Opinion
After the Busan summit, can China and the US overcome the challenges?
On October 30, Chinese President Xi Jinping held a landmark meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in Busan, South Korea, recalibrating and setting the tone again for the development of bilateral relations. Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in trade, energy, and other fields and to promote cultural exchanges; they also agreed that the heads of state would maintain regular contact. Trump expressed his hope to visit China early next year and invited President Xi to visit the United States. At the same time, the two sides’ economic and trade teams announced several breakthrough advances from the latest round of negotiations.
Observers believe that the successful breakthrough of the China-U.S. trade negotiations in Kuala Lumpur laid a good foundation and created a harmonious atmosphere for the Busan Summit; the summit itself and the consensus reached undoubtedly established a new direction and tone for stabilizing and advancing China-U.S. relations, bringing encouraging optimism to the international community and injecting stability and vitality into the global geopolitical and economic systems. In short, from the Kuala Lumpur negotiations to the Busan Summit, China-U.S. relations have basically bid farewell to the long-term turbulence, twists, and crises that began after 2018. It seems that “the light boat has passed ten thousand mountains,” and is sailing toward a new world conducive to the development and prosperity of both countries and to global stability and peace. However, considering the complexity of major-power relations, a rational assessment of current China-U.S. relations should be that “the heavy ship is still crossing a thousand ridges.”
The 100-minute Busan Summit marked the first meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in six years, and the first China-U.S. summit in Trump’s new term, coinciding with the completion of the fourth round of China-U.S. trade talks. Thus, not only did both sides attach great importance to it, but the international community also watched closely. The China-U.S. relationship is the most important in the world; its trajectory determines not only the future of both nations but also global security and destiny. It can be said that mainstream international opinion hopes that the two great ships of China and the United States will move toward each other, coexist peacefully, advance harmoniously, and work together in unity.
According to Xinhua News Agency, Xi Jinping emphasized during the talks that the heads of state play the role of steering and guiding bilateral relations; as the world’s two largest economies with different national conditions, differences and even frictions are natural and normal; China has adhered to one blueprint for more than 70 years, focusing on doing its own work well and sharing development opportunities with the world, with no intention of challenging or replacing anyone; China’s development and revitalization are not in conflict with Trump’s call to “Make America Great Again” and can complement each other for shared prosperity; China and the United States should take a broad view, focusing on the long-term benefits of cooperation rather than falling into a vicious cycle of mutual retaliation; both countries have the will and responsibility to promote peaceful solutions to regional hotspots and can jointly demonstrate major-power responsibility, working together on significant, practical, and beneficial undertakings for both nations and the world.
Trump said, “It is an honor to meet President Xi. China is a great country, and President Xi is a respected great leader and my good friend for many years. We have a very pleasant relationship. U.S.-China relations have always been good and will be better in the future. I hope both China and the United States will have an even better future. China is the United States’ greatest partner, and the two countries working together can accomplish many great things in the world. Future U.S.-China cooperation will achieve even greater results.”
At the Busan Summit, both heads of state stated that China would host the 2026 APEC Economic Leaders’ Informal Meeting and that the United States would host the G20 Summit, expressing satisfaction with each other’s success. They also agreed to exchange visits next year.
During Trump’s first presidency, he paid a state visit to China. After his re-election in 2024, he repeatedly expressed his desire to visit China again as soon as possible. However, for well-known reasons, his second visit to China had long remained uncertain. The Busan Summit confirmed that Trump would visit China early next year and that President Xi would later pay a return visit to the United States, a major positive development eagerly anticipated by both countries and the international community. It indicates that the stability of China-U.S. relations in the coming year, or even several years, is within reach, and further improvement is the shared will of both leaders and the trend of the times and the global situation.
Observers also noted that during the Busan summit talks, neither the Chinese nor U.S. heads of state mentioned the Taiwan issue, indicating that this matter—China’s internal affair that has always obstructed China-U.S. relations—seems no longer on the two sides’ topic list, in stark contrast to their meeting in Osaka, Japan six years ago. On September 19 this year, when Xi Jinping and Donald Trump held a phone consultation, the Taiwan topic did not appear in news reports either. Therefore, the two most recent instances of direct communication between the Chinese and U.S. leaders released an extraordinary signal externally, and are undoubtedly a major step forward in overcoming the “Taiwan obstacle” in China-U.S. relations. Recently, the well-known American think tank Rand Corporation suggested that the U.S. government “support China’s gradual unification,” which can be described as a new line of thinking in U.S. think tanks’ approach to relations with China. Considered together, these signs clearly show that China-U.S. relations differ from the past.
After the China-U.S. leaders’ meeting in Busan, the consensus results of the Kuala Lumpur consultations by the two countries’ economic and trade teams were made public. The good news spread rapidly across the world and was encouraging, mainly including the following aspects:
1.The U.S. side will cancel the additional 10% so-called “fentanyl tariff” on Chinese goods (including goods from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region). The additional 24% reciprocal tariff on Chinese goods (including goods from the HKSAR and the MSAR) will continue to be suspended for one year. The Chinese side will correspondingly adjust countermeasures against the above U.S. tariffs. Both sides agreed to continue extending certain tariff-exclusion measures.
2.The U.S. side will suspend for one year implementation of the “50%” de minimis rule in the export-control measures it announced on September 29. The Chinese side will suspend for one year implementation of relevant export-control and other measures it announced on October 9, and will study and refine specific plans.
3.The U.S. side will suspend for one year its Section 301 investigative measures regarding China’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding industries. After the U.S. side suspends the relevant measures, the Chinese side will correspondingly suspend for one year its countermeasures against the U.S. side.
