Hanno Pevkur, Minister of Defense of Estonia spoke to Harici: “It’s still too early to talk about final peace, we all understand that before the peace, there has to be a ceasefire. We want to be part of these negotiations if that comes onto the table.”
Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur answered Dr. Esra Karahindiba’s questions about the latest developments in the Russia-Ukraine war and the ceasefire and peace negotiations.
Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna, in a statement, said that European leaders should be ready to send military forces to Ukraine in support of any peace deal Donald Trump devises between Kyiv and Moscow. Have Estonia and its allies taken any concrete steps in this direction?
Well, of course, we all understand that it’s still too early to talk about final peace, and we see that the battlefield is not in this moment yet. Of course, we’ve always said that we have to help Ukraine as much as we can and as long as we need. Regarding the peace, of course, we all understand that before the peace, there has to be a ceasefire. When the ceasefire is there, it has to be guaranteed. And we also understand that it has to be guaranteed together with the international allies. So, this is why we have not excluded anything at the moment. We want to be part of these negotiations if that comes onto the table. It’s not on the table yet, but, of course, we always said also that there cannot be any peace negotiation or any peace without Ukraine. And if Ukraine is ready for this, then, of course, we are ready to support them.
Would you be ready to send any troops to Ukraine for help?
When we talk about guaranteeing the peace, we have not excluded that. But also, we have said very clearly that before these peace negotiations start, Ukraine has to have a stronger position. And when Ukraine wants to have a stronger position, then all the Western allies have to send as much help as we can. And we have to deliver all the possible equipment that is in our position in order to help Ukraine and also to train the Ukrainian soldiers. So, as I said, it’s still a bit too early, but we all understand and see that there are rumors going on about different options. But our position is very clear: that no peace can happen without Ukraine. And if there will be some kind of guarantee or peace and guarantee mission, then, of course, all the Western allies together have to be part of that.
As part of Estonia’s recent education reforms, all first graders will be taught in Estonian. Russian language is totally banned from Estonia, and the authorities will begin inspecting schools to ensure compliance with the new law on the transition to Estonian language education. What is your reaction to the reactions from Moscow regarding the situation of the Russian minority in the country? Because it is their mother tongue, and if you think about some constitution of human rights and education rights, it is kind of some contradictory position. I know it is not your field, but I think you can comment because this decision is coming out of the clash with Moscow.
We have also Ukrainian minority, we have Finnish minority, we have Latvian minority, we have many other minorities—tens and tens of nations who are living in Estonia. So the state educational system is in the Estonian language, and this is the point. Of course, we have also international schools—for instance, European school—which is giving the studies in English. But when we talk about the national school system, then this is in Estonian and will be also what we would like to see in the future is that it continues. Regarding any reactions from someone, Estonia is an independent country. We are making our decisions on our own, and this is the answer. There is no other understanding.
With the election of Mr. Trump, statements and road maps for a negotiated settlement in Ukraine have begun to be exchanged. From Tallinn’s point of view, what kind of solution do you envisage for the establishment of peace in Ukraine?
As I said in the beginning, there cannot be any peace without Ukraine. Secondly, what is very, very important is that Russia has to take responsibility for all these war crimes: deporting the children, killing civilians, raping women, etc. This is what we see in Ukraine. This is what has been also proven by facts and collected evidence. And Russia has to take responsibility. So that means that the peace, when it’s done or when it’s concluded, has to be a fair peace. Also, Russia has to pay for all these war crimes—not only about the crimes, but also the destruction they have done in Ukraine. That means, you know, I believe it will be quite a long peace negotiation if it will be conducted one moment. But again, our position is very, very clear. So when I put it into three, like bullets: Firstly, no peace without Ukraine. Secondly, Russia has to take the responsibility. Thirdly, this peace has to be a fair peace with all these different elements.
What could the “fair peace” be?
As I said, first, Russian responsibility. Russians have to pay for the destruction. But also, of course, the Western countries will never accept the occupied territories because this is about the Ukrainian territorial integrity. This is about their right to be and to use their own land. Russia cannot choose one moment from history and say that this is the true history. Because in history, also, Turks have been much more into Russian territory. We’ve seen the Lithuanian-Polish Kingdom being much further, etc. So, it’s not the point that you can choose one specific moment from history and say that this is the only right moment. In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, all the territory of Ukraine was put on paper as it is today. We can never accept that someone is coming to take a piece of your land by force.
In the Baltic Sea, Estonia was the first country to start searching and observing the Shadow Fleet of Russians, which are trying to carry Russian oil to Europe using so many different straits and seas in Europe. Estonia was raising this question and trying to catch international attention and support from Europe, and finally, Russia got the 15th level of sanctions. In Tallinn, there was a summit participated in by Nordic-Baltic 8 countries, and the decision came out that other European countries will support this initiative, too, to search for Russian Shadow Fleets. Now, you have more substantial decisiveness on this topic. Would you like to give any comments after what happened in the summit?
