeatedly been encircled and struck by Israel yet has grown larger the more it fights and stronger with each battle, with supporters and participants cut down in one crop only to grow back in the next.
For this reason, a “Hamas-ization” has appeared as a feature of the times in Palestinian society: in 2007 the Gaza Strip saw a change of regime and became “Hamastan”; the West Bank, which had long been the base and headquarters of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), has also come close to falling into Hamas’s hands; a certain Fatah cadre even turned to Hamas after leaving an Israeli prison; and Palestine has not held general elections for many years, one important reason being that every poll shows Hamas winning handily, while Fatah, the long-time competitor that has controlled the PLO for more than 40 years, cannot match it.
Even though the “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack brought an inhuman catastrophe to the Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip, Palestinians still do not believe that Hamas bears political and moral responsibility. On the contrary, Palestinians who identify with Hamas’s line and strategy still make up the majority, while Fatah, which advocates compromising with Israel and seeking negotiations to resolve disputes, remains at a disadvantage in public opinion.
Based on a comprehensive analysis of recent overseas sources and credible polling data, Palestinian public favorability toward the “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack and confidence that Hamas will win the war are both continuing to decline. But most still believe that the attack and the subsequent “Sixth Middle East War” made the Palestinian issue the focus of global attention. This precisely shows that this war is a political and public-opinion victory for Hamas and even for Palestine, won by Hamas through suicidal resistance and at the cost of the Palestinian people paying a “purgatorial calamity.”
Related polls show that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians oppose Hamas disarming, do not believe that releasing hostages can end the war, and even think Hamas will continue to control Gaza after the war. Even if in Gaza’s demonstrations supporters and opponents of Hamas are roughly half and half, most people believe outside forces are involved. Although Hamas’s popularity once dipped, Fatah has not become more popular. Palestinian support for the “two-state solution” has not changed, but in terms of means, armed struggle is declining and negotiation is rising, while armed struggle is still the preferred way to establish an independent State of Palestine.
Most Palestinians believe the United States and Israel bear primary responsibility for Gaza’s worsening humanitarian disaster. Palestinians who support the “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack do not necessarily mean they support Hamas, nor do they support any killings or atrocities against civilians. A slim majority of Palestinians want a ceasefire as soon as possible, and most still think Hamas is the winner and will yet prevail. The idea of deploying Arab security forces in Gaza to assist the Palestinian Authority’s security forces is opposed by nearly two-thirds of Palestinians.
Moreover, although Gazans have mixed feelings toward Hamas, the vast majority believe that releasing hostages and disarming Hamas will not necessarily bring Israeli withdrawal and peace, and therefore they oppose Hamas disarming or its military leaders leaving Gaza. Most importantly, although Palestinian satisfaction with Hamas continued to decline during the war, it is still clearly higher than satisfaction with the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, and its leader Abbas.
These complex Palestinian polling results show that even if Israel exhausts all its strength, it cannot eradicate Hamas unless it exterminates or expels all 2.3 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and 3.4 million in the West Bank. From this perspective, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be ended through violence and war, but only through a “two-state solution.”
On October 16, Palestinian Prime Minister Mustafa announced that Egypt would hold a Gaza reconstruction conference in November and said that restoring effective governance and administration of the Gaza Strip is very important. The key now is that the future of the Gaza Strip will be decided not by Egypt and the Palestinian National Authority, but by Israel, the United States, and Hamas. Before Hamas accepts demilitarization, war will be inevitable, because this concerns the survival of Israel’s coalition government and Netanyahu’s political future and even personal freedom.
If the claims by Trump and Netanyahu that “the Gaza war is over” do not count, and the Egypt Peace Summit witnessed by Trump and leaders of more than 20 other countries cannot guarantee peace in Gaza, then how can a Gaza reconstruction conference be convened, and even if convened, what could it achieve? (Researcher Li Xinggang of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies, Zhejiang International Studies University, also contributed to this article and is hereby thanked.)
