Trump’s ‘Peace Plan’ Will Accelerate Europe’s ‘Central and Eastern Europeanization’

Trump’s “28-point peace plan” to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict reflects the underlying political logic of American power politics—the “dining table menu” theory: “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”

Liu Xiaodan, Associate Researcher, Institute for Central and Eastern European Economic and Trade Cooperation, Ningbo University
Ma Xiaolin, Specially Appointed Researcher, Institute for Central and Eastern European Economic and Trade Cooperation, Ningbo University; Bao Yugang Chair Professor; Professor at Zhejiang International Studies University; Director of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies

U.S. President Trump has unilaterally introduced a “28-point peace plan” to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict, thoroughly exposing the EU’s power “bottom cards” and directly striking at the EU’s interest “red lines.” This peace roadmap presents solutions in a segmented manner across nine aspects, including Ukraine’s sovereignty, security architecture, arms restrictions and relations with NATO, postwar reconstruction of Ukraine, U.S.–Russia cooperation, territorial division of Ukraine, and humanitarian guarantees. It once again reflects the underlying political logic of American power politics—the “dining table menu” theory: “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”

Obviously, this time Ukraine and the EU have been placed on the menu, while the two major powers, the United States and Russia, sit at the table holding knives and forks. Europe rushed to respond. On November 23, advisors from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other countries held talks with senior Ukrainian officials ahead of the U.S.–Ukraine Geneva meeting; through U.S.–Ukraine negotiations, the “28 points” were compressed into “19 points,” shelving issues of territorial division and parts concerning Ukraine’s relations with NATO and the EU. After this hurried round, the EU was only able to fend off blows, with no capacity to counterattack.

What is noteworthy is that the Central and Eastern European countries on the front line of the Russia–Ukraine conflict instead appear relatively calm, divided into two camps—“pro-war” and “pro-peace”—each adhering to positions aligned with their national interests. In a short period of time, bilateral or multilateral meetings among the United States, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine have continued around the “28-point” or its revised peace plan, with Central and Eastern European countries also interspersed among them, attempting to influence the course of events.

On November 28, Hungarian President Viktor Orbán visited Russia to hold talks on the Russia–Ukraine conflict and energy issues, and expressed hope that U.S. and Russian leaders could meet in Budapest to resolve the conflict peacefully; Orbán stated that “the Moscow talks were very successful.” On December 2, German Chancellor Merz met Polish Prime Minister Tusk in Berlin, stating that he “hopes Poland will become an important partner in building a secure, free, and prosperous Europe.” On the same day, Russian President Putin once again emphasized opposition to bargaining, stating that all modifications proposed by Europe to Trump’s peace plan aim to completely block the entire peace process.

From this, it can be seen that although the process of shifting the Russia–Ukraine conflict “from war to peace” appears to have entered a “fast lane,” it is in fact still in a “climbing stage.” The Central and Eastern European region, increasingly becoming a focal point of great-power competition, is seeing its geopolitical influence continuously strengthened, seemingly assuming the role of a main force shaping Europe’s situation and accelerating the trend of Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization.”

The core characteristics of Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” are reflected in the accelerated advancement of “de-Russification”: in economic, energy, and security fields, achieving partial or full “decoupling” from Russia; at the security level, relying on the United States and the NATO framework to bind external security guarantees; and in development pathways, elevating the priority of security interests while relatively weakening investment in resources related to people’s livelihoods. The roar of artillery fire in the Russia–Ukraine conflict interweaves with the quarrels of U.S.–Ukraine peace negotiations, causing the situation in Central and Eastern Europe to exhibit high sensitivity, sharp confrontation, and complex dynamics, which may spread and deepen across the European continent.

Sensitivity: Absolutization of Security Issues and Politicization of Non-Political Issues

The sensitivity of the situation is manifested, on the one hand, in the absolutization of security issues, with the core focus on military defensive security. The first ten points of the “28-point peace plan” clearly outline Ukraine’s sovereignty and security architecture with attached guarantee conditions. In response, prior to the U.S.–Ukraine Geneva meeting on November 23, several European countries communicated privately with Ukraine, expecting the United States to provide collective defense security guarantees similar to those stipulated in NATO Charter Article 5, demanding that the United States offer comprehensive security assurances and place Ukraine’s security under NATO’s collective defense umbrella.

