Opinion
Trump’s ‘Peace Plan’ Will Accelerate Europe’s ‘Central and Eastern Europeanization’
Trump’s “28-point peace plan” to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict reflects the underlying political logic of American power politics—the “dining table menu” theory: “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”
Liu Xiaodan, Associate Researcher, Institute for Central and Eastern European Economic and Trade Cooperation, Ningbo University
Ma Xiaolin, Specially Appointed Researcher, Institute for Central and Eastern European Economic and Trade Cooperation, Ningbo University; Bao Yugang Chair Professor; Professor at Zhejiang International Studies University; Director of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies
U.S. President Trump has unilaterally introduced a “28-point peace plan” to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict, thoroughly exposing the EU’s power “bottom cards” and directly striking at the EU’s interest “red lines.” This peace roadmap presents solutions in a segmented manner across nine aspects, including Ukraine’s sovereignty, security architecture, arms restrictions and relations with NATO, postwar reconstruction of Ukraine, U.S.–Russia cooperation, territorial division of Ukraine, and humanitarian guarantees. It once again reflects the underlying political logic of American power politics—the “dining table menu” theory: “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”
Obviously, this time Ukraine and the EU have been placed on the menu, while the two major powers, the United States and Russia, sit at the table holding knives and forks. Europe rushed to respond. On November 23, advisors from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other countries held talks with senior Ukrainian officials ahead of the U.S.–Ukraine Geneva meeting; through U.S.–Ukraine negotiations, the “28 points” were compressed into “19 points,” shelving issues of territorial division and parts concerning Ukraine’s relations with NATO and the EU. After this hurried round, the EU was only able to fend off blows, with no capacity to counterattack.
What is noteworthy is that the Central and Eastern European countries on the front line of the Russia–Ukraine conflict instead appear relatively calm, divided into two camps—“pro-war” and “pro-peace”—each adhering to positions aligned with their national interests. In a short period of time, bilateral or multilateral meetings among the United States, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine have continued around the “28-point” or its revised peace plan, with Central and Eastern European countries also interspersed among them, attempting to influence the course of events.
On November 28, Hungarian President Viktor Orbán visited Russia to hold talks on the Russia–Ukraine conflict and energy issues, and expressed hope that U.S. and Russian leaders could meet in Budapest to resolve the conflict peacefully; Orbán stated that “the Moscow talks were very successful.” On December 2, German Chancellor Merz met Polish Prime Minister Tusk in Berlin, stating that he “hopes Poland will become an important partner in building a secure, free, and prosperous Europe.” On the same day, Russian President Putin once again emphasized opposition to bargaining, stating that all modifications proposed by Europe to Trump’s peace plan aim to completely block the entire peace process.
From this, it can be seen that although the process of shifting the Russia–Ukraine conflict “from war to peace” appears to have entered a “fast lane,” it is in fact still in a “climbing stage.” The Central and Eastern European region, increasingly becoming a focal point of great-power competition, is seeing its geopolitical influence continuously strengthened, seemingly assuming the role of a main force shaping Europe’s situation and accelerating the trend of Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization.”
The core characteristics of Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” are reflected in the accelerated advancement of “de-Russification”: in economic, energy, and security fields, achieving partial or full “decoupling” from Russia; at the security level, relying on the United States and the NATO framework to bind external security guarantees; and in development pathways, elevating the priority of security interests while relatively weakening investment in resources related to people’s livelihoods. The roar of artillery fire in the Russia–Ukraine conflict interweaves with the quarrels of U.S.–Ukraine peace negotiations, causing the situation in Central and Eastern Europe to exhibit high sensitivity, sharp confrontation, and complex dynamics, which may spread and deepen across the European continent.
Sensitivity: Absolutization of Security Issues and Politicization of Non-Political Issues
The sensitivity of the situation is manifested, on the one hand, in the absolutization of security issues, with the core focus on military defensive security. The first ten points of the “28-point peace plan” clearly outline Ukraine’s sovereignty and security architecture with attached guarantee conditions. In response, prior to the U.S.–Ukraine Geneva meeting on November 23, several European countries communicated privately with Ukraine, expecting the United States to provide collective defense security guarantees similar to those stipulated in NATO Charter Article 5, demanding that the United States offer comprehensive security assurances and place Ukraine’s security under NATO’s collective defense umbrella.
