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Trump’s ‘Peace Plan’ Will Accelerate Europe’s ‘Central and Eastern Europeanization’

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Trump’s “28-point peace plan” to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict reflects the underlying political logic of American power politics—the “dining table menu” theory: “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”

Liu Xiaodan, Associate Researcher, Institute for Central and Eastern European Economic and Trade Cooperation, Ningbo University
Ma Xiaolin, Specially Appointed Researcher, Institute for Central and Eastern European Economic and Trade Cooperation, Ningbo University; Bao Yugang Chair Professor; Professor at Zhejiang International Studies University; Director of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies

U.S. President Trump has unilaterally introduced a “28-point peace plan” to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict, thoroughly exposing the EU’s power “bottom cards” and directly striking at the EU’s interest “red lines.” This peace roadmap presents solutions in a segmented manner across nine aspects, including Ukraine’s sovereignty, security architecture, arms restrictions and relations with NATO, postwar reconstruction of Ukraine, U.S.–Russia cooperation, territorial division of Ukraine, and humanitarian guarantees. It once again reflects the underlying political logic of American power politics—the “dining table menu” theory: “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”

Obviously, this time Ukraine and the EU have been placed on the menu, while the two major powers, the United States and Russia, sit at the table holding knives and forks. Europe rushed to respond. On November 23, advisors from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other countries held talks with senior Ukrainian officials ahead of the U.S.–Ukraine Geneva meeting; through U.S.–Ukraine negotiations, the “28 points” were compressed into “19 points,” shelving issues of territorial division and parts concerning Ukraine’s relations with NATO and the EU. After this hurried round, the EU was only able to fend off blows, with no capacity to counterattack.

What is noteworthy is that the Central and Eastern European countries on the front line of the Russia–Ukraine conflict instead appear relatively calm, divided into two camps—“pro-war” and “pro-peace”—each adhering to positions aligned with their national interests. In a short period of time, bilateral or multilateral meetings among the United States, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine have continued around the “28-point” or its revised peace plan, with Central and Eastern European countries also interspersed among them, attempting to influence the course of events.

On November 28, Hungarian President Viktor Orbán visited Russia to hold talks on the Russia–Ukraine conflict and energy issues, and expressed hope that U.S. and Russian leaders could meet in Budapest to resolve the conflict peacefully; Orbán stated that “the Moscow talks were very successful.” On December 2, German Chancellor Merz met Polish Prime Minister Tusk in Berlin, stating that he “hopes Poland will become an important partner in building a secure, free, and prosperous Europe.” On the same day, Russian President Putin once again emphasized opposition to bargaining, stating that all modifications proposed by Europe to Trump’s peace plan aim to completely block the entire peace process.

From this, it can be seen that although the process of shifting the Russia–Ukraine conflict “from war to peace” appears to have entered a “fast lane,” it is in fact still in a “climbing stage.” The Central and Eastern European region, increasingly becoming a focal point of great-power competition, is seeing its geopolitical influence continuously strengthened, seemingly assuming the role of a main force shaping Europe’s situation and accelerating the trend of Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization.”

The core characteristics of Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” are reflected in the accelerated advancement of “de-Russification”: in economic, energy, and security fields, achieving partial or full “decoupling” from Russia; at the security level, relying on the United States and the NATO framework to bind external security guarantees; and in development pathways, elevating the priority of security interests while relatively weakening investment in resources related to people’s livelihoods. The roar of artillery fire in the Russia–Ukraine conflict interweaves with the quarrels of U.S.–Ukraine peace negotiations, causing the situation in Central and Eastern Europe to exhibit high sensitivity, sharp confrontation, and complex dynamics, which may spread and deepen across the European continent.

Sensitivity: Absolutization of Security Issues and Politicization of Non-Political Issues

The sensitivity of the situation is manifested, on the one hand, in the absolutization of security issues, with the core focus on military defensive security. The first ten points of the “28-point peace plan” clearly outline Ukraine’s sovereignty and security architecture with attached guarantee conditions. In response, prior to the U.S.–Ukraine Geneva meeting on November 23, several European countries communicated privately with Ukraine, expecting the United States to provide collective defense security guarantees similar to those stipulated in NATO Charter Article 5, demanding that the United States offer comprehensive security assurances and place Ukraine’s security under NATO’s collective defense umbrella.

