Diplomacy
Ex-admiral Sevim says US, Russia and China cannot impose world order
The concept of a global superpower has become obsolete, and even the world’s most prominent states lack the authority or leverage to unilaterally dictate terms to the international community, according to retired Rear Admiral Alaattin Sevim.
Speaking in an interview broadcast on the foreign-policy YouTube channel Harici, the retired flag officer assessed the geopolitical context surrounding the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, China, alongside a scheduled trilateral meeting between US President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Throughout the interview, Sevim argued that while direct diplomatic communication between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing represents a positive gesture toward managing international instability, the era in which three capitals could assemble in isolation to divide geopolitical spheres of influence has definitively ended. He emphasized that the global landscape has evolved into a dense, multipolar matrix characterized by active regional powers, widespread technological diffusion, and an assertive international community that will no longer accept externally mandated arrangements.
“The term ‘superpower’ has expired”
Addressing the geopolitical significance of the tripartite talks, Sevim questioned whether any single state today possesses the decisive political, military, and economic dominance historically associated with superpower status. He noted that while historical analogies such as the 1945 Yalta Conference are frequently cited in public discussions, modern international conditions prevent any small group of states from orchestrating a comparable division of the globe.
“In my opinion, in the middle of such major problems, and at a point where every country has its own interests in very different areas, the fact that this summit can be held is still, I will not say superpowers,” Sevim said. “Because I no longer believe there are superpowers in the world. No country has the ability to convince another country on its own. We can call them great powers, but in my opinion, the term ‘superpower’ has expired.”
Sevim explained that systemic changes in the international architecture have sharply diminished the coercive power and persuasive capacity of the largest states. “In this crowded world environment, in this environment of crowded relations, no state, no matter how large, has a significantly weakened ability to politically convince another country or another community,” he stated. “Therefore, I will not use the term superpower, but the fact that the great powers can gather among themselves like this can be evaluated as a step toward establishing a new order, a world order. At least, a desire in this direction, it may be important that it points to this. But the rest of the world’s opinion must now be taken into account. Therefore, three states can no longer gather and decide on the rest of the world.”
When the host suggested whether international relations could now be characterized by the phrase “greater than three,” Sevim expanded on the formulation. “The world, the world, the world, the world is greater than three, greater than five, and greater than ten now. So, there is no such world,” Sevim said. “We are in a complex world filled with political turmoil, where regional powers want to keep these great powers on their own side. As you said, information spreads very easily. Right now, even a small country that can master information can have a very significant say. A small country that is technologically savvy can still play a decisive role in the world. Therefore, where will you put India? So, these three states will sit down, but where will you put India? Where will you put the other nuclear powers? Therefore, I do not accept the term ‘superpower’ anymore.”
“It is an impossible map, first of all, in my opinion”
During the broadcast, the discussion turned to viral maps circulating across social media platforms, including depictions associated with Russian political philosopher Alexander Dugin that divide the globe into discrete continental blocs ruled by the US, Russia, and China. Sevim dismissed these graphical representations as detached from real-world structural dynamics.
“I mean, I suppose he just brought his own utopia to life. It is an impossible map, first of all, in my opinion,” Sevim remarked. “For one thing, when I saw it, the first thing that came to my mind was this. Do you remember the novel 1984? George Orwell describes a dystopian world. There are three countries there. Oceania. There are three continental countries: Eastasia, East Asia, and Eurasia. They are constantly at war with each other. That kind of map came to my mind. No, it is fantasy, fantasy, a fantasy map. Russia dominates Africa and Europe. China dominates its own country, Australia, and Southeast Asia. And America is just in its own American continent.”
Evaluating the structural capacity of each state, Sevim questioned Russia’s standing as a dominant global economic power, pointing out that its influence is preserved primarily by its strategic arsenal. “Putting aside my refusal to accept the term ‘superpower,’ for instance, is Russia still perceived as a superpower in the world? I mean, what does Russia offer to the world economy? It has literature; I acknowledge that. It has culture. But what is there in the world economy that would be in trouble if it didn’t come from Russia? Think about that. What is its contribution?” Sevim asked. “If it weren’t for its nuclear power, Russia wouldn’t be considered a superpower in American sources or elsewhere anymore. Moreover, not just in American sources, but the general global perception has shifted, and Russia can no longer be evaluated as a superpower. Even America doesn’t have an easy time in its own immediate neighborhood. It even has its own internal troubles.”
Regarding China, Sevim maintained that Beijing has deliberately avoided adopting the classical posture of a hegemonic actor seeking overt domination. “As for China, I am not even sure it wants to be perceived as a superpower. It is more of a soft power country that thinks about advancing and increasing its influence through soft relations rather than using hard power,” he said. “This way, it can build better relationships, but when you say ‘superpower,’ you are talking about a hegemonic power that brings others under its hegemony. This is the world’s perception.”
