Opinion
How did imperialism dismember Yugoslavia?
US imperialism, having enlisted Israel—one of its two strategic allies, the other being the United Kingdom—is endeavoring to reshape the Middle East. The priorities of the US and Israel include the liquidation of nation-states in the region; regime change and even border alterations in Iran, whose turn has come following Iraq and Syria; and the establishment of full US control over energy resources and transit routes. Among these priorities are also the containment of Chinese and Russian influence in the region, the establishment of a Kurdish state as a garrison or puppet state, and the alleviation of Saudi Arabia’s security concerns.
As the US and its European partners advance toward their imperialist objectives, they are exploiting identity politics to the fullest extent. To divide Middle Eastern countries from within and pit them against one another, they incite and exacerbate medieval remnants and feudal residues of belonging, affiliation, and sensibilities. The objective is to first persuade these countries toward federalism via feudalism, and subsequently to divide and dismember them.
In this context, the events that unfolded in Yugoslavia during the final decade of the last century offer critical lessons regarding the consequences of ethnic, religious, and sectarian slaughter. Let us recall Yugoslavia: a nation that interpreted socialism in its own unique way, observed regional and global balances, was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, took significant strides in economy and industry, drew attention with its achievements in sports and arts, and held a prestigious position in the Non-Aligned Movement. It was torn apart in a bloody fashion. Today, seven states stand in Yugoslavia’s place: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Kosovo.
Yugoslavia, which literally means the Land of the South Slavs, was founded after World War II under the leadership of Tito—who was known as Marshal due to his military successes during the war, despite not being a soldier by profession. Tito was a patriot who defended his homeland against Nazi occupiers, a successful commander, a formidable organizer, a staunch socialist, and a successful, charismatic statesman. Born to a Croatian father and a Slovenian mother, Tito believed in independence, self-management, federalism, and a socialist market economy. He did not hesitate to fall out with USSR leader Stalin. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six federated states and two autonomous regions: Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Croatia were the federated states; Vojvodina and Kosovo were the autonomous regions. Tito’s leadership and charisma bore immense significance for his country. With the death of Josip Broz Tito on May 4, 1980, Yugoslavia entered a period of crisis. With imperialism descending upon it, the process of disintegration began.
Why was Yugoslavia chosen as a target?
Yugoslavia occupied an important and unique position in the Balkans, not only geographically but also politically and diplomatically. It possessed an effective administration. It was socialist, yet not under the tutelage of the USSR. It maintained an independent line. It stood out with its industrial infrastructure and skilled workforce.
Alongside these strengths, it also faced significant problems. Ethnic, religious, and cultural differences were rife. Corruption in the bureaucracy was widespread. Rising nationalist currents were becoming conspicuous. There were deep disparities in economic development among the federated republics constituting Yugoslavia. Serbia, holding the population majority and military power, and the economically advanced Slovenia and Croatia held diverging views regarding the country’s future. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 and the USSR in 1991 left Yugoslavia isolated against the West.
The termination of the socialist regime in Yugoslavia, along with economic and political steps taken to prolong the federation’s life—such as the adoption of a market economy and the transition to a multi-party system—did not yield the hoped-for results. On the contrary, they accelerated the country’s dissolution. Both socialism and the federal state collapsed simultaneously. In this respect, its fate resembled that of the USSR. Different political currents in different federated republics failed to cooperate to keep the country standing. Ethnic and religious sensitivities strengthened under the guise of democracy and freedom imposed by the West. In every federated republic, separatist movements, organizations, and actors came to the fore with support arriving from the US and Europe.
Yugoslavia’s unique model of socialism, based on a Yugoslav supra-identity, had been successful while Tito was alive. However, after Tito, it became evident that national issues and identity problems had not been resolved, and the conflicts between them had never truly been eliminated. Another misfortune for the country was that the New World Order, globalization, and imperialism prioritized identity politics and placed Yugoslavia in their crosshairs.
What was Tito’s great anxiety?
According to Yugoslavia’s founding leader Tito, Yugoslavia—harboring numerous ethnic communities within its structure—represented an integrated political identity independent of ethnic differences and transcending them. However, Tito was also aware of the games imperialism was playing on his country; in 1971, he stated: “…They are calculating that if Tito goes, everything will collapse. Some are seriously waiting for this. The internal enemy receives countless support from the outside. Great powers will utilize any devil that serves their purpose.”
