Opinion
Ankara’s Second Summit: Twenty-Two Years On, NATO Returns to a Türkiye That Has Changed the Rules
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
Twenty-two years after Istanbul hosted NATO’s leaders in 2004, the Alliance has returned to Turkish soil, this time to the Beştepe Presidential Complex in Ankara, for a summit that arrives not as ceremony but as reckoning. The 36th NATO Summit, convened July 7–8, unfolds against a backdrop few of its architects in 2004 could have imagined: a Ukraine war grinding into its fifth year, a Middle East still smoldering from a direct US-Israel war with Iran, an American president openly questioning the value of the Alliance he is attending, and a host nation, Türkiye, that has quietly become indispensable to almost every crisis on NATO’s agenda.
Türkiye’s Moment: From Junior Partner to Power Broker
Hosting a NATO summit has always been a statement of strategic weight. But Ankara 2026 is different in kind. Türkiye arrives not merely as host but as leverage. Its defense-industrial base — anchored by companies like ASELSAN, which has attracted reported interest from global capital including BlackRock, with US Ambassador Tom Barrack said to be facilitating contacts and BlackRock’s Larry Fink having met President Erdoğan earlier this year — has positioned Türkiye as a rising node in NATO’s push for defense-industrial self-sufficiency. The Ankara Summit’s dedicated Defence Industry Forum, held alongside the political summit, underscores this: Türkiye is no longer simply a NATO member on the alliance’s southeastern flank but a manufacturing and innovation hub the Alliance now needs.
This is Erdoğan’s leverage point. As European allies scramble to meet the 5% GDP defense-spending pledge agreed last year, with 3.5% earmarked for core defense and 1.5% for resilience and infrastructure, Türkiye has positioned Ankara as a “delivery checkpoint” — a moment to translate commitments into contracts, and contracts into Turkish industrial gain. Analysts covering the summit have openly asked whether the gathering represents collective security or, in effect, the largest commercial handshake in Turkish defense history.
The Russia-China Question: Hedging in Plain Sight
Türkiye’s balancing act is not new, but it has rarely been more visible. Even as Ankara hosts NATO’s leaders, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met his Russian counterpart in Moscow only weeks earlier, part of a pattern of parallel engagement that Ankara has never fully abandoned since the Ukraine war began. Türkiye continues to occupy a unique lane inside NATO: a member state that supplies Kyiv with Bayraktar drones while keeping Black Sea diplomatic channels to Moscow open, and one that has deepened economic and energy ties with both Russia and China without triggering the kind of alliance discipline applied to smaller members. For Ankara, NATO membership and multi-alignment with Moscow and Beijing are not contradictions to be resolved but assets to be managed simultaneously — a posture that gives Turkish diplomats outsized room to maneuver at exactly the summit meant to reaffirm collective unity.
Ukraine: Sustaining a War Without an End
The degraded state of the Ukraine war looms over every session in Ankara. NATO is expected to affirm a pledge of roughly €70 billion in military equipment, assistance, and training for Ukraine in 2026, with allies committing to sustain at least equivalent levels into 2027. Yet the summit convenes amid reports that Italy has been resisting parts of the Ukraine funding language in the draft communiqué, exposing cracks in what NATO officials insist remains a “unity summit.” President Trump is scheduled to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines, following recent phone calls in which Trump suggested renewed prospects for a negotiated peace — even as fighting continues largely unabated and Zelenskyy has publicly flagged what he considers European inaction.
Ankara’s Trade-Off Amid the US-NATO Rift Over Iran
The most consequential subtext of this summit may be the still-raw rupture between Washington and its allies over the Strait of Hormuz. Since the US-Israel war against Iran erupted in late February — triggered by the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — Iran’s closure and periodic re-closure of Hormuz has convulsed global energy markets. When Trump called on NATO, China, Japan and South Korea to help secure the strait militarily in March, every ally declined; Germany’s defense minister flatly stated it was not Europe’s war. Trump responded by calling NATO’s refusal a “very foolish mistake” and describing the Alliance, without American backing, as a “paper tiger.”