Responding to the host’s query on whether a superpower is defined by the rapid enforcement of its voice, Sevim reiterated: “You are talking about a hegemonic power. We have such a perception. There are no such hegemonic powers anymore. There are no powers left that can dictate terms and steer or shape everything exactly as they wish. Therefore, there must be powers that are more coordinated, that value the other side, value the ideas of the other side, and follow a middle path. I do not think China wants to be evaluated in this sense as a superpower, that is, a hegemonic superpower with a scope that entails that. I assess that it wants to keep itself outside the definition of the term superpower.”
“There is no end to this, of course”
Turning to the ongoing military modernization and technological developments across all three nations, the discussion highlighted Russia’s investments in hypersonic strike systems, such as weapons reaching Mach 8, and China’s substantial naval shipbuilding expansion. Sevim situated these programs within the framework of defensive self-preservation and regional deterrence rather than offensive global hegemony.
“Well, they have to defend themselves, though. I mean, at least against the opposing sides, these three countries want to create a balance against each other,” Sevim said. “Above all, Russia, Putin himself has already stated this. He expressed that when compared to conventional forces, he is not strong against NATO in terms of conventional forces. But we have nuclear power. You know this too, don’t you, he said. You know this. Therefore, I think Russia’s armament is primarily to increase its resilience against threats directed at it.”
Evaluating China’s defense inventory, Sevim noted that Beijing continues to navigate quantitative disparities when measured against peer rivals. “As for China, as a result, of course, even though I assess that it does not want to be perceived as a hegemonic power, I evaluate that it wants to create a balance against those who could be its rivals in terms of force structure. I mean, China has been investing in the field of Armed Forces for a very long time, correctly. But if you compare the Armed Forces inventory with other countries, other major states, with America and Russia, you will see that China is still behind in numbers in many areas. Therefore, I assess that it wants to provide a balance here.”
Sevim drew a historical comparison from diplomacy involving Ankara: “Once upon a time, I can’t recall his name exactly right now, but I read an assessment regarding the Turkish army by a Russian statesman who came to Türkiye. He had said this. I mean, you have a very large army. But against other threats around you, it is very large. And when you compare it to ours, it is very small. So, it was a comment like, ‘We cannot understand the size of this army.’ So, China’s situation is a bit like that. It is a large army when compared to other countries around it, but when encountered or compared with America, Russia, and other major states like these, there are of course still areas it needs to improve in terms of inventory.”
Addressing the risks of escalatory action-reaction dynamics in military procurement, Sevim noted that defense industries operate on perpetual cycles of response. “There is no end to this, of course. I mean, whenever a measure is produced, a counter-measure will always be developed. That is how further progress is made,” Sevim observed. “When these are developed, the older technology ones, those developed earlier, will be taken out of inventory, and unless there is a broader change in perception in this world, this race, this armament, and this production will continue. Because it is also an important economy at the same time. There is no point where one can draw a line and say, ‘Okay, that’s enough.'”
“The very reason for forming alliances is to ensure the balance of power”
Examining institutional architecture, Sevim described the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an enduring and resilient defensive structure that will continue to function despite ongoing geopolitical realignments. He argued that the emergence of new security partnerships across different regions reflects natural efforts by states to maintain structural equilibrium.
“NATO is a successful organization. At least, it is an organization that has managed to survive until now. Therefore, it is not easy for an organization that has lasted this long to disintegrate,” Sevim remarked. “So, I assess that it will continue for a while longer, for quite a significant time. Because it is also an organization that makes significant contributions to its member countries. Of course, there are also risks brought by such a membership. However, when you compare the risks with the advantages, my assessment is that the advantages still outweigh them. For this reason, I think NATO will have a future. By the way, of course, new security problems are emerging in different regions of our world. Therefore, it is extremely normal for regional alliances to be formed. New alliances, new defense alliances can always emerge depending on newly emerging threats and developments in the geopolitical and geostrategic security environment.”
When asked whether the proliferation of distinct defense structures creates a foundation for fresh conflict, Sevim answered that alliances primarily restore parity when balances are disrupted. “Yes, but you are talking about this balance of power, and what gives birth to these alliances is, in fact, the disruption of the balance of power. Why do you form an alliance? You have national goals. The primary of these national goals is to ensure your survival, to protect your existence, to defend yourself, or if you are an aggressive state, you have expansionist policies. Let’s put this aside for a moment,” Sevim stated.