In the first 35 years of the Cold War, Yugoslavia stood out as the country with the most liberal economy, the most libertarian political structure, and the highest level of ethnic and religious tolerance in the socialist world. Tito’s three administrative principles were decisive in its prominence with these qualities: 1) Ensuring local freedoms through the concept of self-management. 2) Establishing ethnic harmony within a single-party administration through the concept of brotherhood and unity. 3) Serving world peace through the concept of non-alignment in foreign policy. With Tito’s death in 1980, the country lost its most important unifying glue, and these three principles began to rot. The global economic depression effective in the early 1980s also put the country in a difficult position. The disparities in economic development between the federated republics became blatantly apparent. (1)
It was better understood after his death that Tito was, for Yugoslavia, far more than a founding leader or national hero; he was the actor who enabled living together. It became apparent that there had been a failure to institutionalize the commonalities and similarities among the different peoples, cultures, and religions constituting the federal republic to the hoped-for extent, and that the carefully desired Yugoslav supra-identity could not be formed as wished. The principle of “brotherhood and unity,” which Tito never ceased to mention, was forgotten after his death. Indeed, ten years after his death, civil war began.
In the census conducted in 1981, it was striking that in a country of 22.4 million, only 5 percent of the population defined themselves as “Yugoslav.” This 5 percent segment consisted predominantly of civil and military bureaucrats, party administrators, and intellectuals. For 95 percent of the citizens, ethnic identity, historical memory, and national sentiments were paramount. The deterioration of the economy in the 1980s also fueled reaction against the government and reinforced nationalist sentiments. The multicultural, multi-identity, multi-religious, multi-national, and multi-people structure, combined with the economic development disparities between federal republics, presented an environment for the US and the European Union to use, exploit, and provoke.
Different approaches regarding the fragmentation
Various interpretations have been made regarding the fragmentation of Yugoslavia following years of bloody civil wars.
Some experts state that the support provided by the US and the European Union to fascist actors in Yugoslavia divided the country. They argue that Western imperialism could never stomach a strong and united Yugoslavia in the Balkans.
According to some experts, the fundamental reason for the division is economic. Wealthy and industrially strong Slovenia, and Croatia—which possessed significant tourism revenues and was in a better economic situation—viewed the other parts of the country as a burden. They drew closer to the European Union, particularly Germany, and demanded independence.
Some experts argue that the dissolution of the USSR plunged Yugoslavia, which had very strong trade ties with that country, into an economic bottleneck and brought about the division.
According to some experts, the element uniting the peoples in Yugoslavia was the communist ideology. With the collapse of communism, this bond disappeared, and the country was divided as a result of rising extreme nationalism.
According to other experts, the greatest party responsible for the fragmentation of Yugoslavia is Serbian nationalism. Serbian nationalism dreamed of a Greater Serbia. It ignored the multi-national, multi-religious, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural structure of the country. It viewed the Serbs as the sovereign and primary element of the country, utilized Serb minorities in the federated republics, supported Serb separatists in those regions, and believed it could prevent the country’s division by resorting to violence. Through these attitudes, it caused nationalist currents in other republics to strengthen and ultimately led to the country’s dissolution.
A study conducted in 1980 revealed the economic disparity between the federated republics. According to the study, accepting the Yugoslav average as 100, the minimum subsistence index was 122 in Slovenia and 130 in Croatia. In contrast, it was 87 in Serbia, 76 in Montenegro, 66 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 64 in Macedonia (2). Regarding economic approaches to Yugoslavia’s fragmentation, the per capita GNP (in US dollars) in the federated republics and autonomous regions using 1990–1991 data also provides an idea: Slovenia (5,500), Croatia (3,400), Serbia (2,200), Montenegro (1,700), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1,600), Macedonia (1,400), Vojvodina (3,250), and Kosovo (730) (3).
After Tito, Serbia, which was politically strong and constituted the most populous demographic, attempted to transform the federal state into a unitary state. Economically strong Slovenia and Croatia, on the other hand, endeavored to transform it into a loose confederation. The wealthy republics did not want to “carry” the poor republics and viewed them as a burden. The first signs of breaking away from Yugoslavia with demands for independence came from the two wealthy republics, Slovenia and Croatia. Relying on the fact that Serbs lived in different federated states, Serbia was eager to interfere in the internal affairs of these federated states. This, in turn, increased the backlash.
Yugoslavia’s population structure in terms of religion and sect was as follows: Orthodox Christians constituted one-third of the population, ranking first in this regard. Catholics made up one-fourth of the population. Fifteen percent of the population was Muslim. Although sources vary slightly, the ethnic and religious distribution in Yugoslavia’s federated states and autonomous regions in 1981 was as follows:
- Bosnia-Herzegovina: Muslims 39.1%, Serbs 32%, Croats 18.4%.
- Croatia: Croats 75.1%, Serbs 11.5%.
- Macedonia: Macedonians 67%, Albanians 19.6%.
- Montenegro: Montenegrins 68.5%, Muslims 13.4%.