At present, Europe’s defense and security still follow the U.S.-led NATO unquestioningly, while the realization of strategic autonomy is inseparable from solid defense capabilities as support. To accelerate the process of European defense integration, in October 2025 the European Union officially launched the “Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030,” aiming to promote Europe’s transformation from a “payer” to an “actor” in the defense field, achieve precise alignment between defense fiscal expenditure and diplomatic discourse power, and ultimately ensure that Europe “must be at the table” in negotiations involving European security.

Another layer of sensitivity is reflected in the politicization of non-political issues, focusing on energy. Against the specific backdrop of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” process has driven external cooperation toward a mindset of “emphasizing security over economics,” with livelihood politics yielding to geopolitics. A landmark event was that, under criticism and pressure from Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries, in February 2022 then German Chancellor Scholz announced the suspension of certification for the “Nord Stream 2” project. In October 2025, the EU approved its 19th round of sanctions against Russia, for the first time targeting Russia’s liquefied natural gas industry, marking a further deepening of the EU–Russia energy decoupling process. In this process, energy has been stripped of its basic economic attributes and reduced to a tool of geopolitical competition. In sharp contrast, Hungary has consistently adhered to independently importing Russian energy based on its own economic and livelihood needs; this “going its own way” approach has led some forces to view it as a “Trojan horse” within the anti-Russia system.

Confrontation: Polarization of Differences and Contradiction of Positions

Regarding the territorial clauses involved in the “28-point peace plan,” the majority of Central and Eastern European countries quickly expressed strong opposition. Polish Prime Minister Tusk emphasized that “any agreement must not weaken or undermine the security of Poland and Europe, and peace cannot be achieved at the cost of weakening Ukraine’s military capabilities.” Croatian Prime Minister Plenković declared that the plan infringes upon Ukraine’s territorial integrity. European Commission President von der Leyen also stressed that countries cannot be changed by force and that Ukraine must have the right to choose its own destiny.

As the EU expanded to include Central and Eastern European countries, major states such as the V4 Group (the Visegrád Group, including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) and the three Baltic states have vigorously promoted incorporating Soviet “dictatorial rule” into Europe’s collective memory, gradually shaping the entire EU into an identity-based political actor characterized by “anti-Russia” and “de-Russification.” It is not difficult to see that clauses exchanging territory for peace have completely activated the historical memories of hostility and aversion toward Russia among most Central and Eastern European countries, and this shared identity has further reinforced strong resistance at the EU level.

In contrast, the “pro-peace camp,” represented by Hungary, has remained relatively restrained. From the very beginning of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has strongly opposed the EU’s stance of “supporting Ukraine against Russia” and has been committed to promoting a Budapest meeting between the United States and Russia to facilitate peace talks. On November 28, Orbán visited Moscow and stated his willingness to provide a platform for negotiations to resolve the Ukraine issue. This move triggered strong dissatisfaction from Poland, which subsequently canceled a previously scheduled bilateral summit with Hungary, retaining only the relevant agenda of the Visegrád Group summit on December 3.

However, with high inflation, sharply increasing pressure on people’s livelihoods, and energy and security policies hollowing out national development potential, populist forces have taken the opportunity to make a comeback, and governments in many Central and Eastern European countries face the risk of restructuring. In October 2023, Fico once again assumed the post of Slovak prime minister, a result driven precisely by public dissatisfaction with intensifying inflation; similarly, in December 2025, Babiš, leader of the Czech populist far-right party “ANO (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens),” will once again serve as prime minister. Proceeding from the core interests of safeguarding national economic and livelihood concerns, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic are highly likely to form a “pro-Russia, distant-from-Ukraine” triangle.