At present, Europe’s defense and security still follow the U.S.-led NATO unquestioningly, while the realization of strategic autonomy is inseparable from solid defense capabilities as support. To accelerate the process of European defense integration, in October 2025 the European Union officially launched the “Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030,” aiming to promote Europe’s transformation from a “payer” to an “actor” in the defense field, achieve precise alignment between defense fiscal expenditure and diplomatic discourse power, and ultimately ensure that Europe “must be at the table” in negotiations involving European security.
Another layer of sensitivity is reflected in the politicization of non-political issues, focusing on energy. Against the specific backdrop of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” process has driven external cooperation toward a mindset of “emphasizing security over economics,” with livelihood politics yielding to geopolitics. A landmark event was that, under criticism and pressure from Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries, in February 2022 then German Chancellor Scholz announced the suspension of certification for the “Nord Stream 2” project. In October 2025, the EU approved its 19th round of sanctions against Russia, for the first time targeting Russia’s liquefied natural gas industry, marking a further deepening of the EU–Russia energy decoupling process. In this process, energy has been stripped of its basic economic attributes and reduced to a tool of geopolitical competition. In sharp contrast, Hungary has consistently adhered to independently importing Russian energy based on its own economic and livelihood needs; this “going its own way” approach has led some forces to view it as a “Trojan horse” within the anti-Russia system.
Confrontation: Polarization of Differences and Contradiction of Positions
Regarding the territorial clauses involved in the “28-point peace plan,” the majority of Central and Eastern European countries quickly expressed strong opposition. Polish Prime Minister Tusk emphasized that “any agreement must not weaken or undermine the security of Poland and Europe, and peace cannot be achieved at the cost of weakening Ukraine’s military capabilities.” Croatian Prime Minister Plenković declared that the plan infringes upon Ukraine’s territorial integrity. European Commission President von der Leyen also stressed that countries cannot be changed by force and that Ukraine must have the right to choose its own destiny.
As the EU expanded to include Central and Eastern European countries, major states such as the V4 Group (the Visegrád Group, including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) and the three Baltic states have vigorously promoted incorporating Soviet “dictatorial rule” into Europe’s collective memory, gradually shaping the entire EU into an identity-based political actor characterized by “anti-Russia” and “de-Russification.” It is not difficult to see that clauses exchanging territory for peace have completely activated the historical memories of hostility and aversion toward Russia among most Central and Eastern European countries, and this shared identity has further reinforced strong resistance at the EU level.
In contrast, the “pro-peace camp,” represented by Hungary, has remained relatively restrained. From the very beginning of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has strongly opposed the EU’s stance of “supporting Ukraine against Russia” and has been committed to promoting a Budapest meeting between the United States and Russia to facilitate peace talks. On November 28, Orbán visited Moscow and stated his willingness to provide a platform for negotiations to resolve the Ukraine issue. This move triggered strong dissatisfaction from Poland, which subsequently canceled a previously scheduled bilateral summit with Hungary, retaining only the relevant agenda of the Visegrád Group summit on December 3.
However, with high inflation, sharply increasing pressure on people’s livelihoods, and energy and security policies hollowing out national development potential, populist forces have taken the opportunity to make a comeback, and governments in many Central and Eastern European countries face the risk of restructuring. In October 2023, Fico once again assumed the post of Slovak prime minister, a result driven precisely by public dissatisfaction with intensifying inflation; similarly, in December 2025, Babiš, leader of the Czech populist far-right party “ANO (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens),” will once again serve as prime minister. Proceeding from the core interests of safeguarding national economic and livelihood concerns, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic are highly likely to form a “pro-Russia, distant-from-Ukraine” triangle.
