How did imperialism dismember Yugoslavia?

US imperialism, having enlisted Israel—one of its two strategic allies, the other being the United Kingdom—is endeavoring to reshape the Middle East. The priorities of the US and Israel include the liquidation of nation-states in the region; regime change and even border alterations in Iran, whose turn has come following Iraq and Syria; and the establishment of full US control over energy resources and transit routes. Among these priorities are also the containment of Chinese and Russian influence in the region, the establishment of a Kurdish state as a garrison or puppet state, and the alleviation of Saudi Arabia’s security concerns.

As the US and its European partners advance toward their imperialist objectives, they are exploiting identity politics to the fullest extent. To divide Middle Eastern countries from within and pit them against one another, they incite and exacerbate medieval remnants and feudal residues of belonging, affiliation, and sensibilities. The objective is to first persuade these countries toward federalism via feudalism, and subsequently to divide and dismember them.

In this context, the events that unfolded in Yugoslavia during the final decade of the last century offer critical lessons regarding the consequences of ethnic, religious, and sectarian slaughter. Let us recall Yugoslavia: a nation that interpreted socialism in its own unique way, observed regional and global balances, was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, took significant strides in economy and industry, drew attention with its achievements in sports and arts, and held a prestigious position in the Non-Aligned Movement. It was torn apart in a bloody fashion. Today, seven states stand in Yugoslavia’s place: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Kosovo.

Yugoslavia, which literally means the Land of the South Slavs, was founded after World War II under the leadership of Tito—who was known as Marshal due to his military successes during the war, despite not being a soldier by profession. Tito was a patriot who defended his homeland against Nazi occupiers, a successful commander, a formidable organizer, a staunch socialist, and a successful, charismatic statesman. Born to a Croatian father and a Slovenian mother, Tito believed in independence, self-management, federalism, and a socialist market economy. He did not hesitate to fall out with USSR leader Stalin. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six federated states and two autonomous regions: Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Croatia were the federated states; Vojvodina and Kosovo were the autonomous regions. Tito’s leadership and charisma bore immense significance for his country. With the death of Josip Broz Tito on May 4, 1980, Yugoslavia entered a period of crisis. With imperialism descending upon it, the process of disintegration began.

Why was Yugoslavia chosen as a target?

Yugoslavia occupied an important and unique position in the Balkans, not only geographically but also politically and diplomatically. It possessed an effective administration. It was socialist, yet not under the tutelage of the USSR. It maintained an independent line. It stood out with its industrial infrastructure and skilled workforce.

Alongside these strengths, it also faced significant problems. Ethnic, religious, and cultural differences were rife. Corruption in the bureaucracy was widespread. Rising nationalist currents were becoming conspicuous. There were deep disparities in economic development among the federated republics constituting Yugoslavia. Serbia, holding the population majority and military power, and the economically advanced Slovenia and Croatia held diverging views regarding the country’s future. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 and the USSR in 1991 left Yugoslavia isolated against the West.

The termination of the socialist regime in Yugoslavia, along with economic and political steps taken to prolong the federation’s life—such as the adoption of a market economy and the transition to a multi-party system—did not yield the hoped-for results. On the contrary, they accelerated the country’s dissolution. Both socialism and the federal state collapsed simultaneously. In this respect, its fate resembled that of the USSR. Different political currents in different federated republics failed to cooperate to keep the country standing. Ethnic and religious sensitivities strengthened under the guise of democracy and freedom imposed by the West. In every federated republic, separatist movements, organizations, and actors came to the fore with support arriving from the US and Europe.

Yugoslavia’s unique model of socialism, based on a Yugoslav supra-identity, had been successful while Tito was alive. However, after Tito, it became evident that national issues and identity problems had not been resolved, and the conflicts between them had never truly been eliminated. Another misfortune for the country was that the New World Order, globalization, and imperialism prioritized identity politics and placed Yugoslavia in their crosshairs.

What was Tito’s great anxiety?

According to Yugoslavia’s founding leader Tito, Yugoslavia—harboring numerous ethnic communities within its structure—represented an integrated political identity independent of ethnic differences and transcending them. However, Tito was also aware of the games imperialism was playing on his country; in 1971, he stated: “…They are calculating that if Tito goes, everything will collapse. Some are seriously waiting for this. The internal enemy receives countless support from the outside. Great powers will utilize any devil that serves their purpose.”

