Diplomacy
The final frontier in Ukraine’s crisis: Trump’s peace plan and the proposal for a sanitary zone
Since its inception, the war in Ukraine has escalated into a profound crisis with far-reaching implications, not only for Eastern Europe but for the entire world. The diplomatic tensions, military interventions, and economic sanctions that have followed have underscored the precarious balance between war and peace on the European continent.
During his election campaign, former U.S. President Donald Trump made a bold assertion: “If I take office, I will end the war in Ukraine quickly.” This statement hints at a potential shift in U.S. military and material support for Europe. While the specifics of Trump’s plan remain unclear, his public rhetoric and insights from his advisors have sparked a multifaceted debate among European nations.
Trump’s stated goal is to “establish peace,” but it is evident that the U.S. aims to reduce its traditional military burdens. This could leave Europe facing a stark choice: either take on a greater role in resolving the conflict or bear the consequences of inaction. Such a scenario would force Europe, already strained by the crisis in Ukraine, to reevaluate its security framework.
At the same time, the question of sustained financial and military aid to Ukraine is testing Europe’s political resolve and economic capacity. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has issued a stark warning: “Without financial support, we will lose.” He is urging Western allies to share the burden of the war. Without U.S. support—ranging from advanced weaponry to intelligence and operational planning—Ukraine’s military efforts against Russia would face even greater challenges. Meanwhile, Germany, a cornerstone of the EU, is grappling with whether it is prepared to assume a larger role if U.S. support diminishes. Within the European Union, the lack of a unified approach is evident, as each member state prioritizes its own interests.
What does Trump’s peace plan offer?
Donald Trump has claimed that, if elected president, he would swiftly end the war in Ukraine. During his previous presidency, Trump’s approach to NATO was marked by ambivalence. He notably pressured European countries to increase their defense spending and contribute more to the U.S.-led security umbrella. Now, as he eyes a potential return to the White House, his proposed actions regarding the Ukraine war are of direct concern to Europe. Given its geographical proximity, Europe is the primary region that would bear the consequences of any escalation or misstep in the conflict.
While the specifics of Trump’s peace plan remain undisclosed, leaks suggest that some politicians close to his advisors have discussed the creation of demilitarized zones between Ukraine and Russia. It is speculated that American troops would not be stationed in these zones; instead, they would be overseen by a European-led force. However, this scenario poses significant risks for Brussels. The establishment of such a buffer zone could inadvertently bring European states and Russia into direct confrontation, even with the slightest miscalculation.
Another proposal under consideration is the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force (often referred to as “blue berets”). However, the UN’s track record in conflicts like the Balkan Wars highlights the challenges of such missions. Issues such as a disorganized chain of command can undermine the effectiveness of peacekeepers on the ground. Additionally, creating a UN peacekeeping force requires approval from permanent Security Council members, including China, Russia, and the U.S., which introduces complex diplomatic hurdles. The prospect of a Russian veto in the UN Security Council—particularly on resolutions condemning Russia—remains a significant obstacle.
Within Europe itself, there are deep divisions and contradictions. Germany has pledged continued financial and military support for Ukraine, but debates persist over how much Europe can shoulder if the U.S. withdraws its backing. Ukraine, meanwhile, is in desperate need of funds, weapons, and personnel to sustain its war effort. The Ukrainian military, already outmatched by Russia in conventional power and logistics, requires far greater support from Europe. This support extends beyond cash and weaponry to include troop training, operational planning, intelligence sharing, and maintaining critical supply lines. For Europe, assuming the U.S.’s role in these areas independently would be an immense challenge. While countries like Spain, France, Poland, and Greece have called for joint military coordination, each nation has its own reservations and priorities.
In summary, while the details of Trump’s peace efforts remain unclear, the potential for their failure places Europe in a position of heightened responsibility. If U.S. support is withdrawn, European nations would need to take on greater economic and military risks to support Ukraine. Moreover, if peace negotiations collapse, the conflict could escalate into a larger-scale war, with Europe bearing the brunt of the fallout.
The Biden administration’s ATACMS decision
Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, U.S. President Joe Biden has approached arms aid to Ukraine with caution. Initially, he refrained from providing long-range ATACMS missiles, citing the risk of escalating the conflict into a potential “World War III.” However, Biden has now shifted his stance, greenlighting the use of these weapons for operations targeting deep inside Russian territory. This decision has been widely interpreted as an attempt to undermine former President Donald Trump’s peace initiative. While Ukraine argues that these strikes are acts of self-defense, the use of long-range missiles against Russian soil could escalate the conflict with a nuclear-armed state to an even more perilous level.
