Opinion
The U.S. 2025 ‘National Security Strategy’ Report and the Disintegration Facing the U.S.–Europe Alliance
The Twilight of Transatlantic Relations: The U.S. 2025 Version of the ‘National Security Strategy’ Report and the Disintegration Facing the U.S.–Europe Alliance
Wang Wanying and Ma Xiaolin
The 2025 version of the “National Security Strategy” report released by the Trump administration of the United States on December 4 was like a huge stone thrown into a pool of water, stirring up stormy waves. This document, which proclaims America’s future new security policy, not only removes China and Russia from the position of primary threats, but also tolls the imminent centennial death knell for the transatlantic alliance that has lasted for a hundred years. Not only that, Trump also harshly castigated and humiliated America’s European allies, fearing that Europe might misread this report announcing the end of the U.S.–Europe marriage.
On December 9, Trump said in an interview with the U.S. outlet Politico that “most European countries are becoming rotten.” He accused Europe’s immigration policies of being a “disaster,” saying that “they want political correctness, and that makes them weak” … and that some European leaders are “utter fools.”
The Daily Telegraph, published on the 10th, even revealed that a leaked version of the 2025 “National Security Strategy” report shows that the Trump administration intends to have Hungary and Italy leave the European Union. German Chancellor Merz, however, was not surprised. When commenting on this official U.S. document on the 9th, he said that America’s national security strategy confirmed his judgment: “Europe, and Germany as well, must be more independent from the United States in terms of security policy.” He emphasized that Europeans must be prepared for the United States no longer being an alliance partner …
Looking at the “National Security Strategy” (NSS) reports released by three U.S. administrations from 2017 to 2025, the U.S.–Europe transatlantic relationship has undergone a dramatic shock from “transactional partners” to a “values alliance,” ultimately moving toward “strategic divergence” and a “civilizational rupture.” The 2025 version of the “National Security Strategy” report marks that the transatlantic alliance system after World War II is facing substantive disintegration, and U.S.–Europe relations have officially entered a “post-ally era.”
This trajectory of evolution is not a simple policy swing, but rather a structural reckoning by the United States of its global strategy against the backdrop of soaring costs of maintaining hegemony and intensifying domestic political polarization. From the initial appearance of cracks in 2017 to the civilizational rupture in 2025, every step points to the “irreversibility of divergence,” with its roots deeply embedded in the profound misalignment of power, interests, and values between the U.S. and Europe.
The Overall Picture of the Evolution of Transatlantic Relations
The U.S. “National Security Strategy” is not only a declaration of foreign policy, but also a reflection of its domestic political ecology and global strategic anxiety. From 2017 to 2025, transatlantic relations experienced a shift from a “boiling frog in warm water” style of transactionalization, to a brief “last gasp” during the Biden period, and finally to a “shock therapy”–style rupture in 2025.
This evolution reveals a cruel strategic reality: the traditional Western alliance system can no longer adapt to a multipolar world order and the internal political ecology of the United States. The U.S.–Europe rupture in 2025 is not an accidental “black swan” event, but the inevitable result of three intertwined logics—U.S. hegemonic contraction, U.S.–Europe cognitive misalignment, and the deconstruction of values. A rupture in capabilities forces the United States into strategic retrenchment; a rupture in threat perception leads the U.S. and Europe to move in opposite directions regarding their geopolitical focal points; and a rupture in values pushes former allies to the edge of a “clash of civilizations.” This process demonstrates that the estrangement of transatlantic relations is not a temporary tactical adjustment, but the inevitable end of a historical cycle.
- The Prelude to Divergence: Accumulation of Contradictions and Failure of Repair (2017–2024)
Before the final rupture in 2025, U.S.–Europe relations went through policy attempts by two administrations that were starkly different yet causally linked. Various signs in this stage indicate that the foundation of the alliance had long been eroded by “transactionalism,” and subsequent repair efforts failed to address the root cause.