He continued: “You can reach these national goals with your national power elements. If your national power elements are not sufficient to reach these national goals, then you try to provide this sufficiency with support you will receive from outside, at least until you reach this sufficiency with your own means, and you form alliances. The very reason for forming alliances is to ensure the balance of power. As the balance of power is established, if an alliance disrupts the balance of power, an alternative will certainly emerge against it. It cannot be without an alternative. Therefore, as long as this power race continues, alliances will emerge, but the emergence of alliances is largely to ensure the establishment of the balance of power. Therefore, I think that the formation of alliances is always done by both sides, that is, this alliance and the other alliance or countries against it, to maintain the balance of power. In this sense, forming alliances serves peace more. I mean, it is a peace based on this power and constantly watching the other side, but as a result, this is the reality of our world.”
Addressing whether Russia and China could formalize a mutual defense pact akin to the historical Warsaw Pact to counterbalance NATO, Sevim expressed skepticism, citing structural barriers, peer equality, and institutional complexities. “Even if it’s not like an alliance, establishing such an alliance also has its problems. First of all, they are both peer countries. Even who would lead or how they would manage the leadership organization would be a big problem,” he noted.
However, Sevim pointed out that their geographic contiguity ensures substantial bilateral coordination. “These two countries are neighboring countries. They are countries that share Asia. And an aggression against one will eventually spread to the other. Therefore, them supporting each other in some way effectively becomes an alliance. It would be support done through bilateral relations without being an alliance. I do think they will support each other. At the very least, this will happen. External intervention toward the other country, neither of them would be happy about that,” he said. Sevim added that while NATO remains a defensive treaty organization, Moscow’s security anxieties regarding alliance expansion are structurally intelligible: “After all, it is an organization founded against it. I mean, no matter how much it’s called a defensive organization, there is no guarantee of where defense ends and where offense begins.”
“A full capacity regarding how artificial intelligence will develop has not been developed”
On the diplomatic agenda of the trilateral gathering, Sevim observed that the talks appeared hastily organized without extensive preparatory staff work, which explains why a formal agenda had not been published in advance. Nevertheless, he highlighted arms control and the regulation of emerging technologies as prominent matters of shared concern, particularly Washington’s strategic desire to cap China’s growing nuclear capabilities following the expiration of bilateral US-Russian frameworks.
“Ultimately, I don’t think it is a very well-prepared summit, with a very well-prepared plan. I believe this is also the reason why the agenda hasn’t been clearly specified up until now. However, a topic that all three countries agree on is that a discussion on limiting nuclear weapons is emerging. They have all three agreed on this as an agenda item,” Sevim explained. “This issue is specifically America’s agenda. My assessment is that the SALT treaty with Russia had already expired to a certain extent in February. When Russia wanted to extend it at that time, America did not, and they gave the justification that they wanted an agreement that would now include China as well. I think America’s main intention here is to limit China’s nuclear armament.”
Sevim predicted that substantive limits on warheads remain improbable in the near term because Beijing insists on reaching parity with Washington and Moscow before accepting binding caps. Instead, he identified the role of artificial intelligence in nuclear command and control as an area where common ground might be forged.
“Perhaps there are other matters as well, again concerning nuclear weapons. For example, issues like not using artificial intelligence in the control mechanisms of nuclear weapons are being discussed. An agreement on this could potentially emerge,” Sevim stated. Explaining the underlying apprehensions, he added: “This is what is feared. This is the danger of artificial intelligence. I mean, a full capacity regarding how artificial intelligence will develop, how it will train itself, and what it will learn hasn’t been fully developed yet. Therefore, there is a fear that control will be lost or could be lost. And especially, this is often perhaps more of a psychological fear in people than a technological one. The fact that the control of nuclear weapons is not in human hands, but in the hands of artificial intelligence. Therefore, there is also a psychological barrier involved. There could be an agreement on this matter. I mean, I think there could be an agreement not on limiting nuclear weapons, but on not using artificial intelligence in their control.”
Broadening his analysis of global non-proliferation frameworks, Sevim warned that foundational treaties are eroding because recognized nuclear weapon states have failed to disarm while non-signatory states have developed indigenous arsenals. “Türkiye is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the agreement on the prevention of nuclear tests. But, these agreements actually had two legs. Especially in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, five countries were defined as nuclear powers as of that date: America, Russia, China, England, and France. I mean, while other countries were promised not to possess nuclear weapons, it was stated that countries with nuclear weapons would work on nuclear disarmament. Currently, these agreements are not working, as you can see,” Sevim observed, pointing to North Korea’s withdrawal, the undeclared capabilities of Israel, and arsenals maintained by India and Pakistan.