Dynamics: “New Europe” Leading “Old Europe” and the Fatigue of Supporting Ukraine
Except for the Balkan region, Central and Eastern European countries have all joined the European Union. They have been labeled by U.S. politicians as “New Europe,” aimed at counterbalancing the “Old Europe” represented by Western Europe, with the intention of dividing and weakening the European continent’s drive toward unity. In the early stages of EU accession, these European “newcomer” countries were mostly in a position of passively accepting rules and undergoing one-way transformation; their core demands consistently focused on obtaining more economic development resources and tangible opportunities to improve people’s livelihoods. The outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict has completely reshaped Europe’s political leadership landscape: propelled by the United States, Central and Eastern European countries leaped to the forefront as “vanguards” of anti-Russia, pro-Ukraine support, with their geopolitical influence surging sharply and even reversely shaping the EU’s positions and decision-making toward Ukraine and Russia. In the early phase of the conflict, Poland, the three Baltic states, and others were particularly active, strongly calling for military assistance to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, ultimately pushing these propositions to become unified EU actions.
However, as the Russia–Ukraine conflict became protracted, anxiety and fear among Central and Eastern European publics continued to rise, directly fueling the resurgence of populist far-right parties. In some countries, coalition governments and government reshuffles emerged, leading to fundamental adjustments in foreign policy directions. For example, Hungary and Slovakia have clearly exhibited diversified tendencies of being “pro-Russia, pro-U.S., and skeptical of Europe.” The concept of “nation first” has spread rapidly across the European continent, and governments in Germany, Poland, and other countries have gradually revealed pressure and dissatisfaction regarding the reception of Ukrainian refugees, calling on the EU to increase subsidies for migrant resettlement. At the same time, the emergence of “fatigue with supporting Ukraine and opposing Russia” has disrupted the EU’s previously unified rhythm of “anti-Russia, pro-Ukraine,” with calls and possibilities for resolving the conflict through peace negotiations correspondingly rising. On November 7, during Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s special visit to the United States, Trump stated, “We will end this war in the not-too-distant future,” to which Orbán responded, “Miracles are always possible,” calling on European politicians to stop actions that undermine progress toward Russia–Ukraine peace.
Trump attempts to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict in the name of peace, but the “28-point peace plan” has made the EU clearly recognize that the United States’ approach to seizing Ukrainian resources has become increasingly unsightly, with the principle of “America First” fully on display. Because Russia strongly opposes the “19-point peace plan” and insists on using the “28-point peace plan” as the basis for negotiations, Europe’s security nerves have once again been tightened, accelerating Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” and solidifying the will to “oppose Russia and support Ukraine.” On December 3, European Commission President von der Leyen proposed a new version of a “using Russian assets to aid Ukraine” loan scheme, seeking to resolve Ukraine’s loan funding sources by confiscating frozen European assets of the Russian central bank, and to submit it for review at the EU summit on the 18th. In essence, the issue of Ukraine’s security guarantees fundamentally reflects deep-seated security anxiety across the entire Central and Eastern European region, pulling at Europe’s choices of stance within the conflict.
Due to significant divergences between U.S. and European positions, Russia–Ukraine peace negotiations have repeatedly fallen into deadlock, and the trend of Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” may persist over the long term, potentially accelerating the integration of European defense amid crises. Although EU member states still exhibit pronounced differences and divisions across political, economic, and social fields, in response to pressing external security pressures, all countries have incentives to accelerate steps toward strategic autonomy and increase investment in hard defense capabilities. At the same time, relying on the unique advantages of the unified single market, the EU continues to harden its “soft power,” and in increasingly intense international competition, most member states are coordinating their efforts with a more united and assertive posture.
The “28-point peace plan” is akin to a precisely calibrated litmus test, impacting the strategic “bottom lines” that Central and Eastern European countries and the EU can tolerate. Amid repeated games and tug-of-war among multiple parties, the United States, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine have no longer concealed their respective interest pursuits and sovereignty red lines. A long-term power struggle among the United States, Russia, and Europe has already been set, making it inevitable that the Russia–Ukraine conflict, as a surface manifestation, will evolve toward greater protraction and complexity. In this process, Central and Eastern European countries located in the “middle zone” will continue to see their discourse power in the field of security and defense rise, thereby playing an increasingly pivotal role within the EU’s collective decision-making mechanism.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
A voice rising from New Delhi: BRICS’s manifesto for a new world order
The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in the Indian capital of New Delhi on May 15, 2026, carries a significance that extends far beyond the confines of routine diplomacy. This gathering culminated in the signing of one of the most comprehensive political documents to date, outlining the vision of the world order that BRICS envisions for 2026. Reading between the lines, the document reveals not merely the proceedings of a ministerial summit, but the contours of a comprehensive alternative vision challenging the Western-centric international system. Indeed, this text must be read as a political manifesto of the shifting balances of power, the accelerating global struggle for influence, and the emerging new world order of recent years.
