Dr. Serhat Süha Çubukçuoğlu
Director of Türkiye Program at TRENDS Research & Advisory, Abu Dhabi-UAE
serhat_suha@trendsresearch.org
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi’s long-awaited visit to Türkiye on 4 September 2024 marks a major cornerstone in the evolving regional complex. El Sisi’s first visit to Ankara to meet with his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan holds a symbolic meaning amidst the ongoing war in Gaza and sends a clear signal of rapprochement between the former adversaries. The meeting comes on the heels of President Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo earlier in March, leaving a decade of political tensions between the two capitals behind.
Managing their differences over a range of geopolitical flashpoints from Libya to East Africa with occasional frictions, Türkiye and Egypt sides pursued a policy of de-escalation and fence mending for the past few years based on a mutual understanding of shared interests, reassessment of geopolitical risks, and economic pragmatism. After many rounds of negotiations, they appointed ambassadors to each other’s capitals in August 2023 as a clear indication of the normalization of diplomatic relations, even if not a realignment on all issues of contention.
This was not a straightforward outcome. Since the so-called “Arab Spring” uprisings in 2011, Cairo and Ankara have supported rival factions in Libya, the Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean, vying for regional influence to further their political and economic interests. The tide began to turn in 2020 with initial signs of a thaw in relations as both countries signaled their willingness to engage in dialogue. The Turkish government approved Egypt’s development of partnership with the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and made public statements suggesting that they were open to restoring ties with Egypt, particularly in the context of regional issues like the Eastern Mediterranean.
Türkiye’s steps to marginalize the Muslim Brotherhood and limit its presence in the country were a major catalyst in revitalizing the bilateral relationship with Egypt. In addition to a mutual desire to enhance economic cooperation amid shifting geopolitical currents in the region, Ankara’s strategic motive aimed to neutralize perceived threats against its core interests in the Mediterranean and draw Cairo closer in the regional standoff in the face of a then-growing energy-defense alliance around Athens and Nicosia.
As steady efforts by both Türkiye and Egypt to move past their differences and restore their ties progressed, Presidents Erdoğan and El Sisi put aside their personal feuds and prioritized economic practicalities and prudence over dead-end geopolitical gambits. Initial rounds of exploratory talks between respective intelligence agencies and foreign ministries paved the way for a breakthrough under Qatari mediation at the FIFA World Cup in Doha in November 2022, with a symbolic handshake between the two leaders.
The pace of normalization increased after El Sisi’s phone call to Erdoğan to offer his condolences for the earthquakes that hit Türkiye’s southeast in February 2023, followed by the-then Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s visit to Cairo in March to meet his counterpart, Sameh Shokry. The two presidents had last met at the G20 Summit in New Delhi, India, in September 2023 before Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Cairo in August 2024 to finalize the agenda for the “High Level Strategic Cooperation Council” in Ankara.
Moreover, the Turkish Navy’s ADA-class corvette TCG Kınalıada (F-514) made a port call at Alexandria and participated in a joint exercise with the Egyptian Navy’s Gowind-class corvette ENS El Fateh (971) last month to highlight growing bilateral military ties. Finally, Türkiye’s first indigenous training and light combat aircraft, Hürjet, flew to El Alamein airport near Alexandria on 2 September 2024 to participate in the Egypt International Airshow, a rare event in the history of bilateral relations. While Türkiye sees an opportunity to showcase its abilities and access the regional market, Egypt is known to be interested in Turkish defense products to diversify its supplier base and hedge against political risks.
The mutually hurting stalemate of the previous era was unsustainable for several reasons, but most conspicuously due to the worst economic crises for both countries in their recent history. Türkiye, for its part, needs closer cooperation with its largest trade partner in Africa to find areas for partnership in energy, defense, and tourism. Turkish businesses look for export opportunities as tax rises, high interest rates, and eye-watering inflation bite deeper into pockets of low-wage earners and dampen domestic demand. High-tech defense sector exports are on the rise to partially fill in the gap. Turkish firm Baykar’s potential sale of battle-proven TB2 Bayraktars to Egypt is a case in point that offers a viable, cheaper alternative over Western systems but without the conditionalities or political strings attached.
Similarly, Egypt needs to diversify its trade partners and draw direct investment to overcome high indebtedness and the foreign currency crunch. Revenues from the Suez Canal fell by US$2.2 billion, or by 25%, over the last year as attacks against commercial ships in the Red Sea forced shipping companies to divert vessels around Africa. This gives a stronger rationale for Cairo to build on Turkish investments in Egypt that have reached US$3 billion and to increase the volume of bilateral trade from US$8 billion to US$15 billion in the next five years.
Both Erdoğan and El Sisi are interested in maintaining stability against criticism and popular unrest. To gain more supporters among their people also requires finding political solutions to conflicts in Gaza, Libya, and East Africa, and mitigating the risk of a wider war in the Middle East through closer cooperation via intelligence sharing, mediation, and shuttle diplomacy. As the U.S.-led unipolar world order evolves into multipolarity, middle powers like Türkiye and Egypt have more autonomy and maneuverability to influence outcomes in their neighborhood. The meeting in Ankara is an opportunity to re-emphasize the importance of regional interdependence, shared interests, and mutual respect for sovereignty against divisive currents of religious sectarianism and micro-nationalism. It coincides with Türkiye’s frustration with the lack of progress in its bid for EU membership and aspirations to join the BRICS, an ascendant economic group that counts Egypt among its members.
At a time of war fatigue and deteriorating political stability in the Middle East, the historic meeting between Presidents Erdoğan and El Sisi signifies a profound interest toward collaborative problem-solving amid ongoing conflicts and economic challenges. This renewed partnership not only strengthens their respective national interests but also enhances their influence in shaping a more balanced and multipolar international order.
