Opinion
After the Busan summit, can China and the US overcome the challenges?
On October 30, Chinese President Xi Jinping held a landmark meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in Busan, South Korea, recalibrating and setting the tone again for the development of bilateral relations. Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in trade, energy, and other fields and to promote cultural exchanges; they also agreed that the heads of state would maintain regular contact. Trump expressed his hope to visit China early next year and invited President Xi to visit the United States. At the same time, the two sides’ economic and trade teams announced several breakthrough advances from the latest round of negotiations.
Observers believe that the successful breakthrough of the China-U.S. trade negotiations in Kuala Lumpur laid a good foundation and created a harmonious atmosphere for the Busan Summit; the summit itself and the consensus reached undoubtedly established a new direction and tone for stabilizing and advancing China-U.S. relations, bringing encouraging optimism to the international community and injecting stability and vitality into the global geopolitical and economic systems. In short, from the Kuala Lumpur negotiations to the Busan Summit, China-U.S. relations have basically bid farewell to the long-term turbulence, twists, and crises that began after 2018. It seems that “the light boat has passed ten thousand mountains,” and is sailing toward a new world conducive to the development and prosperity of both countries and to global stability and peace. However, considering the complexity of major-power relations, a rational assessment of current China-U.S. relations should be that “the heavy ship is still crossing a thousand ridges.”
The 100-minute Busan Summit marked the first meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in six years, and the first China-U.S. summit in Trump’s new term, coinciding with the completion of the fourth round of China-U.S. trade talks. Thus, not only did both sides attach great importance to it, but the international community also watched closely. The China-U.S. relationship is the most important in the world; its trajectory determines not only the future of both nations but also global security and destiny. It can be said that mainstream international opinion hopes that the two great ships of China and the United States will move toward each other, coexist peacefully, advance harmoniously, and work together in unity.
According to Xinhua News Agency, Xi Jinping emphasized during the talks that the heads of state play the role of steering and guiding bilateral relations; as the world’s two largest economies with different national conditions, differences and even frictions are natural and normal; China has adhered to one blueprint for more than 70 years, focusing on doing its own work well and sharing development opportunities with the world, with no intention of challenging or replacing anyone; China’s development and revitalization are not in conflict with Trump’s call to “Make America Great Again” and can complement each other for shared prosperity; China and the United States should take a broad view, focusing on the long-term benefits of cooperation rather than falling into a vicious cycle of mutual retaliation; both countries have the will and responsibility to promote peaceful solutions to regional hotspots and can jointly demonstrate major-power responsibility, working together on significant, practical, and beneficial undertakings for both nations and the world.
Trump said, “It is an honor to meet President Xi. China is a great country, and President Xi is a respected great leader and my good friend for many years. We have a very pleasant relationship. U.S.-China relations have always been good and will be better in the future. I hope both China and the United States will have an even better future. China is the United States’ greatest partner, and the two countries working together can accomplish many great things in the world. Future U.S.-China cooperation will achieve even greater results.”
At the Busan Summit, both heads of state stated that China would host the 2026 APEC Economic Leaders’ Informal Meeting and that the United States would host the G20 Summit, expressing satisfaction with each other’s success. They also agreed to exchange visits next year.
During Trump’s first presidency, he paid a state visit to China. After his re-election in 2024, he repeatedly expressed his desire to visit China again as soon as possible. However, for well-known reasons, his second visit to China had long remained uncertain. The Busan Summit confirmed that Trump would visit China early next year and that President Xi would later pay a return visit to the United States, a major positive development eagerly anticipated by both countries and the international community. It indicates that the stability of China-U.S. relations in the coming year, or even several years, is within reach, and further improvement is the shared will of both leaders and the trend of the times and the global situation.