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric UAV attacks in Russia
Today, the nature of asymmetric threats is undergoing a profound transformation, with their focus shifting increasingly toward economic centers. By mid-2026, the nature of asymmetric warfare within the borders of the Russian Federation entered a qualitatively new and critical phase.
An analysis of the Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes carried out in July 2026 reveals a deliberate shift in targeting. Moving beyond military installations and fuel-energy infrastructure, these attacks directly targeted civilian logistics networks and critical nodes of the macroeconomic infrastructure.
The primary objective of this strategic shift is to deplete the country’s internal resources, induce insurmountable disruptions in supply chains, and exert intense psychological pressure on the civilian population.
Large-scale, coordinated strikes on the distribution centers of Wildberries—Russia’s largest e-commerce platform and part of the RVB joint venture (formed by the 2024 merger of Wildberries and Russ)—became the symbol of this new phase of home-front vulnerability. The geographic scope of these attacks, spanning an unprecedented area from the Northwestern Federal District to Southern Russia and Crimea, exposed critical gaps in national industrial risk insurance mechanisms. Furthermore, this situation sparked severe legal disputes between platform economy giants and small businesses, compelling immediate intervention from both corporate executives and senior state officials.
Tracing the multi-layered consequences of the kinetic impacts resulting from these July attacks on the state’s digital and physical economy will shape the new architecture of civilian sector security.
The zenith of the logistical terror waged by Ukraine was recorded on the night of July 24, 2026, marking the most technically complex UAV attack inflicted on Russian Federation territory since the beginning of the year. According to data from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, domestic air defense systems detected and destroyed 571 fixed-wing Ukrainian UAVs that night.
Two points have become exceptionally critical here: saturating radar fields and the military “swarm” effect. In short, this event is the clearest indication that the enemy has transitioned to a tactic of overwhelming radar systems. At the same time, the “swarm” effect generated across a vast geographic expanse aims to rapidly deplete the ammunition of anti-aircraft missile systems and expose air defense positions deep behind the front lines.
The breadth of the targeted geography attests to the unprecedented scale of the operation. UAVs were neutralized over the Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga, Kursk, Leningrad, Novgorod, Oryol, Pskov, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tver, Tula, and Vladimir regions, as well as over Moscow, Krasnodar, the Republic of Crimea, and the waters of the Azov and Black Seas.
Such a dense dispersion of targets across a vast territory points to an attempt to paralyze transportation and logistics arteries within Russia’s European landmass.
In parallel with the mass deployment of UAVs, missile strikes were also conducted against civilian industrial enterprises. During the same period, a missile attack on a local enterprise in the Fileyka district of Kirov resulted in outright catastrophe, leaving 6 people dead and 32 employees injured with varying degrees of severity.
Following the incident, Regional Governor Aleksandr Sokolov stated that the situation required not only the evacuation of the wounded, but also large-scale interventions such as restoring water and power supplies and auditing the security of neighboring settlements. This combined approach—employing inexpensive kamikaze drones to degrade air defenses followed immediately by missile strikes on unprotected industrial zones—presents an entirely new threat paradigm for the civilian economy.
Systematic and sequential attacks directed at the facilities of a single commercial entity completely eliminate the possibility of coincidence. The strategic, macroeconomic, and psychological factors turning civilian commercial warehouses into critical vulnerabilities for an entire state rest upon four pillars:
- Role as the central circulatory system of domestic trade: Wildberries plays a critical role in the architecture of the modern Russian economy, connecting millions of consumers with tens of thousands of SMEs. Damage to distribution centers severe supply chains, triggering localized shortages of essential consumer goods and regional inflationary spikes. The primary goal is to destabilize the domestic market and create an artificial supply vacuum.