The Ukrainian military relies heavily on Western weapons and intelligence to target Russian strategic bases and air defense systems. While international law recognizes the right of an occupied nation to strike enemy logistics centers and military posts in self-defense, the situation remains delicate. The U.S. maintains that it only supports Ukraine’s “right to legitimate self-defense,” but this stance cannot obscure the fact that, in practice, the U.S. is aiding Ukraine by providing intelligence, target selection assistance, and advanced weaponry. This is precisely why German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has resisted supplying Ukraine with long-range Taurus missiles, similar to ATACMS. Scholz views it as a strategic imperative for NATO to avoid direct involvement and confrontation with Russia on the front lines.
The Biden administration’s decision also risks contradicting U.S. interests. As tensions with Russia escalate, the administration may be increasing the likelihood of a broader conflict. While the U.S. may aim to weaken Russia through attrition, the limits of this strategy remain unclear. Some commentators argue that the Biden administration is conflicted, seeking to make “final moves” on the Ukrainian front to counter Trump’s claims that he can bring peace. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its aftermath may also be influencing Biden’s reluctance to take another significant step back. By cornering Russia, the U.S. is simultaneously drawing Europe deeper into the crisis.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s response to these developments will be critical. Direct strikes on Russian strategic bases or airfields using Western long-range missiles could provoke a more aggressive reaction from Moscow. In an environment where nuclear threats have been repeatedly voiced, even a minor miscalculation could lead to catastrophic consequences. Some experts speculate that if Trump returns to power, Biden’s current policy could be sharply reversed, with a renewed focus on negotiations. From a strategic standpoint, it is often argued that no matter how many weapons Biden provides to Ukraine, he lacks a decisive “trump card” to fundamentally shift the balance of the war in Ukraine’s favor.
The limitations of Europe’s military capacity
One of the most pressing debates throughout the Ukraine crisis has been the extent of the European Union and NATO member states’ commitment to bolstering their own military capabilities. Former U.S. President Donald Trump has long criticized Europe, arguing that “Europeans are not paying enough for their own security.” Indeed, the NATO target of increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP faced significant resistance in many European countries. Now, discussions are even turning to higher thresholds, such as 3%. However, what this would mean in practice remains unclear. While some argue that Europe must build a conventional deterrent against Russia, viewing defense spending as a form of essential insurance, others warn that diverting massive budgets to the arms industry would come at the expense of social spending, likely provoking public backlash.
In this context, it is worth recalling the insights of Helmut Schmidt, the former Chancellor of Germany. During the Cold War, Schmidt emphasized the importance of maintaining a “military balance” but also argued that this alone was insufficient to ensure peace. He believed that military balance needed to be complemented by political compromises, arms control agreements, and confidence-building measures. In other words, investing solely in weapons is not enough; diplomacy must also play a central role. Schmidt’s legacy serves as a warning to today’s European leaders: “Strength is important, but flexible diplomacy, openness to dialogue, and active efforts to prevent conflicts from escalating are equally essential.” This principle could be applied to rebuilding de-escalation mechanisms between Russia and NATO. However, in the current climate, such dialogue seems distant, particularly as the conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate.
Moreover, the idea that “all European countries should participate in Europe’s security architecture” remains an ideal that is often voiced but rarely realized in practice. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine have fundamentally undermined the notion of “accepting Russia as part of the European security system.” As a result, even if peace initiatives in this new era seek some form of “deal” with Russia, it is unclear how far Europe is willing or able to stretch to accommodate such an agreement.
Zelensky’s stillborn ‘victory plan’
At the onset of the war, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled what he called the “Victory Plan,” aiming for complete military success. His declaration, “We will push Russia back to its borders; we will not cede a single inch of our territory,” was met with widespread enthusiasm in the West. However, as the conflict dragged on, the Ukrainian army suffered significant losses, Russia’s long-term strategy took hold, and it became evident that Western support was not unlimited. The United States and Germany, in particular, have repeatedly cautioned that Ukraine cannot afford the risk of a major escalation by launching large-scale attacks on Russian territory.