Again, when we talk about the Shadow Fleet, this is one more proof of Russia not respecting international law. We all know that the Baltic Sea is important for Russia transporting the oil out of Russia. But nevertheless, we see that they are doing that not according to international maritime law but they are using exactly the Shadow Fleet, etc. So, it is important that the international community will react to that and then say very clearly that if there is something which is against international law, then we have to react.
How do you find and how do you understand that it is Russian oil?
When it comes from Russia and Russian ports, which oil is it?
There has been damage to telecommunications cables under the Baltic Sea. The failure of the C-Lion1 cable on the Finland-Germany line has fuelled suspicions of sabotage. Who do you think is responsible for this incident? Do you think it is an accident or sabotage?
First, we have to wait for the official investigation outcome. Of course, we have some doubts. Of course, there are some rumors circulating around the news. But when we really want to point the finger to someone who is guilty, we need to have proofs, we need to have evidence. And this is exactly for the investigation to find out. So, let’s wait for the investigation results. At the moment, the understanding is that behind the destruction of the cable in the Finnish Gulf a year back, and now between Finland and Germany and between Sweden and Lithuania, these both vessels—or both ships—were belonging to Chinese companies. So now it’s up to the investigation to find out all the details behind these.
Don’t you have an assumption or suspicion?
We might have many assumptions, but as a minister, I cannot go into the rumors or speculations. So I might have a personal opinion, but at this very moment, it’s not relevant.
In September, Major General Andrus Merilo, Chief of the Estonian General Staff, told the Helsingin Sanomat newspaper that the Finnish and Estonian commands intended to develop a plan to prevent the Russian Navy from operating in the Baltic Sea in the event of an ‘extraordinary situation’. How realistic is the prospect of war in the region?
Well, we see that Russia is hostile toward its neighbors. We saw that in 2008 in Georgia. We saw that in 2014 in Crimea. My understanding is that this was a preparation for a larger war—what we see at the moment, already close to three years, in Ukraine. And of course, we understand, and when we look at Putin’s speech in Munich about 15 years ago, a bit more, then from there you can see the intentions. There should be, from the Russian perspective, a gray zone between NATO and Russia, that there should be no enlargement of NATO, etc. So, when you read this speech, then you understand what the ambitious goals of Putin are.
On the other hand, when we also take the officially approved plan from the Ministry of Defense of Russia, the reality is that close to the Estonian and Finnish border, Russia wants to put a new Army Corps—approximately 50,000 to 60,000 troops, a lot of new tanks, a lot of new equipment. So, when this is not an escalation toward NATO and Western countries, what is it? And this is why, of course, we have to prepare. We have to send a very clear message to Russia: don’t even think about attacking NATO, because NATO will act as one, and NATO is stronger—definitely together as Russia.
Tell me—why does Russia have to use the buffer zone outside of Russia? Russia can also build the buffer zone inside of Russia. Why do they think that the buffer zone can be taken by force, by military force, from the other country, from the other nation?
Maybe they think that Russia doesn’t have to pay for it. The country that has to be in a nonaligned position is preferring a military international organization, to be a member of that organization. Then that country needs to pay—maybe this is the Russian perspective, I don’t know.
Look, NATO is a defensive organization, not an offensive organization. NATO has no intention to attack Russia. NATO is defending its members, and it should be each country’s sovereign right to decide on which side of the civilization they want to be. Do they want to be on the side of Western civilization or Russian civilization, where you don’t have any human rights, any freedom of the press, where people are put in jail just for coming onto the streets? So, this is the choice, and every nation should have the free choice. And again, if Russia wants to build the buffer zone between the NATO countries and Russia, it can definitely do that inside of Russian territory—no problem.
Coming to this PYD issue—Türkiye is a very strong member of NATO, has a very powerful army, and was the only country that fought ISIS on the ground face to face. All other countries were providing aerial support but Turkish soldiers were fighting against ISIS on the ground. Now still, Pentagon and the U.S. still advocating that the YPG is a very good option to fight with ISIS. And our correspondents asked about this: Türkiye is giving you guarantees to fight ISIS with its full presence. Don’t you trust Türkiye? Why do you have to keep an organization that Türkiye sees as a terror group? Why do you still keep supporting them? They said, ‘We are not changing our strategy to fight against ISIS.’ What do you think about NATO? Jens Stoltenberg, the previous Secretary General, was always very supportive of Türkiye. But the members of NATO—including Germany, France, and the U.S.—these countries who say ‘Türkiye is a very good ally,’ leave Türkiye alone in this YPG terror issue.
