Diplomacy
Ex-admiral Sevim says US, Russia and China cannot impose world order
The concept of a global superpower has become obsolete, and even the world’s most prominent states lack the authority or leverage to unilaterally dictate terms to the international community, according to retired Rear Admiral Alaattin Sevim.
Speaking in an interview broadcast on the foreign-policy YouTube channel Harici, the retired flag officer assessed the geopolitical context surrounding the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, China, alongside a scheduled trilateral meeting between US President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Throughout the interview, Sevim argued that while direct diplomatic communication between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing represents a positive gesture toward managing international instability, the era in which three capitals could assemble in isolation to divide geopolitical spheres of influence has definitively ended. He emphasized that the global landscape has evolved into a dense, multipolar matrix characterized by active regional powers, widespread technological diffusion, and an assertive international community that will no longer accept externally mandated arrangements.
“The term ‘superpower’ has expired”
Addressing the geopolitical significance of the tripartite talks, Sevim questioned whether any single state today possesses the decisive political, military, and economic dominance historically associated with superpower status. He noted that while historical analogies such as the 1945 Yalta Conference are frequently cited in public discussions, modern international conditions prevent any small group of states from orchestrating a comparable division of the globe.
“In my opinion, in the middle of such major problems, and at a point where every country has its own interests in very different areas, the fact that this summit can be held is still, I will not say superpowers,” Sevim said. “Because I no longer believe there are superpowers in the world. No country has the ability to convince another country on its own. We can call them great powers, but in my opinion, the term ‘superpower’ has expired.”
Sevim explained that systemic changes in the international architecture have sharply diminished the coercive power and persuasive capacity of the largest states. “In this crowded world environment, in this environment of crowded relations, no state, no matter how large, has a significantly weakened ability to politically convince another country or another community,” he stated. “Therefore, I will not use the term superpower, but the fact that the great powers can gather among themselves like this can be evaluated as a step toward establishing a new order, a world order. At least, a desire in this direction, it may be important that it points to this. But the rest of the world’s opinion must now be taken into account. Therefore, three states can no longer gather and decide on the rest of the world.”
When the host suggested whether international relations could now be characterized by the phrase “greater than three,” Sevim expanded on the formulation. “The world, the world, the world, the world is greater than three, greater than five, and greater than ten now. So, there is no such world,” Sevim said. “We are in a complex world filled with political turmoil, where regional powers want to keep these great powers on their own side. As you said, information spreads very easily. Right now, even a small country that can master information can have a very significant say. A small country that is technologically savvy can still play a decisive role in the world. Therefore, where will you put India? So, these three states will sit down, but where will you put India? Where will you put the other nuclear powers? Therefore, I do not accept the term ‘superpower’ anymore.”
“It is an impossible map, first of all, in my opinion”
During the broadcast, the discussion turned to viral maps circulating across social media platforms, including depictions associated with Russian political philosopher Alexander Dugin that divide the globe into discrete continental blocs ruled by the US, Russia, and China. Sevim dismissed these graphical representations as detached from real-world structural dynamics.
“I mean, I suppose he just brought his own utopia to life. It is an impossible map, first of all, in my opinion,” Sevim remarked. “For one thing, when I saw it, the first thing that came to my mind was this. Do you remember the novel 1984? George Orwell describes a dystopian world. There are three countries there. Oceania. There are three continental countries: Eastasia, East Asia, and Eurasia. They are constantly at war with each other. That kind of map came to my mind. No, it is fantasy, fantasy, a fantasy map. Russia dominates Africa and Europe. China dominates its own country, Australia, and Southeast Asia. And America is just in its own American continent.”
Evaluating the structural capacity of each state, Sevim questioned Russia’s standing as a dominant global economic power, pointing out that its influence is preserved primarily by its strategic arsenal. “Putting aside my refusal to accept the term ‘superpower,’ for instance, is Russia still perceived as a superpower in the world? I mean, what does Russia offer to the world economy? It has literature; I acknowledge that. It has culture. But what is there in the world economy that would be in trouble if it didn’t come from Russia? Think about that. What is its contribution?” Sevim asked. “If it weren’t for its nuclear power, Russia wouldn’t be considered a superpower in American sources or elsewhere anymore. Moreover, not just in American sources, but the general global perception has shifted, and Russia can no longer be evaluated as a superpower. Even America doesn’t have an easy time in its own immediate neighborhood. It even has its own internal troubles.”
Regarding China, Sevim maintained that Beijing has deliberately avoided adopting the classical posture of a hegemonic actor seeking overt domination. “As for China, I am not even sure it wants to be perceived as a superpower. It is more of a soft power country that thinks about advancing and increasing its influence through soft relations rather than using hard power,” he said. “This way, it can build better relationships, but when you say ‘superpower,’ you are talking about a hegemonic power that brings others under its hegemony. This is the world’s perception.”
Responding to the host’s query on whether a superpower is defined by the rapid enforcement of its voice, Sevim reiterated: “You are talking about a hegemonic power. We have such a perception. There are no such hegemonic powers anymore. There are no powers left that can dictate terms and steer or shape everything exactly as they wish. Therefore, there must be powers that are more coordinated, that value the other side, value the ideas of the other side, and follow a middle path. I do not think China wants to be evaluated in this sense as a superpower, that is, a hegemonic superpower with a scope that entails that. I assess that it wants to keep itself outside the definition of the term superpower.”