In the 10-point peace plan Zelensky presented, the primary condition is the return of all Ukrainian territory, including regions annexed by Russia. Moscow, however, claims legitimacy over these areas through referendums in Crimea and Donbas. This fundamental disagreement leaves the question, “Is there common ground for compromise?” unanswered. Furthermore, Zelensky has ruled out direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, even issuing a decree declaring Putin’s administration illegitimate. This stance effectively blocks the path to a diplomatic solution from the outset. Nevertheless, some European leaders support Zelensky’s proposal to organize a peace conference, arguing that Russia’s participation would be beneficial.
This impasse has created an opening for former U.S. President Donald Trump’s rhetoric: “If I am elected, I will sit down and talk.” In both Europe and the United States, there is growing sentiment that negotiations are the only viable way to end the war. However, a ceasefire—freezing the conflict—is a prerequisite for any talks. The direction of such negotiations, the terms under which Ukraine and Russia might reach an agreement, and the guarantees Europe would provide remain deeply uncertain. The deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, for instance, would require Russia to refrain from using its veto in the Security Council.
European leaders now face a critical choice: support Trump’s peace initiatives or align with President Joe Biden’s strategy of “pushing Russia back.” Both scenarios carry significant risks for Europe. If Trump succeeds, a demilitarized zone could be established between Ukraine and Russia, but European troops would likely be required to secure it. If Biden’s policy prevails, Europe could become a target for Russia amid escalating tensions, especially with the use of long-range weapons.
Moreover, institutions like the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations are grappling with their roles in this evolving security architecture. Whether Europe will develop an independent military structure or deepen its defense cooperation under the U.S. umbrella remains unclear.
The greatest irony in this situation is that the hope for peace appears to hinge on two uncertain factors: Vladimir Putin’s restraint and Donald Trump’s potential election as president, which could lead to a reversal of Biden’s policies. How sustainable or healthy this is for Europe is a matter of intense debate.
Diplomacy
FIFA abandons $4.2 billion commercial stake sale following widespread revolt
FIFA and Gianni Infantino have backed down from plans to sell a stake in the organization’s commercial and event operations following widespread backlash.
In a statement issued late Friday night, the embattled FIFA president said:
“After carefully listening to all views, it has become clear that this project, regardless of the level of support, causes divisions that are now contrary to the interests of the objective originally established. Our goal has always been, and will always be, to unite and improve. As a result, this proposal will not be implemented.”
Infantino’s proposal met with fierce resistance from UEFA, CONCACAF, and the Asian Football Confederation (AFC).
UEFA indicated that all 55 of its members would boycott FIFA competitions, including the World Cup, if the plans remained on the table.
In its statement, FIFA noted that “nobody is selling football,” and while asserting that it “acknowledges and respects the feedback and concerns expressed publicly,” emphasized that it would continue to implement suggestions.
It added that it “reaffirms its commitment to an open and democratic process of consultation.”
Shortly after FIFA issued its statement, the AFC released its own declaration of solidarity with UEFA and the Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF).
Infantino subsequently suffered two major internal blows.
First, his adviser Carlos Cordeiro resigned from his position, sharply criticizing the plan in a statement as “a bad deal for FIFA member associations, a bad deal for football, and a bad deal for the long-term future of the game.”
Then, FIFA Chief Operating Officer Kevin Lamour told the Associated Press that staff felt “deceived” by Infantino and that after raising the issue, he would “sleep better, even at the cost of losing his job.”
Lamour said:
“This is the project of a single person. Leaving aside that this project should not proceed… it is now time for the political leaders of world football to ask themselves the right questions and make the right decisions.”
These developments left Infantino cornered, and by Friday afternoon, numerous figures within the organization—speaking to The Athletic on condition of anonymity to protect their jobs—believed it was no longer a question of “if” the cord would be cut, but “when.”
Joshua Kushner’s venture capital firm Thrive had not withdrawn from the deal as of Friday night, but that became moot when FIFA management ultimately decided to kill the project via a public statement.
Joshua Kushner is the brother of Jared Kushner, the son-in-law of Donald Trump.
On Tuesday, world football’s governing body had announced its intention to establish FIFA Forward Enterprises (FFE), a new private entity to manage its flagship events, including the World Cup and the Club World Cup, with plans to sell a 21% minority stake in FFE to external investors.
The sale was targeted to generate $4.2 billion (£3.2 billion) in revenue. FIFA stated that this amount could be immediately distributed to its 211 member associations under a new funding stream named the “FIFA Fast-Forward Program” (FFFP).
