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Transatlantic relations facing a ‘darkest hour’

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The Munich Security Conference, which ended on February 17, unexpectedly turned into a “struggle session” where the United States openly criticized its European partners. Moreover, it witnessed what many saw as the “darkest hour” of transatlantic relations, as the U.S. openly negotiated with Russia over Ukraine’s future without European involvement.

In September 1938, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany reached the “Munich Agreement,” which sacrificed Czechoslovakia and paved the way for World War II. This year’s Munich Security Conference was seen by many European countries as the “Munich Conspiracy,” where the United States is backstabbed transatlantic relations and sacrificed another small European nation—Ukraine.

The internal storm between the U.S. and Europe sparked by the Munich Conference has yet to subside and is escalating into a war of words between American and European leaders, especially those of Ukraine. This rift is even exacerbating internal divisions within the United States regarding values and foreign policy. On February 23, a critical parliamentary election was held in Germany; the far-right emerged as the second-largest party. On February 24, on the third anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine war, the United States, for the first time, blocked a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia as an “aggressor.” Yesterday, French leader Macron made a rare emergency visit to the United States to repair severely damaged transatlantic relations. Next week, the British Prime Minister is also expected to visit the United States. Meanwhile, following a rapid foreign ministers’ reconciliation meeting in Riyadh, the U.S. and Russia are preparing for a summit between their presidents, potentially at the end of February.

All of this indicates that within just one month of Donald Trump’s “return to power,” he has already begun dramatically reshaping Europe’s political and geopolitical landscape, fundamentally altering transatlantic relations, and arbitrarily resetting the global balance of power and security system.

On the eve of the Munich Security Conference, Trump, newly back in office, demonstrated behavior that harmed U.S.-Europe relations and even provoked European partners. This included withdrawing from multilateral treaties and mechanisms that European allies staunchly supported, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the World Health Organization (WHO), and UNESCO. He also sought to acquire Greenland from NATO member Denmark, threatened European trade partners with new tariffs, encouraged European right-wing parties to seize power through Elon Musk’s influence, and pressured NATO’s European members to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Additionally, Trump increasingly pursued a unilateral approach to ending the Russia-Ukraine war as quickly as possible.

Despite European partners’ prior anticipation and precautions against “Trump 2.0,” recognizing the challenges he would bring, the political tsunami unleashed during the Munich Conference still caught them off guard, making them momentarily be stung. Christopher Heusgen, the conference chairman, was moved to tears during his farewell speech on February 16, visibly overwhelmed. Although some questioned the connection between the video of his tears and the conference, German media quoted the seasoned diplomat as describing the event as “a nightmare for Europe in some sense.”

The “European nightmare” in Munich began with a blunt barrage of criticism and lecturing from U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance during his opening speech on February 14. Regarding immigration, democracy, and other issues, Vance argued that the real threats facing Europe did not come from external forces like Russia or China but from Europe’s internal deviation from its “most fundamental values.” He repeatedly questioned whether the U.S. and Europe still shared a common agenda.

Vance also accused EU leaders of suppressing freedom of speech and religion, failing to curb illegal immigration, and singled out the UK, Germany, Romania, and Sweden for their numerous “misgovernances.” He questioned whether Europe’s current values were still worth defending by the United States. Vance’s rapid-fire, saturation-style criticism left many European leaders in attendance shocked, bewildered, deeply humiliated, and outraged, completely disrupting the usual rhythm and planned agenda of the Munich Security Conference.

Not only that, but Vance, as the newly appointed Vice President of the United States, made his first visit to Europe, disregarding basic diplomatic etiquette by refusing the official meeting invitation from the host, German Chancellor and SPD leader Scholz. Instead, he held a 30-minute private meeting with Weidel, the leader of the far-right opposition party, Alternative for Germany (AfD). Vance’s actions completed the policy and directional “closed loop” that Elon Musk had repeatedly echoed across the ocean with the AfD and Weidel, forming a chain of evidence of systematic U.S. interference in Germany’s internal affairs.

