Opinion
Europe: Transitioning from strategic dependence on the U.S. to strategic self-preservation
On March 5, French government spokesperson Sophie Primas stated that French President Emmanuel Macron, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer were considering a joint visit to the United States, with the visit expected to be completed “in the short term.” If this plan materializes, it will mark the second time these three European leaders visit the White House within a short period following Donald Trump’s re-election as president. Previously, Macron and Starmer had attempted to persuade Trump in person to value the traditional transatlantic relationship and maintain U.S.-Europe alignment on the Russia-Ukraine war, but with little success. Zelensky’s visit to the White House, however, turned into a diplomatic disaster, with both sides engaging in heated arguments that ended on bad terms. Zelensky’s delegation even left the White House hungry, as they were asked to leave without partaking in the lavish luncheon prepared by their host.
The three White House summits marked another diplomatic “Waterloo” for Europe after its “darkest moment” at the Munich Security Conference. At Munich, European leaders were publicly humiliated by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance and were shocked to witness the U.S. engaging in high-level diplomacy with Russia. Despite their dismay, some still held onto illusions. However, after experiencing Trump’s stern lecturing at the White House, European leaders have become much more pragmatic and realistic. Therefore, before seeking another visit to the White House, France and the UK have adjusted their previous stances on the Russia-Ukraine war, now supporting ceasefire negotiations, while Ukraine has obediently stated its willingness to transition from war to peace “under U.S. leadership” and sign a “minerals-for-security” agreement with the U.S.
European leaders are striving to repair the U.S.-Europe relationship, which has been severely fractured by “Trump’s new policies,” in an effort to preserve “peace under American rule.” They aim to ensure continued transatlantic cooperation through three key ties: traditional values, the transatlantic political alliance, and the NATO military alliance, while maintaining a shared destiny, shared interests, and shared moral values. However, Trump 2.0 is likely to bring more sadness, harm, and worries to his European allies. To some extent, European countries have realized that they must adapt to the historical turning point of a “the profound changes unseen in a century.” They must accept the “historical end” of the U.S.-Europe partnership and quickly achieve strategic awakening, gradually breaking free from their strategic dependence on the U.S. while strengthening strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, military self-reliance, and strategic self-preservation.
Europe’s strategic awakening follows an undeniable historical and practical logic. First, no powerful nation remains dominant forever, no absolute center of power is eternal, and no strong ally is unbreakable. This is a lesson from thousands of years of human history, frequently discussed by Western politicians, and confirmed by more than ten shifts in global power centers since the 1500s.
Moreover, under “Trumpism,” the U.S. is irreversibly shifting toward a new era of isolationism, mercantilism, and Monroe Doctrine-style policies, focusing on self-revolution, self-redemption, and making itself “great again.” It has grown weary of acting as the world’s leader, fulfilling international obligations, bearing multilateral responsibilities, and financing global initiatives. The U.S. is even reluctant to continue practicing the evangelical “Messianic” spirit of benevolence and global salvation. Europe must recognize that after a century-long alliance, the U.S. and Europe are now at a crossroads where separation is inevitable. More precisely, the U.S. is actively dismantling the global order and rule-based system it built and sustained for a century—without caring about Europe’s grievances or how it complains tearfully about the break-up.
Europe must now consider how to end its strategic dependence on the U.S. Historically, the U.S. was a “bastard child” of European civilization on the North American continent. However, in the process of breaking away from its colonial “sinful womb,” this “illegitimate offspring” unexpectedly became Europe’s ultimate lifeline and savior. Since its entry into World War I and subsequent victory, the U.S. has fought increasingly stronger wars, achieving an unprecedented level of global hegemony. It has continuously shaped Europe’s fate: without strong American leadership and generous support, Europe could not have swiftly defeated the Axis powers, rapidly recovered from the devastation of two world wars, collapsed the Soviet-led Cold War adversaries, or maintained its dominance in Western education, science, technology, economy, and soft power.
A century of dependence has conditioned Europe into a “fatherly” or “motherly” psychological attachment to the U.S., fostering both admiration and reliance. Despite frequent complaints, disputes, and protests against this overbearing “patriarch,” Europe remains unable to break free. However, the time has come for Europe to awaken from this dependence and embrace strategic independence.
