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Will Trump win his round in Venezuela?

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Ahmed Moustafa, Director and Founder of Asia Center for Studies & Translation Egypt

Intro

Predicting the outcome of a complex geopolitical situation is difficult, but the current “round” in Venezuela—as of late 2025—is characterized by a significant escalation in U.S. pressure. The administration has recently launched a “Maximum Pressure 2.0” campaign, which is currently at a fever pitch:

Naval Blockade: On December 16, 2025, President Trump announced a “total and complete blockade” of all sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving Venezuela. He described Venezuela as “completely surrounded” by a massive U.S. naval armada.

Military Engagement: The U.S. has conducted more than 20 strikes on vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific that it alleges are linked to drug trafficking. These actions have resulted in dozens of casualties and sparked intense international debate over the legality of these “intercepts.”

Asset Reclamation: Trump has explicitly demanded that Venezuela return oil and land assets “stolen” from U.S. companies (referring to the nationalization of the oil industry under Hugo Chávez).

Terrorist Designation: The administration has designated the Maduro government as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (FTO) and labeled specific gangs like Tren de Aragua as narco-terrorist threats.

Strengths for the U.S.

Economic Leverage: A successful blockade could cripple the Maduro government’s primary source of revenue (oil), potentially leading to internal collapse.

Domestic Support: Trump’s base largely supports a “hard-line” approach to curb migration and drug flows.

Military Superiority: The presence of a massive armada makes it physically difficult for Venezuela to export oil without U.S. interference.

However, challenges for the U.S.

Geopolitical Support: Russia and China remain allies of Maduro. Russia recently pledged continued support, and the UN has expressed concern over “international piracy.”

Regional Stability: Leaders like Brazil’s Lula and Mexico’s Sheinbaum are calling for mediation, fearing a “Vietnam-style” quagmire in South America.

Refugee Crisis: Further destabilizing the Venezuelan economy may actually increase the flow of migrants to the U.S. border, contradicting other administration goals.

To delve deeper into this analytical report, we will analyze several factors as follows:-

Western democracy is flawed and differentiates between bad and worse

A persuasive critique of contemporary Western democracy posits that its foundational principle has been fundamentally corrupted, devolving into a system where citizens are often constrained to selecting the lesser of two perceived evils. This degeneration stems from an over-reliance on the ballot box as the sole arbiter of democratic legitimacy, a mechanism that prioritizes the mere act of voting over the critical evaluation of candidate competence, integrity, and policy expertise. The selection process itself is profoundly compromised, as party nominations are frequently determined not by meritocratic assessment but by the insidious influences of political factionalism, religious dogma, and ethnic tribalism. This creates a candidate pool often devoid of the most qualified individuals, instead favoring those who best navigate the intricate webs of internal party politics and identity-based mobilization.

This systemic failure is exacerbated by the significant and often clandestine interference of powerful financial lobbies and oligarchic interests. These entities exploit a permissive regulatory environment to exert undue influence on the political process, shaping legislation and policy to serve narrow, private ends rather than the public good. The resultant “revolving door” phenomenon—where individuals seamlessly transition between roles as industry regulators and lobbyists for the sectors they once oversaw—has created a regulatory capture that paralyzes Western parliaments and core institutions. This symbiosis between capital and power ensures that economic and governance structures are engineered for rent-seeking and the preservation of entrenched privilege, effectively nullifying the democratic will and creating a governance deficit.

Consequently, these structurally embedded vulnerabilities have rendered Western democracies ill-equipped to address existential challenges, most notably the protracted economic malaise that commenced with the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The inadequate policy responses, often prioritizing bank bailouts and austerity over Main Street recovery, coupled with the massive diversion of public funds into perpetual military engagements (extending far beyond the oft-cited Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns), have exacerbated inequality and eroded public trust. The manifest inability of the system to foster renewal is perhaps most symbolically captured in the advanced age and perceived limitations of its standard-bearers, as evidenced by the 2016 and 2024 U.S. presidential contests (Trump, Biden and then Trump one more time). This gerontocratic entrenchment is not merely a demographic curiosity but a potent symptom of a deeper institutional stagnation, where the pathways for genuine renewal and competent leadership are effectively blocked by the very mechanisms that define the modern democratic process.

