Opinion
Trump’s ‘Peace Plan’ Will Accelerate Europe’s ‘Central and Eastern Europeanization’
Trump’s “28-point peace plan” to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict reflects the underlying political logic of American power politics—the “dining table menu” theory: “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”
Liu Xiaodan, Associate Researcher, Institute for Central and Eastern European Economic and Trade Cooperation, Ningbo University
Ma Xiaolin, Specially Appointed Researcher, Institute for Central and Eastern European Economic and Trade Cooperation, Ningbo University; Bao Yugang Chair Professor; Professor at Zhejiang International Studies University; Director of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies
U.S. President Trump has unilaterally introduced a “28-point peace plan” to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict, thoroughly exposing the EU’s power “bottom cards” and directly striking at the EU’s interest “red lines.” This peace roadmap presents solutions in a segmented manner across nine aspects, including Ukraine’s sovereignty, security architecture, arms restrictions and relations with NATO, postwar reconstruction of Ukraine, U.S.–Russia cooperation, territorial division of Ukraine, and humanitarian guarantees. It once again reflects the underlying political logic of American power politics—the “dining table menu” theory: “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”
Obviously, this time Ukraine and the EU have been placed on the menu, while the two major powers, the United States and Russia, sit at the table holding knives and forks. Europe rushed to respond. On November 23, advisors from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other countries held talks with senior Ukrainian officials ahead of the U.S.–Ukraine Geneva meeting; through U.S.–Ukraine negotiations, the “28 points” were compressed into “19 points,” shelving issues of territorial division and parts concerning Ukraine’s relations with NATO and the EU. After this hurried round, the EU was only able to fend off blows, with no capacity to counterattack.
What is noteworthy is that the Central and Eastern European countries on the front line of the Russia–Ukraine conflict instead appear relatively calm, divided into two camps—“pro-war” and “pro-peace”—each adhering to positions aligned with their national interests. In a short period of time, bilateral or multilateral meetings among the United States, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine have continued around the “28-point” or its revised peace plan, with Central and Eastern European countries also interspersed among them, attempting to influence the course of events.
On November 28, Hungarian President Viktor Orbán visited Russia to hold talks on the Russia–Ukraine conflict and energy issues, and expressed hope that U.S. and Russian leaders could meet in Budapest to resolve the conflict peacefully; Orbán stated that “the Moscow talks were very successful.” On December 2, German Chancellor Merz met Polish Prime Minister Tusk in Berlin, stating that he “hopes Poland will become an important partner in building a secure, free, and prosperous Europe.” On the same day, Russian President Putin once again emphasized opposition to bargaining, stating that all modifications proposed by Europe to Trump’s peace plan aim to completely block the entire peace process.
From this, it can be seen that although the process of shifting the Russia–Ukraine conflict “from war to peace” appears to have entered a “fast lane,” it is in fact still in a “climbing stage.” The Central and Eastern European region, increasingly becoming a focal point of great-power competition, is seeing its geopolitical influence continuously strengthened, seemingly assuming the role of a main force shaping Europe’s situation and accelerating the trend of Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization.”
The core characteristics of Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” are reflected in the accelerated advancement of “de-Russification”: in economic, energy, and security fields, achieving partial or full “decoupling” from Russia; at the security level, relying on the United States and the NATO framework to bind external security guarantees; and in development pathways, elevating the priority of security interests while relatively weakening investment in resources related to people’s livelihoods. The roar of artillery fire in the Russia–Ukraine conflict interweaves with the quarrels of U.S.–Ukraine peace negotiations, causing the situation in Central and Eastern Europe to exhibit high sensitivity, sharp confrontation, and complex dynamics, which may spread and deepen across the European continent.
Sensitivity: Absolutization of Security Issues and Politicization of Non-Political Issues
The sensitivity of the situation is manifested, on the one hand, in the absolutization of security issues, with the core focus on military defensive security. The first ten points of the “28-point peace plan” clearly outline Ukraine’s sovereignty and security architecture with attached guarantee conditions. In response, prior to the U.S.–Ukraine Geneva meeting on November 23, several European countries communicated privately with Ukraine, expecting the United States to provide collective defense security guarantees similar to those stipulated in NATO Charter Article 5, demanding that the United States offer comprehensive security assurances and place Ukraine’s security under NATO’s collective defense umbrella.