“There is no end to this, of course”
Turning to the ongoing military modernization and technological developments across all three nations, the discussion highlighted Russia’s investments in hypersonic strike systems, such as weapons reaching Mach 8, and China’s substantial naval shipbuilding expansion. Sevim situated these programs within the framework of defensive self-preservation and regional deterrence rather than offensive global hegemony.
“Well, they have to defend themselves, though. I mean, at least against the opposing sides, these three countries want to create a balance against each other,” Sevim said. “Above all, Russia, Putin himself has already stated this. He expressed that when compared to conventional forces, he is not strong against NATO in terms of conventional forces. But we have nuclear power. You know this too, don’t you, he said. You know this. Therefore, I think Russia’s armament is primarily to increase its resilience against threats directed at it.”
Evaluating China’s defense inventory, Sevim noted that Beijing continues to navigate quantitative disparities when measured against peer rivals. “As for China, as a result, of course, even though I assess that it does not want to be perceived as a hegemonic power, I evaluate that it wants to create a balance against those who could be its rivals in terms of force structure. I mean, China has been investing in the field of Armed Forces for a very long time, correctly. But if you compare the Armed Forces inventory with other countries, other major states, with America and Russia, you will see that China is still behind in numbers in many areas. Therefore, I assess that it wants to provide a balance here.”
Sevim drew a historical comparison from diplomacy involving Ankara: “Once upon a time, I can’t recall his name exactly right now, but I read an assessment regarding the Turkish army by a Russian statesman who came to Türkiye. He had said this. I mean, you have a very large army. But against other threats around you, it is very large. And when you compare it to ours, it is very small. So, it was a comment like, ‘We cannot understand the size of this army.’ So, China’s situation is a bit like that. It is a large army when compared to other countries around it, but when encountered or compared with America, Russia, and other major states like these, there are of course still areas it needs to improve in terms of inventory.”
Addressing the risks of escalatory action-reaction dynamics in military procurement, Sevim noted that defense industries operate on perpetual cycles of response. “There is no end to this, of course. I mean, whenever a measure is produced, a counter-measure will always be developed. That is how further progress is made,” Sevim observed. “When these are developed, the older technology ones, those developed earlier, will be taken out of inventory, and unless there is a broader change in perception in this world, this race, this armament, and this production will continue. Because it is also an important economy at the same time. There is no point where one can draw a line and say, ‘Okay, that’s enough.'”
“The very reason for forming alliances is to ensure the balance of power”
Examining institutional architecture, Sevim described the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an enduring and resilient defensive structure that will continue to function despite ongoing geopolitical realignments. He argued that the emergence of new security partnerships across different regions reflects natural efforts by states to maintain structural equilibrium.
“NATO is a successful organization. At least, it is an organization that has managed to survive until now. Therefore, it is not easy for an organization that has lasted this long to disintegrate,” Sevim remarked. “So, I assess that it will continue for a while longer, for quite a significant time. Because it is also an organization that makes significant contributions to its member countries. Of course, there are also risks brought by such a membership. However, when you compare the risks with the advantages, my assessment is that the advantages still outweigh them. For this reason, I think NATO will have a future. By the way, of course, new security problems are emerging in different regions of our world. Therefore, it is extremely normal for regional alliances to be formed. New alliances, new defense alliances can always emerge depending on newly emerging threats and developments in the geopolitical and geostrategic security environment.”
When asked whether the proliferation of distinct defense structures creates a foundation for fresh conflict, Sevim answered that alliances primarily restore parity when balances are disrupted. “Yes, but you are talking about this balance of power, and what gives birth to these alliances is, in fact, the disruption of the balance of power. Why do you form an alliance? You have national goals. The primary of these national goals is to ensure your survival, to protect your existence, to defend yourself, or if you are an aggressive state, you have expansionist policies. Let’s put this aside for a moment,” Sevim stated.
He continued: “You can reach these national goals with your national power elements. If your national power elements are not sufficient to reach these national goals, then you try to provide this sufficiency with support you will receive from outside, at least until you reach this sufficiency with your own means, and you form alliances. The very reason for forming alliances is to ensure the balance of power. As the balance of power is established, if an alliance disrupts the balance of power, an alternative will certainly emerge against it. It cannot be without an alternative. Therefore, as long as this power race continues, alliances will emerge, but the emergence of alliances is largely to ensure the establishment of the balance of power. Therefore, I think that the formation of alliances is always done by both sides, that is, this alliance and the other alliance or countries against it, to maintain the balance of power. In this sense, forming alliances serves peace more. I mean, it is a peace based on this power and constantly watching the other side, but as a result, this is the reality of our world.”
Addressing whether Russia and China could formalize a mutual defense pact akin to the historical Warsaw Pact to counterbalance NATO, Sevim expressed skepticism, citing structural barriers, peer equality, and institutional complexities. “Even if it’s not like an alliance, establishing such an alliance also has its problems. First of all, they are both peer countries. Even who would lead or how they would manage the leadership organization would be a big problem,” he noted.
