From Great Power Competition to Strategic Stability: A New Orientation of China-US Relations

U.S. President Donald Trump paid a state visit to China from May 13 to 15, 2026. For the current turbulent international order, this summit between the two great powers of China and the United States is of extraordinary significance, bringing a degree of certainty to an uncertain world.

A major focus of domestic and international attention is that during his visit to China, Trump appeared far more rational, restrained and pragmatic than he did in Europe. In Europe, he often treated allies with emotional outbursts, unilateral pressure and even public mockery; in Beijing, by contrast, he moderated his tone, chose his words carefully, stressed respect for China and a willingness to cooperate, demonstrating a greater sense of realpolitik and diplomatic propriety.

During his tour at Zhongnanhai, he even remarked that if he gets used to this place, he might not want to leave. He also expressed hope of visiting China again in six months. All this points to productive communications between the two sides. The most important outcome was their agreement to build a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability. This is clearly a major new development and transformation in China-U.S. relations, which will undoubtedly send strong reverberations, profoundly shaping not only the societies of both nations but also the global strategic landscape and the existing structure of international relations.

What Is the “China-US Constructive Relationship of Strategic Stability”?

Although no joint communiqué was issued nor press conference held following President Trump’s visit to China, the Chinese side nonetheless spoke highly of the trip, describing it as a “historic meeting”. The reason lies in the two sides’ agreement to build a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability.

Strategic stability originally refers to a state among nuclear-armed powers where mutual deterrence prevents nuclear war. The concept emerged from U.S.-Soviet arms control during the Cold War and now also describes peaceful relations between major powers. In the current China-U.S. context, “strategic stability” is understood broadly to mean that the two countries can maintain a stable framework in their most crucial interactions.

How should we understand the new positioning of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability”? During the meeting on May 14, President Xi Jinping put forward the “four should-bes” to define this new framework: It should be positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay, healthy stability with competition kept within bounds, normal stability with differences under control, and durable stability with peace in prospect. Each dimension of “stability” leaves considerable room for interpretation.

The first dimension: cooperation as the mainstay. Over the past decade, both the Trump administration’s launch of two trade wars and the Biden administration’s building of a “small yard with high fences” and imposing high-tech export controls on China have created massive disruptions to the normal operations of enterprises in both countries and to bilateral trade. As the world’s two largest economies, frequent frictions caused by U.S. policies are clearly abnormal and detrimental to the economic development of both nations and the world. It is therefore essential to return to a tone centered on cooperation.

The second dimension is well-regulated competition. The United States is prone to the Thucydides Trap mindset and harbors deep misgivings about China’s rise and development. Nevertheless, China has no intention of engaging in zero-sum games where one side wins and the other loses. From Chinese perspective, competition between nations is inevitable. Yet the world today faces the fundamental task of expanding common interests rather than dividing existing gains. We embrace sound competition and reject vicious rivalry; otherwise, the world risks repeating the tragedies of World War I, World War II and even the Cold War.

The third dimension is manageable differences. Disagreements are inevitable in China-U.S. interactions. However, if economic, trade, technological, cultural and academic exchanges are all politicized and securitized, even ordinary bilateral issues will escalate into strategic confrontations. A mature major-country relationship does not mean the absence of disputes, but the ability to keep dialogue intact even after disagreements arise.

The fourth dimension is foreseeable peace. It targets the most fundamental and bottom-line principle in China-U.S. relations: the two countries must avoid war. Today’s China-U.S. relationship is no longer a simple bilateral tie between two isolated nations, but two core pillars embedded in the global industrial chain, financial system, technological system and security architecture. Therefore, foreseeable peace requires strategic self-awareness from both sides: competition must not escalate into conflict, and confrontation must never lead to war. Neither side shall gamble the future of 1.4 billion Chinese people, over 300 million Americans and the entire world on an unaffordable conflict for short-term political gains.

These signals released from this summit indicate that both sides are striving to shift their relations from confrontation to a new phase featuring controllable competition and pragmatic cooperation.

The Constructive Significance of the New Positioning of China-U.S. Relations

These “four should-bes” are not a one-sided expectation that China places on the United States, but rather a mutual commitment between the two countries. The definition put forward by the Chinese leader has received high recognition from the U.S. side. Therefore, there is good reason to believe that this new framework will serve as the strategic guideline for China-U.S. relations over the next three years, which will cover Trump’s second term, because it benefits both nations.

For China, what matters more are the strategic gains from this meeting: namely, persuading the United States to embrace a framework of constructive strategic stability. China’s paramount strategic goal is to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which demands a stable external environment. Yet since Trump’s first term, China has faced containment by the United States and its allies across trade, technology, finance, and geopolitics, posing severe challenges to its development. China has long sought to transcend the Thucydides Trap. While it does not shy away from competition and stands ready to uphold its interests in economic and trade frictions with the U.S., it has no desire for strategic rivalry. Instead, China aims to steer bilateral relations back to a path of rationality, communication, and non-confrontation, so as to secure a stable external environment for economic growth.

