Opinion
The great reversal of U.S.-Russia relations and China’s diplomatic choice
Ma Xiaolin, Professor at Zhejiang International Studies University, Director of the Mediterranean Research Institute
Zhang Lupeng, Professor at Zhejiang International Studies University, Director of the Slavic Research Center at the Mediterranean Research Institute
On February 27, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at the annual meeting of the Federal Security Service (FSB) that Russia and the United States are ready to re-establish cooperative relations. He noted that not everyone is pleased with the U.S.-Russia dialogue and that some are attempting to disrupt the process. On the same day, U.S. and Russian delegations held the first round of closed-door bilateral consultations in Istanbul, Turkey, lasting over six hours. The focus of the talks was the operation of embassies in each other’s countries and visa issues.
This meeting followed a series of significant events, including the phone call between the U.S. and Russian presidents on February 12 and a milestone diplomatic meeting between senior representatives of both countries in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on February 18. These developments indicate that with the advent of the Trump 2.0 era, the two major adversaries—Russia and the United States—are attempting to turn the page on the dark chapter of the Ukraine crisis and move rapidly toward the normalization of bilateral relations. Additionally, according to Bloomberg, the two countries are discussing the Arctic as a new area for economic cooperation, including joint resource extraction and the development of Arctic trade routes.
At this delicate moment of a sharp adjustment in U.S.-Russia relations, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke with Putin on the phone on February 24—the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Two days later, Xinhua News Agency published a commentary stating that the conversation between the Chinese and Russian leaders sent a “clear signal to the world” in three key aspects: “China-Russia relations are mature, stable, and resilient”; “steady advancement of cooperation in various fields”; and “timely communication on important issues.”
As U.S.-Russia relations quickly warm, U.S.-European relations become tense, and the Russia-Ukraine war potentially accelerates toward an end in 2025, several key questions arise: Will U.S.-Russia relations see substantial improvement? Will China-Russia relations be affected? How will China respond to U.S.-China and China-Europe relations? How will China maximize benefits while avoiding harm? These are new and critical choices China must confront.
The U-Turn in U.S. Diplomacy and Russia’s Strategic Relief
The Russia-Ukraine war has lasted for three years. While Russia has occupied parts of four eastern Ukrainian regions, strengthened Putin’s leadership position, improved the Russian military’s combat experience, and deepened strategic cooperation with North Korea, it has also paid a heavy price. This includes but is not limited to: damage to its international reputation, strained diplomatic relations, declining regional influence, a NATO expansion forming a C-shaped encirclement around Russia, threats to maritime security in the Black and Baltic Seas, risks to overseas military outposts, massive war expenditures, economic sanctions disrupting trade and energy exports, reduced foreign investment, significant casualties, domestic tensions, and population loss. These difficulties have created unprecedented challenges for Russia. However, Trump’s pro-Russia stance has presented Moscow with a strategic opportunity, significantly easing external—particularly U.S.—pressure.
First, Russia’s “special military operation” is expected to achieve its strategic goals. The Trump administration has essentially accepted Russia’s conditions, including Ukraine not joining NATO, halting NATO’s eastward expansion, the resignation of the Zelensky administration, suppression of Nazi influences in Ukraine, and Russia’s control over portions of the four eastern Ukrainian regions. This includes gaining substantial land, resources, and population in the Donbas region. Meanwhile, peace talks will prevent further escalation of the war, reduce external military threats to Russia, and ensure the country’s strategic security.
Through three years of military action, Russia has reinforced its influence in the post-Soviet space, blocked Ukraine’s westward integration, demonstrated its resolve and ability to defend national interests, strengthened its voice on the international stage, secured its position in the Black Sea, and maintained control over the crucial strategic stronghold of Crimea. Furthermore, the new Syrian government has shown friendliness toward Russia, agreeing to allow Russian military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim as strategic footholds in the eastern Mediterranean.
Based on current trends, future peace negotiations will likely ensure Russia’s geopolitical interests in Ukraine, particularly its control over eastern Ukraine. Consequently, Russia’s geopolitical influence in Europe will be enhanced, positively affecting its security environment and increasing its leverage in negotiations with Western countries.
Additionally, Russia’s previously difficult situation is expected to improve comprehensively. The restoration of U.S.-Russia relations and peace talks with Ukraine could allow Russia to rebuild ties with Western nations, reduce international isolation, ease sanctions and external pressures, improve its global image, and expand diplomatic space. This, in turn, would better protect Russia’s national interests and enhance its international influence.