At present, Europe’s defense and security still follow the U.S.-led NATO unquestioningly, while the realization of strategic autonomy is inseparable from solid defense capabilities as support. To accelerate the process of European defense integration, in October 2025 the European Union officially launched the “Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030,” aiming to promote Europe’s transformation from a “payer” to an “actor” in the defense field, achieve precise alignment between defense fiscal expenditure and diplomatic discourse power, and ultimately ensure that Europe “must be at the table” in negotiations involving European security.

Another layer of sensitivity is reflected in the politicization of non-political issues, focusing on energy. Against the specific backdrop of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” process has driven external cooperation toward a mindset of “emphasizing security over economics,” with livelihood politics yielding to geopolitics. A landmark event was that, under criticism and pressure from Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries, in February 2022 then German Chancellor Scholz announced the suspension of certification for the “Nord Stream 2” project. In October 2025, the EU approved its 19th round of sanctions against Russia, for the first time targeting Russia’s liquefied natural gas industry, marking a further deepening of the EU–Russia energy decoupling process. In this process, energy has been stripped of its basic economic attributes and reduced to a tool of geopolitical competition. In sharp contrast, Hungary has consistently adhered to independently importing Russian energy based on its own economic and livelihood needs; this “going its own way” approach has led some forces to view it as a “Trojan horse” within the anti-Russia system.

Confrontation: Polarization of Differences and Contradiction of Positions

Regarding the territorial clauses involved in the “28-point peace plan,” the majority of Central and Eastern European countries quickly expressed strong opposition. Polish Prime Minister Tusk emphasized that “any agreement must not weaken or undermine the security of Poland and Europe, and peace cannot be achieved at the cost of weakening Ukraine’s military capabilities.” Croatian Prime Minister Plenković declared that the plan infringes upon Ukraine’s territorial integrity. European Commission President von der Leyen also stressed that countries cannot be changed by force and that Ukraine must have the right to choose its own destiny.

As the EU expanded to include Central and Eastern European countries, major states such as the V4 Group (the Visegrád Group, including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) and the three Baltic states have vigorously promoted incorporating Soviet “dictatorial rule” into Europe’s collective memory, gradually shaping the entire EU into an identity-based political actor characterized by “anti-Russia” and “de-Russification.” It is not difficult to see that clauses exchanging territory for peace have completely activated the historical memories of hostility and aversion toward Russia among most Central and Eastern European countries, and this shared identity has further reinforced strong resistance at the EU level.

In contrast, the “pro-peace camp,” represented by Hungary, has remained relatively restrained. From the very beginning of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has strongly opposed the EU’s stance of “supporting Ukraine against Russia” and has been committed to promoting a Budapest meeting between the United States and Russia to facilitate peace talks. On November 28, Orbán visited Moscow and stated his willingness to provide a platform for negotiations to resolve the Ukraine issue. This move triggered strong dissatisfaction from Poland, which subsequently canceled a previously scheduled bilateral summit with Hungary, retaining only the relevant agenda of the Visegrád Group summit on December 3.

However, with high inflation, sharply increasing pressure on people’s livelihoods, and energy and security policies hollowing out national development potential, populist forces have taken the opportunity to make a comeback, and governments in many Central and Eastern European countries face the risk of restructuring. In October 2023, Fico once again assumed the post of Slovak prime minister, a result driven precisely by public dissatisfaction with intensifying inflation; similarly, in December 2025, Babiš, leader of the Czech populist far-right party “ANO (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens),” will once again serve as prime minister. Proceeding from the core interests of safeguarding national economic and livelihood concerns, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic are highly likely to form a “pro-Russia, distant-from-Ukraine” triangle.