Observers also noted that during the Busan summit talks, neither the Chinese nor U.S. heads of state mentioned the Taiwan issue, indicating that this matter—China’s internal affair that has always obstructed China-U.S. relations—seems no longer on the two sides’ topic list, in stark contrast to their meeting in Osaka, Japan six years ago. On September 19 this year, when Xi Jinping and Donald Trump held a phone consultation, the Taiwan topic did not appear in news reports either. Therefore, the two most recent instances of direct communication between the Chinese and U.S. leaders released an extraordinary signal externally, and are undoubtedly a major step forward in overcoming the “Taiwan obstacle” in China-U.S. relations. Recently, the well-known American think tank Rand Corporation suggested that the U.S. government “support China’s gradual unification,” which can be described as a new line of thinking in U.S. think tanks’ approach to relations with China. Considered together, these signs clearly show that China-U.S. relations differ from the past.
After the China-U.S. leaders’ meeting in Busan, the consensus results of the Kuala Lumpur consultations by the two countries’ economic and trade teams were made public. The good news spread rapidly across the world and was encouraging, mainly including the following aspects:
1.The U.S. side will cancel the additional 10% so-called “fentanyl tariff” on Chinese goods (including goods from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region). The additional 24% reciprocal tariff on Chinese goods (including goods from the HKSAR and the MSAR) will continue to be suspended for one year. The Chinese side will correspondingly adjust countermeasures against the above U.S. tariffs. Both sides agreed to continue extending certain tariff-exclusion measures.
2.The U.S. side will suspend for one year implementation of the “50%” de minimis rule in the export-control measures it announced on September 29. The Chinese side will suspend for one year implementation of relevant export-control and other measures it announced on October 9, and will study and refine specific plans.
3.The U.S. side will suspend for one year its Section 301 investigative measures regarding China’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding industries. After the U.S. side suspends the relevant measures, the Chinese side will correspondingly suspend for one year its countermeasures against the U.S. side.
In addition, the two sides also reached consensus on cooperation in fentanyl counter-narcotics, expanding trade in agricultural products, and handling certain individual corporate cases. The two sides further confirmed the outcomes of the Madrid economic and trade consultations; the U.S. side made positive commitments in fields such as investment, and the Chinese side will properly resolve issues related to TikTok with the U.S. side.
Economic and trade cooperation is the ballast stone of China-U.S. relations. Although Donald Trump’s second-term policy toward China “started low and moved low,” the posture is commendable and the momentum is good. However, in April of this year he launched a global tariff war, beginning with attacks on neighboring countries and allies and soon pointing the sword at China. China came prepared, quickly launching a “combination punch of eleven arrows” to counter, and promoted the completion of four rounds of marathon trade negotiations between China and the United States:
— May 10–11 this year, Geneva, Switzerland: China and the United States reached a consensus on tariff reductions;
— July 28–29, Stockholm, Sweden: China and the United States agreed to extend the tariff-suspension period;
— September 14–17, Madrid, Spain: China and the United States focused on tariffs and export controls;
— October 24–27, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: China and the United States reached the above package consensus.
The harvest from the half-year series of China-U.S. trade negotiations, especially the major outcomes recently achieved, paved the way for the smooth holding of the China-U.S. Busan summit; and the new consensus reached by the two heads of state at the Busan summit has in turn provided driving force and top-level guarantees for follow-up negotiations to thoroughly resolve economic and trade disputes, and will provide new expectations and clarify a new direction for expanding China-U.S. economic and trade and energy cooperation, as well as people-to-people exchanges.
From the four rounds of China-U.S. trade negotiations to the China-U.S. summit in Busan, we can draw major insights for handling China-U.S. relations:
First, “Let him be strong, the clear breeze brushes the mountain ridge; let him be overbearing, the bright moon shines on the great river.” As a major country in the world, China must unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, strive around the dream of building a strong country and national rejuvenation, and avoid all external interference; it must always “bite the green mountain and not let go,” using strong economic development, great comprehensive strength, and sustained social stability to respond to a world where change and turmoil intertwine.