The Long-Term War’s Severe Impact on the Russian Economy
If Russia can collaborate with the United States to reach a peace agreement on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it may gradually lift or ease sanctions, restore normal economic and trade exchanges with other countries, and stabilize energy prices. This would alleviate economic pressure and create favorable conditions for domestic economic development.
The Trump administration has claimed that it will not only cooperate with Russia in the fields of economy, energy, and space but also support Russia’s re-entry into the G7. These policies would be beneficial for Russia’s economic recovery and growth. Recently, the continuous strengthening of the Russian ruble indicates that the market is generally confident in the Russian economy. Once the war ends, Russia will be able to redirect more energy and resources from the military sector to domestic economic development, social progress, and improving people’s livelihoods. This would promote the comprehensive development of the country and society, enhance living standards, strengthen domestic stability and cohesion, and restore the country’s overall strength.
China-Russia Relations May Be Affected, and China Needs to Adjust Timely and Prudently
The improvement of U.S.-Russia relations will profoundly impact the Russia-Ukraine situation and the global landscape. The Trump administration, by strengthening U.S.-Russia relations and promoting peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, may readjust the United States’ global strategic layout, focusing more resources and efforts on other key regions and areas. This could lead to increased pressure and containment efforts against China.
First, Russia’s strategic dependence on China may decrease, requiring China to adjust its expectations. The frequent high-level interactions between Russia and the U.S. suggest a trend toward normalization of bilateral relations. Russia is expected to resume cooperation with the U.S. in several areas of shared interest, including Ukraine’s future and Middle East governance, as well as in the fields of economy, energy, and space exploration. As the Trump administration relaxes restrictions on Russia, the overall Western sanctions pressure will gradually decrease, expanding Russia’s strategic space for survival on the international stage.
At the same time, this also means that Russia’s dependence on China will gradually diminish, and its strategic autonomy will increase. The previous trend of Russia’s “pivot to the East and South” may slow down. As a result, China’s initiative in cooperation with Russia may decrease, and it will have to adapt to a scenario where Russia regains greater strategic autonomy and bargaining power in bilateral exchanges.
Second, the improvement of U.S.-Russia relations will not be smooth, and China need not be overly anxious. The current interactions between U.S. and Russian leaders only indicate a trend toward easing tensions, but resuming contacts does not equate to genuine improvement in relations. U.S.-Russia relations are still in the early “ice-breaking” stage, and there is still a long way to go before full normalization. Similarly, reaching a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement will require extensive work. Therefore, it is premature to declare a U.S.-Russia “honeymoon period” or predict that the Russia-Ukraine war will soon end.
China should closely monitor U.S.-Russia interactions, maintain communication with Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and the U.S., and coordinate with key Global South countries through mechanisms such as BRICS. This would allow China to continue playing a constructive role in the Ukraine issue while safeguarding its own interests.
Third, Trump’s major policy shift toward Russia faces resistance.
- Domestic political opposition – Trump’s policy proposals are highly controversial in the U.S., as the Democratic Party broadly supports continued assistance to Ukraine. Trump’s push for a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement could exacerbate partisan divisions and internal political struggles in the U.S., affecting the government’s decision-making efficiency and execution.
- Impact on the U.S. military-industrial complex – A peace agreement would immediately reduce military-industrial demand, which could lead to open or covert opposition from defense contractors and military-industrial capital.
- European dissatisfaction – Trump’s push for a Russia-Ukraine peace deal has already sparked dissatisfaction among European allies, who fear that the U.S. move will weaken NATO’s cohesion and leave Europe more vulnerable when facing Russia alone. This could lead to fractures in U.S.-Europe relations and impact traditional transatlantic alliances.
As a result, the trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine conflict will also depend on the responses of the EU, Ukraine, and other involved parties—it is not solely dictated by the U.S. and Russia. The Trump administration faces constraints from the Democratic Party establishment and military-industrial interests at home, and given Trump’s unpredictable leadership style, the process of restoring U.S.-Russia relations will not be entirely smooth. Whether there will be obstacles, how significant these obstacles will be, and whether there will be setbacks remain areas worth continuous observation and attention.
Managing Complex Relations with Russia and the U.S.: China Holds the Initiative
- Putin is not Trump; Russia-China relations under Putin will not experience drastic swings.
In the next four years, China should focus on consolidating and strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia in the new era and enhancing communication and coordination with Russia on the Ukraine issue. As U.S.-Russia relations ease significantly, Russia’s diplomatic situation will gradually improve. However, under Putin’s leadership, Russia is unlikely to place more trust in the U.S. within just four years of Trump’s presidency than in its long-term strategic partners such as China.