For the United States, it places greater emphasis on the pragmatic benefits of this visit. The U.S. signaled its intention to visit China as early as last year, aiming to leverage its perceived victories over Venezuela and Iran to pressure China. However, the war in Iran has yet to end, and it has produced significant blowback against the U.S., exposing few critical realities to the world:

First, the U.S. cannot defeat Iran, and a power unable to subdue Iran has no credible path to conquering China.

Second, although China is the world’s largest energy importer, it faces no imminent risk of energy shortages.

Third, surging domestic inflation and oil prices in the U.S. have stoked public discontent, undermining Trump’s prospects in the midterm elections.

Fourth, the U.S. failed to defeat China in the trade war, instead hitting a wall. In February, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the massive tariffs imposed by the Trump administration under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) were illegal.

Fifth, a series of events like the maiden flight of China’s sixth-generation fighter jet, the May 7^th India-Pakistan air battle, the September 3 military parade, and the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict have convinced the U.S. that military coercion is unlikely to bend China to its will.

From the U.S. perspective, a reality-based assessment compels recognition of China’s international standing. Moreover, China’s neutral stance in multiple global crises has led the U.S. to view it as a rational, predictable, and negotiable strategic rival rather than an entirely uncontrollable challenger.

For the world at large, the realization of strategic stability in China-U.S. relations also contributes to global peace and stability. In this era of major-power games, world development and security are confronted with numerous challenges: rising global unrest and armed conflicts, sluggish economic growth mounting pressures on people’s livelihoods, stagnant technological progress and retrogressive international cooperation, a fractured international order and unbalanced rule-based systems, deteriorating diplomatic atmospheres and setbacks to peaceful diplomacy, ineffective governance over global issues, and small and medium-sized countries being reduced to pawns in great-power contests. The gravest crisis facing the world today lies not in troubles plaguing individual nations, but in the prevalent global state of instability, uncertainty and unpredictability. As the world’s two largest economies, China and the United States bear the responsibility to deliver stable expectations for the whole world.

The Future of China-U.S. Relations

In the short term, the proposal of a constructive strategic stability relationship between China and the United States means there will still be opportunities for positive interactions over the next six months. President Xi Jinping has agreed to pay a visit to U.S. in September 2026, and there is a high probability that the two leaders will meet again at the APEC Summit in Shenzhen and the G20 Summit in the United States again. In other words, the two countries will continue to maintain engagement, intensify cooperation on the basis of managing differences, and foster a favorable atmosphere for multiple rounds of head-of-state diplomacy in the period ahead.

Nevertheless, the “constructive strategic stability relationship between China and the United States” still faces an even bigger test that will determine its true substance. The Taiwan issue is the most sensitive and core issue in China-U.S. relations, representing China’s vital core national interest. This is a bottom line and red line that cannot be traded or trampled on.

On board Air Force One returning to the U.S. after his China visit, Trump laid out his latest “Four Don’ts” on Taiwan: Don’t want anyone to pursue independence; Don’t want to send troops thousands of miles to fight a war; Don’t become a backer for “Taiwan independence”; Don’t easily commit to arms sales to Taiwan.

This statement does not represent a shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. While the first three “Don’ts” can be seen as a form of strategic reassurance to China, the deliberate ambiguity on arms sales preserves the core tool of “using Taiwan issue to contain China”. In short, Trump has not abandoned the “Taiwan card” during this visit, and he still seeks to use it as a tool to constrain China. Accordingly, whether Trump approves a US$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which is the largest single arms deal in U.S. history, will not only test U.S. political commitments but also directly determine whether major conflict between China and the U.S. could break out in the future.

Though this visit facilitates the realization of strategic stability between China and the United States, the structural contradictions between the two sides in ideology, development models, technological competition and geopolitical strategies remain unresolved. In line with the logic of strategic defense, strategic stalemate and strategic counteroffensive, China-U.S. relations have entered the phase of strategic stalemate. Yet how long this phase will last remains uncertain. It is likely to be extremely protracted, spanning two to three decades or even longer until the two countries attain balanced strength across all fields.

China harbors no intention of challenging America’s dominant status, while the U.S. can hardly abandon its attempt to contain China. Hence, during this strategic stalemate, bilateral relations may witness intermittent frictions and truces, with neither side able to subdue the other. Both sides have to cooperate amid competition, which will become the new normal of bilateral ties.

In any case, the vision of a constructive strategic stability relationship is a bitter yet effective remedy proposed by China for China-U.S. relations and global peace. It does not cure minor ailments, but targets the entrenched fatal malady of hegemonic anxiety. This prescription requires joint adherence by both sides. China has demonstrated utmost sincerity and steadfast resolve. Now the ball is in America’s court, especially in the hands of decision-makers in Washington. Will it lay aside arrogance and embrace an equal, stable and sustainable new framework of bilateral relations, or remain trapped in the illusion of acting from a position of strength and rush headlong down the path of confrontation? It is hoped that this Beijing summit will mark a fresh starting point for bilateral ties. If both sides fully implement the constructive strategic stability relationship, reduce emotional decisions and excessive securitization tendencies, and step up pragmatic communication and tangible cooperation, it will prove a blessing for China, the United States and the entire world.

*Dr. Yang Chen
Associate Professor and Executive Director, Center for Turkish Studies, Institute of Global Studies, Shanghai University