Second, “A train runs fast because the locomotive leads.” The healthy and stable development of China-U.S. relations relies on the strategic judgment, strategic mutual trust, personal friendship, and frequent communication of the two countries’ leaders. President Xi Jinping not only has a far-reaching view of the overall, strategic, and key essential characteristics of China-U.S. relations, but has also repeatedly stressed: “We have a thousand reasons to get China-U.S. relations right, and not a single reason to wreck them”; “China never bets on the United States to lose, never interferes in U.S. internal affairs, and has no intention of challenging or replacing the United States; we are pleased to see a confident, open, developing, and prosperous United States.” These assertions set the general policy for China in handling relations with the United States. From his campaign for a second term, Donald Trump no longer listed China as a main topic, nor did he promise armed support for “Taiwan independence.” After taking office he released a large amount of positive and healthy information toward China, restrained his subordinates in managing statements regarding China, and held three phone calls with President Xi Jinping. The positive guidance, steady steering, and command of the overall situation by the Chinese and U.S. heads of state have played an irreplaceable navigational role in stabilizing and recovering the bilateral relationship.
Third, be reasonable, advantageous, and measured; talk business when discussing business; contend without breaking. China and the United States are the two largest economies in the world and important trading partners for each other. In the 53 years since normalization of relations, they have achieved many major and mutually beneficial outcomes, while also accumulating many political differences, economic problems, and trade frictions. However, as long as both sides adhere to the principle of avoiding the politicization of economic and trade issues, avoiding the economization of political issues, and avoiding the instrumentalization of the economic and trade relationship, they will certainly find proper solutions and reach a new consensus and a new realm of mutual benefit, win–win cooperation, and mutual achievement.
Fourth, “When elephants fight, the lawn suffers.” China and the United States are, respectively, a world-class power and a major power; their bilateral relationship is vital, a tug on one hair moves the whole body, and it concerns global stability and peace. The China–U.S. trade war has seriously affected the world’s industrial, supply, and value chains, and has impacted the future and destiny of the world trade system, the economic system, and globalization. If China and the United States fight viciously, both will be hurt and defeated and the world will suffer; if China and the United States reconcile, both countries will profit and the world will benefit. This has become a highly shared understanding and a basic consensus of international public opinion. Therefore, in line with the responsibility and mission of seeking the well-being of the two peoples and safeguarding world peace and development, China and the United States must properly handle their bilateral relations, must assume major-power responsibilities, and abide by major-power obligations.
The China–U.S. summit in Busan is a high point of a “V-shaped” reversal after a cliff-like deterioration of relations lasting seven years, but the bilateral relationship has still not returned to its best historical state, nor has a new normal of stable development yet formed. Although the leaders of the two countries stress “to be partners and to be friends,” this prospect is still far from the ideal state of being “true partners and true friends,” let alone “good partners and good friends.”
Given the huge differences between China and the United States—especially the United States’ political system, social system, and national positioning, which lead to continued uncertainty in its domestic and foreign affairs—even if the great ship of China–U.S. relations sails into safe waters with calm seas and bright sunshine, it will inevitably encounter sudden changes of weather, high winds and rough waves, and even the test of stormy seas. However, for China, it must always maintain strong strategic confidence, strategic composure, strategic direction, strategic will, and strategic wisdom, and, with the posture of a great and powerful country of “let the winds blow from the east, south, west, and north; I remain unmoved,” meet changes in the situation and changes in the world.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
A voice rising from New Delhi: BRICS’s manifesto for a new world order
The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in the Indian capital of New Delhi on May 15, 2026, carries a significance that extends far beyond the confines of routine diplomacy. This gathering culminated in the signing of one of the most comprehensive political documents to date, outlining the vision of the world order that BRICS envisions for 2026. Reading between the lines, the document reveals not merely the proceedings of a ministerial summit, but the contours of a comprehensive alternative vision challenging the Western-centric international system. Indeed, this text must be read as a political manifesto of the shifting balances of power, the accelerating global struggle for influence, and the emerging new world order of recent years.