Unlike Trump, who comes from a business background, Putin is a more stable and far-sighted politician who will undoubtedly make long-term, stable plans for Russia’s strategic development and national interests.
The world is generally adopting a wait-and-see attitude toward Trump’s current administration, closely observing whether his team can effectively govern the United States, suppress the Democratic establishment, build his own loyal political base, and achieve his goal of “Making America Great Again” by suppressing all competitors and consolidating U.S. global hegemony. The ultimate objective is to ensure that, four years from now, the MAGA faction can continue executing Trump’s policies and securing the interests of the Trump family.
- China should remain strategically clear-headed and not allow the Trump administration to disrupt its pace.
China should maintain strategic clarity, stability, and direction to the greatest extent possible, avoiding falling into a strategy of attrition set by its competitors.
In recent years, a common view among China-U.S. strategic think tanks is that within the next ten years, the power balance between China and the U.S. may shift. If, by then, China’s national strength surpasses that of the U.S., Washington may adjust its stance toward China—potentially abandoning its suppression strategy and choosing to cooperate with China in governing the world.
This is, of course, the ideal scenario. However, under this logic, China would need to accelerate its development over the next decade and surpass the U.S. in various key indicators. The danger of this approach, however, is that it could lead to excessive consumption of China’s developmental potential and exhaust the nation.
During the Cold War, the U.S. used military competition to drain the Soviet Union, eventually leading to its collapse. The Reagan administration’s “Star Wars” program forced the Soviet Union into an unsustainable arms race, depleting its national strength. This was a carefully planned U.S. strategic trap.
The current China-U.S. competition is a long-term struggle involving both economic development (“charging energy”) and strategic military capabilities (“releasing energy”).
– China’s institutional advantages, economic and social potential, and cultural resilience allow it to engage in a long-term battle of endurance rather than rushing to surpass the U.S. in every aspect.
– China does not need to engage in a direct competition for dominance with the U.S., nor does it need to exhaust itself in the process.
– Instead, China should focus on preserving national potential, balancing its relationships with the U.S., Russia, and Europe, and maintaining strategic stability on the Taiwan issue.
– China should leverage soft and smart power strategies to outmaneuver its opponents while ensuring sustainable and long-term national development.
– The ultimate goal remains the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, achieved through a balanced and methodical approach to strengthening both hard and soft power.
- China should strengthen relations with Europe, especially restoring cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries.
Trump’s pro-Russia stance has alarmed and dissatisfied European nations. Many EU countries fear that after suffering major economic losses due to the Ukraine crisis, they will also face U.S. security blackmail.
China should take concrete measures to help the EU enhance its strategic autonomy by strengthening economic, technological, and trade cooperation and ensuring shared benefits.
– Central and Eastern European countries, in particular, are increasingly concerned about their security as Russia gains the upper hand amid U.S.-Russia reconciliation.
– This presents an opportunity for China to revive the “16+1” China-Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation Mechanism.
– China should closely monitor these developments and strategically plan the restoration of China-Central and Eastern European cooperation.
Over the next three to four years, China should, under the framework of international norms, enhance mutually beneficial relations with Europe, boost trade exchanges, reduce tariff barriers, expand cooperation in artificial intelligence and renewable energy and strengthen people-to-people exchanges to increase China’s strategic maneuverability in Europe.
- Strengthening and protecting China’s strategic deterrence, particularly its nuclear deterrence and national security capabilities.
China must continue developing its strategic deterrence, particularly its nuclear deterrent and overall national security infrastructure.
– Enhancing the technological advancement and ensuring the absolute security of China’s nuclear capabilities is a key pillar of national security and territorial integrity.
– Regardless of whether they belong to the Republican or Democratic Party, U.S. politicians fear Russia’s strong strategic nuclear forces. As a result, the U.S. has always been cautious when dealing with Russia.
– Ukraine, on the other hand, lost its strategic nuclear deterrence and suffered severe consequences—its national security and territorial integrity were brutally violated.
To ensure China’s long-term national security, it is imperative to maintain a robust strategic deterrence, including nuclear capabilities, and reinforce national defense to deter potential threats.
Conclusion
- Putin’s Russia will not abandon its long-term strategic partnership with China in favor of short-term gains from Trump’s U.S.
- China should remain strategically patient, avoiding unnecessary exhaustion in competition with the U.S.