Trump represents the true image of Zionist oligarchic pragmatism in the West because he is part of it

Donald Trump’s presidency represents a profound paradox and a critical case study in the erosion of democratic norms, characterized by an overt alignment with expansionist Zionist policies and a transactional approach to governance that leveraged the power of a media and technology oligarchy. His administration cultivated a symbiotic relationship with figures like Elon Musk, securing vital support by initially projecting a facade of gender-neutral morality that ultimately alienated religious and minority groups. This coalition enabled a domestic and foreign policy agenda that was both ideologically driven and ruthlessly pragmatic. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Middle East, where his administration, despite electoral support from some Muslim and Arab-American communities, acted as a primary enabler of the Netanyahu government. His policies, including the move of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and the brokering of the Abraham Accords that sidelined Palestinian aspirations, effectively greenlit the subsequent escalation of violence and the devastating bloodbath in Gaza, betraying those who sought a just resolution to the enduring conflict.

On the global stage, Trump’s doctrine was defined by an abrasive unilateralism and a blatant disregard for international law, seeking to advance U.S. economic interests through coercive measures rather than diplomacy. He antagonized longstanding allies with punitive tariffs, manipulated volatile immigration issues critical to the U.S. labor market, and openly pursued the annexationist fantasy of acquiring territories like Greenland. This revisionist approach culminated in a direct assault on Venezuelan sovereignty, where his administration attempted an illegitimate coup against the elected government of Nicolás Maduro. This maneuver was a transparent effort to install a puppet regime and plunder the world’s largest proven oil reserves, a strategic pivot after failed provocations against Iran and Russia, motivated by a desire to control energy prices and avert domestic economic fallout from soaring gasoline costs, which threatened to exceed $7 per gallon.

The economic foundation upon which these aggressive policies were built was, however, inherently unstable and masked significant fiscal peril. Behind a media-obscured facade of growth, the administration presided over an alarming acceleration of the national debt, which according to Bank of America, grew at a rate of one trillion dollars every 100 days, pushing the total internal debt beyond $40 trillion. This precariousness was exacerbated by self-destructive immigration policies, including the imposition of exorbitant visa fees reaching $150,000 on companies employing foreign workers. This short-sighted action catalyzed a flight of both American and foreign businessmen and skilled labor, further straining an economy profoundly dependent on their contribution. Thus, Trump’s legacy is not merely one of ideological thuggery but of a calculated destabilization of both international order and domestic economic security for the benefit of a narrow oligarchic and ideological elite.

Where did Trump get his enormous wealth and the role of shadow trading in it?

While Donald Trump’s wealth is frequently attributed to his real estate empire and branding ventures, a more critical analysis suggests the origins may be far more complex and ethically fraught. Allegations that have surfaced from various legal proceedings and investigative reports, including those connected to the late financier Jeffrey Epstein, posit that a portion of this capital could be linked to illicit networks. These networks purportedly involved prostitution rings and the facilitation of access to underage girls for global elites, activities which, if substantiated, would represent a significant and clandestine revenue stream operating parallel to his legitimate businesses. This perspective challenges the canonical narrative of self-made success, proposing instead that his fortune may be partially built upon the exploitation inherent in human trafficking.

Further scrutiny extends to the international drug trade, a shadow economy estimated by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to generate annual global revenues ranging from $400 to $650 billion. The assertion that Venezuela is a primary source of U.S. narcotics is a widely debunked political claim not supported by DEA intelligence, which consistently identifies Mexican cartels as the dominant force. However, the scale of this illicit market invites examination of any individual with the logistical capacity and connections to engage in it. Unverified claims from certain sources have attempted to implicate Trump in such activities, suggesting potential complicity or personal involvement. These assertions, while serious, remain within the realm of allegation rather than established legal fact, yet they persist as a component of the critical discourse questioning the integrity of his wealth accumulation.

The personal history of his wife, Melania Trump, a Slovenian immigrant and former model whose work included nude photography, is often cited within this analytical framework not as a condemnation of her profession, but as potential circumstantial evidence of his immersion in a milieu where human commodification is normalized. When synthesized, these threads—the association with figures like Epstein, the persistent allegations of involvement in drug and sex trafficking, and the operation within industries blurring the lines between legal and illegal—form a persuasive argument for many researchers. This argument posits that a comprehensive understanding of Trump’s wealth must acknowledge the potential confluence of legitimate enterprise and illicit, shadow economies that thrive on exploitation.

How can Donald Trump and America be confronted and punished in practical, new, and unconventional ways?