The overarching theme dominating the entire document is “The Rise of the Global South.” BRICS members contend that the current international order is unjust, insufficiently representative, and fails to reflect the interests of developing nations. Consequently, they emphasize the urgent need to restructure foundational institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, BRICS now positions itself as the voice of the non-Western world. Today, the global arena is traversing an era in which the post-World War II international system has plunged into a profound crisis of legitimacy and representation. Developments such as the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, the Gaza crisis, global trade wars, the weaponization of sanctions, energy security challenges, and technological competition demonstrate that the current system struggles to mirror contemporary global realities. It is precisely from this premise that the BRICS nations operate, sending a clear message to the world through the New Delhi Outcome Document: “The status quo is no longer sustainable.”
One of the most striking aspects of the document is how clearly it demonstrates that BRICS no longer views itself as a mere platform for economic cooperation. Having long focused primarily on economic development, trade, and finance since its inception, BRICS has now reached a far more ambitious posture. In the New Delhi Outcome Document, issues of security, geopolitical crises, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate policies, energy transition, and international governance reforms occupy a place as central as economics. This indicates that BRICS’s ambition to become a foundational actor in global politics is steadily gaining traction. Reading between the lines, the strongest emphasis emerges on the concept of a “multipolar world.” The core approach of BRICS is animated by the premise that the Western-centric, largely US-led international order, which took shape over the decades following the end of the Cold War, is no longer the sole alternative. Throughout the declaration, the repeated use of phrases like “more just,” “more representative,” “more democratic,” and “more inclusive” international system constitutes a direct critique of the current distribution of global power.
The sections concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council are particularly critical. Indeed, the call for UN reform stands out as one of the most pivotal political segments of the document. BRICS nations explicitly state that the current structure fails to reflect contemporary realities. They contend that Africa, Latin America, and emerging Asian powers are underrepresented in decision-making mechanisms. What is even more remarkable is that China and Russia have reaffirmed their support for India and Brazil to assume greater roles within the Security Council. This state of affairs reveals, first and foremost, the elevation of India and Brazil to global-power status. Secondly, it demonstrates an increasing political cohesion within BRICS. Finally, it illustrates a fundamental questioning of the post-WWII international order.
Another prominent element in the document is the sharp critique of the sanctions policies pursued by the United States and the West. The intensive use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in recent years has engendered collective discomfort among BRICS nations. The text emphasizes that unilateral sanctions violate international law and severely hamper the economic development of developing nations. Although no countries are named directly, this formulation can be read as a potent critique targeted at measures such as US sanctions on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as the embargo on Cuba. This approach is a continuation of BRICS’s long-standing critique regarding the “weaponization of economics.” Indeed, one of the most strategic segments of the declaration emerges here. For BRICS is no longer merely criticizing the existing financial architecture; it is actively endeavoring to construct alternative mechanisms. Initiatives such as cross-border payment systems, trade in local currencies, financial integration, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank can be read as harbingers of a long-term quest to forge an alternative to the dollar-centric global economic structure. While it is premature to speak of a system capable of fully displacing the dollar, the steps taken by BRICS are beginning to demonstrate that the current financial order is not the only option.
Another major political segment of the New Delhi Document concerns the Gaza and Palestine issue. Here, we witness one of the strongest stances BRICS has ever taken on the matter. The document employs highly resolute language regarding Gaza and Palestine, with a notable emphasis on an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Furthermore, South Africa’s legal action against Israel and the rulings of the International Court of Justice are directly recalled in the text. In the face of recent offensives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, BRICS nations have displayed one of their clearest collective stances to date. The call for an immediate ceasefire, the demand for unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, support for Palestinian statehood, and the emphasis on international law stand among the declaration’s most potent political messages. This can be interpreted as an indication of BRICS’s desire to become a more visible and effective political actor in global crises.