The overarching theme dominating the entire document is “The Rise of the Global South.” BRICS members contend that the current international order is unjust, insufficiently representative, and fails to reflect the interests of developing nations. Consequently, they emphasize the urgent need to restructure foundational institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, BRICS now positions itself as the voice of the non-Western world. Today, the global arena is traversing an era in which the post-World War II international system has plunged into a profound crisis of legitimacy and representation. Developments such as the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, the Gaza crisis, global trade wars, the weaponization of sanctions, energy security challenges, and technological competition demonstrate that the current system struggles to mirror contemporary global realities. It is precisely from this premise that the BRICS nations operate, sending a clear message to the world through the New Delhi Outcome Document: “The status quo is no longer sustainable.”
One of the most striking aspects of the document is how clearly it demonstrates that BRICS no longer views itself as a mere platform for economic cooperation. Having long focused primarily on economic development, trade, and finance since its inception, BRICS has now reached a far more ambitious posture. In the New Delhi Outcome Document, issues of security, geopolitical crises, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate policies, energy transition, and international governance reforms occupy a place as central as economics. This indicates that BRICS’s ambition to become a foundational actor in global politics is steadily gaining traction. Reading between the lines, the strongest emphasis emerges on the concept of a “multipolar world.” The core approach of BRICS is animated by the premise that the Western-centric, largely US-led international order, which took shape over the decades following the end of the Cold War, is no longer the sole alternative. Throughout the declaration, the repeated use of phrases like “more just,” “more representative,” “more democratic,” and “more inclusive” international system constitutes a direct critique of the current distribution of global power.
The sections concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council are particularly critical. Indeed, the call for UN reform stands out as one of the most pivotal political segments of the document. BRICS nations explicitly state that the current structure fails to reflect contemporary realities. They contend that Africa, Latin America, and emerging Asian powers are underrepresented in decision-making mechanisms. What is even more remarkable is that China and Russia have reaffirmed their support for India and Brazil to assume greater roles within the Security Council. This state of affairs reveals, first and foremost, the elevation of India and Brazil to global-power status. Secondly, it demonstrates an increasing political cohesion within BRICS. Finally, it illustrates a fundamental questioning of the post-WWII international order.
Another prominent element in the document is the sharp critique of the sanctions policies pursued by the United States and the West. The intensive use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in recent years has engendered collective discomfort among BRICS nations. The text emphasizes that unilateral sanctions violate international law and severely hamper the economic development of developing nations. Although no countries are named directly, this formulation can be read as a potent critique targeted at measures such as US sanctions on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as the embargo on Cuba. This approach is a continuation of BRICS’s long-standing critique regarding the “weaponization of economics.” Indeed, one of the most strategic segments of the declaration emerges here. For BRICS is no longer merely criticizing the existing financial architecture; it is actively endeavoring to construct alternative mechanisms. Initiatives such as cross-border payment systems, trade in local currencies, financial integration, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank can be read as harbingers of a long-term quest to forge an alternative to the dollar-centric global economic structure. While it is premature to speak of a system capable of fully displacing the dollar, the steps taken by BRICS are beginning to demonstrate that the current financial order is not the only option.
Another major political segment of the New Delhi Document concerns the Gaza and Palestine issue. Here, we witness one of the strongest stances BRICS has ever taken on the matter. The document employs highly resolute language regarding Gaza and Palestine, with a notable emphasis on an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Furthermore, South Africa’s legal action against Israel and the rulings of the International Court of Justice are directly recalled in the text. In the face of recent offensives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, BRICS nations have displayed one of their clearest collective stances to date. The call for an immediate ceasefire, the demand for unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, support for Palestinian statehood, and the emphasis on international law stand among the declaration’s most potent political messages. This can be interpreted as an indication of BRICS’s desire to become a more visible and effective political actor in global crises.
