In the film The Leopard (1963), adapted by Italian director Luchino Visconti from the novel of the same name by Tomasi di Lampedusa, the adventurer Tancredi Falconeri (Alain Delon), explaining his decision to join the Garibaldians to Don Fabrizio Salina (Burt Lancaster), says at one point: “If we want things to remain as they are, some things will have to change”.
Something similar could be said about the European Parliament (EP) elections. I would like to point out that, despite all the ‘far-right storm’, the ‘centre-right’ European People’s Party (EPP), which did much better than the pre-election polls, came out on top; moreover, this is the group of Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, one of the most bellicose figures in the EU… Indeed, EPP leader Manfred Weber immediately called for a second term for Leyen. If the Socialist Group in the EP and the liberal Renew also support the EPP, the EP of the last mandate could continue in the same way.
So we have to say that the claims that the wind is changing in the EU, that ‘pro-Russian’ parties are coming to the fore, that ‘fascism’ is on the rise, that ‘the (centre) left is finished’ are greatly exaggerated. Moreover, despite the success of the right in Central European countries, we should not forget that we are facing a fragmented picture: Although Germany is divided between the CDU/CSU and the AfD, it must be remembered that the Christian Democrats have moved far away from the Angela Merkel line and joined the German ‘war party’. Marine Le Pen’s National Union (RN), which won a major victory in France, distanced itself from the AfD shortly before the elections. It was also noted that the ID, of which the RN was a part, had a lower representation in the polls, and half of this representation came from the RN. We know that Le Pen has also softened her former ‘radical’ positions as she prepares her party for power. For example, the possibility of a ‘Frexit’ is no longer on the horizon.
The party of Giorgia Meloni, leader of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which increased its number of seats in the EP, came first in the country of the Italian Brothers (FdI), and it is understood that this group will act as a ‘bridge’ between the EPP and the ID. Meloni’s ‘mainstreaming’ after coming to power through a rapid shift towards anti-Russianism reminds us to stay away from simplistic interpretations.
Also in Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party still came first with around 8% of the vote, while the new ‘centre-right’ Tisza party, founded by former Fidesz member Peter Magyar, pulled off a big surprise and came second with around 30% of the vote. The election for mayor of Budapest, also held on the same day as the EP elections, was won by the opposition-backed Gergely Karácsony.
We can see that the composition of the EP has remained more or less similar, while at national level there have been significant changes, especially in Central Europe. Even at the national level, we can see that each region has its own specificities, for example, there has not been a massive ‘shift to the right’ in the Scandinavian countries or in Iberia. Or in Greece, for example, we see that New Democracy is losing ground, but parties such as Pasok, Syriza and the Communist Party of Greece are gaining votes. In other words, we can say that the national reactions against the EU and the governments are flowing into different channels.
All this points to a new and hybrid regime in which the ‘centre’ is shifting to the ‘right’, but in which elements on the fringes are also swinging to the ‘centre’. In Europe, the ‘centre’ had already been disintegrating for decades after the eurozone crisis. Now, war, militarisation, the return of geopolitics and years of prolonged economic stagnation require something to change in order to maintain order.
The introduction of industrial policies and the resonance of the ‘new mercantilist’ economics associated with Trump in Europe, but especially in exporting countries such as Germany, Austria and Hungary, is leading to hybridisation. The fact that Joe Biden is picking up where Trump left off in many areas, and that many European countries are moving towards a balance between ‘liberals’ and ‘illiberals’, points to this. Reactions to the Israeli occupation of Gaza are an interesting example of this. We recently analysed the relationship between Likud and the European right. When it comes to the preservation of ‘Judeo-Christian Europe’, the fact that parties of the right and left are competing with each other provides some clues.
The elections in the UK in July and the US in November will show how far this hybridisation has progressed. They will also show that the EU and the EP elections alone cannot set the course for the world.
But at the end of the day, those who are worried about the AfD, for example, should ask themselves this question: If the SPD-Greens-FDP war coalition is collapsing, is it not better to worry about another war party, the CDU, coming to the fore?
