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The prospects for the Russia–U.S. Budapest summit are bleak

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On October 23, White House spokesperson Levitt said that the planned U.S.–Russia meeting in Budapest had not been completely canceled, stating, “The president and this administration look forward to holding such meetings again in the future, but we must ensure that the talks can yield concrete positive results.”

Although Levitt’s clarification rekindled hope after U.S. President Trump announced the cancellation of the summit the day before, the wide gaps in the parties’ positions mean that even if the Russian and U.S. leaders gather in Budapest, the summit’s prospects would still be bleak. The summit was set during a phone call between Trump and Putin on October 16 and received active cooperation from the Hungarian government. However, the situation took a sharp turn within just a week, showing that brokering peace between Russia and Ukraine is by no means easy.

On the 22nd, Trump announced to the media that he was canceling the planned meeting with Russian President Putin because he felt the two sides “could not achieve the necessary objectives.” However, Trump did not shut the door on a new round of U.S.–Russia summits, stressing that he would meet with Putin in the future and reiterating the principled position of “adhering to a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine conflict.”

As efforts for a Russia–U.S. summit were impeded, the United States and Europe further increased pressure on Russia, casting a greater shadow over the possibility that the summit would proceed and make positive progress. On the 22nd, the Trump administration first announced sanctions on Russia related to the Ukraine crisis, citing Putin’s “dishonesty and lack of candor” in the relevant talks, and imposed sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil companies—Rosneft and Gazprom—to cut off financial sources supporting Russia’s prosecution of the war. It is reported that the crude oil exports of these two companies account for 50% of Russia’s total crude oil exports.

At the same time, to reinforce these sanctions, the Trump administration launched “secondary sanctions” and indirect containment measures, imposing a 25% tariff on Indian goods exported to the United States to retaliate for its purchase of Russian oil at discount prices, thereby undermining Russia’s ability to maintain a military edge. Reuters commented that this was a major shift in Trump’s Russia policy.

As a new measure tightening the screws on Russia in step with the United States, the 27 EU member states also announced on the 22nd a 19th round of sanctions against Russia, focused on the energy and financial sectors. Under this sanctions order, the EU will for the first time ban Russian liquefied natural gas from entering the European market and will lower the price paid for Russian crude oil to 47.6 dollars per barrel; in addition, Russia’s two major oil companies will face a comprehensive trading ban, financial institutions in Russia and certain other countries will be restricted by trading bans, and crypto partners will be included in the scope of sanctions for the first time.

Of course, to some extent, the U.S. and Europe stepping up sanctions on Russia is also a punishment for Russia’s joint exercises of its land, sea, and air strategic nuclear forces on the 22nd, during which it launched intercontinental ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. At this point, the Russia–U.S. Budapest summit that once offered a glimmer of hope to the international community is likely to be aborted completely. The fundamental reason is the huge gap between the positions of Russia and Ukraine and their European partners, as well as the United States, with differences hard to bridge.

Russia’s demands are very clear and not open to doubt. Specifically, a peace agreement must be reached first before a cease-fire can be discussed. Moreover, Russia does not intend to give up the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula it currently occupies; it is only willing to trade parts of the Ukrainian territory it occupies in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions for Ukraine’s withdrawal from the remaining areas it controls in Donbas, allowing Russia to have full possession of the more strategically significant eastern Ukraine.

The U.S. position has wavered but ultimately accommodated Ukraine and its European allies. Trump has repeatedly hoped for a local cease-fire between Russia and Ukraine followed by a peace agreement. In essence, he wants to persuade Ukraine to give up the land occupied by Russia and to avoid futile and unwinnable battles so as not to fall into a passive situation of losing more territory the longer the war lasts. It is reported that during Ukrainian President Zelensky’s recent visit to the White House, Trump, who had missed out on the Nobel Peace Prize and lost patience with mediation, was extremely displeased. He not only tossed aside the battlefield map of Ukraine presented by Zelensky, but also received this deferential leader of a small country coldly, leaving him to hold a press conference only on the street outside the White House fence. The reality that a weak country has no diplomacy is lamentable.

Ukraine and its European partners who firmly back its resolute resistance to Russia take a hard line. Zelensky has repeatedly emphasized that territorial issues are non-negotiable, that talks can only be based on the lines between the two sides before Russia launched the “special military operation,” and he rejects ceding land for peace. Most European countries reject the “land swap” plan Putin recently proposed to Trump and oppose Ukraine obtaining a peace agreement at the price of giving up territory, because in essence it still sacrifices Ukraine’s territory and sovereignty.

Recently, Ukraine and its European partners also jointly formulated a “12-point plan” to comprehensively end the Russia-Ukraine war. Its main contents include that, after both sides agree to a cease-fire and commit to stopping territorial advances, Ukraine will obtain security guarantees, funds needed to repair war damage, and a fast track to join the EU. Europe will gradually lift sanctions on Russia and, after it agrees to help Ukraine with reconstruction, return the 300 billion dollars of Russian assets frozen in European countries. If Russia attacks a neighboring country again, European sanctions will quickly resume. In addition, Russia and Ukraine will open negotiations on the governance of occupied territories; however, neither Ukraine nor Europe will legally recognize any occupied territory as belonging to Russia.

In this sense, Ukraine and Europe have still made concessions to a certain extent, namely acknowledging the reality that it is difficult to defeat Russia militarily and retake the territory Ukraine has lost, being willing to first stop the war based on practical considerations, solidify the zones of control and the battlefield pattern, treat the occupied territories as a “governance issue,” and hold to the final bottom line of not recognizing Russia’s legality over Ukrainian territory.

Power determines the course and outcome of war; circumstances overpower individuals. Because Russia has won an overwhelming victory at the battlefield level and continues to expand its occupied areas, it insists that Ukraine and Europe must accept a package peace treaty before a cease-fire, and it demands that Ukraine not join NATO in the future and that there be no foreign troops stationed in Ukraine.

The vast negotiating gulf between Russia and Ukraine and their European partners buried Trump’s passion and optimism and left the White House master, who believes in “transactional diplomacy” and is eager for quick results, at a loss, increasingly showing dissatisfaction with Putin, and in the end hitting both sides: brandishing sanctions to try to force Russian concessions while refusing to sell Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine so as not to worsen U.S.–Russia relations and bring trouble upon himself.

The Ukraine war has lasted three and a half years, and the stalemate cannot be fundamentally changed in the short term, so various peace proposals are naturally being floated to break the deadlock. However, history shows that wars are easy to start and hard to end, because neither side wants to be the loser or readily accept defeat. The large-scale military contest in the Korean War lasted only one year, but peace talks continued for two years. America’s Vietnam War lasted 14 years, with peace talks continuing for seven. The Soviet Union’s Afghanistan war lasted 10 years, with negotiations taking three. America’s Afghanistan war lasted 13 years, and after Obama announced the end of the war the two sides still fought and negotiated for as long as seven years…

The Russia–Ukraine war will not change the overall pattern of “a miserable victory for Russia and a disastrous defeat for Ukraine.” It will likely end in the “Korean War model,” namely both sides fight to exhaustion, find the optimal stop-loss point, halt fire, sign an armistice, and then wait for a better window to sign a peace treaty. It has been 72 years since the Korean War armistice and a peace treaty is still far away. Therefore, expecting the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war to cease fire soon and reach a peace treaty is wishful thinking.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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