Under the plan, FIFA’s total development funding would have exceeded $10 billion over the next four years.
Despite mounting criticism in recent days, FIFA confirmed that if member associations opposed the FFE plan but the proposal was accepted, the dissenting federations would each receive $20 million (£14.9 million) for the 2027–30 cycle, regardless of whether shares in FFE were sold to private investors (to be followed by $22 million for 2031–34 and $24 million for 2035–38).
However, had a given member association accepted the FFE proposal, it would have received $40 million for the 2027–30 period, with subsequent payouts remaining the same.
The three confederations that explicitly took a stand against FIFA’s plan represent 137 of the 211 FIFA member associations.
FIFA had stated that for the proposal to move forward, it required the approval of a majority of the 211 member associations as well as the 37-member FIFA Council, which consists of Infantino and eight FIFA vice presidents.
Strategic reactions and leadership crisis
South American football confederation CONMEBOL did not reject the plans in a statement on Friday, but noted that financial and commercial decisions “must always serve the interests of football and never take precedence over the essence of the game.”
According to a report by The Athletic, Infantino’s future leadership of FIFA was called into question during UEFA and CONCACAF meetings held on Thursday.
Infantino assumed the FIFA presidency in February 2016, succeeding Sepp Blatter, and was expected to run unopposed in the next election scheduled for March 2027.
There is also talk among European officials of putting forward Nasser Al-Khelaifi, the Qatari CEO of beIN Media, to run against Infantino.
Lise Klaveness, President of the Norwegian Football Federation, told VG: “My clear impression right now is that he has suffered a major loss of trust. We did not vote for him last time and were skeptical about this. There are many good aspects to FIFA, but if you take a lax approach to governance principles and rules, you lose trust quickly.”
Diplomacy
Defense Priorities director warns US air strategy in Middle East faces tactical limits
The collapse of a tentative memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran, coupled with the diminishing strategic returns of American air power, has left the United States locked in an unsustainable, low-intensity conflict with Iran, according to Benjamin Friedman, Policy Director at the Washington-based think tank Defense Priorities.
Speaking in an interview on the YouTube channel Harici with host Sarp Sinan Hacır, Friedman attributed the failure of the short-lived US-Iran memorandum primarily to the Trump administration’s diplomatic missteps, vague draft language, and unrealistic expectations regarding a comprehensive settlement.
“Both sides really deserve some blame, but the Trump administration deserves the bulk of the blame for drafting an agreement that was so vague on key terms,” Friedman said, citing ambiguities surrounding the timeline for unfreezing Iranian assets and the scope of American commitments to restrain Israeli military operations in Lebanon.
Friedman emphasized that deep-seated mistrust in Tehran, exacerbated by repeated instances where diplomatic engagement was followed by Israeli or American military strikes, led Iranian negotiators to adopt an unyielding posture. At the same time, he noted that Iran likely miscalculated by using disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz to aggressively force leverage.
“The Trump administration remained intent on this sort of grand bargain that would restrain Iran seeking weapons development… and I think they continue to misread the Iranian willingness to sign that kind of deal,” Friedman noted, adding that Tehran viewed its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz as essential despite the risk of provoking further strikes.
Expressing deep skepticism over the prospects for a lasting diplomatic breakthrough, Friedman criticized the administration’s reliance on informal envoys such as Steve Bannon and Jared Kushner over professional diplomatic channels, predicting that the baseline outcome will remain an unpredictable, episodic conflict.
“What’s more likely is a kind of on-off-again kind of war—sort of what we’re in now, where we have occasional strikes, with the United States perhaps by accident adopting the Israeli model of ‘mowing the lawn’ periodically,” Friedman said.
Addressing the efficacy of US air power, Friedman argued that military operations against Iranian targets have reached a point of diminishing returns. While early strikes successfully eliminated critical high-value assets—such as over-the-horizon radar systems that targeted anti-ship missiles—Iran’s ballistic missile and long-range drone capabilities remain largely intact and operational.
He pointed to a recent strike on a base hosting US personnel in Jordan, launched from western Iran over a distance exceeding 1,000 kilometers, as evidence of Tehran’s sustained strike precision and the tactical limits of American interdiction efforts.
“The war is a failure for air power even in a tactical sense,” Friedman stated. “Initially, we looked at it and said we had a lot of success in destroying targets, but as more information came out, it turned out they had maybe more than half of their missiles and launchers survive the initial phase of the war.”