- Serbia: Serbs 66.4%, Albanians 19.6%.
- Slovenia: Slovenes 90.5%.
In Kosovo, Albanians constituted 77.5% of the population. In Vojvodina, 55.8% of the population was Serb, and 21.7% was Hungarian. The most populous minorities consisted of Albanians, Hungarians, Roma, Bulgarians, Romanians, Slovaks, and Turks. (4)
In Yugoslavia, where the population reached 23.5 million in 1990, Serbs constituted the largest demographic with a population of 10 million. Of these 10 million, 6 million lived in Serbia, 1.5 million in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 600,000 in Croatia.
The football match in Zagreb and the fractured region
While Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia’s two wealthy federated republics, complained about the central economic structure and viewed the other republics as a burden, they also claimed that the system constantly favored Serbia. According to them, they were the ones working and producing, but the Serbs, who held the majority in the bureaucracy, trade, and banking, were skimming the cream off the country.
Slovenia was very eager for independence. This was because it was both the wealthiest federated republic and possessed a relatively homogeneous population. It had already turned its face toward the free market economy and integration with Europe. It trusted its developed economy. It received support from Germany, with which it had historical ties and which backed it. It pursued a nationalist policy that excluded and belittled the federated republics in poorer and weaker positions. Croatia, too, trusted its economic power. It was a federated republic where nationalism was influential.
Macedonia, Yugoslavia’s poorest federated republic, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, its most ethnically mixed, wanted the federation to continue its existence in the form of a loose confederation. Both feared a federation that did not include Slovenia and Croatia. In October 1990, Croatia and Slovenia proposed transforming the federation into a loose confederation. Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina supported the thesis of a federation of sovereign states. Serbia and Montenegro, however, demanded a centralized federal system. (5)
The reason Bosnia-Herzegovina—which desired a loose federation—was the country that least wanted the dissolution of the federation was primarily due to the complexity of its ethnic, religious, and cultural structure; other reasons included the fragility of its economy and its military weakness.
The political and social tension, which was running quite high, became fully exposed with a football match played in the Croatian capital, Zagreb. The events that transpired before the Dinamo Zagreb – Red Star match at Maksimir Stadium on May 13, 1990—Croatian footballer Zvonimir Boban kicking a police officer, injured police, fighting fans—demonstrated that living together was no longer possible. The process of division was ignited by a football match played between Croatian and Serbian teams.
Shortly after this event, on July 2, 1990, the Slovenian national assembly, followed by the Croatian national assembly, made decisions for independence. On June 25, 1991, the two republics, unable to agree with the Serbs in the federation administration, officially declared their independence. On June 27, the federal army, under Serbian control, intervened in Slovenia and Croatia. Slovenia was ready for war, having quietly invested in its defense and taken the necessary steps for two years. It was the federal army that was not sufficiently prepared. Slovenia won the war. On the 10th day of the war, the federal army was forced to request a ceasefire. In Croatia, the federal army seized one-fourth of the country, and the war ended in January 1992.
Ultimately, Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1992. Conflicts, and particularly genocides and massacres against Muslim Bosniaks, occurred on the country’s fragmented lands. Even though they separated, deep divergences of opinion and crises of confidence came to the fore among the states that would continue to live as neighbors in the same region. The winner was US and European imperialism.
References
- Oral Sander, Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994 [Political History 1918-1994], İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1994, pp. 493-494.
- Tanıl Bora, Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Av Sahası [Hunting Ground of the New World Order], Birikim Yayınları, Istanbul, 1994, p. 55.
- Murat Taşar, Burhan Metin, Altay Ünaltay, Bosna- Hersek ve Postmodern Ortaçağa Giriş [Bosnia-Herzegovina and Introduction to the Postmodern Middle Ages], Birleşik Yayıncılık, Istanbul, 1996, p. 109.
- Mehmet Atay, “Balkan Jeopolitiğini Etkileyen ve Değiştiren Politik- Askeri Gelişmelere Kısa Bakış” [A Brief Look at Political-Military Developments Affecting and Changing Balkan Geopolitics], Avrasya Dosyası, Spring-Summer 1998, Vol: 4, pp. 112 – 113.
- Emin Gürses, Milliyetçi Hareketler ve Uluslararası Sistem [Nationalist Movements and the International System], Bağlam Yayınları, Istanbul, 1998, p. 185.
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
Opinion
The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues
BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.
Allan Wilson, Journalist
Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.
“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”
Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.
For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.
The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.
“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.
A statue, a warning
The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.
The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.
For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”
Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.
The shrinking window
Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.
This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.
Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.
A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.
The international dimension
The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”
Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.
For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.
“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.
This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.
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