It is beyond all praise that Greece immediately sent rescue teams and humanitarian aid in the wake of the devastating disaster in Türkiye. No doubt it is also encouraging that Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias visited the region to offer condolences and that the Greek press adopted a more responsible publication strategy, helping to calm the tensions that had been rising between the two countries in recent months. The statements of good neighborliness, collaboration, and solidarity made by Greek authorities, particularly Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, a substantial shift in attitude on the part of Athens and Premier Mitsotakis has already pointed to that change clearly.
1999 EARTHQUAKE DIPLOMACY EXPERIENCES
All these suggest that the Greek side expects a new earthquake or seismic diplomacy. After the two countries rushed to each other’s aid during the Gulf Earthquake in Türkiye in 1999 and the earthquake that followed in Athens, friendship and collaboration blossomed, and efforts were made to first manage the problems between the two countries and then find solutions. The efforts that began at that time and tragically floundered in the Türkiye-European Union process became fruitless since Ankara was forced to make huge concessions as if it were going to become an EU member because the process itself was toxic.
This process’s goal was not to get Türkiye into the European Union but to trick Ankara into thinking it would join in exchange for significant concessions, notably over the disputed territories of the Aegean and Cyprus. This process was highly risky in terms of downgrading crucial concerns of Turkish foreign policy since the government in those years sorely required the support and permission of the EU for its domestic efforts/initiatives to change/transform Türkiye. Thank God, the process ended before Türkiye took any tangible and lasting damage. As the late Denktaş pointed out, the Cypriot Greek-Greek fanaticism and avarice also contributed to the situation. After all, not much was achieved by the earthquake diplomacy of that period because the problems were not handled within the framework of bilateral relations and in line with common interests. In the process that Greece used its EU membership, and the other countries happily agreed to be in cahoots with it, Greece’s issues with Türkiye became the criteria that Türkiye had to satisfy to join the EU in a fashion that had nothing to do with the EU Acquis.
Therefore, when they open their mouths, all Greek officials take great pleasure in reminding Türkiye of its obligations on the Aegean and Cyprus. About two years ago, showing off in Ankara, The Greek foreign minister was calling attention to the criteria created in this EU process while explaining what Türkiye should do regarding the Aegean and Cyprus crises. He was saying the right things for himself.
THE EU PROCESS DID NOT AIM TO MAKE TURKIYE A MEMBER
While I worked at a university in Ankara, I often invited ambassadors based in the city as well as high-ranking diplomats and politicians visiting the country to deliver talks to students. Ms. Dora Bakoyannis, the elder sister of Greece’s current Prime Minister, Mitsotakis, was one of the speakers I invited to come directly from Athens. Attracting attention with her well-educated and friendly demeanor, Ms. Bakoyannis graced and participated in this series of conferences held for students, faculty, and media members in the fall of 2014. She insistently called for Türkiye to return to the toxic EU process, from which Türkiye seemed to have moved away in those years. Even though she failed to persuade many people in the room at the time that EU membership was not a pleasant issue, especially in Greece, battling with a devastating financial and economic crisis, she had given the right advice in line with her country’s foreign policy interests.
At that time, when the expectations that Türkiye would completely give up its rights in Cyprus, abandon the Turkish Cypriots, and accept the Greek theses in the Aegean were extremely high, I still remember some EU ambassadors saying, “We all know that it is not able to become a member of the EU, but we believe we can settle the Cyprus problem by persuading Türkiye as if it would happen” as I stated in my article, ‘Turkey would be better off outside the EU,’ published in the Financial Times and our exchange of views.
A RETURN TO THE EU PROCESS IS HARMFUL
Those days are gone. Türkiye has no interest in the EU process, which is based entirely on deception. Yet, the EU’s polish has been severely tarnished by the financial and economic depressions that have hit several member states since 2008. Almost everyone agrees that the EU’s political integration business in a multipolar world has largely fallen into disrepair. It would be foolish to attempt to restart negotiations for Türkiye’s EU membership at this time while also letting Greece find faults with us.
Keep in mind that Greece is not vainly willing to kickstart a fresh Türkiye-EU process by using the current outpouring of support for the earthquake victims in Türkiye. They need to de-escalate the tension that they fueled in recent months as if they might be able to gain military superiority over Türkiye in the Aegean, and that has risen after Ankara has paid back with interest, because in a multipolar world, there is no longer, or less than before, a guarantee that NATO or America will stop a Turkish-Greek conflict even at the last minute.
There is a buzzword: NATO played a role in dissolving the Soviet Union and preventing a Turkish-Greek conflict. It is correct because if we take a historical and strategic view, for example, could Athens stand this much against Ankara in a multipolar world order where there is no bipolarity and NATO-Warsaw Pact military rivalry? At a time when the potential for a conflict was growing, Greece would have been far more open to finding solutions via bilateral dialogue. The interwar period is roughly a good example. In sum, the United States and NATO successfully prevented a conflict between Türkiye and Greece, but tensions between the two countries have escalated to the point of becoming intractable owing to maximalist Greek policies and the EU carrot it used against Türkiye. Opportunities were wasted for the sake of “acting dignified and responsible” when Türkiye did not respond from within NATO to the veto threat of Athens against the EU’s determination to expand to Eastern Europe after the Cold War if the Greek Cypriot side’s application for EU membership is not evaluated under the name “Republic of Cyprus” and representing the whole island.
However, when the EU approved or was about to accept the Greek Cypriot side’s application, Türkiye might have warned that any Eastern European country willing to join NATO should first recognize the TRNC and establish embassies; otherwise, it would block their entry. The process would be frozen because these countries cannot join the EU without NATO membership. Either the Greek Cypriots’ bid for membership would be put on hold, or a Cyprus solution would be accomplished in line with the Turkish thesis. However, it did not happen since the promise of EU membership has always lulled Türkiye. Let’s also not forget the almost psychological-warfare-like writings and comments made by influential members of the media, academia, and others instrumental in this process.
Nowadays, new earthquake diplomacy with Greece is not a terrible idea, but combining it with the Türkiye-EU process might lead to significant complications. As a result, everyone has gathered to throw a few blows to a Türkiye that is taken into the fist range of the EU. We can defend neither a two-state solution in Cyprus nor our rightful arguments in the Aegean. Sweden is pleased with this process since the EU will require that we ratify the NATO membership pact; otherwise, our EU membership will be blocked. France exerts pressure on us to accept the Armenian genocide slanders, and it does everything it can to head off the political fallout of the war Azerbaijan won decisively. They transform our nation into a haven for asylum seekers and illegal immigrants and drive us to abandon our peace efforts with Syria. The previous earthquake/seismic diplomacy made us forget how Greece was caught red-handed while supporting the terrorist organization PKK. This time, Türkiye’s advantages as a mid-size powerhouse in a multipolar world, able to exert influence in multiple regions, would be lost in the EU’s garbage dump.
As it turns out, they are not needed. In a multipolar world, it will not be in their own interests for Greece and the Greeks to pursue hostile policies against Türkiye. A two-state solution in Cyprus would allow Greece to export natural gas and oil to Türkiye, and a clear demarcation of the Aegean Sea’s borders would be beneficial to future plans for Athens. It is important to highlight the positive outcomes of the cooperative management of hydrocarbon reserves, including in the tourist industry and many others. If we get into the EU trap, we will not even attempt to put any of them into words.