Discussing Ankara’s position under the alliance’s defensive framework, Sevim addressed why Türkiye has not signed the subsequent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. “That is the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This treaty also forbids the keeping of nuclear weapons on the territories of member countries. Türkiye did not become a member of this. It is not a member for this reason. Because a part of NATO’s nuclear capacity is located in Türkiye. Let’s also think about how much of this is actually NATO. I mean, nuclear weapons might also exist within the framework of bilateral relations with America. Therefore, for this reason, they are not a party to this agreement. In my opinion, Türkiye also needs to increase its knowledge and experience regarding nuclear capacity, and I don’t mean nuclear weapons, but everything else,” he noted.
“Passage through natural straits should always be free”
Addressing maritime security and supply chain vulnerabilities, Sevim highlighted the strategic significance of natural maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Malacca, Bab-el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, the Bering Strait, and the Turkish Straits. He argued that military coercion cannot permanently secure commercial transit routes against asymmetric threats.
“Well, global trade, maritime trade in particular, especially since a large portion of world trade still passes through these places we call bottlenecks, and here, of course, I believe that these kinds of struggles will not end in these locations. I mean, you might overcome a group currently dominant there or establish some control mechanisms, but they will inevitably remain under threat in some other way,” Sevim stated. “I must say just one thing. Nevertheless, the principle of free use of the seas is important. I mean, especially for these natural straits, that is, straits not made by human hands, surely control regulations for passage and a nominal, acceptable payment to support the expenses incurred under these regulations could be made; but I think passage through natural straits should always be free.”
Sevim emphasized that closing such arteries creates uncontrollable systemic shockwaves: “If there is such an obstruction, it would cause significant crises globally and spread across the world. There are a significant number of such straits in the world, like if you take Gibraltar, the Bering Strait, the Turkish Straits, Bab-el-Mandeb, Malacca, these are all vital waterways that global trade relies on, and passage through them can be controlled, and indeed must be, but obstructing them should be subject to very strict conditions. It should be subject to very well-defined conditions.”
Reflecting on attempts to pacify shipping lanes purely through military deployments, he added: “We say we’ll do this, we’ll solve it with positive messages, but if you’re going to go there, sit down, and try to dominate using force, how far will your dominance reach? There’s also that factor. How much will you be able to dominate? Therefore, these troubles will continue. The important thing, I think, is to consider the needs and demands of the actors and states dominant in these regions and to seek common solutions that everyone can accept. These are not issues that can be prevented by using force.”
“No one can eat the whole cake alone anymore”
Concluding his assessment, Sevim cautioned that any trilateral understanding reached between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing will face political limits both internationally and domestically within the US political system. He noted that bilateral discussions between Trump and Xi are likely to center on critical trade disputes, such as Chinese restrictions on rare earth element exports and US export controls on advanced semiconductor microchips, while Russia seeks to insert the Ukraine war onto the agenda.
Furthermore, Sevim underscored that foreign capitals must calculate the durability of US presidential commitments given the potential for institutional shifts in Washington following upcoming electoral cycles. “Both other countries, for instance China and Russia, are likely considering that after the American elections, even though the American president is quite influential in foreign policy, there is a very high probability of a change in presidency within the framework of American politics two years from now,” Sevim observed. “I mean, if you consider the Democrats’ previous approaches to China and Russia, they must also be thinking about what kind of deal can be made during this period.”
Contrasting Democratic policies with Trump’s posture, Sevim noted: “The Democrats are tougher on Russia. They are supportive of NATO; they aren’t like Trump, telling them ‘you pay for your own expenses now.’ They are supportive of NATO, supportive of Ukraine, and tougher against Russia. Regarding China, they approached it in previous terms with the mindset that ‘China will be our future strategic rival; let’s give importance to diplomacy, but let’s not forget they are our rival.’ I don’t think there will be much change in that period anymore. Therefore, they need to think about both the next two years and the situation after two years.”
Ultimately, Sevim reiterated that international governance cannot be dictated by an exclusive grouping of three capitals, as the contemporary order requires broad multilateral consensus. “Therefore, if these countries are acting as a superpower, telling the rest of the world that they must follow our decisions and that we provide this control, and if they approach this meeting like the Pope dividing the world, Spain to the west and Portugal to the east of the middle of the Atlantic, that is not the reality anymore. There is no such world,” he stressed.
“The decisions these three countries make, if they can be implemented, do not necessarily give them dominion over the rest of the world. I shouldn’t say dominion, but they can have influence. They certainly will, but the decisions they make there, I believe, should be negotiated. I believe they must be negotiated and also accepted by the rest of the world now,” Sevim concluded. “I mean, we are in a very, very multipolar world now. It’s not just two poles, or three poles, or anything like that. We are in a multipolar world with regional poles, where regional events can only be addressed by regional powers, and regional powers must always be taken into account. No one, or even two or three people, can eat the whole cake alone anymore. Everyone wants their own share of the cake now.”