However, Sevim pointed out that their geographic contiguity ensures substantial bilateral coordination. “These two countries are neighboring countries. They are countries that share Asia. And an aggression against one will eventually spread to the other. Therefore, them supporting each other in some way effectively becomes an alliance. It would be support done through bilateral relations without being an alliance. I do think they will support each other. At the very least, this will happen. External intervention toward the other country, neither of them would be happy about that,” he said. Sevim added that while NATO remains a defensive treaty organization, Moscow’s security anxieties regarding alliance expansion are structurally intelligible: “After all, it is an organization founded against it. I mean, no matter how much it’s called a defensive organization, there is no guarantee of where defense ends and where offense begins.”
“A full capacity regarding how artificial intelligence will develop has not been developed”
On the diplomatic agenda of the trilateral gathering, Sevim observed that the talks appeared hastily organized without extensive preparatory staff work, which explains why a formal agenda had not been published in advance. Nevertheless, he highlighted arms control and the regulation of emerging technologies as prominent matters of shared concern, particularly Washington’s strategic desire to cap China’s growing nuclear capabilities following the expiration of bilateral US-Russian frameworks.
“Ultimately, I don’t think it is a very well-prepared summit, with a very well-prepared plan. I believe this is also the reason why the agenda hasn’t been clearly specified up until now. However, a topic that all three countries agree on is that a discussion on limiting nuclear weapons is emerging. They have all three agreed on this as an agenda item,” Sevim explained. “This issue is specifically America’s agenda. My assessment is that the SALT treaty with Russia had already expired to a certain extent in February. When Russia wanted to extend it at that time, America did not, and they gave the justification that they wanted an agreement that would now include China as well. I think America’s main intention here is to limit China’s nuclear armament.”
Sevim predicted that substantive limits on warheads remain improbable in the near term because Beijing insists on reaching parity with Washington and Moscow before accepting binding caps. Instead, he identified the role of artificial intelligence in nuclear command and control as an area where common ground might be forged.
“Perhaps there are other matters as well, again concerning nuclear weapons. For example, issues like not using artificial intelligence in the control mechanisms of nuclear weapons are being discussed. An agreement on this could potentially emerge,” Sevim stated. Explaining the underlying apprehensions, he added: “This is what is feared. This is the danger of artificial intelligence. I mean, a full capacity regarding how artificial intelligence will develop, how it will train itself, and what it will learn hasn’t been fully developed yet. Therefore, there is a fear that control will be lost or could be lost. And especially, this is often perhaps more of a psychological fear in people than a technological one. The fact that the control of nuclear weapons is not in human hands, but in the hands of artificial intelligence. Therefore, there is also a psychological barrier involved. There could be an agreement on this matter. I mean, I think there could be an agreement not on limiting nuclear weapons, but on not using artificial intelligence in their control.”
Broadening his analysis of global non-proliferation frameworks, Sevim warned that foundational treaties are eroding because recognized nuclear weapon states have failed to disarm while non-signatory states have developed indigenous arsenals. “Türkiye is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the agreement on the prevention of nuclear tests. But, these agreements actually had two legs. Especially in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, five countries were defined as nuclear powers as of that date: America, Russia, China, England, and France. I mean, while other countries were promised not to possess nuclear weapons, it was stated that countries with nuclear weapons would work on nuclear disarmament. Currently, these agreements are not working, as you can see,” Sevim observed, pointing to North Korea’s withdrawal, the undeclared capabilities of Israel, and arsenals maintained by India and Pakistan.
Discussing Ankara’s position under the alliance’s defensive framework, Sevim addressed why Türkiye has not signed the subsequent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. “That is the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This treaty also forbids the keeping of nuclear weapons on the territories of member countries. Türkiye did not become a member of this. It is not a member for this reason. Because a part of NATO’s nuclear capacity is located in Türkiye. Let’s also think about how much of this is actually NATO. I mean, nuclear weapons might also exist within the framework of bilateral relations with America. Therefore, for this reason, they are not a party to this agreement. In my opinion, Türkiye also needs to increase its knowledge and experience regarding nuclear capacity, and I don’t mean nuclear weapons, but everything else,” he noted.
“Passage through natural straits should always be free”
Addressing maritime security and supply chain vulnerabilities, Sevim highlighted the strategic significance of natural maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Malacca, Bab-el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, the Bering Strait, and the Turkish Straits. He argued that military coercion cannot permanently secure commercial transit routes against asymmetric threats.
“Well, global trade, maritime trade in particular, especially since a large portion of world trade still passes through these places we call bottlenecks, and here, of course, I believe that these kinds of struggles will not end in these locations. I mean, you might overcome a group currently dominant there or establish some control mechanisms, but they will inevitably remain under threat in some other way,” Sevim stated. “I must say just one thing. Nevertheless, the principle of free use of the seas is important. I mean, especially for these natural straits, that is, straits not made by human hands, surely control regulations for passage and a nominal, acceptable payment to support the expenses incurred under these regulations could be made; but I think passage through natural straits should always be free.”
Sevim emphasized that closing such arteries creates uncontrollable systemic shockwaves: “If there is such an obstruction, it would cause significant crises globally and spread across the world. There are a significant number of such straits in the world, like if you take Gibraltar, the Bering Strait, the Turkish Straits, Bab-el-Mandeb, Malacca, these are all vital waterways that global trade relies on, and passage through them can be controlled, and indeed must be, but obstructing them should be subject to very strict conditions. It should be subject to very well-defined conditions.”