Trump’s “welcome gift” to European partners upon taking office was so crude that it plunged European leaders into a dark tunnel of complete disillusionment and bone-chilling despair. They witnessed firsthand that the U.S. delegation did not come seeking friendship and cooperation, but rather to provoke and confront; not to uphold transatlantic relations, but to create friction and expand division; not to inherit the political legacy of U.S.-Europe ties carefully maintained by Obama and Biden, but to dig up the past and overturn everything; not to continue the role of Western leadership that the U.S. had long assumed after World War II, but to shift the burden, shirk responsibility, and even sacrifice Europe and the entire West to “make America great again.”

The “darkest hour” for Europe witnessed at the Munich Security Conference was not only the “free-fall” decline of transatlantic relations and the sense of European partners losing their footing, but also the U.S.’s rapid pursuit of compromise and rapprochement with Russia, leaving its European partners behind and even treating war-torn Ukraine — which the U.S. had supported for nearly three years — as a sacrificial pawn. The U.S.’s massive “U-turn” in policy, marked by its speed, intensity, and devastating consequences, left European partners and Ukraine reeling and unable to respond.

Before the Munich conference, the Trump administration had already openly invited Russia to attend the event, aiming to facilitate direct dialogue with long-estranged European partners. Moreover, the U.S. made a series of one-sided, flattering remarks toward Moscow regarding U.S.-Russia and EU-Russia relations, including advocating for the G7 partners to readmit Russia, thus restoring the G8. U.S. Secretary of Defense Hegses also explicitly told European partners, especially Ukraine, not to harbor illusions of reclaiming territories lost since 2014, including Crimea and large areas of eastern and southern Ukraine occupied by Russia.

While European partners were busy digesting the bruising effects of Vance’s verbal onslaught and interpreting Trump’s policy shift on Russia and Ukraine, a senior U.S. diplomatic and security delegation had already held a four-hour secret meeting with the Russian delegation in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, more than 1,000 kilometers away from Munich. Foreign media revealed that the U.S. delegation included Secretary of State Rubio, National Security Advisor Waltz, and Special Representative for Middle Eastern Affairs Whitkov, while the Russian side was represented by Foreign Minister Lavrov and Presidential Assistant Ushakov.

This was the first high-level formal meeting between the U.S. and Russia since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict nearly three years ago, the second handshake between the two countries after two years of suspended direct contact, and a U.S.-initiated “ice-breaking” attempt to repair relations with Russia despite opposition from European partners, especially Ukraine. The four-point consensus ultimately reached by both sides marked a turning point in U.S.-Russia relations, signaling that Washington had moved beyond the Russia-Ukraine war and abandoned its European partners and Ukraine — the two geopolitical casualties of this conflict:

  1. Both sides agreed to establish a consultation mechanism and take the necessary measures to normalize the operations of their diplomatic missions.
  2. Both sides agreed to appoint senior teams to end the Ukraine conflict as quickly as possible in a lasting, sustainable, and mutually acceptable manner.
  3. Both sides agreed to lay the foundation for future cooperation, which would resume once the Russia-Ukraine conflict concludes.
  4. The participating teams agreed to maintain contact to ensure the negotiation process proceeds in a timely and productive manner.

Originally key players in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, European countries—especially Ukraine—have now become mere spectators in this U.S.-Russia deal that directly impacts their fate. It could even be said that Europe is not only experiencing a “darkest hour” and a “Munich Conspiracy” but is also facing a new “Yalta moment”: two great powers, the United States and Russia, are determining the course of the European battlefield, dividing the post-war geopolitical map and spheres of influence, and designing a new European security framework according to their own interests.

In a short period, European leaders have been repeatedly blindsided and betrayed by the United States, leaving them scrambling to respond. On the day the Munich conference ended—the day before the U.S.-Russia meeting in Riyadh—leaders of major European countries gathered in Paris for an emergency summit on European security. After the U.S.-Russia meeting, French President Macron again convened a European emergency summit to discuss countermeasures. Furthermore, Macron, along with British Prime Minister Starmer, planned an urgent visit to the United States, hoping to prevent the situation from becoming completely unmanageable.