Dynamics: “New Europe” Leading “Old Europe” and the Fatigue of Supporting Ukraine

Except for the Balkan region, Central and Eastern European countries have all joined the European Union. They have been labeled by U.S. politicians as “New Europe,” aimed at counterbalancing the “Old Europe” represented by Western Europe, with the intention of dividing and weakening the European continent’s drive toward unity. In the early stages of EU accession, these European “newcomer” countries were mostly in a position of passively accepting rules and undergoing one-way transformation; their core demands consistently focused on obtaining more economic development resources and tangible opportunities to improve people’s livelihoods. The outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict has completely reshaped Europe’s political leadership landscape: propelled by the United States, Central and Eastern European countries leaped to the forefront as “vanguards” of anti-Russia, pro-Ukraine support, with their geopolitical influence surging sharply and even reversely shaping the EU’s positions and decision-making toward Ukraine and Russia. In the early phase of the conflict, Poland, the three Baltic states, and others were particularly active, strongly calling for military assistance to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, ultimately pushing these propositions to become unified EU actions.

However, as the Russia–Ukraine conflict became protracted, anxiety and fear among Central and Eastern European publics continued to rise, directly fueling the resurgence of populist far-right parties. In some countries, coalition governments and government reshuffles emerged, leading to fundamental adjustments in foreign policy directions. For example, Hungary and Slovakia have clearly exhibited diversified tendencies of being “pro-Russia, pro-U.S., and skeptical of Europe.” The concept of “nation first” has spread rapidly across the European continent, and governments in Germany, Poland, and other countries have gradually revealed pressure and dissatisfaction regarding the reception of Ukrainian refugees, calling on the EU to increase subsidies for migrant resettlement. At the same time, the emergence of “fatigue with supporting Ukraine and opposing Russia” has disrupted the EU’s previously unified rhythm of “anti-Russia, pro-Ukraine,” with calls and possibilities for resolving the conflict through peace negotiations correspondingly rising. On November 7, during Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s special visit to the United States, Trump stated, “We will end this war in the not-too-distant future,” to which Orbán responded, “Miracles are always possible,” calling on European politicians to stop actions that undermine progress toward Russia–Ukraine peace.

Trump attempts to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict in the name of peace, but the “28-point peace plan” has made the EU clearly recognize that the United States’ approach to seizing Ukrainian resources has become increasingly unsightly, with the principle of “America First” fully on display. Because Russia strongly opposes the “19-point peace plan” and insists on using the “28-point peace plan” as the basis for negotiations, Europe’s security nerves have once again been tightened, accelerating Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” and solidifying the will to “oppose Russia and support Ukraine.” On December 3, European Commission President von der Leyen proposed a new version of a “using Russian assets to aid Ukraine” loan scheme, seeking to resolve Ukraine’s loan funding sources by confiscating frozen European assets of the Russian central bank, and to submit it for review at the EU summit on the 18th. In essence, the issue of Ukraine’s security guarantees fundamentally reflects deep-seated security anxiety across the entire Central and Eastern European region, pulling at Europe’s choices of stance within the conflict.

Due to significant divergences between U.S. and European positions, Russia–Ukraine peace negotiations have repeatedly fallen into deadlock, and the trend of Europe’s “Central and Eastern Europeanization” may persist over the long term, potentially accelerating the integration of European defense amid crises. Although EU member states still exhibit pronounced differences and divisions across political, economic, and social fields, in response to pressing external security pressures, all countries have incentives to accelerate steps toward strategic autonomy and increase investment in hard defense capabilities. At the same time, relying on the unique advantages of the unified single market, the EU continues to harden its “soft power,” and in increasingly intense international competition, most member states are coordinating their efforts with a more united and assertive posture.

The “28-point peace plan” is akin to a precisely calibrated litmus test, impacting the strategic “bottom lines” that Central and Eastern European countries and the EU can tolerate. Amid repeated games and tug-of-war among multiple parties, the United States, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine have no longer concealed their respective interest pursuits and sovereignty red lines. A long-term power struggle among the United States, Russia, and Europe has already been set, making it inevitable that the Russia–Ukraine conflict, as a surface manifestation, will evolve toward greater protraction and complexity. In this process, Central and Eastern European countries located in the “middle zone” will continue to see their discourse power in the field of security and defense rise, thereby playing an increasingly pivotal role within the EU’s collective decision-making mechanism.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.