1. The Initiation of Transactionalism: The First Appearance of Cracks (2017–2020)
The “National Security Strategy” report released in December 2017 was the starting point of divergence. It broke the post–Cold War U.S. consensus on the “liberal international order” and introduced naked realism into the sacred realm of alliance relations.
First, it established the “debt-based” positioning of allies. The Trump 1.0 administration regarded allies as projects to be evaluated on a balance sheet. This so-called “principled realism” was in fact “transactionalism without moral distinction.” The report harshly criticized NATO allies for failing to meet the target of 2% of GDP in defense spending. At the time, this was interpreted in Europe as a negotiating tactic, but later proved to be a signal that the U.S. strategic community’s tolerance for NATO “free-riding” had dropped to zero.
Second, it pioneered economic nationalism. The 2017 version of the “National Security Strategy” defined economic prosperity as a core pillar of national security and, for the first time, explicitly regarded trade deficits as a national security threat. This logic of “trade as war” made it difficult for the U.S. and Europe to form a united front in policy toward China. During this period, Europe was forced to adopt a “hedging” strategy, attempting to maintain a balance between China and the United States.
2. The Fragile “Last Gasp”: Failure of Repair (2021–2024)
After the Biden administration took office, it attempted to reverse its predecessor’s course through the 2022 version of the “National Security Strategy,” once again establishing Europe as a core partner in defending the “rules-based order.” However, the limitations exposed during the implementation of this report highlighted the structural irreversibility of the U.S. strategic retrenchment trend.
First, the hollowing out of alliance mechanisms. Although the Biden administration established the “U.S.–EU Trade and Technology Council” (TTC) in an attempt to coordinate technology policy toward China, as think tanks such as the Atlantic Council have pointed out, the U.S. side was never willing to establish a “democratic technology alliance” with treaty-binding force. The TTC ultimately remained only at the level of loose policy dialogue.
Second, the covert continuation of “America First.” The massive subsidies and local content requirements in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) triggered strong warnings from Macron about a “split within the Western camp,” and Europe’s industrial circles even described it as “the murder of European industry.” This meant that even during the “ally” period, the United States was unwilling to make concessions to Europe on core economic interests. This kind of “false healing” failed to withstand the pressure of the resurgence of isolationism within the United States, laying the groundwork for the complete rupture in 2025.
- The Outbreak and Inevitability of the 2025 Divergence
The 2025 version of the “National Security Strategy” report released by the Trump 2.0 administration is not only a sudden policy shift, but also a “final reckoning” of the contradictions accumulated in the earlier period. It marks the elevation of U.S.–Europe relations from tactical divergences entangled in interests to a structural rupture at the level of geopolitics and civilizational cognition.
1. The Explicit Outbreak of Divergence: Deep Ruptures Across Four Dimensions
Strategic “Neglect and Retrenchment”:
Many media outlets have keenly noted that in this report of more than 30 pages, only two and a half pages are devoted to Europe. Leonardo Hutter, a researcher at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the United States, stated bluntly that this means the United States no longer regards Europe as part of its core interests: “Europe has become increasingly irrelevant to the United States.” The report clearly proposes prioritizing the Western Hemisphere, aiming to eliminate the influence of external forces in Latin America, marking a substantive retreat by the United States from “globalism” to “hemispherism.” The United States announced a substantial reduction in its permanent military presence in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The report states that “indiscriminate global intervention has hollowed out U.S. power,” and that the United States must refuse to continue acting as the “world’s police.”