In the first 35 years of the Cold War, Yugoslavia stood out as the country with the most liberal economy, the most libertarian political structure, and the highest level of ethnic and religious tolerance in the socialist world. Tito’s three administrative principles were decisive in its prominence with these qualities: 1) Ensuring local freedoms through the concept of self-management. 2) Establishing ethnic harmony within a single-party administration through the concept of brotherhood and unity. 3) Serving world peace through the concept of non-alignment in foreign policy. With Tito’s death in 1980, the country lost its most important unifying glue, and these three principles began to rot. The global economic depression effective in the early 1980s also put the country in a difficult position. The disparities in economic development between the federated republics became blatantly apparent. (1)

It was better understood after his death that Tito was, for Yugoslavia, far more than a founding leader or national hero; he was the actor who enabled living together. It became apparent that there had been a failure to institutionalize the commonalities and similarities among the different peoples, cultures, and religions constituting the federal republic to the hoped-for extent, and that the carefully desired Yugoslav supra-identity could not be formed as wished. The principle of “brotherhood and unity,” which Tito never ceased to mention, was forgotten after his death. Indeed, ten years after his death, civil war began.

In the census conducted in 1981, it was striking that in a country of 22.4 million, only 5 percent of the population defined themselves as “Yugoslav.” This 5 percent segment consisted predominantly of civil and military bureaucrats, party administrators, and intellectuals. For 95 percent of the citizens, ethnic identity, historical memory, and national sentiments were paramount. The deterioration of the economy in the 1980s also fueled reaction against the government and reinforced nationalist sentiments. The multicultural, multi-identity, multi-religious, multi-national, and multi-people structure, combined with the economic development disparities between federal republics, presented an environment for the US and the European Union to use, exploit, and provoke.

Different approaches regarding the fragmentation

Various interpretations have been made regarding the fragmentation of Yugoslavia following years of bloody civil wars.

Some experts state that the support provided by the US and the European Union to fascist actors in Yugoslavia divided the country. They argue that Western imperialism could never stomach a strong and united Yugoslavia in the Balkans.

According to some experts, the fundamental reason for the division is economic. Wealthy and industrially strong Slovenia, and Croatia—which possessed significant tourism revenues and was in a better economic situation—viewed the other parts of the country as a burden. They drew closer to the European Union, particularly Germany, and demanded independence.

Some experts argue that the dissolution of the USSR plunged Yugoslavia, which had very strong trade ties with that country, into an economic bottleneck and brought about the division.

According to some experts, the element uniting the peoples in Yugoslavia was the communist ideology. With the collapse of communism, this bond disappeared, and the country was divided as a result of rising extreme nationalism.

According to other experts, the greatest party responsible for the fragmentation of Yugoslavia is Serbian nationalism. Serbian nationalism dreamed of a Greater Serbia. It ignored the multi-national, multi-religious, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural structure of the country. It viewed the Serbs as the sovereign and primary element of the country, utilized Serb minorities in the federated republics, supported Serb separatists in those regions, and believed it could prevent the country’s division by resorting to violence. Through these attitudes, it caused nationalist currents in other republics to strengthen and ultimately led to the country’s dissolution.

A study conducted in 1980 revealed the economic disparity between the federated republics. According to the study, accepting the Yugoslav average as 100, the minimum subsistence index was 122 in Slovenia and 130 in Croatia. In contrast, it was 87 in Serbia, 76 in Montenegro, 66 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 64 in Macedonia (2). Regarding economic approaches to Yugoslavia’s fragmentation, the per capita GNP (in US dollars) in the federated republics and autonomous regions using 1990–1991 data also provides an idea: Slovenia (5,500), Croatia (3,400), Serbia (2,200), Montenegro (1,700), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1,600), Macedonia (1,400), Vojvodina (3,250), and Kosovo (730) (3).

After Tito, Serbia, which was politically strong and constituted the most populous demographic, attempted to transform the federal state into a unitary state. Economically strong Slovenia and Croatia, on the other hand, endeavored to transform it into a loose confederation. The wealthy republics did not want to “carry” the poor republics and viewed them as a burden. The first signs of breaking away from Yugoslavia with demands for independence came from the two wealthy republics, Slovenia and Croatia. Relying on the fact that Serbs lived in different federated states, Serbia was eager to interfere in the internal affairs of these federated states. This, in turn, increased the backlash.

Yugoslavia’s population structure in terms of religion and sect was as follows: Orthodox Christians constituted one-third of the population, ranking first in this regard. Catholics made up one-fourth of the population. Fifteen percent of the population was Muslim. Although sources vary slightly, the ethnic and religious distribution in Yugoslavia’s federated states and autonomous regions in 1981 was as follows:

• Bosnia-Herzegovina: Muslims 39.1%, Serbs 32%, Croats 18.4%.
• Croatia: Croats 75.1%, Serbs 11.5%.
• Macedonia: Macedonians 67%, Albanians 19.6%.
• Montenegro: Montenegrins 68.5%, Muslims 13.4%.
• Serbia: Serbs 66.4%, Albanians 19.6%.
• Slovenia: Slovenes 90.5%.