The fundamental bottom line for Europe and Ukraine is that they cannot be excluded from any negotiations regarding war and peace in Ukraine. European countries, including Ukraine, are well aware of the nature of U.S. power diplomacy, which essentially operates as “table diplomacy”: *“If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”* For the Trump administration, the current version of “table diplomacy” is clearly not about equal, mutually accommodating negotiations—it is a situation where the White House has the final say.

With the Munich conference over, the consequences of the “Munich Conspiracy” continue to unfold. In recent days, Trump’s disdain and dismissive attitude toward Ukrainian President Zelensky have become increasingly blatant, escalating into outright personal attacks and open questioning of Zelensky’s presidential legitimacy. Trump even reversed the narrative by blaming Zelensky for provoking the Russia-Ukraine war three years ago. Previously, Trump warned Zelensky that if Ukraine did not quickly agree to a ceasefire, “Ukraine would cease to exist.” He also hinted that Ukraine would eventually become part of Russia.

Trump’s attacks on Zelensky not only shocked European leaders but also deeply wounded the national pride and patriotic sentiments of both Ukrainian officials and citizens, who condemned Trump and expressed solidarity with Zelensky. This backlash, in turn, angered Trump’s loyal followers. For example, Vance publicly warned Zelensky and other Ukrainian leaders that “retaliating against the U.S. president is foolish” and would yield no favorable outcomes.

Trump’s recent foreign policy moves and rhetoric have not only offended and alienated European partners—particularly Ukraine, the “little brother”—but have also pushed the U.S. establishment, especially Democrats, to their breaking point. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, a Democrat, delivered a harshly worded speech condemning Trump’s unfair remarks about Zelensky and Ukraine, calling them “disgusting” three times in succession. This level of open, unfiltered criticism of a sitting president’s words and actions is virtually unprecedented in U.S. congressional history.

Trump’s increasingly provocative rhetoric after the Munich conference is essentially a retaliation against European partners and Ukraine for questioning his foreign policy. Previously, Ukraine had rejected a U.S. proposal to control its mineral resources. On the day the Munich conference opened, the U.S. delegation presented Zelensky with a document requesting his signature. The document would have granted the United States ownership of 50% of Ukraine’s mineral reserves as repayment for U.S. aid and a continuation of U.S. security guarantees. Zelensky politely refused to sign, citing the need to thoroughly review the terms—and, in reality, because he was unwilling to cede half of Ukraine’s mineral wealth to the United States.

Tragically, the idea of this “resources-for-security” swap was initially proposed by Zelensky himself. However, the revised U.S. version of the agreement, delivered by Treasury Secretary Bessent on February 12, was so exorbitant that Zelensky was forced to backtrack and withdraw his offer, unwilling to hastily sign what would be seen as a humiliating treaty of subjugation that could mark him as a historical traitor to his nation.

             

In response to recent events, The Economist and TIME magazines independently published cover illustrations of Trump wearing a crown, with the headlines “The would-be king” and “Long Live the King!” respectively. Notably, Trump himself took these ironic covers as a compliment, with both his campaign team and the official White House social media accounts reposting the “coronation” images. This series of actions highlighted Trump’s defiant, unapologetic governing style, signaling that the world must brace for the frequent “earthquakes” his domestic and global reshaping efforts will trigger over the next four—or even eight—years.

After 452 years as a republic, the Roman Empire transitioned to an imperial system in 27 BC, when Octavian was crowned Augustus as its first emperor. However, 248 years after its founding, the United States will not become the “American Empire” simply because of Trump’s “return as king.” Still, the intense domestic and international upheaval caused by Trump 2.0 is fundamentally altering both America and the world. The greatest casualty of this seismic shift is likely to be the transatlantic relationship, which has withstood a century of trials without collapsing—until now. Perhaps the sacrifice of Ukraine is just an unfortunate beginning—a dangerous omen of what lies ahead.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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