Strategic Autonomy: Europe’s Honor and Dream
Strategic autonomy is not only Europe’s honor and dream, but also one of its primary goals in the pursuit of unity. Historically, Europe has long been unable to act independently due to its internal fragmentation, where numerous feudal states coexisted. Even after the establishment of the Westphalian system, Europe still found itself entangled in two world wars. After World War II, Europe was further drawn into the grand geopolitical game of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Being weak and vulnerable, Europe had to rely on the protection of a strong United States to ensure its security and development.
With the collapse of the Cold War order and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, Europe’s dream of unification became increasingly tangible. Through five rounds of EU enlargement, most European countries were brought under the same umbrella. Simultaneously, NATO’s continued eastward expansion pushed Europe’s security frontiers deep into Russia’s traditional strategic heartland.
As the 21st century began, Europe’s strategic environment underwent a dramatic improvement. It not only emerged from the historical shadow of the Soviet threat but also witnessed new developments in the United States—where growth stagnated, and signs of contraction and decline appeared. Thus, strategic autonomy became a new European aspiration, gaining widespread support from nations and citizens alike. However, the U.S. establishment, particularly represented by the Democratic Party, has continued efforts to keep Europe under White House leadership through shared values, traditional alliances, and military partnerships. To achieve this, the U.S. carefully orchestrated the “Ukraine trap,” using Russia as a “scarecrow” to frighten many small European nations, thereby forcing them to remain under the American hegemonic umbrella and continue following Washington’s lead.
Trump’s new policies actually present Europe with a historic opportunity and a strategic window to break free and establish true self-reliance. However, Europe still lacks the necessary strategic confidence and preparedness. It continues to seek leverage from the United States and, in some cases, even prefers to remain under American strategic protection. The inevitable outcome of this approach is that Europe will eventually find itself standing on shaky ground.
Strategic Autonomy: Independent Path Internally, Diplomatic Independence Externally
Strategic autonomy means choosing an independent path domestically and achieving diplomatic independence externally. Europe has historically been the birthplace of modern international relations and diplomacy, serving as both the intellectual foundation and early model for American diplomacy. As a master of geopolitical maneuvering, Europe has long been a dominant player in global affairs.
However, diplomacy must be backed by national power—particularly economic and military strength. This fundamental rule has often left Europe, despite its past glory, with a form of “crippled diplomacy.” With the exception of a few cases such as France, most European countries have historically aligned themselves with U.S. policy, often adhering to White House directives. They have been required to continuously coordinate their policies and even political stances with Washington to ensure transatlantic alignment, thereby creating a synchronized diplomatic chorus.
After the Cold War, the acceleration of global multipolarity provided Europe with greater diplomatic space and maneuverability. European nations, based on their own interests or the collective interests of the EU, have at times pursued diplomatic policies that diverged from or even opposed those of the United States. This growing diplomatic independence, driven by strategic autonomy, has become a concrete manifestation of Europe’s pursuit of unity and strength. However, it has also inevitably become the primary source of conflict, disagreement, and friction between Europe and the U.S.
During Trump’s first term (Trump 1.0), diplomatic disputes between the U.S. and Europe emerged, particularly over issues related to values. However, these differences were quickly mended during Joe Biden’s administration. With Trump’s return to power (Trump 2.0), the transatlantic diplomatic relationship has once again diverged—not only in ideology but also in paradigm. Disputes over trade wars and the Russia-Ukraine conflict have further widened the gap, to the point where Europe and the U.S. are now moving in entirely different directions. Ironically, this divergence will, in turn, reinforce Europe’s diplomatic independence.
Europe’s Greatest Crisis: The Security Dilemma
Europe’s most pressing crisis is its security dilemma—specifically, whether it can establish an independent and powerful military force outside the NATO framework and achieve military self-sufficiency, including the ability to confront its traditional adversary, Russia, on its own.
After the Cold War, Europe embraced NATO, an alliance centered around the United States. The essence of this arrangement was to leverage American military power to neutralize the Soviet threat, prevent Germany’s resurgence, and ultimately avoid another world war.
For more than half a century, the U.S. has maintained a strong military presence in Europe, with numerous bases and a large troop deployment. Washington has also consistently covered over half of NATO’s defense budget, with its military expenditures exceeding 3% of its GDP annually. This long-standing reliance on American security guarantees has not only led Europe to neglect its own military capabilities but has also become an unsustainable burden for the U.S.