- Immense facility footprints and defense complexity: Spanning hundreds of thousands of square meters across the nation, these hangars constitute massive targets with high radar contrast. Unlike military bases, these commercial warehouses cannot possess their own air defense systems; placing every such facility under an air defense umbrella is physically impossible without compromising frontline systems.
- Social and psychological impact: In the eyes of the public, logistics centers symbolize daily economic stability. Black plumes of smoke visible from miles away, massive fires, and civilian casualties represent a hybrid terror tactic designed to transport an atmosphere of fear deep into peaceful cities and shake the internal socio-political climate.
- Magnified radius of economic impact: Inventory consumed by flames in these warehouses generally consists of stock purchased by merchants on credit. The destruction of commodity inventories holds the potential to cause mass vendor bankruptcies, bank loan defaults, and cascading layoffs across small businesses.
The events of July 2026 mark an irreversible shift in the threat landscape facing Russian commerce and macroeconomics. Attacks directed at Wildberries hubs in regions such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Tambov exposed the utter vulnerability of civilian logistics infrastructure.
Deploying relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles, the enemy is capable of inflicting tens of billions of rubles in direct damage, paralyzing the supply of essential goods, and triggering an acute social crisis in which hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs face the threat of bankruptcy. According to Russian experts, the total cost of a single fire—similar to the Kotovsk incident on July 18—can range between 50 and 100 billion Rubles ($630 million – $1.2 billion USD).
Despite its massive capital reserves, corporate business was caught unprepared for military threats. The medium-term survival of the e-commerce economy depends on the state and the private sector uniting to engineer unprecedented systemic solutions. Establishing compensation funds and introducing mandatory risk-distribution mechanisms are critical steps that must be taken.
Logistics hubs will remain open targets unless a “state program for subsidized reinsurance of military risks” is established for the critical nodes of the civilian economy. In the future, it will not suffice for large enterprises merely to pour capital into the physical protection of infrastructure; they must also deeply decentralize their logistics networks to prevent the concentration of goods and capital at single points of failure.
Opinion
Egypt Under Fire: What Does the Damietta Strike Mean for Global Energy Markets?
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
For the first time since successive waves of escalation between Washington and Tehran began in recent months, an Egyptian liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility has become a direct target.
In the early hours of Wednesday, 29 July 2026, at least one drone struck the floating storage unit Energos Winter, owned and operated by a U.S. company and sailing under the Marshall Islands flag, while it was moored at the Mediterranean port of Damietta. The impact ignited a fire that spread to a neighboring LNG carrier, GasLog Salem. Egyptian authorities confirmed that the blaze was brought under control without any reported casualties, while no group had claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing.

A Broader Context That Cannot Be Ignored
The incident did not occur in a vacuum. It came only hours after the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had conducted joint strikes with Saudi forces targeting armed factions in Iraq accused of launching drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities. Tehran responded by warning against a “miscalculation,” at a time when the Middle East is still grappling with the repercussions of an earlier round of escalation that erupted on 8 July, when U.S. forces carried out strikes inside Iranian territory following an attack on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated with attacks targeting U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman.
Against this tense backdrop, Damietta appears to represent yet another link in the chain of regional escalation—but an exceptional one. For decades, Egypt has sought to keep itself removed from direct military polarization in the region, unlike several Gulf states that have increasingly become arenas of open confrontation.
At the same time, this interpretation does not entirely rule out the possibility of an indirect Israeli role, driven by hostility toward Egypt’s growing diplomatic influence in the Palestinian and Gaza files. Cairo has remained committed to advancing the two-state solution and to implementing the second and third phases of the peace roadmap agreed upon following the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit last October. The Israeli government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, has sought to obstruct these efforts. Netanyahu, who is the subject of arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court, is widely accused of bearing responsibility for committing genocide that, according to Palestinian authorities, have resulted in the deaths of approximately 73,000 Palestinian civilians since 7 October 2023.
Why Egypt?