Reflecting on attempts to pacify shipping lanes purely through military deployments, he added: “We say we’ll do this, we’ll solve it with positive messages, but if you’re going to go there, sit down, and try to dominate using force, how far will your dominance reach? There’s also that factor. How much will you be able to dominate? Therefore, these troubles will continue. The important thing, I think, is to consider the needs and demands of the actors and states dominant in these regions and to seek common solutions that everyone can accept. These are not issues that can be prevented by using force.”
“No one can eat the whole cake alone anymore”
Concluding his assessment, Sevim cautioned that any trilateral understanding reached between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing will face political limits both internationally and domestically within the US political system. He noted that bilateral discussions between Trump and Xi are likely to center on critical trade disputes, such as Chinese restrictions on rare earth element exports and US export controls on advanced semiconductor microchips, while Russia seeks to insert the Ukraine war onto the agenda.
Furthermore, Sevim underscored that foreign capitals must calculate the durability of US presidential commitments given the potential for institutional shifts in Washington following upcoming electoral cycles. “Both other countries, for instance China and Russia, are likely considering that after the American elections, even though the American president is quite influential in foreign policy, there is a very high probability of a change in presidency within the framework of American politics two years from now,” Sevim observed. “I mean, if you consider the Democrats’ previous approaches to China and Russia, they must also be thinking about what kind of deal can be made during this period.”
Contrasting Democratic policies with Trump’s posture, Sevim noted: “The Democrats are tougher on Russia. They are supportive of NATO; they aren’t like Trump, telling them ‘you pay for your own expenses now.’ They are supportive of NATO, supportive of Ukraine, and tougher against Russia. Regarding China, they approached it in previous terms with the mindset that ‘China will be our future strategic rival; let’s give importance to diplomacy, but let’s not forget they are our rival.’ I don’t think there will be much change in that period anymore. Therefore, they need to think about both the next two years and the situation after two years.”
Ultimately, Sevim reiterated that international governance cannot be dictated by an exclusive grouping of three capitals, as the contemporary order requires broad multilateral consensus. “Therefore, if these countries are acting as a superpower, telling the rest of the world that they must follow our decisions and that we provide this control, and if they approach this meeting like the Pope dividing the world, Spain to the west and Portugal to the east of the middle of the Atlantic, that is not the reality anymore. There is no such world,” he stressed.
“The decisions these three countries make, if they can be implemented, do not necessarily give them dominion over the rest of the world. I shouldn’t say dominion, but they can have influence. They certainly will, but the decisions they make there, I believe, should be negotiated. I believe they must be negotiated and also accepted by the rest of the world now,” Sevim concluded. “I mean, we are in a very, very multipolar world now. It’s not just two poles, or three poles, or anything like that. We are in a multipolar world with regional poles, where regional events can only be addressed by regional powers, and regional powers must always be taken into account. No one, or even two or three people, can eat the whole cake alone anymore. Everyone wants their own share of the cake now.”
Diplomacy
British scholar Richard Sakwa warns of permanent conflict in Ukraine
In an in-depth interview broadcast on the Harici YouTube channel’s “Strategic Compass” programme, hosted by international relations expert Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal, renowned British political scientist and specialist in Russian and East European studies Prof. Dr. Richard Sakwa delivered a sweeping, critical assessment of the Ukraine war, European diplomacy, and the shifting dynamics of global security architecture.
Prof. Dr. Richard Sakwa, who serves as an honorary professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent and holds an academic affiliation with Moscow State University, joined Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal to examine recent confidential and multi-track diplomatic talks, the strategic mistakes made by Western and Ukrainian leadership, and the structural drivers of the ongoing European crisis.
Opening the discussion, Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal noted that behind-the-scenes meetings had taken place involving various intermediaries in Abu Dhabi, as well as subsequent direct contacts between US and Russian representatives in Moscow, suggesting that substantive issues concerning the post-war European security architecture were finally entering the agenda. Ünal observed that for the first time since hostilities began, Washington appeared willing to address Russian proposals originally tabled prior to February 2022.
Responding to Ünal’s initial appraisal, Sakwa agreed that “in the last few weeks, diplomacy has accelerated and intensified in all sorts of forums.” He cited the gathering in Oslo involving Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Norwegian leadership, British officials, and national security advisers as an important breakthrough. European leaders, Sakwa observed, had repeatedly complained about being excluded from key negotiating tables. “Russia says, ‘Well, of course you should be at the table, but you should come to the table with some positive ideas rather than the idea of simply sabotaging any initiatives,'” Sakwa said.
Recalling previous diplomatic episodes, Sakwa pointed to the August 2025 Anchorage summit between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, contrasting it with a subsequent White House gathering of European representatives:
“Remember that famous scene where they gathered around in the White House, which is in my view, one of the most humiliating pictures in European history, that here you had Trump sitting in all his pomp and glory and the European leaders as eager supplicants.”
Prof. Dr. Ünal concurred, characterising the scene as “very much like the professor basically holding a PhD lecture in his office instead of the class… because the professor is at the same time the dean of the faculty.”
