Opinion
Has Ukraine become Trump’s ‘Valentine’s Day’ gift to Putin?
February 14 is “Valentine’s Day,” an important day in the Western world, and it also coincided with the opening of the three-day Munich Security Conference (MSC). A day earlier, U.S. President Trump announced that high-ranking diplomats from the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine would attend the conference. He emphasized that the Russia-Ukraine conflict “must come to an end” and criticized former U.S. President Biden’s statements that suggesting “Ukraine could join NATO.” According to Trump, these remarks contributed to the escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2022. Additionally, Trump expressed his desire for Russia to rejoin the G8, arguing that if the G8 had still existed, the Ukraine issue might never have arisen. Trump has always admired and respected Russian President Putin and has never concealed his pro-Russian stance. Less than a month into office, Trump made the Russia-Ukraine conflict one of the top priorities of his foreign policy agenda, presenting policies and proposals that largely disappointed Ukraine and European countries. Because of this, observers jokingly said that Trump was preparing to give Ukraine to Putin and Russia as a “Valentine’s Day” gift.
It was evident that Trump attached great importance to this year’s Munich Security Conference. He sent a high-level delegation led by Vice President Vance, which included Secretary of State Rubio and the special envoy for the Russia-Ukraine crisis, Kellogg. Ukraine, on the other hand, was represented personally by President Zelensky. Russia, however, continued its tradition of not attending the conference, which it had maintained since 2022. This year’s Munich Security Conference was significantly different from the previous three meetings. While the Russia-Ukraine conflict remained the main agenda item, the focus was no longer solely on condemning Russia or discussing how to support Ukraine. Instead, the discussions centered on how to end the war and how the U.S. and Europe could bring this “European version of the Afghanistan War” to a conclusion. The reason for this shift is simple: the U.S. government has changed. The Biden administration, which had once orchestrated the Ukraine crisis and “trapped” Russia and Europe, is now in the past. Trump, who has promised to end the Russia-Ukraine war “overnight,” is back in power and is now the key decision-maker regarding whether the war will end and how the crisis will unfold.
February 24 marks the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Before this significant date arrives, Trump has already clearly laid out his blueprint for reshaping the geopolitical landscape of Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. This blueprint is far more realistic and tangible than Trump’s previous ideas of annexing Greenland, Canada, and Mexico, controlling the Panama Canal, or even “clearing out Gaza.” It is also a conclusion that leaves Ukraine and Europe deeply frustrated yet powerless to change. This naturally aligns with the author’s prediction from three years ago—that “Russia will achieve a tragic victory, while Ukraine will suffer a tragic defeat.”
On the 12th, Trump and Putin held their first phone consultation in several years. According to Kremlin spokesperson Peskov, the call lasted an hour and a half, during which both parties agreed on achieving a long-term resolution to the Ukraine crisis through negotiations, arranging a U.S.-Russia summit, Putin’s invitation for Trump to visit Moscow, as well as discussions on U.S.-Russia relations and the Middle East situation. It is also reported that their conversation extended beyond geopolitical issues, covering topics such as artificial intelligence, energy, and the U.S. dollar, giving the call a broader significance beyond the constraints of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The messages conveyed were also highly intriguing.
Moreover, both sides agreed to immediately establish and dispatch a negotiation team to begin talks. On the 18th, representatives of Russia and the United States began their first official high-level talks since the start of the Ukraine war in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. The Russian side is represented by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Russian Deputy Presidential Advisor Yuriy Ushakov, and the head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), Kirill Dmitriev. The U.S. delegation includes Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and White House Special Representative for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff.
These developments indicate that the U.S. and Russia have begun to emerge from a three-year-long geopolitical standoff, restoring direct communication between their heads of state and effectively bringing bilateral relations back to the state they were in before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Prior to the call, both sides not only made a series of positive statements to set the stage but also facilitated the release of detained personnel from each other’s countries, further warming the atmosphere. However, this call undoubtedly demonstrated an example of “over-the-top diplomacy” for Ukraine and America’s European partners. That is, as the leader of the Western bloc and NATO’s de facto commander, the U.S. engaged in direct discussions with its long-time adversary, Russia, over Ukraine’s and Europe’s future without thoroughly consulting its partners and allies in advance.