Over the past two years, Egypt has steadily strengthened its position as a regional hub for liquefying and re-exporting natural gas. This growing role has been supported by its two LNG plants at Idku and Damietta, in addition to a network of pipelines linking the country with Israel and Cyprus.
This infrastructure—unmatched elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of combined liquefaction capacity and direct access to European and global markets—has transformed Damietta and Idku into critical gateways for Eastern Mediterranean gas, including increasing volumes of Israeli/Stolen Palestinian natural gas liquefied and re-exported through Egyptian facilities.
According to local reports, the Energos Winter alone was supplying approximately 450 million cubic feet of gas per day to Egypt’s national grid and was preparing to receive four additional cargoes during August.
This expanding role gives any attack on Egypt’s gas infrastructure significance far beyond the immediate incident itself. It threatens not only Egypt’s domestic energy supplies but also a supply chain upon which Europe has increasingly relied as part of its strategy to diversify away from Russian natural gas.
Who Was Behind the Attack? Open Scenarios
At the time of writing, no organization had officially claimed responsibility, leaving several possible interpretations.
The first scenario cautions against prematurely attributing responsibility to Iran or its regional allies. It argues that the ambiguity surrounding the incident—and the absence of any claim of responsibility—may itself be deliberate, allowing whichever actor carried out the attack to undermine Egyptian stability without incurring immediate political costs.
This possibility includes actors competing over Eastern Mediterranean energy routes, as well as local or transnational groups pursuing agendas unrelated to the U.S.-Iran confrontation. Egyptian officials themselves have adopted a notably cautious approach. Egypt’s Minister of Information warned against “rushing to accuse any party,” while a former official suggested that “certain actors are seeking to drag Egypt into the conflict,” implying that the attack may have been designed precisely to draw Cairo into a confrontation it has consistently sought to avoid.
A second scenario, Israeli Involvement or the Involvement of Israel’s Allies
This, in itself, remains a serious hypothesis that is reportedly being discussed in undisclosed investigative circles. The prevailing analyses, supported by pro-Israeli and pro-American narratives, have largely centered on suspicions directed at Iran or Iran-aligned actors within the context of the ongoing conflict, rather than at Tel Aviv. This is partly because Israel maintains an energy partnership with Egypt, making any attack on an Egyptian export terminal potentially detrimental to its own natural gas interests.
Nevertheless, this hypothesis—like all others—must ultimately be assessed in light of the findings of the official investigations, which are still underway. It is worth recalling, however, that repeated warnings have been voiced regarding the visits of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington, as such visits have often been followed by heightened regional instability, as was argued after developments last December. According to this line of analysis, Netanyahu seeks to prolong the conflict with Iran in order to strengthen his domestic political position, secure his continuation in office, and advance Israel’s long-term strategic objective of neutralizing Iran and carrying out “Greater Israel.”
Within this framework, some analysts argue that there are broader efforts to weaken both Egypt and Türkey. They cite remarks attributed to a former Mossad operative during appearances on Israeli television, alleging that such a strategy would also serve to divert international attention away from the Gaza file and the question of Palestinian statehood—an issue on which Egypt has intensified its diplomatic efforts in recent days. According to this interpretation, creating indirect pressure on Egypt—the region’s most stable and secure state—could be viewed as a means of drawing Cairo into a wider regional confrontation.
A third scenario links the incident directly to the broader U.S.-Iran escalation. According to the article, The New York Times, citing two Iranian sources, reported that the attack may have been intended as a signal that global shipping and energy supplies could face deeper disruptions should Tehran or its allies choose to escalate further. The sources, however, did not identify the perpetrators or specify the launch point of the drone.
The Messages Behind the Attack
Regardless of who carried out the operation, the choice of target sends several important signals. An attack on what the article describes as the first American-owned energy asset on Egyptian soil would convey a message to Washington that not only its military installations in the Gulf, but also its economic footprint across the region, has become increasingly vulnerable.