- China must seize the opportunity to strengthen relations with Europe, particularly Central and Eastern European countries, amid U.S.-Russia reconciliation.
- Strengthening strategic deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, remains a crucial safeguard for China’s national security.
By following these principles, China can effectively navigate the shifting geopolitical landscape while ensuring its long-term stability and prosperity.
Opinion
A voice rising from New Delhi: BRICS’s manifesto for a new world order
The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in the Indian capital of New Delhi on May 15, 2026, carries a significance that extends far beyond the confines of routine diplomacy. This gathering culminated in the signing of one of the most comprehensive political documents to date, outlining the vision of the world order that BRICS envisions for 2026. Reading between the lines, the document reveals not merely the proceedings of a ministerial summit, but the contours of a comprehensive alternative vision challenging the Western-centric international system. Indeed, this text must be read as a political manifesto of the shifting balances of power, the accelerating global struggle for influence, and the emerging new world order of recent years.
The overarching theme dominating the entire document is “The Rise of the Global South.” BRICS members contend that the current international order is unjust, insufficiently representative, and fails to reflect the interests of developing nations. Consequently, they emphasize the urgent need to restructure foundational institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, BRICS now positions itself as the voice of the non-Western world. Today, the global arena is traversing an era in which the post-World War II international system has plunged into a profound crisis of legitimacy and representation. Developments such as the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, the Gaza crisis, global trade wars, the weaponization of sanctions, energy security challenges, and technological competition demonstrate that the current system struggles to mirror contemporary global realities. It is precisely from this premise that the BRICS nations operate, sending a clear message to the world through the New Delhi Outcome Document: “The status quo is no longer sustainable.”
One of the most striking aspects of the document is how clearly it demonstrates that BRICS no longer views itself as a mere platform for economic cooperation. Having long focused primarily on economic development, trade, and finance since its inception, BRICS has now reached a far more ambitious posture. In the New Delhi Outcome Document, issues of security, geopolitical crises, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate policies, energy transition, and international governance reforms occupy a place as central as economics. This indicates that BRICS’s ambition to become a foundational actor in global politics is steadily gaining traction. Reading between the lines, the strongest emphasis emerges on the concept of a “multipolar world.” The core approach of BRICS is animated by the premise that the Western-centric, largely US-led international order, which took shape over the decades following the end of the Cold War, is no longer the sole alternative. Throughout the declaration, the repeated use of phrases like “more just,” “more representative,” “more democratic,” and “more inclusive” international system constitutes a direct critique of the current distribution of global power.
The sections concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council are particularly critical. Indeed, the call for UN reform stands out as one of the most pivotal political segments of the document. BRICS nations explicitly state that the current structure fails to reflect contemporary realities. They contend that Africa, Latin America, and emerging Asian powers are underrepresented in decision-making mechanisms. What is even more remarkable is that China and Russia have reaffirmed their support for India and Brazil to assume greater roles within the Security Council. This state of affairs reveals, first and foremost, the elevation of India and Brazil to global-power status. Secondly, it demonstrates an increasing political cohesion within BRICS. Finally, it illustrates a fundamental questioning of the post-WWII international order.
Another prominent element in the document is the sharp critique of the sanctions policies pursued by the United States and the West. The intensive use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in recent years has engendered collective discomfort among BRICS nations. The text emphasizes that unilateral sanctions violate international law and severely hamper the economic development of developing nations. Although no countries are named directly, this formulation can be read as a potent critique targeted at measures such as US sanctions on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as the embargo on Cuba. This approach is a continuation of BRICS’s long-standing critique regarding the “weaponization of economics.” Indeed, one of the most strategic segments of the declaration emerges here. For BRICS is no longer merely criticizing the existing financial architecture; it is actively endeavoring to construct alternative mechanisms. Initiatives such as cross-border payment systems, trade in local currencies, financial integration, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank can be read as harbingers of a long-term quest to forge an alternative to the dollar-centric global economic structure. While it is premature to speak of a system capable of fully displacing the dollar, the steps taken by BRICS are beginning to demonstrate that the current financial order is not the only option.
Another major political segment of the New Delhi Document concerns the Gaza and Palestine issue. Here, we witness one of the strongest stances BRICS has ever taken on the matter. The document employs highly resolute language regarding Gaza and Palestine, with a notable emphasis on an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Furthermore, South Africa’s legal action against Israel and the rulings of the International Court of Justice are directly recalled in the text. In the face of recent offensives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, BRICS nations have displayed one of their clearest collective stances to date. The call for an immediate ceasefire, the demand for unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, support for Palestinian statehood, and the emphasis on international law stand among the declaration’s most potent political messages. This can be interpreted as an indication of BRICS’s desire to become a more visible and effective political actor in global crises.