Sakwa described the performance of European leaders as “absolutely outlandish and sad because instead of pushing a positive agenda, they were trying to sabotage” progress. “Okay, maybe they didn’t like what was agreed at Anchorage,” Sakwa noted. “It wasn’t decided, but it was basically some sort of land-for-peace deal. Okay, sit down at a table. Let’s hammer it out. Both sides, clearly with Moscow and Washington on board. Well then let’s take it forwards. Instead of which it was simply: there can be no negotiation on this framework.”
“Europe was simply in the corridor waiting for others”
Turning to the February talks held in Abu Dhabi and subsequent diplomatic tracks involving figures such as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, Sakwa highlighted the marginalisation of European officials. Although European national security advisers were present in the UAE, Sakwa pointed out that “they of course were not allowed to sit at the table in Abu Dhabi… They were simply in the corridor waiting for others. And that’s again symbolic.”
Sakwa stressed that European powers remain paralysed because they lack both a unified representative and a coherent diplomatic posture:
“Until they decide on a person who will represent Europe, then of course it’s very difficult for them to do so. A number of European leaders, including Giorgia Meloni of Italy, has insisted on it; it was time that we decided. She herself possibly is a candidate. Gerhard Schroeder, the former German Chancellor, has been posited because at least he knows… He is a substantive political figure trusted certainly by Moscow, and so with a long track record in European continental politics. But still there’s no decision. And so Europe needs to decide on a person, but it also needs to decide on a platform. What will they enter the negotiations on, what basis? Simply to say Russia has to capitulate?”
Examining the European Political Community summit held in Dublin in mid-November, Sakwa remarked that the gathering of around 50 leaders offered nothing substantive beyond posturing by the so-called “coalition of the willing.” He singled out British proposals to deploy troops to Ukraine following any prospective ceasefire:
“The UK is ready to take the lead. If there’s a peace deal, if there’s a ceasefire, to enter Ukraine with its forces, some NATO forces, which Moscow said from the beginning is simply unacceptable. So talk about the dialogue of the deaf. Well, there’s no dialogue, but if there was, it would be one dialogue of the deaf because they’re simply incommensurate demands. In fact, that demand kills any negotiations before it started. And that may have been its purpose. Why Europe wants to talk itself into a bigger war is not clear. My view is that it’s largely performative.”
Sakwa argued that primary figures such as Emmanuel Macron in France, Friedrich Merz in Germany, and UK figures including Andy Burnham, who continues the policies of Keir Starmer, lack a positive foreign policy agenda. “If Ukraine is willing to fight Russia, then we’ll support it until the end,” Sakwa said of their calculations.
“One of the most catastrophic leaders in world history”
The professor stressed that the recent flurry of diplomatic activity is driven by the reality on the front line: “Ukraine’s position is becoming increasingly untenable. A lot of people have been arguing for quite some time that this is a war that will be settled on the battlefield. And unfortunately, sadly, and catastrophically and tragically, it looks as if that’s the case.”
Recalling Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s June declarations of a 40-day campaign targeting Russian domestic infrastructure, Sakwa observed:
“Missiles, drones and so on attacking Russia, the oil refineries, the warehouses for Wildberries and Ozon, equivalent of Amazon, and again lately or not long ago against data centres and all of this which is damaging Russia. Over 500 Russian civilians killed in that campaign, in all the campaigns. So it’s not nugatory. But Russia in response has taken off its gloves.”
Contrasting Moscow’s approach with Western military campaigns, Sakwa stated: “Compared to the Anglo-American attack on Baghdad in the first days of the war in 2003… and indeed Iran on 28th of February when they hit 1,000 targets, many of them decided by Palantir and artificial intelligence, including the girls’ school in Minab on the first day, 28th February 2026. Absolutely catastrophic. Russia is now attacking the heat, the bridges, the basic infrastructure, railways and so on. And it’s devastating. Ukraine doesn’t have the air defences and winter is coming. It’s going to be a catastrophic winter. Massive refugees.”
Sakwa directed severe criticism toward the Ukrainian head of state:
“Zelenskyy, in my view, I have been arguing this for a long time, is one of the most catastrophic leaders in world history. He’s led his people to catastrophe. He is often praised for his courage. It isn’t courage, it’s foolhardiness. He didn’t have courage in accepting peace when he knew what needed to be done. When he was elected in 2019, he didn’t have the courage to accept the Istanbul negotiation peace framework in March, February 2022. And then he hasn’t had the courage since then for endless negotiation rounds to make any sensible concessions because he knows that there are veto players in Ukraine. This is the Azov people, the 3rd Army Corps, the Praetorian Guard, who act as the ultra-nationalists, who act as veto players. Well, he should have had the courage with Western support to face them down.”
He added that Western powers share fundamental culpability: “The West has failed all the way through… It hasn’t had the courage to stand by its own normative framework. It failed to push through Minsk or some negotiation, a Steinmeier formula, it doesn’t matter what you call it. Then it’s failed now to stick to anti-corruption and for the human rights and media rights within Ukraine itself.”