Donald Trump’s unilateral imposition of an air and sea embargo on Venezuela—without congressional approval—constitutes a clear violation of both international law and the U.S. Constitution. The blockade, which has exacerbated Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis, contravenes the UN Charter’s prohibition on coercive economic measures that harm civilian populations (Article 2(4)). Legally, Trump’s circumvention of Congress also violates the War Powers Resolution and the separation of powers doctrine. Given the U.S.’s historical impunity for such actions, traditional judicial mechanisms (e.g., the ICC, where the U.S. is not a member) are unlikely to hold him accountable. Thus, unconventional strategies must be explored, such as multilateral economic sanctions against Trump and his administration by Global South nations, targeted asset foreclosures, and diplomatic isolation under the principle of universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity.

The Global South, led by geopolitical heavyweights China and Russia, holds significant leverage to impose consequences. Both nations have condemned U.S. sanctions on Venezuela, with China providing over $60 billion in investments and Russia deploying military advisers. To punish Trump’s administration, they could escalate financial retribution—such as freezing U.S. officials’ offshore assets (an estimated $30 billion in Russian and Chinese-linked holdings) or restricting access to critical mineral supply chains. Additionally, they might pursue resolutions in the UN General Assembly to delegitimize U.S. sanctions, building on prior votes where 193 nations condemned unilateral coercive measures. However, their willingness depends on balancing anti-imperialist rhetoric against economic pragmatism, particularly China’s reliance on U.S. markets.

Beyond diplomatic condemnation, legal avenues exist under international frameworks. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), representing 120 states, could initiate a collective lawsuit at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for violating the UN Charter’s sovereignty principles. Precedents exist: Nicaragua successfully sued the U.S. in 1986 over embargo-related damages. Economically, Global South nations might adopt secondary sanctions against U.S. firms enforcing the blockade, similar to the EU’s anti-sanctions statute (Blocking Statute 2271/96). Venezuela itself has already petitioned the ICC to investigate U.S. sanctions as crimes against humanity, citing a 40% increase in mortality due to medical shortages (Lancet, 2019). Strengthening these efforts requires coordinated action from BRICS and regional bodies like ALBA.

The claim that what is being done to Venezuela is bullying and theft of its wealth is an oversimplification that ignores the complexity of the internal US situation

While unconventional measures offer pathways to accountability, their effectiveness hinges on sustained geopolitical unity. China and Russia may lack the incentive to risk direct confrontation unless U.S. actions further destabilize their interests. However, escalating legal and economic pushback—coupled with grassroots pressure (e.g., sanctions divestment campaigns targeting Trump-linked businesses)—could erode U.S. moral authority. The Global South must weigh symbolic victories versus tangible penalties, but history suggests that even symbolic defeats can constrain hegemonic overreach. For academics, documenting these violations and advocating for transnational legal activism remains critical in shaping future norms against unilateral aggression.

Several researchers find that the US strategic interest in Venezuelan oil reserves reflects domestic energy poverty and financial desperation, which may contradict US empirical data. In fact, the US has been the world’s largest producer of crude oil since 2018, consistently producing more than 10 million barrels per day, reaching, according to US data, whose credibility is suspicious, 12.9 million barrels per day in 2023, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). Far from suffering from energy scarcity, the US is a net exporter of petroleum products, as it claims, with the possibility of energy independence increasing thanks to advances in shale extraction technologies such as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, both of which have destroyed the US environment, soil, and groundwater, according to several environmental experts.

Some may say that we should analyze US foreign policy toward Venezuela in a broader geopolitical context from an American perspective. Venezuela has the world’s largest proven oil reserves—about 303 billion barrels, according to OPEC data for 2023 — making it an important player in energy markets, despite current production difficulties due to economic mismanagement and sanctions. US involvement, particularly during the Trump administration, has focused on overthrowing the democratic regime and changing it by force and through US proxies and an opposition that embraces the US agenda, alleging humanitarian crises and anti-authoritarian principles, rather than outright seizure of resources. Sanctions were used to pressure the Nicolás Maduro regime, not to directly seize oil, although critics argue that such measures may indirectly benefit US energy interests.

While accusations of economic imperialism and interventionism deserve careful scientific study, portraying US policy as mere “theft and intimidation” oversimplifies multifaceted diplomatic and strategic calculations. The Trump administration’s actions must be placed in their proper context within the long-standing tradition of US foreign policy of asserting regional influence and countering hostile powers, such as Russia and China, which have maintained economic and military ties with Venezuela. Attributing these policies to domestic failure ignores the complex interaction between national security, ideological opposition to authoritarianism, and global energy market dynamics. Rigorous scientific analysis requires moving beyond simplistic narratives to examine the structural, institutional, and ideological drivers of foreign policy in a multipolar world.