In Kosovo, Albanians constituted 77.5% of the population. In Vojvodina, 55.8% of the population was Serb, and 21.7% was Hungarian. The most populous minorities consisted of Albanians, Hungarians, Roma, Bulgarians, Romanians, Slovaks, and Turks. (4)

In Yugoslavia, where the population reached 23.5 million in 1990, Serbs constituted the largest demographic with a population of 10 million. Of these 10 million, 6 million lived in Serbia, 1.5 million in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 600,000 in Croatia.

The football match in Zagreb and the fractured region

While Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia’s two wealthy federated republics, complained about the central economic structure and viewed the other republics as a burden, they also claimed that the system constantly favored Serbia. According to them, they were the ones working and producing, but the Serbs, who held the majority in the bureaucracy, trade, and banking, were skimming the cream off the country.

Slovenia was very eager for independence. This was because it was both the wealthiest federated republic and possessed a relatively homogeneous population. It had already turned its face toward the free market economy and integration with Europe. It trusted its developed economy. It received support from Germany, with which it had historical ties and which backed it. It pursued a nationalist policy that excluded and belittled the federated republics in poorer and weaker positions. Croatia, too, trusted its economic power. It was a federated republic where nationalism was influential.

Macedonia, Yugoslavia’s poorest federated republic, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, its most ethnically mixed, wanted the federation to continue its existence in the form of a loose confederation. Both feared a federation that did not include Slovenia and Croatia. In October 1990, Croatia and Slovenia proposed transforming the federation into a loose confederation. Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina supported the thesis of a federation of sovereign states. Serbia and Montenegro, however, demanded a centralized federal system. (5)

The reason Bosnia-Herzegovina—which desired a loose federation—was the country that least wanted the dissolution of the federation was primarily due to the complexity of its ethnic, religious, and cultural structure; other reasons included the fragility of its economy and its military weakness.

The political and social tension, which was running quite high, became fully exposed with a football match played in the Croatian capital, Zagreb. The events that transpired before the Dinamo Zagreb – Red Star match at Maksimir Stadium on May 13, 1990—Croatian footballer Zvonimir Boban kicking a police officer, injured police, fighting fans—demonstrated that living together was no longer possible. The process of division was ignited by a football match played between Croatian and Serbian teams.

Shortly after this event, on July 2, 1990, the Slovenian national assembly, followed by the Croatian national assembly, made decisions for independence. On June 25, 1991, the two republics, unable to agree with the Serbs in the federation administration, officially declared their independence. On June 27, the federal army, under Serbian control, intervened in Slovenia and Croatia. Slovenia was ready for war, having quietly invested in its defense and taken the necessary steps for two years. It was the federal army that was not sufficiently prepared. Slovenia won the war. On the 10th day of the war, the federal army was forced to request a ceasefire. In Croatia, the federal army seized one-fourth of the country, and the war ended in January 1992.

Ultimately, Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1992. Conflicts, and particularly genocides and massacres against Muslim Bosniaks, occurred on the country’s fragmented lands. Even though they separated, deep divergences of opinion and crises of confidence came to the fore among the states that would continue to live as neighbors in the same region. The winner was US and European imperialism.

References

1. Oral Sander, Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994 [Political History 1918-1994], İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1994, pp. 493-494.
2. Tanıl Bora, Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Av Sahası [Hunting Ground of the New World Order], Birikim Yayınları, Istanbul, 1994, p. 55.
3. Murat Taşar, Burhan Metin, Altay Ünaltay, Bosna- Hersek ve Postmodern Ortaçağa Giriş [Bosnia-Herzegovina and Introduction to the Postmodern Middle Ages], Birleşik Yayıncılık, Istanbul, 1996, p. 109.
4. Mehmet Atay, “Balkan Jeopolitiğini Etkileyen ve Değiştiren Politik- Askeri Gelişmelere Kısa Bakış” [A Brief Look at Political-Military Developments Affecting and Changing Balkan Geopolitics], Avrasya Dosyası, Spring-Summer 1998, Vol: 4, pp. 112 – 113.
5. Emin Gürses, Milliyetçi Hareketler ve Uluslararası Sistem [Nationalist Movements and the International System], Bağlam Yayınları, Istanbul, 1998, p. 185.