In addition, the two sides also reached consensus on cooperation in fentanyl counter-narcotics, expanding trade in agricultural products, and handling certain individual corporate cases. The two sides further confirmed the outcomes of the Madrid economic and trade consultations; the U.S. side made positive commitments in fields such as investment, and the Chinese side will properly resolve issues related to TikTok with the U.S. side.
Economic and trade cooperation is the ballast stone of China-U.S. relations. Although Donald Trump’s second-term policy toward China “started low and moved low,” the posture is commendable and the momentum is good. However, in April of this year he launched a global tariff war, beginning with attacks on neighboring countries and allies and soon pointing the sword at China. China came prepared, quickly launching a “combination punch of eleven arrows” to counter, and promoted the completion of four rounds of marathon trade negotiations between China and the United States:
— May 10–11 this year, Geneva, Switzerland: China and the United States reached a consensus on tariff reductions;
— July 28–29, Stockholm, Sweden: China and the United States agreed to extend the tariff-suspension period;
— September 14–17, Madrid, Spain: China and the United States focused on tariffs and export controls;
— October 24–27, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: China and the United States reached the above package consensus.
The harvest from the half-year series of China-U.S. trade negotiations, especially the major outcomes recently achieved, paved the way for the smooth holding of the China-U.S. Busan summit; and the new consensus reached by the two heads of state at the Busan summit has in turn provided driving force and top-level guarantees for follow-up negotiations to thoroughly resolve economic and trade disputes, and will provide new expectations and clarify a new direction for expanding China-U.S. economic and trade and energy cooperation, as well as people-to-people exchanges.
From the four rounds of China-U.S. trade negotiations to the China-U.S. summit in Busan, we can draw major insights for handling China-U.S. relations:
First, “Let him be strong, the clear breeze brushes the mountain ridge; let him be overbearing, the bright moon shines on the great river.” As a major country in the world, China must unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, strive around the dream of building a strong country and national rejuvenation, and avoid all external interference; it must always “bite the green mountain and not let go,” using strong economic development, great comprehensive strength, and sustained social stability to respond to a world where change and turmoil intertwine.
Second, “A train runs fast because the locomotive leads.” The healthy and stable development of China-U.S. relations relies on the strategic judgment, strategic mutual trust, personal friendship, and frequent communication of the two countries’ leaders. President Xi Jinping not only has a far-reaching view of the overall, strategic, and key essential characteristics of China-U.S. relations, but has also repeatedly stressed: “We have a thousand reasons to get China-U.S. relations right, and not a single reason to wreck them”; “China never bets on the United States to lose, never interferes in U.S. internal affairs, and has no intention of challenging or replacing the United States; we are pleased to see a confident, open, developing, and prosperous United States.” These assertions set the general policy for China in handling relations with the United States. From his campaign for a second term, Donald Trump no longer listed China as a main topic, nor did he promise armed support for “Taiwan independence.” After taking office he released a large amount of positive and healthy information toward China, restrained his subordinates in managing statements regarding China, and held three phone calls with President Xi Jinping. The positive guidance, steady steering, and command of the overall situation by the Chinese and U.S. heads of state have played an irreplaceable navigational role in stabilizing and recovering the bilateral relationship.
Third, be reasonable, advantageous, and measured; talk business when discussing business; contend without breaking. China and the United States are the two largest economies in the world and important trading partners for each other. In the 53 years since normalization of relations, they have achieved many major and mutually beneficial outcomes, while also accumulating many political differences, economic problems, and trade frictions. However, as long as both sides adhere to the principle of avoiding the politicization of economic and trade issues, avoiding the economization of political issues, and avoiding the instrumentalization of the economic and trade relationship, they will certainly find proper solutions and reach a new consensus and a new realm of mutual benefit, win–win cooperation, and mutual achievement.
Fourth, “When elephants fight, the lawn suffers.” China and the United States are, respectively, a world-class power and a major power; their bilateral relationship is vital, a tug on one hair moves the whole body, and it concerns global stability and peace. The China–U.S. trade war has seriously affected the world’s industrial, supply, and value chains, and has impacted the future and destiny of the world trade system, the economic system, and globalization. If China and the United States fight viciously, both will be hurt and defeated and the world will suffer; if China and the United States reconcile, both countries will profit and the world will benefit. This has become a highly shared understanding and a basic consensus of international public opinion. Therefore, in line with the responsibility and mission of seeking the well-being of the two peoples and safeguarding world peace and development, China and the United States must properly handle their bilateral relations, must assume major-power responsibilities, and abide by major-power obligations.
The China–U.S. summit in Busan is a high point of a “V-shaped” reversal after a cliff-like deterioration of relations lasting seven years, but the bilateral relationship has still not returned to its best historical state, nor has a new normal of stable development yet formed. Although the leaders of the two countries stress “to be partners and to be friends,” this prospect is still far from the ideal state of being “true partners and true friends,” let alone “good partners and good friends.”
Given the huge differences between China and the United States—especially the United States’ political system, social system, and national positioning, which lead to continued uncertainty in its domestic and foreign affairs—even if the great ship of China–U.S. relations sails into safe waters with calm seas and bright sunshine, it will inevitably encounter sudden changes of weather, high winds and rough waves, and even the test of stormy seas. However, for China, it must always maintain strong strategic confidence, strategic composure, strategic direction, strategic will, and strategic wisdom, and, with the posture of a great and powerful country of “let the winds blow from the east, south, west, and north; I remain unmoved,” meet changes in the situation and changes in the world.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
Opinion
The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues
BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.
Allan Wilson, Journalist
Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.
“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”
Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.
For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.
The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.
“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.
A statue, a warning
The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.
The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.
For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”
Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.
The shrinking window
Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.
This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.
Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.
A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.
The international dimension
The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”
Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.
For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.
“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.
This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.
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