The Sochi Summit, set to take place on September 4th, is poised to address a range of critical issues, with the Grain Agreement, potential Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations, and the Syria dossier taking center stage in the discussions. These prominent agenda items raise several pressing questions: Can the existing grain agreement be sustained? Are conditions conducive for peace talks between Russia and Ukraine? What role will Turkey play in these negotiations, and what lies ahead for Ankara-Damascus normalization? Eminent figures, E. Lieutenant General İsmail Hakkı Pekin and Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal, have provided insightful analysis on these matters for Harici.
At the heart of this summit lies the Grain Corridor agreement, which ended with Russia’s withdrawal. Prior to President Erdoğan’s meeting with President Putin, the foreign ministers of both nations convened. During their joint press statement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov conveyed Russia’s stance on the Black Sea Grain Initiative agreement:
* Russia is open to returning to the grain agreement once its conditions in the package agreement with the United Nations (UN) are met.
* Russia has plans to send one million tons of grain to Turkey for processing, with financial support from Qatar, destined for countries facing urgent grain needs.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan also shared pertinent information:
*The UN, with Turkey’s collaboration, is preparing a new set of grain agreement proposals.
*To ensure the uninterrupted export of Russian grain and fertilizer, Russia’s demands must be met.
* The grain agreement holds immense significance for global food security and the stability of the Black Sea region.
Retired Lieutenant General İsmail Hakkı Pekin, former head of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff, anticipates a reevaluation of last year’s grain corridor agreement. However, he believes Russia may propose shipping grain to Turkey for redistribution to countries in urgent need, casting doubt on Russia’s return to the existing grain deal. His rationale is rooted in the Western embargo on Russian fertilizer and grain exports, which, if extended again, might erode Russia’s incentive to maintain the current agreement.
International Relations Expert Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal offered insights into Turkey’s proposal and Russia’s reluctance to embrace it. While Turkey and the UN seek a grain agreement resembling last year’s model, unresolved issues with the UN’s commitment to Russia’s agricultural bank and the lack of insurance coverage for ships transporting Russian grain contribute to Russia’s skepticism. This situation mirrors past Western promises, reminiscent of assurances given in the 1990s concerning NATO’s expansion eastward, which were ultimately unfulfilled. Consequently, Russia may insist on delivering grain grants to nations in dire need.
Ünal noted that Russia’s alternative grain deal proposal encompasses a limited quantity designated as grants for African countries facing acute shortages. Russia’s intention is to fulfill commitments made at the summit with African nations.
However, the more crucial issue revolves around the transportation of Russian and Ukrainian grain to global markets. Ünal underscored the complexities involved:
“Ukraine transports some grain to Eastern Europe via land routes, but objections from other nations due to the lower cost of Ukrainian grain complicate matters. Last year, 60-70% of Ukrainian grain transited the Black Sea corridor, with ships inspected in the Straits to prevent weapon smuggling, a concession Turkey made despite the Montreux Convention granting sole authority to search ships in the Straits. However, this corridor closed following Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian ships and unfulfilled promises to Russia.”
Recently, a civilian cargo ship made the first voyage from Ukraine to Turkey since the grain deal’s collapse, but this experimental shipment raises concerns about ship contents and safety. Turkey deems this route risky and opposes it, potentially raising the specter of conflict with NATO countries.
İsmail Hakkı Pekin cautioned about the dangers posed by such experimental shipments, highlighting the potential for naval confrontations at sea.
In response to the United States’ proposal to increase grain shipments via the Danube River, Ünal pointed out the difficulties in implementing this solution, such as grain transportation logistics, potential Russian interference, and increased costs.
The U.S.’s motivation for such proposals may involve maintaining existing sanctions against Russia. More than thirty million tons of grain were shipped through the Black Sea last year, making alternative routes impractical.
Ünal warned that the U.S. might seek NATO naval involvement in the Black Sea to enforce its goals, a move that could escalate tensions.
When asked about potential alternative solutions if promises to Russia remain unfulfilled, Ünal suggested that Turkey could purchase Russian grain and resell it, possibly including Ukrainian grain. This arrangement would serve Turkey’s grain industry needs and enable it to access global markets, aligning with Western interests despite their reluctance to see Russian grain sold.
Turning to the Russia-Ukraine peace talks, the joint statement from Fidan and Lavrov indicated Turkey’s willingness to facilitate or mediate negotiations when conditions permit. While Turkey advocates for lasting peace and regional stability, Russia finds Ukrainian President Zelensky’s peace proposal unacceptable.
The Erdoğan-Putin meeting is expected to broach the topic, with the possibility of both sides exploring the terms for peace. Potential conditions may include Ukraine ceding Crimea in exchange for a federalized Ukrainian state, incorporating Donetsk and Lugansk as constituent republics, and dismantling neo-Nazi elements.
Ünal noted that peace based on these terms is plausible but contingent on convincing the U.S. and the UK, currently in election cycles. President Biden’s need for a successful war narrative may deter peace talks. However, if President Trump is reelected, the possibility of peace negotiations may emerge, necessitating Turkey’s mediation.
Ünal emphasized that Turkey’s balanced approach has fostered trust among the involved parties.
Pekin echoed concerns about the U.S. elections and posited that peace talks may remain a distant possibility.
The potential for normalization between Turkey and Syria is another pivotal issue at the Sochi Summit. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov confirmed discussions on the subject with Fidan but provided no details.
Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal expressed optimism about the prospects of Ankara-Damascus normalization, citing Syria’s elevated negotiating position. Moscow may advocate for Turkey’s gradual withdrawal from Syrian territory, potentially involving the return of refugees and collaborative efforts against the PKK/YPG, akin to the Adana Memorandum’s revival. Turkey may need to recognize organizations designated as terrorists by Syria, accommodating them within the Adana Memorandum framework. Recognizing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) might also be part of the normalization process to create states unafraid of Western pressure.
Retired intelligence chief İsmail Hakkı Pekin, however, cautioned that Syria’s internal turmoil might overshadow normalization efforts. The situation in Syria is fluid, with potential flashpoints, such as U.S. pressure on Assad to grant autonomy to certain regions, including Suwayda and Daraa, exacerbating instability. Turkey may need to secure its interests through collaboration with Assad, navigating the delicate balance between U.S. opposition and its own security concerns.
The Sochi Summit promises to address critical international issues, from grain agreements to peace talks and regional normalization. The summit’s outcomes will depend on diplomatic finesse, geopolitical dynamics, and the evolving global landscape.