That rift has not healed; it has merely gone quiet enough to allow a summit to proceed. A ceasefire and blockade-lifting memorandum signed in June eased the crisis, but Iran has since signaled it will impose transit fees on Hormuz shipping, with “special treatment” reportedly reserved for friendlier states — a policy Washington rejects as unworkable for any lasting deal. Strait security is now formally on this week’s NATO agenda, even though the underlying disagreement over burden-sharing on Iran was never resolved, only overtaken by events. This is the trade-off Turkish politicians are positioned to exploit: Ankara can offer itself as an indispensable interlocutor — bridging Washington’s frustration with European reluctance — while extracting defense-procurement access and diplomatic capital in return, precisely the kind of transactional leverage Erdoğan has cultivated throughout the crisis.
The Middle East Overhang: Syria, Lebanon, and a Widening Israel Rift
Türkiye’s regional posture will shape the summit’s Middle East undertone as much as any formal session. President Trump is set to hold a separate bilateral meeting in Ankara with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former rebel commander now leading Damascus. The meeting follows Trump’s repeated suggestion — first floated at the G7 — that Syrian forces could take on Hezbollah in Lebanon more effectively than Israel, a proposal al-Sharaa has consistently declined, insisting Damascus seeks only economic channels with Beirut, not a military role reminiscent of Syria’s decades-long occupation of Lebanon. The subtext is unmistakable: Washington is testing whether it can redirect regional security burdens away from an Israeli campaign in Lebanon that has produced significant civilian casualties, toward a Syrian government still consolidating power after Assad’s fall — a maneuver that would simultaneously ease pressure on Israel and open a new channel of US engagement with post-Assad Syria, independent of Iran.
Layered atop this is an open diplomatic rupture between Ankara and Jerusalem. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, in a CNN Türk interview days before the summit, described Israel’s policies and mindset as “a burden that humanity can no longer bear” and called for international sanctions, accusing Israel of perpetrating mass killing in Gaza. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar branded the remarks “textbook incitement to genocide,” a charge Germany’s foreign minister also distanced himself from as unacceptable rhetoric, while President Isaac Herzog denounced the comments as antisemitic. Erdoğan, for his part, dismissed Israeli criticism as an attempt to deflect from its own conduct in Gaza. That this exchange erupted just as NATO’s Israeli-aligned members prepare to sit alongside Türkiye’s delegation adds a genuinely awkward undercurrent to an Alliance summit ostensibly focused on Russia and defense spending — and gives Ankara another card to play: positioning itself as the Muslim world’s most vocal NATO-member critic of Israel, a role with real currency across the Arab and Islamic world even as it strains Türkiye’s Western alliances.
The Palestinian Case and Arab Coordination
For Cairo, Islamabad, Doha, and Riyadh, the Ankara summit is being watched less for its Ukraine communiqué than for what it signals about regional alignment on Gaza and the Palestinian file. Egypt, Qatar, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have each played mediating or coordinating roles throughout the Iran crisis and its regional spillover — Islamabad brokered ceasefire talks during the Hormuz confrontation, while Qatar helped facilitate a Lebanon ceasefire alongside the United States and Iran. That same quartet’s coordination on Gaza reconstruction, Palestinian statehood diplomacy, and pressure against further escalation in Lebanon is likely to intensify in the summit’s aftermath, particularly if Fidan’s confrontational posture toward Israel hardens into a broader Turkish push to rally Muslim-majority states — inside and outside NATO — around a unified Palestinian position. Whether Ankara’s rhetoric translates into coordinated Arab-Turkish diplomatic action, or remains a unilateral Turkish gesture aimed at domestic and regional audiences, will be one of the more consequential open questions to emerge from a summit meant, on paper, to be about Russia and the Atlantic alliance — and that has become, in practice, a referendum on how far Türkiye’s ambitions now extend.
This analysis draws on reporting from NATO’s official summit documentation, Reuters, the Congressional Research Service, The National, The Jerusalem Post, Al Arabiya, and other outlets covering the Ankara Summit as of July 7, 2026.
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
Opinion
The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues
BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.
Allan Wilson, Journalist
Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.
“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”
Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.
For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.
The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.
“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.
A statue, a warning
The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.
The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.
For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”
Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.
The shrinking window
Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.
This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.
Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.
A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.
The international dimension
The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”
Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.
For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.
“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.
This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.
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