At present, Europe’s defense and security still follow the U.S.-led NATO unquestioningly, while the realization of strategic autonomy is inseparable from solid defense capabilities as support. To accelerate the process of European defense integration, in October 2025 the European Union officially launched the “Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030,” aiming to promote Europe’s transformation from a “payer” to an “actor” in the defense field, achieve precise alignment between defense fiscal expenditure and diplomatic discourse power, and ultimately ensure that Europe “must be at the table” in negotiations involving European security.
Another layer of sensitivity is reflected in the politicization of non-political issues, focusing on energy. Against the specific backdrop of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” process has driven external cooperation toward a mindset of “emphasizing security over economics,” with livelihood politics yielding to geopolitics. A landmark event was that, under criticism and pressure from Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries, in February 2022 then German Chancellor Scholz announced the suspension of certification for the “Nord Stream 2” project. In October 2025, the EU approved its 19th round of sanctions against Russia, for the first time targeting Russia’s liquefied natural gas industry, marking a further deepening of the EU–Russia energy decoupling process. In this process, energy has been stripped of its basic economic attributes and reduced to a tool of geopolitical competition. In sharp contrast, Hungary has consistently adhered to independently importing Russian energy based on its own economic and livelihood needs; this “going its own way” approach has led some forces to view it as a “Trojan horse” within the anti-Russia system.
Confrontation: Polarization of Differences and Contradiction of Positions
Regarding the territorial clauses involved in the “28-point peace plan,” the majority of Central and Eastern European countries quickly expressed strong opposition. Polish Prime Minister Tusk emphasized that “any agreement must not weaken or undermine the security of Poland and Europe, and peace cannot be achieved at the cost of weakening Ukraine’s military capabilities.” Croatian Prime Minister Plenković declared that the plan infringes upon Ukraine’s territorial integrity. European Commission President von der Leyen also stressed that countries cannot be changed by force and that Ukraine must have the right to choose its own destiny.
As the EU expanded to include Central and Eastern European countries, major states such as the V4 Group (the Visegrád Group, including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) and the three Baltic states have vigorously promoted incorporating Soviet “dictatorial rule” into Europe’s collective memory, gradually shaping the entire EU into an identity-based political actor characterized by “anti-Russia” and “de-Russification.” It is not difficult to see that clauses exchanging territory for peace have completely activated the historical memories of hostility and aversion toward Russia among most Central and Eastern European countries, and this shared identity has further reinforced strong resistance at the EU level.
In contrast, the “pro-peace camp,” represented by Hungary, has remained relatively restrained. From the very beginning of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has strongly opposed the EU’s stance of “supporting Ukraine against Russia” and has been committed to promoting a Budapest meeting between the United States and Russia to facilitate peace talks. On November 28, Orbán visited Moscow and stated his willingness to provide a platform for negotiations to resolve the Ukraine issue. This move triggered strong dissatisfaction from Poland, which subsequently canceled a previously scheduled bilateral summit with Hungary, retaining only the relevant agenda of the Visegrád Group summit on December 3.
However, with high inflation, sharply increasing pressure on people’s livelihoods, and energy and security policies hollowing out national development potential, populist forces have taken the opportunity to make a comeback, and governments in many Central and Eastern European countries face the risk of restructuring. In October 2023, Fico once again assumed the post of Slovak prime minister, a result driven precisely by public dissatisfaction with intensifying inflation; similarly, in December 2025, Babiš, leader of the Czech populist far-right party “ANO (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens),” will once again serve as prime minister. Proceeding from the core interests of safeguarding national economic and livelihood concerns, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic are highly likely to form a “pro-Russia, distant-from-Ukraine” triangle.