On the other hand, the text does not entirely gloss over the internal divergences within BRICS. It openly acknowledges that members hold differing views, particularly on Middle Eastern issues. This is significant because today’s BRICS is no longer a bloc comprised solely of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the integration of new members such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, it has evolved into a far more complex geopolitical entity. Interestingly, the document explicitly notes that rather than a unified stance, differing perspectives exist on certain issues. Specifically, it is conceded that members hold divergent positions on matters concerning Iran, the Gulf states, and Yemen. Despite these differences, the bloc’s ability to establish common ground demonstrates an expansion of BRICS’s diplomatic capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the New Delhi process also represents a significant diplomatic triumph for India. While the recent wave of expansion—bringing in Iran, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—has enriched the platform’s geopolitical diversity, it has also rendered collective decision-making processes more intricate. Particularly at a juncture where the war in Iran continues, the deep-seated divergences between Iran and the Gulf states led many experts to predict that BRICS would struggle to find common political ground and that the summit would be fraught with severe diplomatic friction. However, despite all these differences, India succeeded in rallying members with diverging interests and priorities around the same platform, proving that BRICS retains its capacity to generate dialogue rather than fracture. In this context, the outcome in New Delhi is not limited merely to the content of the published joint text. The true, striking success lies in the preservation of a diplomatic arena that enabled members—who find themselves directly opposed on certain issues in an extremely sensitive and polarized crisis environment—to compromise on other matters and continue negotiating under the BRICS umbrella.
Furthermore, one of the document’s most critical messages emerges in the realm of technology. The extensive coverage of topics such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, data security, and cybersecurity is no coincidence. Indeed, the global power struggle of the future will be shaped heavily through technological supremacy. BRICS nations clearly demonstrate their awareness of this reality and their intent to act in unison in the technological race. Particularly noteworthy is their quest to develop alternatives to Western-centric norms in artificial intelligence governance. A distinct approach is also observed in energy and climate policies. Instead of the rapid energy transition frequently championed by Western nations, the concept of a “just energy transition” is prioritized. At the heart of this approach lies the conviction that the economic growth needs of developing nations must not be disregarded. BRICS countries advocate for a balance between environmental responsibility and the right to development. This points to a major fault line that will become increasingly pronounced in global climate debates in the coming years.
When all these headings are evaluated together, the resulting picture is remarkably clear: BRICS is no longer merely a platform for safeguarding economic interests. It is a center of power beginning to articulate its own vision of how the international system ought to operate. At the core of this vision lies the objective of greater representation, sovereign equality, deeper multipolarity, and a stronger voice for developing nations in global decision-making processes.
The New Delhi Document, brought to the table at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, is far more than a mere communique; it is one of the landmark texts of the historic transformation unfolding in global politics. As the world rapidly moves away from a unipolar structure, BRICS is emerging as one of the most powerful political and economic vehicles of this transition. Today, many rules of the international system may still be written by the West. Yet, the message rising from New Delhi is clear: far more actors now demand a seat at the table to rewrite those very rules. BRICS is transitioning from an economic club into a political, diplomatic, financial, and technological powerhouse. Its claim to serve as the collective voice and compass of the Global South is strengthening. It pursues a dual strategy: offering an alternative to Western-centric institutions while simultaneously working to transform them. BRICS is not yet establishing institutions to directly replace the UN, IMF, World Bank, or WTO; rather, it is striving to change the rules and the distribution of power within them.
The 2026 New Delhi Document of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India under its presidency, can be regarded as one of the most comprehensive strategic documents in the twenty-year history of BRICS. The text serves as a political manifesto for an era marked by the sunset of the US- and Western-led unipolar epoch, the demands of rising powers for greater agency, and the accelerating quest of the Global South to establish a permanent weight in the international system.
The essence of the document can be distilled into a single sentence: while BRICS remains a platform that adapts to the rules of the existing international order, it is simultaneously transforming into a global actor that seeks to rewrite them.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
Opinion
NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism
Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.
As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.
In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.
Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.
Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion
NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.
And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.
The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.
The collapse of the Atlantic system
Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.
In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.
Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.
For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.
Opinion
Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing
Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.
For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.
Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.
It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.
The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.
Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.
This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.
For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.
China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.
All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.
The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.
Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.
Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
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