EU unveils Arctic plan targeting military corridors and resources

The EU is developing plans to enhance its military mobility in the Arctic and aims to establish “multimodal military movement corridors” across the High North.

According to a report by German Foreign Policy, this initiative was outlined in the EU’s new Arctic strategy presented by the European Commission in Brussels on Tuesday.

Under the strategy, a complex logistics network consisting of “ports, airports, and their inland connections” will be created across the Arctic, designed to “remain operational even under adverse weather conditions.”

The strategy paper also announces that “exercises or stress tests” will be conducted to ensure the smooth deployment of military forces and capabilities to the Arctic.

Through this strategy, the EU is responding to the reality that climate change-driven Arctic ice melt is facilitating access to regional natural resources while opening new sea routes, such as the Northeast and Northwest Passages, which can now be used for both commercial and military operations.

The Arctic strategy aims for greater independence from the US and envisages laying a “pan-Arctic” submarine cable running from Europe through the polar region to East Asia.

Arctic natural resources

The EU’s new Arctic strategy addresses, among other topics, the natural resources located in the Arctic, both beneath the seabed and on land.

Due to thawing ice, these resources are already accessible or will soon become easier to reach, and Brussels supports their extraction.

Specific projects highlighted include a rare earth element extraction venture near Kiruna in northernmost Sweden and a plan to mine molybdenum in eastern Greenland.

Departing from its previous 2021 Arctic strategy, the Commission no longer advocates an outright ban on oil, gas, and coal extraction in the Arctic within a multilateral framework.

This policy shift comes as Norway has emerged as the bloc’s most vital natural gas supplier, providing approximately 30% of all its natural gas imports following the EU’s phased reduction of Russian energy imports.

However, production from Norway’s existing fields is expected to decline in the 2030s. Consequently, Norway plans to explore new deposits in the Barents Sea, where vast reserves are estimated to lie.

Dependent on raw material supplies from Norway as well as strategic cooperation with Oslo, the EU no longer opposes these exploration plans.

New sea routes opened by melting ice

The EU is also turning its attention to the gradual opening of new Arctic shipping routes.

For instance, the Northeast Passage, running along Russia’s northern coastline from East Asia to Europe, is now open to navigation between August and October.

This route is considerably shorter than the conventional transit via the Indian Ocean, significantly reducing shipping costs, especially in light of current oil prices.

A Chinese shipping firm launched regular services via the Northeast Passage this summer, while a South Korean vessel recently returned to the port of Busan after completing its maiden commercial voyage along the corridor.

Although used by few vessels to date, the Northwest Passage has also come into operation as a route extending from the North Atlantic through Canada’s northern archipelago and north of Alaska toward East Asia.

Experts believe that, during the summer months, this passage could offer advantages over the traditional route via the Panama Canal “for certain vessel types and transport routes.”

The emergence of new military capabilities was underscored in September when four Russian warships navigated the Shokalsky Strait between two Russian Arctic islands for the first time in history.

Military mobility in the High North

This development represents another driver behind the EU’s new Arctic Strategy placing particular emphasis on military aspects.

Russia has been strengthening its Arctic military positions for some time, partly because the headquarters of its Northern Fleet, which hosts part of its second-strike capability, is located on its north-western coast, and partly because its exceptionally long northern coastline remains strategically vulnerable.

NATO has likewise been expanding its activities in the Arctic considerably, holding numerous exercises across northern Finland, Sweden, and Norway, as well as in Iceland and Greenland, alongside its new “Operation Arctic Sentry.”

The strategy document states that the EU must now strengthen its own posture in the Arctic.

This objective is to be pursued both in cooperation with NATO and through independent EU measures.

For example, situational awareness must be enhanced, including by leveraging EU satellite systems, particularly Copernicus and Galileo.

Additionally, the planned IRIS2 satellite constellation, conceived as Europe’s counterpart to Starlink, should be expanded to cover the Arctic to improve communications.

To coordinate these initiatives, the EU plans to establish a Maritime Security Centre.

The EU places special emphasis on military mobility in the Arctic. According to the document, rapid and large-scale troop deployments must be feasible in the region at any time if required.

To this end, “multimodal military movement corridors” incorporating ports, airports, and their inland connections need to be established.

These facilities will be designed as a unified, complex logistics system “capable of remaining operational even under adverse weather conditions.”

Realising this plan will require preparation for “ice clearance,” “the handling of heavy and oversized military vehicles on frozen ground,” and “the rapid repair of damaged infrastructure.”

Looking ahead, the EU is urged to organize “exercises or stress tests focused on the smooth deployment of forces and military capabilities to and within the Arctic” in cooperation with NATO or like-minded partners.

Viewing these capabilities as vital for “credible deterrence,” the EU also underscores the need for its own icebreaker fleet to clear pathways through the ice for warships.

The Arctic’s role in “strategic autonomy” vis-a-vis the US

Throughout this process, the EU is not only adopting a clear stance toward Russia, but is also pursuing greater independence from the US.

On one hand, the strategy encourages deepening ties with Greenland, which is part of Denmark, does not belong to the EU, and has faced threats of US annexation. The document designates this relationship as a cornerstone of the new Arctic strategy.

On the other hand, the text calls for intensifying cooperation as part of a “Northern Neighbourhood” strategy with Norway, Iceland, and Canada, as well as with the UK, which occupies a strategically advantageous position despite not being an Arctic coastal state.

The EU maintains a security and defence dialogue with Norway, holding its fifth session this past April, alongside launching an “Arctic Dialogue” with Oslo this year.

Canada is classified by the European Commission as a “natural ally” in the Arctic. Observers note that while Canada is mentioned dozens of times throughout the strategy, the US is cited only a handful of times.

This contrast is seen as evidence that the EU is seeking independence from Washington in the High North.

Accordingly, the document explicitly references “European strategic autonomy” as an “integral component of the Arctic.”

Pan-Arctic cable plan extending to Japan

The EU Arctic Strategy also identifies Japan and South Korea as cooperation partners in the region.

This partnership is linked to plans to connect Greenland to the EU via a submarine cable, which would subsequently be extended across the Bering Strait to Japan and South Korea.

Berlin has advocated the construction of such a “pan-Arctic cable” for some time.

According to a statement issued in early July by the Berlin-based German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), such an infrastructure project is highly desirable for multiple reasons.

First, data traffic between Europe and Asia, 90% of which currently passes through the Red Sea and the strait between Djibouti and Yemen (Bab el-Mandeb), “suffers from a high failure rate and a lack of redundancy.”

Furthermore, the Arctic route is “significantly shorter,” resulting in reduced latency and fewer transmission delays.

International equity trading in particular stands to benefit from “real-time data transmission” enabled by a new polar cable link.

SWP outlines two potential routes for the cable: one running west of Greenland and the other running east.