Security “Undermining at the Root”:
On the NATO issue, the 2025 report adopts a strategy of “undermining at the root,” completely changing the nature of the alliance. The report not only requires Europe to share costs, but also demands that Europe take over defense responsibilities. It reiterates the startling consensus reached at the June 2025 Hague Summit: NATO member states committed to raising defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. Even though this target adopts a dual-track structure of “3.5% core defense + 1.5% civil defense infrastructure,” easing short-term fiscal pressure, it still maintains a high-pressure posture requiring allies to fully pay for their own security. The strategic intent behind setting such a high threshold is not truly to expect Europe to meet it, but to create a state in which allies are in “permanent default.” This provides the United States with a “legitimate” pretext, based on the principle of “transactional realism,” to adjust, scale back, or even refuse to implement Article Five at any time, effectively making NATO’s collective defense commitment conditional and hollow.
In addition, the report announces the suspension of all military assistance to Ukraine and unilaterally proposes a peace plan aimed at “rebuilding strategic stability with Russia.” This plan includes limiting Ukraine’s military capabilities and prohibiting its accession to NATO, and is widely regarded as sacrificing Ukraine’s sovereignty, effectively relegating Europe’s security agenda to a secondary position. From Vice President Vance’s blunt criticism of Europe at the Munich Security Conference at the beginning of the year, to the United States’ “over-the-head diplomacy” toward Europe on the Ukraine issue, all indicate that the United States no longer regards Europe as an equal partner requiring consultation, but rather as a strategic chess piece to be disposed of at will.
Economic “Designation as an Adversary”:
In the economic and trade domain, the 2025 report regards the European Union as a major competitor, and in some formulations even implies that it is more “exploitative” than geopolitical rivals. The report places “economic security” in an absolute priority position and plans to impose punitive “reciprocal tariffs” on EU goods in response to the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and digital services tax. The report even uses the highly confrontational term “Liberation Day tariffs,” implying that the United States needs to be “liberated” from Europe’s trade exploitation. In the high-tech field, the United States leverages its dominance in AI and quantum computing, using extraterritorial jurisdiction and standards monopolization to force European companies to become dependent on the United States within technological ecosystems. This logic of “you must rely on me, but I will exploit you” renders the TTC mechanism nominal in existence only, transforming it into a tool for U.S. pressure.
Ideological “Civilizational Defense”:
The most shocking and subversive part of the 2025 report is its abandonment of America’s customary “export of democracy,” turning instead to an isolationist “civilizational defense,” and directly launching attacks on Europe’s mainstream political values. The report puts forward the theory of “civilizational erosion,” claiming that due to open immigration policies, multiculturalism, and the “suppression” of freedom of speech (referring to EU regulation of social media), Europe faces the risks of “civilizational extinction” and “replacement.” This marks a rupture between official U.S. ideology and Europe’s liberal mainstream.
Furthermore, the report openly proposes that the United States will support “patriotic” parties within Europe (namely right-wing populist forces) to “correct Europe’s current trajectory” and resist the erosion of the foundations of Western civilization by multiculturalism. This means that the United States has shifted from being a supporter of European integration to an instigator of European fragmentation. Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt sharply pointed out that this effectively positions the United States as “the right wing of Europe’s far right.” Liana Fix, a researcher at the Council on Foreign Relations, believes that this way of viewing U.S.–Europe relations from a “civilizational” perspective marks “the end of transatlantic alliance relations based on liberal values.”
2. Proof of the Inevitability of Divergence: Three Structural Root Causes
From “transaction” in 2017, to “alliance” in 2022, and then to “divergence” in 2025, the evolution of the positioning of transatlantic relations in U.S. national security strategy reveals a cruel strategic reality: the traditional Western alliance system can no longer adapt to a multipolar world order and the internal political ecology of the United States. This evolution is not accidental, but the result of the combined effects of three major structural factors:
First is the rupture of power. The United States is no longer able to simultaneously maintain a global hegemonic system and the living standards of its domestic population, and must carry out strategic retrenchment. The idea of “denial strategy” has become mainstream—concentrating resources on the Indo-Pacific and abandoning Europe.
Second is the rupture of threat perception. The United States views China as an existential threat and Europe as a tool or even a burden; Europe views Russia as an existential threat and China as a systemic rival but also a necessary partner for cooperation. This misalignment of geopolitical interests is structural and cannot be bridged by diplomatic rhetoric.