For Egypt, which has consistently pursued a policy of strategic restraint and regional neutrality, the incident serves as a reminder that its geographic position—adjacent to some of the world’s most important energy and maritime corridors—no longer guarantees insulation from the conflicts unfolding around it.
For global markets, the attack suggests that the geographic scope of potential disruption is expanding beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf into the Eastern Mediterranean, increasing insurance premiums for shipping and critical energy infrastructure in a region long regarded as comparatively secure.
Egypt’s Official Response
The Egyptian government handled the incident with considerable caution and procedural professionalism, treating it primarily as a crisis-management operation rather than a political event.
The Cabinet confirmed that the fire had been caused by a drone attack without attributing responsibility to any specific party, emphasizing that investigations were continuing “to take all necessary measures to safeguard Egypt’s interests and national security.”
Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly described the response as a test of the state’s crisis-management capabilities, praising emergency teams for successfully moving the burning vessels away from the port, thereby preventing what could have become a far larger disaster.
President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi addressed the incident publicly for the first time during a telephone conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. During the call, he confirmed that the competent authorities were conducting a comprehensive investigation, warned of the dangers posed by the escalating regional situation, and stressed the importance of cooperation between Egypt and the international community to contain the crisis while adhering to peaceful solutions.
This measured diplomatic approach—avoiding direct accusations while emphasizing de-escalation—reflects Cairo’s determination not to be drawn into a broader regional confrontation despite having come under direct attack on its own territory.
Several Gulf states also expressed their full solidarity with Egypt and voiced support for its efforts to safeguard its national security and sovereignty.
The Impact on Global Energy Markets
The Damietta incident occurred at a time when global energy markets were already under considerable strain. Brent crude had been hovering around US$90 per barrel following the escalation of 8 July, while the European Title Transfer Facility (TTF) benchmark for natural gas had climbed above US$700 per 1,000 cubic meters for the first time since March.
Any additional disruption affecting an Egyptian LNG export terminal risks reinforcing this upward trend. Europe has increasingly relied on Egyptian liquefied natural gas as part of its broader strategy to diversify supplies away from Russian pipeline gas. Consequently, even a temporary interruption to Egypt’s export infrastructure could heighten market concerns over supply security.
The incident also adds to the geopolitical risk premium already factored into insurance costs for vessels operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. Higher perceived risks could translate into increased shipping and insurance costs for LNG carriers throughout the region, even if subsequent investigations conclude that the attack was an isolated event unlikely to be repeated.
What Should Be Done to Prevent Similar Incidents?
First, Egypt should further strengthen its short-range air defense capabilities and counter-drone systems around strategic energy installations along its Mediterranean coastline. This includes deploying advanced early-warning radar networks and cost-effective interception systems capable of neutralizing small unmanned aerial vehicles before they reach critical infrastructure.
Second, broader regional intelligence-sharing mechanisms should be expanded among Egypt and neighboring states—including Cyprus, Greece, and Türkiye—in recognition of the increasingly interconnected nature of Eastern Mediterranean gas infrastructure and the shared strategic importance of safeguarding regional energy corridors.
Third, given that the targeted floating storage unit is owned by a U.S. company, Washington should contribute to financing and modernizing the protection of such critical infrastructure rather than limiting its response to statements indicating that it is merely “monitoring the situation,” as the article characterizes the U.S. reaction.
Finally—and perhaps most importantly—reducing the broader cycle of regional escalation between Washington and Tehran remains the only sustainable guarantee against similar incidents in the future. Any purely technical or localized security measures can mitigate immediate risks but cannot eliminate them so long as the underlying geopolitical drivers of confrontation remain unresolved.
Conclusion
The Damietta incident serves as a stark reminder that geographic neutrality alone is no longer sufficient to shield a country that has become a pivotal node in the global energy network.