Venezuela’s struggle between past and present and lessons from the Gaza resistance

Venezuela’s contemporary struggle against foreign intervention must be understood through the lens of its historical anticolonial resistance, particularly the Bolivarian revolution’s defiance of Spanish imperial rule in the 19th century. Today, this struggle has transformed into resistance against what many Latin American scholars characterize as neo-imperial dominance—particularly U.S. economic sanctions that have cost Venezuela over $200 billion in lost revenues between 2017 and 2022, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Just as Simón Bolívar fought to liberate Gran Colombia from colonial exploitation, modern Venezuela must frame its resistance not as isolationism, but as a continuation of anti-imperial sovereignty. The current geopolitical pressure, manifested through financial blockades and political isolation, parallels historical patterns of external domination—only now administered through economic coercion rather than direct military occupation.

Equally instructive is the steadfast resistance of the Palestinian people in Gaza, who, despite enduring over 17 years of blockade (since 2007) and recurring military assaults—resulting in over 70,000 civilian deaths since October 2023, per Gaza Health Ministry reports—have refused to relinquish their land or dignity. Their resilience offers a powerful model of grassroots defiance in the face of disproportionate force and global indifference. Similarly, Hugo Chávez’s strategic bypassing of Western financial systems—exemplified by the 2005 energy-for-food barter agreement with Argentina, which exchanged Venezuelan oil for Argentine agricultural products—demonstrated that economic sovereignty could be preserved through South-South cooperation. This precedent underscores the viability of regional integration and alternative trade mechanisms in countering hegemonic control. By drawing on both historical liberation struggles and contemporary acts of resistance, Venezuela can articulate a coherent, morally grounded foreign policy that aligns with global movements against neocolonialism and for self-determination.

Conclusions:

The text critiques modern Western democracy, arguing it has become flawed, limiting citizens to choosing between two unsatisfactory options. It highlights how political party nominations often follow factionalism rather than merit, resulting in unqualified candidates. This situation worsens due to the influence of wealthy lobbies that manipulate policy for private gain, leading to a governance deficit.

Donald Trump’s presidency exemplifies these democratic issues, promoting policies aligned with specific interests while fostering military and economic instability. His administration’s actions in the Middle East and towards international relations reflect aggressive unilateralism. Additionally, Trump’s financial legacy is questioned, suggesting ties to potentially illicit activities and raising concerns about the sources of his wealth.

The history of Melania Trump, a Slovenian immigrant and former model, highlights potential issues related to human commodification and Trump’s wealth, which may involve both legitimate and illegal enterprises. Trump’s air and sea embargo on Venezuela, imposed without Congress’s approval, violates international law and worsens the country’s humanitarian crisis. To hold Trump accountable, Global South nations like China and Russia might consider sanctions, asset freezes, or legal action through international courts.

Venezuela’s significant oil reserves make it strategically important, but the U.S. involvement often emphasizes regime change rather than resource theft. The current situation reflects a historical struggle against neo-imperial dominance, paralleling past anticolonial resistance. Venezuela can draw on these struggles to promote a foreign policy advocating for sovereignty and integration against hegemonic control.

Opinion

Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.

Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.

For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.

In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.

This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.

The Problem of Proxy Wars

During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”

Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.

The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.

However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.

The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.

In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”

The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.

At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.

These distinctions matter.

Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.

Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?

The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.

Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.

Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.

The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.

The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?

That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.

The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.

There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.

The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.

The Economics of Fear

The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?

Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.

One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.

A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.

This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.

More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.

The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.

When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.

America After Iran

In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.

The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.

The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.

The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.

This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.

The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.

The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.

America Is Changing From Within

The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.

The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.

Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.

They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.

This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.

A Dinner for Dialogue

One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.

We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.

The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.

Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.

Very often, it begins around a single table.

Istanbul’s Larger Message

The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.

The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.

This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.

The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.

It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.

Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.

For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.

The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.

For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.

It was not an attempt to erase differences.

It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.

At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.

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A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West

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Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.

It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.

Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.

Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?

It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.

As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.

In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.

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Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria

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At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.

This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.

US moves in the Mediterranean

Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.

Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.

The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.

Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.

Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.

Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?

Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.

So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?

Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.

Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?

In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.

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