“You wouldn’t buy a used toothbrush from Boris Johnson”
Prof. Dr. Ünal then questioned Sakwa regarding the operational restraint displayed by the Russian military in the initial stages of the conflict, inquiring whether Vladimir Putin’s stated belief in the historical fraternity between Russians and Ukrainians had influenced Moscow’s military doctrine.
Sakwa affirmed that this fraternal concept was central:
“At least one third of Ukrainians used Russian as an absolutely primary language. Two thirds have a very good working knowledge. And in Russia, almost every Russian you speak to, you scratch a Russian and you find a Ukrainian.”
He noted, however, that Putin’s April 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians explicitly acknowledged that shared cultural roots did not dictate political integration into a single state: “He did stress quite clearly that that one people did not entail necessarily that they had to belong to one state. It’s absolutely explicit there that we respect them as one people.”
Sakwa explained that this close kinship rendered the conflict “a fratricidal civil war,” which he described as “the worst type of war because of the depth of hatred. Because these people are so close, the ultra-nationalists will want all the time to pick on the small differences, to expand them.”
On the strategic dimension, Sakwa argued that the initial military deployment was conceived strictly as coercive diplomacy:
“The designation was indeed a special military operation with limited military intervention. 150,000 to 190,000 troops to invade a country of, at that time, maybe 45 million people was just absurd. When the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, it had of its own troops over half a million and perhaps 200,000 more of Warsaw Pact, so 700,000 odd. So the idea was it was going to be a coercive diplomacy. So they didn’t do ‘shock and awe’ as the Anglo-Americans did over Baghdad or as the Israeli-US did in Tehran and over Iran recently. The idea was to force them to the negotiating table and for the Europeans finally to listen, finally to engage with Russia’s security concerns.”
This gambit, Sakwa argued, very nearly succeeded during the early 2022 talks in Gomel, Antalya, and Istanbul: “They got to 90, 95% of a deal, even though NATO even before that, on the 24th of March, said, ‘We will not provide security guarantees,’ which would have been the backstop to any deal.”
The initiative was aborted, Sakwa asserted, following Western intervention:
“Then, of course, we had the famous incident of our great leader, Boris Johnson, going to Kyiv on the 9th of April and said, ‘You know, you keep fighting and we’ll support you.’ And of course, the Ukrainians were stupid enough to accept Boris Johnson. You wouldn’t buy a used toothbrush from Boris Johnson, let alone buying a whole peace deal on which the fate of your people depended.”
Sakwa highlighted the subsequent human catastrophe, noting that Zelenskyy’s mounting frustration became visible during a recent appearance in Copenhagen alongside Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, where the Ukrainian president stated he wished Putin were dead. Sakwa described this as “boorishness and vindictiveness” that demonstrated “the degradation of European leaders who sit and nod,” stressing that Putin remains the undisputed leader of a major power with whom formal negotiations must eventually be conducted.
Regarding domestic Russian dynamics, Sakwa pointed out that hardliners in Moscow had long complained: “‘Why are we fighting this war with one hand tied behind our back?’ And some said two hands tied. Now the hands are no longer behind their back, and they’ve unleashed devastating attacks.” He dismissed proposals circulating in Washington through Kushner and Witkoff, which suggest that Ukraine might cede parts of the Donbas in exchange for accelerated NATO membership, calling the concept “pure nonsense” that fails to account for Moscow’s demand for a comprehensive geopolitical buffer zone.
“The war will end, but there will be no peace”
Addressing Prof. Dr. Ünal’s inquiry into how Zelenskyy transformed from a peace candidate elected by a broad cross-section of the population, including Russian-speaking communities in the Donbas, into an uncompromising wartime leader, Sakwa drew historical parallels with Petro Poroshenko:
“Poroshenko was elected as a peace leader. He reneged on it. Zelensky was elected as a peace leader. Within weeks, he then capitulated to the ethno-nationalists, the ultra-nationalists, the hardline threats.”
Poroshenko, Sakwa recounted, committed an unforgivable act in April 2014 by launching artillery and missile strikes against Donetsk and Luhansk: “The vast majority of casualties were innocent civilians in Donetsk city, Luhansk and other places, quite often double-tap attacks. They attack a school or bus stop and then they send in a second one when the rescue workers go in. The OSCE was giving these figures until 2016 when Ukraine complained about it, and then they stopped giving where the missile attacks came from.”
He observed the tragic irony that front-line troops on both sides, until the advent of dense drone warfare, frequently watched the same television series and cultural programmes produced in Russia. Yet political leadership repeatedly abandoned diplomatic compromises, such as the December 2019 Paris summit under the Normandy format:
“All that Zelenskyy could do at that Paris meeting in December 2019 was smirk. There was a deal on the table negotiated between Vladislav Surkov, who was then the Russian person responsible for Donbas, and the Ukrainian side. They were then going to formalise it at a summit meeting of the two leaders in Paris, and then Zelensky reneged on it. He could have saved his people; he didn’t. And then he had many more chances all the way through, and the West did, until the final invasion of February 2022, including, of course, the December 2021 two documents, the peace treaties, which are now back in play.”
Sakwa dismissed assertions by European figures like Kaja Kallas that the existing security architecture remains functional:
“It’s working so brilliantly that Europe is now in what I nowadays call the Third Great European War. The first one was the First World War. The second one, of course, was the Second World War. This war is a continuation as a result of the failure to deal with the contradictions of the peace deal in 1945. That is, of course, the division of the continent between the Soviet Union and the West, and today perpetuated between Russia and the European West.”
