Alexander Lukashenko, dubbed Europe’s last dictator, has been in power in Belarus for almost 30 years. Lukashenko, who came to power in Belarus in the 1994 elections, was elected for the fifth time in 2020. The Lukashenko government in Belarus has good relations with the Russian Federation rather than Europe. In geopolitical terms, this creates the profile of a country that is in Europe but maintains Soviet ties in its relations with Russia.
This should not come as a surprise, as there is a certain space that Russia provides for Belarus. Russia is also the main supporter of Lukashenko, who has been in power since the 1994 elections. In this context, it is inevitable that the more Europe’s ties with Russia weaken, the more pro-Russian Belarus will become. This was also the case during the Russian-Ukrainian war. In the aftermath of the Western sanctions against Russia, Russia’s attempt to expand its economic relations with Belarus in alternative areas was reflected in the growing strategic partnership and economic relations with Belarus. Of course, the deployment of troops and the supply of ammunition to Belarus should also be taken into account. But could these good relations between the two countries lead to Belarus’ involvement in the Ukrainian war? The importance of Belarus for Russia in the Ukrainian war is that it acts as a bridgehead. But is Belarus’ approach to the Ukrainian war at the expected level?
Belarusian influence in the Ukrainian war
The relations between Belarus and Russia are explained on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus with an emphasis on geography as well as “close historical and cultural ties between the peoples”[1]. Of course, Russia’s Tsarist period and the subsequent history of the region as an important part of Russian history is important, but after the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, we do not see a Europe-oriented Belarus like the Baltic states. In this context, Russia is Belarus’ biggest supporter and strategic partner. Indeed, Belarus’ economic relations with Russia, which account for half of its foreign trade, have grown despite the Russian-Ukrainian war. In 2022, two-way trade between the two countries increased by around 15 per cent. Relations with Ukraine, on the other hand, have stagnated, especially in economic terms. From $6.9 billion in 2021, economic relations fell to $1.6 billion in 2022 and $13.8 million in the first seven months of 2023[2].
Belarus’ policy has become important, especially in the context of the “special military operation” launched by Russia in Ukraine in February 2022. As part of this process, Lukashenko welcomed thousands of Russian soldiers into his country. He even acted as a mediator between the Wagner leader Evgeny Prigozhin and Russian President Vladimir Putin, especially when the Wagner Uprising of 2023 is remembered. As a result, Wagner soldiers were stationed on Belarusian territory. In addition, from 2023, some of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons were also deployed on Belarusian territory. After this move, Putin declared that it was “a reminder to those who think of inflicting a strategic defeat”[3] on Russia. It should not be forgotten, however, that Belarus did not take a direct part in the conflict. It continues to play an instrumental role in the region through its alliance with Russia as a deterrent.
In addition to being an important ally for Russia, Belarus is also seen as an important instrument of hybrid warfare in foreign policy, especially in its relations with Europe. This is not a new situation. Russia and Belarus have previously pursued policies such as reducing energy supplies, repairing pipelines to Europe, etc. during periods of problems in relations with Europe. In this respect, the relations between the two countries also reflect their common policy of deterrence.
On the other hand, there are dissenting voices in Belarus regarding the war with Ukraine. The fact that Belarus shares a 1,000-kilometre border with Ukraine makes it necessary to consider the dimension of relations. The reason for this should be seen in the context of Ukraine’s invasion of Russian territory with a sudden attack on 6 August and the opening of the Kursk front. The war that has been going on in Ukraine for almost three years has now expanded with the opening of a new front on Russian territory. The possibility of Belarus being the next stage should also be considered. Zelenski’s decision to go to Kursk was reportedly motivated by dwindling support from the EU and the US and the aim of strengthening his hand against Russia. But it is also a reflection of the territorial scope of the spreading war. In other words, with Ukraine’s problems in the ongoing war on its own territory, Russia is now experiencing the war on its own territory. Therefore, new fronts may bring new problems and new instrumentalisations.
Cracks in Belarus’s support for Russia?
The influence of Belarus should be reconsidered at this point. This is due to the growing fear of war in Belarus, as reported by PBS[4] in 2023. It is known that Russia has been sending arms and ammunition to Belarus, but the rhetoric of tactical nuclear war has been in the background. However, the possibility has also been raised that the Belarusian army of some 45,000 soldiers would disobey orders if sent into Ukraine. Indeed, according to a Chatham House poll in 2022, 25% of Belarusians supported Russia’s actions, while 97% of respondents opposed the deployment of Belarusian troops[5], indicating that public and government support in Belarus are at very different poles. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Lukashenko has not yet taken any direct aggressive steps.
During the war, Ukraine did not take any direct steps against violations by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on Belarusian territory. Similarly, Belarus has begun to deploy mines and troops on the Ukrainian border in response to possible threats. As I mentioned earlier, this indicates that they are also considering the possibility of targeting Belarusian territory as a new front.
Indeed, the Kursk front changed the course of the Ukrainian-Russian war. For Belarus, there is a war going on right next door that requires constant vigilance. That is why Lukashenko has warned that this war could escalate into World War III as a result of developments in the Kursk region. He has also called on Russia and Ukraine to begin peace negotiations. Although it is not clear whether these calls will be heeded in the near future, the possibility of opening new fronts and a nuclear threat should not be forgotten behind Belarus’s calls for restraint. Although Russia may deploy tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory or use them in case of danger in the context of its own nuclear doctrine, the reality of a possible nuclear threat from two nuclear power plants (Kursk and Zaparoye) should not be forgotten.
* Assoc. Prof. Dr. Merve Suna Özel Özcan, Kırıkkale University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations. e-mail: mervesuna@kku.edu.tr
[1]https://www.mfa.gov.by/en/bilateral/russia/#:~:text=Traditionally%2C%20Russia%20is%20both%20our,of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Belarus.
[2] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraine-belarus-relations-context-russo-ukrainian-war
[3] https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cn42re7ldeeo
[4] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/belarusians-wary-of-being-drawn-into-russias-war-in-ukraine
[5] https://en.belaruspolls.org/wave-11