With Trump’s Return, NATO’s Easy Days Under U.S. Protection Are Over
With Trump back in office, NATO can no longer enjoy the luxury of relying on the U.S. security umbrella. The alliance must now assume the primary responsibility for its own defense. During his first term, Trump pressured NATO members to increase their military spending to 2% of GDP. In his second term, he is now demanding it be doubled to 5%, significantly reducing the burden on the U.S.
For Europe, achieving military independence and self-reliance has become an urgent reality. In terms of conventional troop numbers, weaponry, strategic capabilities, and defense industry strength, Europe remains far behind the U.S. in the short term. It may even struggle to counterbalance Russia. As the Trump administration plans to abandon Ukraine, and Europe is forced to prepare for defending Ukraine—or even itself—alone, serious questions arise: How quickly can the EU establish its own military force? Can it rely on the nuclear umbrella provided by the UK and France?
The European “Rearmament” Plan
On March 4, in response to the U.S. cutting off weapons, intelligence support, and possibly even satellite links to Ukraine, the European Union announced a plan to raise approximately €800 billion to “rearm Europe” and establish a secure and resilient defense framework. Under Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Germany—after nearly 70 years of pacifism—has doubled its defense budget, surpassing 2% of GDP. The newly elected government coalition, led by Friedrich Merz, is set to propose a bill in the German Parliament next week to establish an extra-budgetary fund of €500 billion under the guise of infrastructure investment, but ultimately aimed at further increasing defense expenditures.
As founding members of NATO and permanent members of the UN Security Council, Britain and France are stepping up as Europe’s natural leaders. While attempting to salvage the crumbling U.S.-Europe geopolitical marriage, they are also actively strategizing Europe’s post-“U.S. withdrawal” defense framework. Discussions include “nuclear sharing” and the potential formation of a European “security force” to support Ukraine.
Observers suggest that the EU and its member states are about to enter an unprecedented period of multilateral and bilateral security negotiations, scrambling to fill the “three-dimensional vacuum” left by the U.S. abandoning its NATO leadership responsibilities—or potentially withdrawing from NATO altogether. This vacuum includes historical disillusionment, present uncertainty, and psychological panic over the future.
Trump 2.0: A Long-Term Shift?
Theoretically, Trump’s second term could last eight years, and “Trumpism” might persist even longer. In just two months since his return, Trump has already withdrawn from agreements, abandoned allies, and broken diplomatic trust—all with strong momentum that is likely to continue and expand.
This trajectory threatens to overturn the entire post-WWII global security system, international governance framework, and global order. Almost overnight, the United States—once Europe’s unwavering ally and “big brother”—has morphed into a familiar stranger, a tariff war instigator, an ideological adversary, and even a strategic rival.
Meanwhile, Europe is left to navigate an uncertain path alone, and the “Western world” as we know it appears to have fractured into two distinct entities: the U.S. and Europe. The EU was completely unprepared for such a historic and profound transformation in transatlantic relations. European Council President Ursula von der Leyen even described it as a “watershed moment.”
The Inevitable U.S.-Europe Split
The transatlantic relationship is now undergoing systematic dismantling, revision, and restructuring. European leaders are investing enormous efforts in trying to restore the relationship to normalcy. However, the ideological and economic differences between the U.S. and Europe have become so vast that they are likely to drift further apart, potentially reaching the point of no return.
As history has shown, long periods of unity are followed by division, and long periods of division eventually lead to reunification. This historical cycle is playing out once again.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
-
Europe4 days agoEuropean unions urge governments to scrap all Palantir deals
-
Diplomacy4 days agoEast-West Forum in Istanbul highlights irreversible shift to multipolarity
-
Europe1 week agoEmmanuel Todd says West faces collapse amid Ukraine and Iran crises
-
Europe1 week agoEuropean intelligence chiefs divide over risk of Russian attack
-
Diplomacy1 week agoEast-West Forum in Istanbul to debate multipolarity and global order
-
Middle East1 week agoSharaa says 7 October must not shape Israel policy on Syria
-
America1 week agoRepublican support for Trump’s war with Iran drops sharply in polls
-
Middle East1 week agoPalestinian factions confront legitimacy crisis at Istanbul talks