Dynamics: “New Europe” Leading “Old Europe” and the Fatigue of Supporting Ukraine

Except for the Balkan region, Central and Eastern European countries have all joined the European Union. They have been labeled by U.S. politicians as “New Europe,” aimed at counterbalancing the “Old Europe” represented by Western Europe, with the intention of dividing and weakening the European continent’s drive toward unity. In the early stages of EU accession, these European “newcomer” countries were mostly in a position of passively accepting rules and undergoing one-way transformation; their core demands consistently focused on obtaining more economic development resources and tangible opportunities to improve people’s livelihoods. The outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict has completely reshaped Europe’s political leadership landscape: propelled by the United States, Central and Eastern European countries leaped to the forefront as “vanguards” of anti-Russia, pro-Ukraine support, with their geopolitical influence surging sharply and even reversely shaping the EU’s positions and decision-making toward Ukraine and Russia. In the early phase of the conflict, Poland, the three Baltic states, and others were particularly active, strongly calling for military assistance to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, ultimately pushing these propositions to become unified EU actions.

However, as the Russia–Ukraine conflict became protracted, anxiety and fear among Central and Eastern European publics continued to rise, directly fueling the resurgence of populist far-right parties. In some countries, coalition governments and government reshuffles emerged, leading to fundamental adjustments in foreign policy directions. For example, Hungary and Slovakia have clearly exhibited diversified tendencies of being “pro-Russia, pro-U.S., and skeptical of Europe.” The concept of “nation first” has spread rapidly across the European continent, and governments in Germany, Poland, and other countries have gradually revealed pressure and dissatisfaction regarding the reception of Ukrainian refugees, calling on the EU to increase subsidies for migrant resettlement. At the same time, the emergence of “fatigue with supporting Ukraine and opposing Russia” has disrupted the EU’s previously unified rhythm of “anti-Russia, pro-Ukraine,” with calls and possibilities for resolving the conflict through peace negotiations correspondingly rising. On November 7, during Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s special visit to the United States, Trump stated, “We will end this war in the not-too-distant future,” to which Orbán responded, “Miracles are always possible,” calling on European politicians to stop actions that undermine progress toward Russia–Ukraine peace.

Trump attempts to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict in the name of peace, but the “28-point peace plan” has made the EU clearly recognize that the United States’ approach to seizing Ukrainian resources has become increasingly unsightly, with the principle of “America First” fully on display. Because Russia strongly opposes the “19-point peace plan” and insists on using the “28-point peace plan” as the basis for negotiations, Europe’s security nerves have once again been tightened, accelerating Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” and solidifying the will to “oppose Russia and support Ukraine.” On December 3, European Commission President von der Leyen proposed a new version of a “using Russian assets to aid Ukraine” loan scheme, seeking to resolve Ukraine’s loan funding sources by confiscating frozen European assets of the Russian central bank, and to submit it for review at the EU summit on the 18th. In essence, the issue of Ukraine’s security guarantees fundamentally reflects deep-seated security anxiety across the entire Central and Eastern European region, pulling at Europe’s choices of stance within the conflict.

Due to significant divergences between U.S. and European positions, Russia–Ukraine peace negotiations have repeatedly fallen into deadlock, and the trend of Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” may persist over the long term, potentially accelerating the integration of European defense amid crises. Although EU member states still exhibit pronounced differences and divisions across political, economic, and social fields, in response to pressing external security pressures, all countries have incentives to accelerate steps toward strategic autonomy and increase investment in hard defense capabilities. At the same time, relying on the unique advantages of the unified single market, the EU continues to harden its “soft power,” and in increasingly intense international competition, most member states are coordinating their efforts with a more united and assertive posture.

The “28-point peace plan” is akin to a precisely calibrated litmus test, impacting the strategic “bottom lines” that Central and Eastern European countries and the EU can tolerate. Amid repeated games and tug-of-war among multiple parties, the United States, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine have no longer concealed their respective interest pursuits and sovereignty red lines. A long-term power struggle among the United States, Russia, and Europe has already been set, making it inevitable that the Russia–Ukraine conflict, as a surface manifestation, will evolve toward greater protraction and complexity. In this process, Central and Eastern European countries located in the “middle zone” will continue to see their discourse power in the field of security and defense rise, thereby playing an increasingly pivotal role within the EU’s collective decision-making mechanism.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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