This approach reflects Trump’s signature “simple, direct, and effective” style, as well as a significant return to realism in great power relations. It also serves as a concrete illustration of the principle that “power determines status” and embodies the jungle law that U.S. Secretary of State Blinken once cited: “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”
After reminiscing and discussing major decisions with Putin, Trump then had an hour-long phone call with Zelensky, briefing him on “all the details” of his talks with Putin. Zelensky stated, “We are working on coordinating with the U.S. to stop Russian aggression and ensure a reliable and lasting peace. President Trump said, ‘Let’s do it.'” These statements indicate that Ukraine has decided to follow Trump’s proposed roadmap and timeline to bring an end to the Russia-Ukraine war, eliminate the crisis at its root, and plan for Ukraine’s future.
Trump has actually already outlined the framework of his plan for how to quickly end the Russia-Ukraine war, fundamentally resolve the crisis, and ensure Ukraine’s long-term security. His first priority is to achieve a ceasefire as soon as possible, aiming to reach this goal within the first six months of his presidency. Trump has previously warned that if either Russia or Ukraine opposes this objective, he will support the other side to ensure that the goal is met.
Secondly, the borders between Russia and Ukraine will not return to their pre-conflict positions. On February 12, at the 26th Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting in Brussels, the newly appointed U.S. Secretary of Defense, Hegses, stated bluntly: “Restoring Ukraine’s borders to their pre-2014 state is unrealistic. Pursuing this illusionary goal will only prolong the war and cause more suffering.”
Thirdly, Ukraine will not be allowed to join NATO, neither in the near future nor in the long term. On the 12th, Trump once again emphasized this point via CNN, directly citing Hegses’ statement that Ukraine’s NATO membership is “unrealistic.” Hegses even told European partners in Brussels that after the crisis ends, European forces should be the primary force responsible for Ukraine’s security, and the U.S. military would not participate.
Russia, which has taken clear initiative on the battlefield, remains composed and patient, waiting for the day when the U.S. finally abandons Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian authorities have evidently lost confidence—not only do they see no hope of reclaiming lost territories through military means, but they also fear losing further American military aid. They have even abandoned the fantasy of NATO membership under U.S. leadership and are now scrambling to preserve what remains, mitigate losses, and secure U.S. security guarantees by any means necessary.
On the same day that Trump held separate phone calls with Putin and Zelensky, Kyiv was busy receiving the newly appointed U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Besent. As the first high-ranking official from Trump’s new administration to visit Ukraine, Besent was invited by Zelensky to discuss an economic cooperation deal. The proposal involves opening up Ukraine’s mineral resources to American companies, allowing Ukraine to monetize its reserves as “compensation” for U.S. aid. Observers have described this deal as “trading minerals for assistance,” aiming to secure $300 billion in support from the Trump administration.
Over the past three years, the United States has provided Ukraine with a total of $32.4 billion, accounting for 27.2% of global aid to Ukraine. As part of Zelensky’s so-called “Victory Plan,” this resource transaction aims to bind the U.S. to Ukraine in an effort to prevent Washington from cutting off aid. However, this type of resource-based arrangement will undoubtedly provoke Russia to accelerate the extraction of minerals in its controlled territories and may even spark a global rush to exploit Ukraine’s mineral wealth. For Ukraine, after losing vast amounts of land, continuing to sell off its resources raises the question: is this a diplomatic victory or a failure? Readers can judge for themselves.
In conclusion, Trump’s solution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict is now fully laid out—it is no longer subject to speculation or multiple interpretations. It firmly establishes Ukraine as the ultimate loser in this conflict. Meanwhile, Europe, having lost U.S. support and NATO’s protective umbrella, now finds its hopes of collectively defending Ukraine or even reclaiming lost territories to be nothing more than a geopolitical fairy tale.
The framework of a “Russia’s tragic victory and Ukraine’s tragic defeat” is now set, and as the Russia-Ukraine war approaches its third anniversary, its end may finally be in sight. Moving forward, we will witness how, under U.S. mediation, Russia and Ukraine negotiate de-escalation, gradual cooling of hostilities, and a step-by-step ceasefire, ultimately leading to a long-term armistice agreement akin to the Korean War settlement or another form of peace deal.
We will also see how, under Trump’s coercion and diplomatic maneuvering, the U.S. will gradually ease and lift sanctions on Russia, push for Russia’s return to the G8, and work to normalize Russia-Europe relations by sidelining the Ukraine crisis.
The like-minded Trump and Putin have finally found their long-awaited opportunity for direct dialogue and collaboration, and they truly understand and resonate with each other. If you don’t believe it, consider this piece of news: on February 10, Trump’s social media account shared Putin’s flattering remark, stating that Trump will “soon restore order in Europe” and that Europe will “stand at its master’s feet, gently wagging its tail.”
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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