Friedman observed that the global proliferation of low-cost, high-precision guidance technology has permanently altered the strategic landscape, neutralizing the traditional invulnerability of forward-deployed US installations. “The precise effects of air power that used to be almost a monopoly of the United States… is actually making our posture in the region less sustainable,” he said, warning that similar vulnerabilities would be vastly amplified in any potential high-intensity conflict with China.
As an alternative to open-ended military engagement, Friedman suggested that Washington consider a complete military withdrawal from the region, even if it entails accepting Iranian transit fees on commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. “The cost of preventing that through perpetual outbursts of warfare is much higher than just accepting it,” he noted.
Turning to regional dynamics, Friedman addressed Israel’s current absence from active strike operations against Iran, characterizing it as a calculated move to preserve its own air defense interceptors while relying on Washington to bear the operational and political burdens of containment.
On European security and the broader alliance structure, Friedman offered a critical assessment of the NATO summit in Ankara and the administration’s “NATO 3.0” concept. He described the white paper led by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as an effort to coerce European states into escalating defense expenditures and purchasing American hardware under the threat of reduced security guarantees, rather than executing a structured, strategic US posture adjustment.
“This is not a real US withdrawal; it’s a kind of pressure to up your loyalty in a particular way,” Friedman said, noting that major European powers such as Germany, France, and the UK lack a compelling existential incentive to construct independent, large-scale conventional war-fighting capabilities.
Regarding bilateral relations with Ankara, Friedman noted that US-Turkish tensions have eased considerably following the shift in American posture in Syria and progress toward resolving long-standing friction points, including the F-35 program and S-400 procurement. He added that while Israeli leadership under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed frustration over Washington’s constructive engagement with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the White House has maintained its strategic course despite pressure from domestic pro-Israel lobbying groups.
Addressing internal Republican Party dynamics, Friedman highlighted the evolving public stance of Vice President J.D. Vance, whose cautious criticism of Israeli influence and emphasis on divergent national interests reflects broader ideological shifts within the conservative base.
“Vance is more representative of the shift in the Republican Party,” Friedman said. “He’s criticizing them in a limited way and saying, ‘Our interests are different.’ From the perspective of those of us who would like the United States to have a more distant relationship from Israel, it’s progress.”
Looking ahead to the upcoming US midterm elections, Friedman anticipated that a loss of congressional control by the Republican Party would severely curtail the administration’s domestic executive overreach, though its structural impact on foreign policy execution and Middle Eastern operations would remain comparatively limited.
Diplomacy
UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham pledges full support to Ukraine in meeting with Zelenskyy
UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham has met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Portsmouth, England.
Zelenskyy is the first world leader Burnham has met in person since taking office, with the prime minister committing to building a “firm partnership” between the United Kingdom and Ukraine.
Demonstrating their support, the two leaders toured a military base in Portsmouth where 200 Ukrainian troops are currently undergoing naval training exercises.
Burnham described his meeting with the Ukrainian president as “warm” and said he plans to visit Ukraine soon.
“We will build this together and address the various issues President Zelenskyy is facing, many of which we discussed today,” Burnham said.
The meeting follows an announcement by London that it will share intellectual property rights to assist Kyiv’s war effort.
The new prime minister announced that the UK will share the “Stone Cloak” electronic warfare system—which is fitted to drones to prevent detection—and will assist Ukraine in mass-producing the technology.
Burnham has focused primarily on domestic matters since replacing Keir Starmer, who faced criticism from elements within his own party for spending too much time abroad and focusing heavily on foreign affairs.
However, Burnham sought to signal continuity in Britain’s policy toward Ukraine. In one of his first phone calls after becoming prime minister last week, Burnham invited Zelenskyy to visit the UK “as soon as possible.”
Starmer spent his final full day as prime minister in Kyiv, where he announced £255 million in funding for Ukraine.
Speaking to Sky on Monday, Zelenskyy said his telephone conversation with Burnham had been “very good.”
The Ukrainian leader noted that Starmer had previously assured him that “the new government would maintain the policy of supporting Ukraine during the war.”
The new prime minister told the Ukrainian leader it was “no coincidence” that he was his first international visitor since moving into Downing Street.
“The purpose of this is to send a very clear message. We stand 100% with Ukraine, I personally stand 100% with you, and I will fully deliver on every commitment this country has made to Ukraine,” Burnham said.
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