No, again, we have to separate each member state or each country’s actions outside of their own territory and what NATO is doing as an alliance. NATO as an alliance is strictly focused on defending its member states and its territories. So, this is the focus of NATO. When we talk about also—and when we take the new approved regional plans for NATO—then these plans are defense plans, not offense or attack plans. This is why I believe that we have to keep it separate: what NATO is and NATO tasks, compared to the member states’ individual foreign and defense policy. Because when we take also the United States and Estonian troops in Iraq at the moment, then we are there together with our allies on Operation Inherent Resolve. So, Operation Inherent Resolve is led by the United States. This is why we have to keep it separate—it’s not a NATO mission. Yes, we also have a NATO mission in Iraq where Estonia is also contributing, but we have to keep these issues separate. This is why I don’t want to go into bilateral relations between Türkiye and the United States, but I’m happy to elaborate and happy to discuss what NATO is for and what NATO stands for.
But what is NATO? NATO is composed of states.
Yeah, but you know this is exactly what we have to understand that there are differences. When we talk about also, for instance, Poland—Poland was attacked by migrants coming from Belarus. So, this is not the question of a defense alliance or the question of NATO. This is the question of police forces, border guards, etc. Also, terrorism is not considered as a military problem at the moment. Terrorism is dealt with as an internal affairs matter, also in the United States, for instance. So, this is why, of course, we have to understand and separate very clearly the different tasks of different organizations.
Türkiye is also a member of many organizations. Estonia is part of many organizations. And, for instance, we can also say that, let’s say, the European Union. The European Union has 27 member states. Why is it not defending against military threats? Because it has been very clearly stated that NATO is taking care of the military’s defense posture and the defense, and the European Union is mainly for freedom of trade, freedom of people, etc. This is why we have to make the difference, and I believe also every person—doesn’t matter if this person is in Türkiye or in Estonia—we have to make a difference why different organizations are formed.
You’re traveling to Northern Iraq. Can you tell us the reason for your travel? What is your defense and military cooperation with the Central Iraq or Northern Iraq government? What’s happening there? Why do you have your troops there?
Yes, as I said, we are participating in the mission called Operation Inherent Resolve. We know that this operation will be reformed. Of course, we have to wait because the lead country is the United States. We’ll see when the President Trump administration starts its term, then probably there will be a change in the mission. But at the moment, yes, Estonia has around 100 troops in Iraq on this mission, and we are helping to secure the peace in this region. So, this is what the allies are doing. We are not there because we just went there. We are there because the Iraqi government asked us—or actually asked the United States—to provide that kind of service, that kind of security guarantee. And this is why the United States formed Operation Inherent Resolve.
After the anti-EU post-election and pre-election legislative initiatives in Georgia, there was a strong reaction from the Baltic states to the authorities in Tbilisi. I think you also sanctioned some of their politicians. In light of the events in Georgia, what do you think of the comments about a short-term escalation of tensions in Russia’s neighborhood, such as in the Baltic and the Caucasus?
Well, as we see also from Syria, that Russia is not able to handle many crises at one moment. So, of course, Georgia is different because they’ve been manipulating the Georgian nation and Georgian people for a long time already. We’ve seen many proofs about the violation of election freedom. Unfortunately, the regime today in Georgia is not ready to conduct or to bring new elections onto the table. And, of course, this is something that the Western countries are not approving because we get a lot of information about different violations of the elections. So, this is why, of course, first and foremost, it’s for the Georgian people to come out and say that this is not the way they want to live and this has not been the election result they voted for. And, of course, this is very clear proof of how Russia is trying to affect different neighbors by also intervening in elections. We saw that in Romania lately. We saw that in Moldova. Also, during the Estonian Parliament elections, we had one party that got some orders from Russian services. So, this is, unfortunately, what we see. And, of course, again, this is very clearly showing that Russia is not respecting the freedoms of its neighbors. And, you know, the only way to fight this is to come out openly with this and to show what Russia is actually doing—how they are influencing not only European elections but also, as we’ve seen, trying to manipulate U.S. elections.
Very shortly about the Suwalki Corridor—it was very much spoken about in recent months. When I came to Tallinn, I spoke with Mr. Marko Mihkelson. Do you still see the Suwalki Corridor as a threat, as an open risk for Russia because of this Belarusian case? Like, it is a very, very small place, but it can cut all the connection with the NATO region and the European Union region. Do you seriously have such hesitation, or is it just one more place to be protected from Russia?
Well, we all understand that Belarus is fully under Russian control, especially when we talk about military actions. So, we see that during this ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine, and as Russia also has the Kaliningrad enclave, then, of course, we all understand that the corridor called Suwalki in between Lithuania and Poland is critical for us. It is an important connection, and as it is so, of course, we need to do everything we can in order to keep it free.
But do you believe there is really a risk? Because not so many people in Russia speak about it, but officials in the Baltics speak about it.
You know, when we come to this neighborhood, and as we are here in Istanbul at the moment, when you talk about the Turkish Straits or Bosphorus Strait—so, is it a problem for Türkiye when it will be closed? I believe it is. It’s the same with the Suwalki Corridor. So just put it in local conditions, local understanding, and you will understand how important it is.