Dynamics: “New Europe” Leading “Old Europe” and the Fatigue of Supporting Ukraine
Except for the Balkan region, Central and Eastern European countries have all joined the European Union. They have been labeled by U.S. politicians as “New Europe,” aimed at counterbalancing the “Old Europe” represented by Western Europe, with the intention of dividing and weakening the European continent’s drive toward unity. In the early stages of EU accession, these European “newcomer” countries were mostly in a position of passively accepting rules and undergoing one-way transformation; their core demands consistently focused on obtaining more economic development resources and tangible opportunities to improve people’s livelihoods. The outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict has completely reshaped Europe’s political leadership landscape: propelled by the United States, Central and Eastern European countries leaped to the forefront as “vanguards” of anti-Russia, pro-Ukraine support, with their geopolitical influence surging sharply and even reversely shaping the EU’s positions and decision-making toward Ukraine and Russia. In the early phase of the conflict, Poland, the three Baltic states, and others were particularly active, strongly calling for military assistance to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, ultimately pushing these propositions to become unified EU actions.
However, as the Russia–Ukraine conflict became protracted, anxiety and fear among Central and Eastern European publics continued to rise, directly fueling the resurgence of populist far-right parties. In some countries, coalition governments and government reshuffles emerged, leading to fundamental adjustments in foreign policy directions. For example, Hungary and Slovakia have clearly exhibited diversified tendencies of being “pro-Russia, pro-U.S., and skeptical of Europe.” The concept of “nation first” has spread rapidly across the European continent, and governments in Germany, Poland, and other countries have gradually revealed pressure and dissatisfaction regarding the reception of Ukrainian refugees, calling on the EU to increase subsidies for migrant resettlement. At the same time, the emergence of “fatigue with supporting Ukraine and opposing Russia” has disrupted the EU’s previously unified rhythm of “anti-Russia, pro-Ukraine,” with calls and possibilities for resolving the conflict through peace negotiations correspondingly rising. On November 7, during Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s special visit to the United States, Trump stated, “We will end this war in the not-too-distant future,” to which Orbán responded, “Miracles are always possible,” calling on European politicians to stop actions that undermine progress toward Russia–Ukraine peace.
Trump attempts to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict in the name of peace, but the “28-point peace plan” has made the EU clearly recognize that the United States’ approach to seizing Ukrainian resources has become increasingly unsightly, with the principle of “America First” fully on display. Because Russia strongly opposes the “19-point peace plan” and insists on using the “28-point peace plan” as the basis for negotiations, Europe’s security nerves have once again been tightened, accelerating Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” and solidifying the will to “oppose Russia and support Ukraine.” On December 3, European Commission President von der Leyen proposed a new version of a “using Russian assets to aid Ukraine” loan scheme, seeking to resolve Ukraine’s loan funding sources by confiscating frozen European assets of the Russian central bank, and to submit it for review at the EU summit on the 18th. In essence, the issue of Ukraine’s security guarantees fundamentally reflects deep-seated security anxiety across the entire Central and Eastern European region, pulling at Europe’s choices of stance within the conflict.
Due to significant divergences between U.S. and European positions, Russia–Ukraine peace negotiations have repeatedly fallen into deadlock, and the trend of Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” may persist over the long term, potentially accelerating the integration of European defense amid crises. Although EU member states still exhibit pronounced differences and divisions across political, economic, and social fields, in response to pressing external security pressures, all countries have incentives to accelerate steps toward strategic autonomy and increase investment in hard defense capabilities. At the same time, relying on the unique advantages of the unified single market, the EU continues to harden its “soft power,” and in increasingly intense international competition, most member states are coordinating their efforts with a more united and assertive posture.
The “28-point peace plan” is akin to a precisely calibrated litmus test, impacting the strategic “bottom lines” that Central and Eastern European countries and the EU can tolerate. Amid repeated games and tug-of-war among multiple parties, the United States, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine have no longer concealed their respective interest pursuits and sovereignty red lines. A long-term power struggle among the United States, Russia, and Europe has already been set, making it inevitable that the Russia–Ukraine conflict, as a surface manifestation, will evolve toward greater protraction and complexity. In this process, Central and Eastern European countries located in the “middle zone” will continue to see their discourse power in the field of security and defense rise, thereby playing an increasingly pivotal role within the EU’s collective decision-making mechanism.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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