On the other hand, the text does not entirely gloss over the internal divergences within BRICS. It openly acknowledges that members hold differing views, particularly on Middle Eastern issues. This is significant because today’s BRICS is no longer a bloc comprised solely of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the integration of new members such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, it has evolved into a far more complex geopolitical entity. Interestingly, the document explicitly notes that rather than a unified stance, differing perspectives exist on certain issues. Specifically, it is conceded that members hold divergent positions on matters concerning Iran, the Gulf states, and Yemen. Despite these differences, the bloc’s ability to establish common ground demonstrates an expansion of BRICS’s diplomatic capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the New Delhi process also represents a significant diplomatic triumph for India. While the recent wave of expansion—bringing in Iran, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—has enriched the platform’s geopolitical diversity, it has also rendered collective decision-making processes more intricate. Particularly at a juncture where the war in Iran continues, the deep-seated divergences between Iran and the Gulf states led many experts to predict that BRICS would struggle to find common political ground and that the summit would be fraught with severe diplomatic friction. However, despite all these differences, India succeeded in rallying members with diverging interests and priorities around the same platform, proving that BRICS retains its capacity to generate dialogue rather than fracture. In this context, the outcome in New Delhi is not limited merely to the content of the published joint text. The true, striking success lies in the preservation of a diplomatic arena that enabled members—who find themselves directly opposed on certain issues in an extremely sensitive and polarized crisis environment—to compromise on other matters and continue negotiating under the BRICS umbrella.
Furthermore, one of the document’s most critical messages emerges in the realm of technology. The extensive coverage of topics such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, data security, and cybersecurity is no coincidence. Indeed, the global power struggle of the future will be shaped heavily through technological supremacy. BRICS nations clearly demonstrate their awareness of this reality and their intent to act in unison in the technological race. Particularly noteworthy is their quest to develop alternatives to Western-centric norms in artificial intelligence governance. A distinct approach is also observed in energy and climate policies. Instead of the rapid energy transition frequently championed by Western nations, the concept of a “just energy transition” is prioritized. At the heart of this approach lies the conviction that the economic growth needs of developing nations must not be disregarded. BRICS countries advocate for a balance between environmental responsibility and the right to development. This points to a major fault line that will become increasingly pronounced in global climate debates in the coming years.
When all these headings are evaluated together, the resulting picture is remarkably clear: BRICS is no longer merely a platform for safeguarding economic interests. It is a center of power beginning to articulate its own vision of how the international system ought to operate. At the core of this vision lies the objective of greater representation, sovereign equality, deeper multipolarity, and a stronger voice for developing nations in global decision-making processes.
The New Delhi Document, brought to the table at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, is far more than a mere communique; it is one of the landmark texts of the historic transformation unfolding in global politics. As the world rapidly moves away from a unipolar structure, BRICS is emerging as one of the most powerful political and economic vehicles of this transition. Today, many rules of the international system may still be written by the West. Yet, the message rising from New Delhi is clear: far more actors now demand a seat at the table to rewrite those very rules. BRICS is transitioning from an economic club into a political, diplomatic, financial, and technological powerhouse. Its claim to serve as the collective voice and compass of the Global South is strengthening. It pursues a dual strategy: offering an alternative to Western-centric institutions while simultaneously working to transform them. BRICS is not yet establishing institutions to directly replace the UN, IMF, World Bank, or WTO; rather, it is striving to change the rules and the distribution of power within them.
The 2026 New Delhi Document of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India under its presidency, can be regarded as one of the most comprehensive strategic documents in the twenty-year history of BRICS. The text serves as a political manifesto for an era marked by the sunset of the US- and Western-led unipolar epoch, the demands of rising powers for greater agency, and the accelerating quest of the Global South to establish a permanent weight in the international system.
The essence of the document can be distilled into a single sentence: while BRICS remains a platform that adapts to the rules of the existing international order, it is simultaneously transforming into a global actor that seeks to rewrite them.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
Opinion
NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism
Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.
As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.
In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.
Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.
Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion
NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.
And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.
The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.
The collapse of the Atlantic system
Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.
In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.
Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.
For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.
Opinion
Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing
Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.
For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.
Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.
It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.
The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.
Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.
This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.
For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.
China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.
All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.
The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.
Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.
Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
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