References:
1- https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39ez3klwmro
4- https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/29/world/middleeast/ships-drone-strike-egypt.html
Opinion
Rising populist parties in Europe and liberalism
Leon Trotsky, one of the foremost leaders of the October Revolution, defined fascism as the totalitarian organization of society by monopoly capital. Magnates of large-scale monopoly capital are acutely aware that their profits cannot be safeguarded in the absence of authoritarian political power. Thus, fascism finds its bedrock of support among capitalist forces, the grand bourgeoisie, monopoly capital circles, and major landowners. We are all too familiar with the calamities fascism wrought upon the world in the era preceding the Second World War.
The post–World War II era is often commemorated as the golden age of capitalism—a period characterized by robust growth rates and low unemployment. Real wages climbed, social rights expanded, demands for a welfare state remained vibrant, and the pursuit of a social state yielded tangible results. This era ultimately met its demise in the 1970s, undone by shifts in the regime of accumulation and structural economic crises.
Today, across Europe, political parties that could virtually be characterized as the direct successors to pre-WWII fascist movements are consolidating their electoral gains. Germany, France, and Italy serve as quintessential examples. These parties weaponize poverty, unemployment, and anti-foreigner, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and anti-Middle Eastern sentiments, while capitalizing on the incompetence of traditional center-right and center-left parties and taking a deeply Eurosceptic, critical stance toward the European Union. They employ caustic rhetoric against the political elites who have dominated governance for decades. Receiving endorsement from both US President Trump and Russian leader Putin, they draw substantial support simultaneously from working-class constituencies—traditionally the bedrock of the left—and from grand capital circles. While monopoly capital quietly pats these populist movements on the back, it simultaneously winks at liberal-democratic and increasingly indistinguishable social-democratic parties that champion unbridled capitalism and aggressive liberalism. Beyond France and Germany, examples abound from Italy to the United Kingdom…
The interests of grand capital, which back populist regimes and advocate authoritarian governance, also champion localization. For the erosion of the national, the public, and the collective—alongside the attenuation of the central state and the elevation of the local—works decisively to the advantage of big capital.
Why?
Because of this:
Under liberalism, the state does not regulate the market; rather, the market regulates, directs, and subdues both the state and society. In a liberal order, the state is expected to act on behalf of capital and in favor of the market—intervening in politics, society, and the law, and enacting statutory frameworks strictly to this end. The state is tasked with engineering legal and institutional arrangements for the market’s account and benefit. Society is reduced to a market-society, wherein the citizen is reimagined as a consumer, a client, and an entrepreneur. Since competition is elevated as the supreme imperative, citizens themselves must become entrepreneurial and competitive—a posture the state actively promotes and incentivizes.
According to liberals, the state bears no obligation to shield its citizens from the pitiless mechanics of the market or the ferocity of unchecked capitalism. On the contrary, the state demands and encourages that citizens establish themselves as entrepreneurial actors within the market arena. Consequently, the state aligns itself with capital, operating at its beck and call. Hence, liberalism harbors an innate preference for unorganized, non-unionized, cheap labor. Wages are suppressed; agricultural subsidies are gutted to a minimum; and strikes are banned on the flimsiest of pretexts.
Because liberalism insists that the state be sculpted, organized, and driven according to market demands—allowing the market to command and direct the state—the liberal vision of the nexus between politics and economics, as well as politics and law, is deeply fractured. In their worldview, law must operate exclusively to the advantage of capital, acting as the vigilant sentinel for the inviolability of property rights. It must dismantle every obstacle standing in the way of free trade, unbridled competition, and the free market, while swiftly and severely penalizing any force that dares to impede them. To conform to the expectations and demands of capital: this is the primary imperative required of the law.
In sum, through its championing of identity politics, its reduction of the citizen to a mere client, and its liquidation of the state’s social character in order to place public power at the disposal of capital, liberalism stands fundamentally opposed to the social, the public, and the national. This is a truth that must be firmly impressed upon left-liberals, nationalist-liberals, and conservative-liberals alike.
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