Discussing the internal militarisation of Ukrainian politics, Sakwa pointed to an estimated 60,000 ideological troops held in reserve, including the 3rd Army Corps commanded by Andriy Biletsky and the Azov units integrated into the National Guard:
“60,000 Praetorian Guards equivalent, if you like. The Freikorps in Germany after the First World War, ready to sabotage any peace deal, ready to kill anybody, including Zelensky, who makes a peace deal. They are the veto players. They are encouraged by figures like Senator Lindsey Graham in the United States: ‘What’s not to like about it? Ukrainians are willing to die killing Russians and no Americans suffering.'”
Assessing the endgame, Sakwa offered a sober prognosis:
“My view is that the war could well end within the next six months. Ukraine is collapsing economically, physically, desertions from the army and so on, the massive loss of life, and the cities are dying and emptying out. So the war will end, but there will be no peace. Even then there’ll be no peace because you’ve got these units… remaining as a reserve army for permanent war. And of course MI6 and the CIA also. It’s this terrible collusion.”
Sakwa recalled the deep historical roots of this Western intelligence involvement, noting that British support for insurgent bands in Western Ukraine after 1945 led to tens of thousands of deaths into the 1950s, a pattern revived with intensity after 2014. “That is why Russia says it’s so absurd to talk of a ceasefire which solves nothing,” Sakwa remarked. “Of course we want an end to this killing, it just has to end. But we want an end to it which is sustainable, which means some more substantive peace order.”
He dismissed proposals for European Union accession as an alternative security guarantee, referencing Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty inserted at the behest of Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski: “Article 42.7 is a milder version of NATO’s Article 5. It turned an economic association into a quasi-security pact… which is why Yanukovych in November 2013 balked and why Moscow was so concerned.”
“My book is dedicated to the other Ukraine”
When asked by Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal about potential territorial claims or ambitions from Poland regarding Western Ukraine (Galicia and Lviv) if Ukraine were reduced to a rump state, Sakwa discounted formal annexations while acknowledging the weight of memory:
“Western Galicia was Polish in the interwar years, Lviv in particular. Incidentally, my father served in Lviv as a Polish officer before the war… But since the war, all the Poles have been either expelled or left in that huge migration of populations. So that would actually be a very big poisoned chalice for the Poles.”
Sakwa stressed that the continuing devastation of Ukraine reflects a profound failure of statesmanship:
“My book on the Russo-Ukrainian war, ‘The Lost Peace’ and ‘Follies of Empire’, is dedicated to the other Ukraine. Now, what does that mean, this other Ukraine? Those millions of Ukrainians who have left or are suppressed internally, who wanted a pluralistic, tolerant, multicultural, multilingual, thriving democracy. And Ukrainians can do it. Highly educated, highly able… Anybody like me who talks about peace and who talks about dialogue, who talks about a tolerant, multicultural, multilingual Ukraine at peace with all of its neighbours, including Russia, we are condemned as capitulationists and appeasers to Putin. This shameful, infantile language is just shocking. It’s always 1938 for these people. It’s always appeasement, always that Putin is the new Hitler, ‘Putler’. This is childish and devastatingly dangerous talk.”
Regarding the eventual contours of a rump Ukraine, Sakwa observed: “The feeling in Russia is that they have to take Odesa, that a rump Ukraine will survive. But who will manage this rump Ukraine? Who will restore it? If you have these ultra-nationalists, the war will continue. If it’s some sort of Western tutelage, we don’t trust it. Perhaps a United Nations force with Chinese, Indian, and other troops… But Ukraine must stick to its own original declaration of state sovereignty and constitutional neutrality. Neutrality is not a sphere of influence; it is a sphere of security, much like Finlandisation was: no NATO, no military threat, but internally do what you like.”
Sakwa assigned historical responsibility for the collapse of post-Cold War security architecture directly to the Clinton administration: “One can’t let Bill Clinton off the hook on this. Strobe Talbott and his advisers in the early 1990s went for NATO enlargement, which was symbolic of the failure to negotiate an inclusive peace order from Lisbon to Vladivostok.”
“Four levels to this war”
Evaluating the current posture in Washington, Sakwa explained to Ünal that the US establishment remains deeply fractured:
“Trump and some people around him do want to see an end to this. But as always, the United States is bitterly divided. We have John Ratcliffe at the head of the CIA who seems to be very keen to continue the war. We have plenty of Republicans keen to continue the war… We have plenty of Democrats now saying they are going to stop these peace efforts, adopting the European dog-in-the-manger attitude: ‘We’ve got no ideas ourselves, but we’re going to stop anybody else having any ideas.'”
Sakwa structured the conflict into four distinct analytical tiers:
“There are four levels to this war. The first level is the internal conflict within Ukraine. The second level is the Russo-Ukrainian bilateral level, which Zelensky messed up big time. The third level is this Russian-European one, which seems to be intensifying and becoming more bitter, with figures like our Defence Secretary saying we have to prepare for war in a thousand days… And the fourth level is, of course, this superpower level between Washington and Moscow.”