Third is the rupture of values. With the institutionalization of right-wing populism in the United States, the U.S. and Europe have gradually drifted apart on core values such as democracy, human rights, climate change, and multilateralism. “Shared values” have become an empty shell, replaced by the projection of the theory of “civilizational conflict” within the Western world itself.
- Europe’s Passive Adaptation to the “Inevitable Divergence”
If German Chancellor Merkel’s speech in 2017 was a “warning” of the U.S.–Europe breakup, then the 2025 version of the U.S. “National Security Strategy” report is the “verdict.” Europe has no choice but to accept the reality that the United States has already “left.” Confronted with the “shock” brought by the 2025 report, Europe’s strategic community has gone through a process from shock and denial to forced action. The extremization of U.S. policy is pushing Europe to become a truly independent geopolitical pole.
1. Promoting the Hardening of Europe’s Political Stance
In a speech on December 8, European Council President Costa sent a clear signal. He stated that it is unacceptable for the United States to issue threats of interference in Europe’s internal politics, emphasizing that “allies do not threaten to interfere in the internal political lives of other allies.” Costa frankly admitted that differences in worldview between the United States and Europe are widening, that the United States no longer believes in multilateralism, and that Europe must “achieve sovereign autonomy” in response to the new U.S. strategy. Former President of the European Commission Prodi also called for the formulation of policies “to make its stance firmer,” even though the EU has not yet formed a systematic response. However, Europe’s voices are not unified. U.S. support for European right-wing forces has produced immediate effects, exacerbating fragmentation within Europe. Right-wing governments in countries such as Hungary and Italy have welcomed parts of the 2025 report, viewing them as endorsements of their own anti-immigration and anti–EU centralization policies. This has led to divisions within the EU on policies toward the United States and Russia, making it difficult to form a unified voice to counter U.S. pressure.
2. Accelerating the Process of “Strategic Autonomy” and Tactical Hedging
The introduction of the 2025 version of the “National Security Strategy” report and a series of moves by the Trump administration have made Europe’s desire to accelerate “strategic autonomy” even stronger. On the one hand, defense autonomy is speeding up. Faced with the threat of U.S. troop withdrawals, countries such as Germany and Poland have been forced to substantially increase defense budgets, trying to fill the conventional deterrence vacuum left by the United States; Germany plans to establish a new special defense fund, with the “turning point of the times” shifting from slogan to implementation, and is discussing with France the Europeanization of the nuclear umbrella; the United Kingdom has also clearly put forward “NATO first, but not NATO only,” and is seeking to establish a new strategic partnership with the European Union; as the only two nuclear powers in Europe, the United Kingdom and France have seen an unprecedented increase in urgency regarding defense cooperation, and the two countries are accelerating the advancement of an upgraded version of the “Lancaster House Treaties.” In short, Europe is enhancing its “autonomous capacity to act without the United States” by increasing defense capabilities and investing in strategic industries. On the other hand, the “red line” defense in technology and trade. Since the beginning of this year, the European Union has carried out a series of enforcement actions against U.S. technology companies based on the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act. Analysts believe this is the EU’s direct response to U.S. tariff intervention, intended to “draw red lines” vis-à-vis the United States in the field of digital sovereignty. Europe is learning to play its hand with the United States more cleverly by gathering more bargaining chips.
*Wang Wanying – Assistant Research Fellow, Institute for Central and Eastern European Economic and Trade Cooperation Studies, Ningbo University; Lecturer, School of Foreign Languages, Ningbo University
*Ma Xiaolin – Specially Appointed Research Fellow, Institute for Central and Eastern European Economic and Trade Cooperation Studies, Ningbo University; Bao Yugang Chair Professor; Professor, Zhejiang International Studies University; Dean, Institute of Mediterranean Studies
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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