On the other hand, the text does not entirely gloss over the internal divergences within BRICS. It openly acknowledges that members hold differing views, particularly on Middle Eastern issues. This is significant because today’s BRICS is no longer a bloc comprised solely of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the integration of new members such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, it has evolved into a far more complex geopolitical entity. Interestingly, the document explicitly notes that rather than a unified stance, differing perspectives exist on certain issues. Specifically, it is conceded that members hold divergent positions on matters concerning Iran, the Gulf states, and Yemen. Despite these differences, the bloc’s ability to establish common ground demonstrates an expansion of BRICS’s diplomatic capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the New Delhi process also represents a significant diplomatic triumph for India. While the recent wave of expansion—bringing in Iran, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—has enriched the platform’s geopolitical diversity, it has also rendered collective decision-making processes more intricate. Particularly at a juncture where the war in Iran continues, the deep-seated divergences between Iran and the Gulf states led many experts to predict that BRICS would struggle to find common political ground and that the summit would be fraught with severe diplomatic friction. However, despite all these differences, India succeeded in rallying members with diverging interests and priorities around the same platform, proving that BRICS retains its capacity to generate dialogue rather than fracture. In this context, the outcome in New Delhi is not limited merely to the content of the published joint text. The true, striking success lies in the preservation of a diplomatic arena that enabled members—who find themselves directly opposed on certain issues in an extremely sensitive and polarized crisis environment—to compromise on other matters and continue negotiating under the BRICS umbrella.
Furthermore, one of the document’s most critical messages emerges in the realm of technology. The extensive coverage of topics such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, data security, and cybersecurity is no coincidence. Indeed, the global power struggle of the future will be shaped heavily through technological supremacy. BRICS nations clearly demonstrate their awareness of this reality and their intent to act in unison in the technological race. Particularly noteworthy is their quest to develop alternatives to Western-centric norms in artificial intelligence governance. A distinct approach is also observed in energy and climate policies. Instead of the rapid energy transition frequently championed by Western nations, the concept of a “just energy transition” is prioritized. At the heart of this approach lies the conviction that the economic growth needs of developing nations must not be disregarded. BRICS countries advocate for a balance between environmental responsibility and the right to development. This points to a major fault line that will become increasingly pronounced in global climate debates in the coming years.
When all these headings are evaluated together, the resulting picture is remarkably clear: BRICS is no longer merely a platform for safeguarding economic interests. It is a center of power beginning to articulate its own vision of how the international system ought to operate. At the core of this vision lies the objective of greater representation, sovereign equality, deeper multipolarity, and a stronger voice for developing nations in global decision-making processes.
The New Delhi Document, brought to the table at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, is far more than a mere communique; it is one of the landmark texts of the historic transformation unfolding in global politics. As the world rapidly moves away from a unipolar structure, BRICS is emerging as one of the most powerful political and economic vehicles of this transition. Today, many rules of the international system may still be written by the West. Yet, the message rising from New Delhi is clear: far more actors now demand a seat at the table to rewrite those very rules. BRICS is transitioning from an economic club into a political, diplomatic, financial, and technological powerhouse. Its claim to serve as the collective voice and compass of the Global South is strengthening. It pursues a dual strategy: offering an alternative to Western-centric institutions while simultaneously working to transform them. BRICS is not yet establishing institutions to directly replace the UN, IMF, World Bank, or WTO; rather, it is striving to change the rules and the distribution of power within them.
The 2026 New Delhi Document of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India under its presidency, can be regarded as one of the most comprehensive strategic documents in the twenty-year history of BRICS. The text serves as a political manifesto for an era marked by the sunset of the US- and Western-led unipolar epoch, the demands of rising powers for greater agency, and the accelerating quest of the Global South to establish a permanent weight in the international system.
The essence of the document can be distilled into a single sentence: while BRICS remains a platform that adapts to the rules of the existing international order, it is simultaneously transforming into a global actor that seeks to rewrite them.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
Opinion
NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism
Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.
As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.
In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.
Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.
Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion
NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.
And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.
The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.
The collapse of the Atlantic system
Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.
In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.
Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.
For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.
Opinion
Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing
Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.
For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.
Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.
It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.
The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.
Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.
This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.
For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.
China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.
All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.
The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.
Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.
Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
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