While expressing scepticism about Trump’s capacity to follow through given internal political opposition and personal longevity, Sakwa highlighted the upcoming trilateral diplomacy on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen, China:
“This will be the first serious trilateral superpower summit since 1955 when the UK was at Geneva with the Soviet Union and the United States as a great power… I would like to see this trilateral format of the serious great powers, hopefully joined by India, reflecting what should be reflected in the United Nations Security Council: those with the greatest privilege have the greatest responsibility, rather than legacy spoilers like France and the United Kingdom.”
Concluding the interview, Prof. Dr. Ünal asked whether upcoming electoral cycles across Europe might displace existing hardline administrations. Sakwa predicted a significant changing of the guard, beginning with France:
“Macron clearly is out; he can’t stand. Opinion polls show Marine Le Pen way ahead, with Jean-Luc Melenchon challenging for second place as Edouard Philippe and Raphael Glucksmann trail. A second round between Melenchon and Le Pen will be fascinating. It can’t be worse than anything we’ve seen with Macron, Hollande, and Sarkozy, who utterly failed in statesmanship and responsibility to our continent. In Germany, Friedrich Merz’s Russophobia is off the scale. In Britain, while an election may not occur until 2028 or 2029, the public mood is shifting. Up and down the country, people are saying: ‘Not in our name. We don’t want this war; we have to make an equitable peace where the tolerant, good Ukraine can thrive.'”
Diplomacy
US and allies sign pact to shield AI supply chains from China
The US and several countries, including Japan, Australia, Israel and the United Kingdom, have agreed to establish a joint list of critical technologies and supply chains supporting artificial intelligence.
US Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg told the Financial Times (FT) that South Korea, India, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have also signed the “San Francisco Declaration on the Secure Foundations of Lasting Prosperity”.
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the European Commission are also expected to sign the declaration next week.
The declaration forms part of the US-led “Pax Silica” initiative, which aims to strengthen AI-related supply chains, including semiconductors, critical minerals and energy infrastructure, as Washington and its partners seek to reduce vulnerabilities and deepen cooperation amid growing competition with Beijing.
Helberg said the agreement recognizes that the technologies and infrastructure supporting AI development often span multiple countries, making supply chain security a shared responsibility.
The initiative emerged as President Donald Trump prepares to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit to be held in Shenzhen, China.
Washington accuses Beijing of failing to fulfil its commitments under a trade truce the leaders reached in late 2025.
Helberg said the agreement would help participating countries identify the sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure needed to develop what Trump calls “superintelligence” and enable information sharing on areas where supply chains need to be diversified.
The declaration states that economic security is fundamental to national security and calls for stronger safeguards against the theft or unauthorized transfer of technologies that could give adversarial actors a military or intelligence advantage.
The agreement also provides for the establishment of working groups to address vulnerabilities in AI supply chains and develop economic hubs to attract investment into related sectors.
The initiative is part of a broader US effort to reduce reliance on China for critical materials, particularly rare earth elements, as Washington seeks to diversify supply sources for itself and its allies.
Diplomacy
NATO cancels 2027 summit over Ukraine and Iran rifts
NATO is cancelling its 2027 leaders’ summit planned for Albania due to disagreements over defence spending and the wars in Iran and Ukraine, the Associated Press (AP) reported.
Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama said alliance countries have not yet agreed on a date for the next summit, but confirmed the meeting will not take place in 2027.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte also confirmed that the alliance is not bound to a fixed schedule and that leaders meet “when necessary”.
NATO is also reducing the number of ministerial-level meetings.
No defence ministers’ meeting was held in October this year, and none is planned for October 2027.
Alliance foreign ministers will meet only once next year instead of twice.
NATO explains these changes as “restructuring”.
US policies and Iran war divide the alliance
One reason for the disagreements has been US policies under President Donald Trump.
The US administration is demanding that allies increase defence spending, criticizing them for not sufficiently supporting the war against Iran, and questioning Washington’s previous commitments to European security.
At the summit held in Ankara in July, allies agreed on a 70 billion euro aid package for Ukraine for 2026 and pledged to maintain a similar level in 2027.
However, Italy opposed the second point.
The NATO Secretary General also proposed making military support spending for Kyiv mandatory at 0.25% of gross domestic product, but this initiative failed.
According to The Telegraph’s sources, only seven of the 32 NATO countries backed the proposal, while countries including the UK, France, Spain, Italy, and Canada opposed it.
Divisions grow over Ukraine aid and membership
Furthermore, in November, Bulgaria refused to provide military support to Ukraine and join the European Union’s (EU) new aid package, while Poland suspended financing for purchasing US weapons for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Negotiations conducted by Trump’s special envoys with Moscow behind allies’ backs are also causing an additional rift in the alliance.
The US and Europe also hold different views on Ukraine’s prospects of joining NATO.
While the Trump administration and Trump himself oppose this accession, the Ukrainian President stated on 14 November that the Americans had asked him whether he was ready to give up Donbas in exchange for alliance membership.
In contrast to Washington’s shifting line, some European politicians insist on Kyiv’s unconditional integration.
French President Emmanuel Macron said on 15 November: “Ukraine’s place is inside the alliance.”
Some countries, such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, share the same stance.
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