Alexander Rahr is one of Germany’s leading foreign policy experts. He worked at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) for twenty years, where he held managerial positions and played significant roles in shaping German foreign policy. Specializing particularly in German-Russian relations, Rahr is known for his work on Eastern European policies. His analyses, which bring intellectual depth to politics, have earned him respect in both academic and decision-making circles. Rahr, a recipient of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, has also drawn the German public’s attention to the Eurasian region with his perspectives on the area. We conducted an exclusive interview with Alexander Rahr at his home in Berlin. We asked him about the new federal government in Germany and the prominent issues.

Q: What will be the biggest challenges and tests for the new government?

A: The biggest challenge, to put it simply, will be to present a different image from the traffic light coalition [traffic light coalition, referring to the previous SPD-Greens-FDP government] and not to be internally divided like them. That in itself is already a difficult task. And I am sure that the first major dispute will erupt over the issue of migration in the summer months. Especially if the CDU, along with Interior Minister Dobrindt, is serious about closing borders and deporting people. In that case, the danger of the coalition collapsing would immediately arise, because the SPD would oppose it. I believe such disagreements will also occur in defense and militarization policies. Individuals within the SPD who come from the peace movement will oppose such extensive armament. In short, it would surprise me if this government lasts 4 years.

The German economy cannot be fixed by ‘militarizing’

Q: Germany has been in a recession for some time. In this context, I’d like to ask: With the new government, is the aim to stimulate the economy by prioritizing military spending, in other words, to achieve economic dynamism through a kind of militarization? Is this possible? Because this seems like a transformation. Germany is no longer the leader in the automotive sector as it once was. Could it now be seeking to fill this gap with the defense industry?

A: Yes, this is the plan of the Merz government [referring to a hypothetical future government led by Friedrich Merz of the CDU] and the elites. This situation quite surprises me, because I don’t recognize such a Germany. But when I read Spiegel and other news sources, I come across things that confirm what you’re saying. German economic circles, especially the government and parties, believe that an arms race—which is the policy Reagan pursued 40 years ago of “exhausting the Russians through an arms race”—will lead to a major economic breakthrough. They think that large-scale European armament will bring new orders, new companies will be established, new financial resources will be created, and most importantly, Europe will thereby strengthen, intimidate others, and gain more influence in the world.

This is a rather traditional perspective. However, it is very dangerous and ignores certain realities. This viewpoint completely underestimates the Russian economy; because it is still believed that Russia can be defeated with sanctions, but this will not happen. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that the response to large-scale militarization by Germany or Europe will be for the rest of the world—China, for example—to start arming itself. China will no longer be so peaceful. Other countries seeing Europe arm itself will initially think it’s against Russia, but then they will realize it could also be against China and other countries, and they will prepare themselves accordingly. This is not a good development for the global economy. On the contrary, it could lead to the formation of new blocs in the world and the end of globalization.

When we look at Germany’s internal dynamics, I think there’s a great deal of living in a fantasy world here too. Because Germany’s biggest problems are neither in Russia nor in the Ukraine crisis; they are not externally sourced. Germany’s real problem—which experts have been pointing out for years—is deindustrialization. This process is quite advanced. For Germany to become a strong industrial country again, it needs to regain its potential, but not through armament. We need to produce things that people genuinely need and rebuild the infrastructure. Bridges are crumbling, roads are deteriorating, railways aren’t working, airports aren’t functioning properly. All of this cannot be fixed with a defense industry. We are no longer living in the 1930s.

The government will make major cuts in social spending

Secondly, the largest item in Germany’s state budget is social spending. 43% of the German budget is allocated to social payments such as pensions for retirees—whose numbers are increasing—the long-term unemployed, students, and special pension rights for mothers. So, social spending in Germany is extremely high. You cannot simultaneously try to rapidly expand the defense industry, make Europe the world’s strongest military power, and maintain these social budgets and the social safety net at the same level. They will have to make cuts. And it is precisely at this point that we will reach the limits of society’s tolerance. Of course, it’s not possible to borrow indefinitely. The money allocated to armament will not generate enough tax revenue to cover the deficits in social spending. This means that there will be cuts in social benefits, or people in Germany—especially retirees—will have to forgo many things they are accustomed to in the coming years.

Borrowing currently seems attractive to the incumbent governments in Europe and America. But they forget that they have to pay substantial interest. This money is not earned; it is borrowed, and high interest must be paid on it. This interest can only be covered by income generated by the economy. And a large part of this income will be spent just to pay this interest. Consequently, this trajectory could lead to a major social crisis in Germany. Germany has not experienced large-scale mass protests in the last 30 years. The German people have always been a satiated, or at least relatively satiated, populace. Here, compared to some European countries, no one is hungry. But let me say this: if care is not taken, this situation can change rapidly within a few years. If Germany does not reorient itself towards the “social” priorities that formed the basis of the social market economy in the past, and instead focuses solely on armament, then the problems we will face will become clearly apparent.

The AfD could be banned by the current establishment parties

Q: I’d like to come to the topic of the AfD… In your opinion, is it still possible for this party to be banned in the future, or will the German elites or the system try to integrate the AfD? Could the party eventually be drawn into the system and perhaps become a governing partner with the CDU? What would need to happen for this? For example, scenarios such as the party splitting by dissociating from figures like Björn Höcke and adopting a more “conformist” line are being discussed. What are your thoughts on this?

A: I can offer you three possible scenarios on this matter. First scenario: Politics continues with a “muddling through” approach. Meaning, problems are patched up with temporary solutions, some things are attempted to be fixed, but they break down again after a while. Managing the situation this way can be sustained for a few more years as long as the money lasts and the public tolerates it. But at some point, this scenario will become unsustainable.

Second scenario: The “Brandmauer” [firewall, meaning a strict refusal to cooperate with the AfD] collapses, and the CDU is forced to enter into a coalition with the AfD. This could happen particularly at the state level. Furthermore, I think a formation like Sahra Wagenknecht’s party could re-emerge, strengthening particularly in East Germany. Even if this doesn’t happen, another similar left-leaning party could emerge. This could also be an answer to your question about whether the AfD will split: the AfD won’t split, but a different party might be born. This new party could, under certain conditions, become a coalition partner with the AfD in states like Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt, or Saxony. If this model works, similar developments could occur in other states. This is a very plausible development scenario for Germany within the next 20 years.

The third scenario is this: The AfD could be banned by the current establishment parties or elites. I think such a culture of prohibition is quite possible in Germany; serious fear can be instilled in the public through the fear of Russia or the threat of fascism. German society, due to its historical past, is very sensitive to such fears and could support such a ban. However, other countries will not approach this situation in the same way. If Germany moves towards such a policy of prohibition, it could lose its leadership position in Europe. Because I don’t think other European countries will follow the same path.

German politics awaits a post-Trump US

Q: What will German foreign policy be like in the new era? Relations with the US and Germany’s role within Europe are among the most keenly anticipated and debated topics.

A: German foreign policy is still in an impasse, and the new government doesn’t have much time to decide what to do. With Merz, the world not only gains a new German chancellor, but Europe also gains a new leader. Although this may seem like a somewhat arrogant approach from Germany’s perspective, it is perceived and expressed similarly in other European countries. Hopes are pinned on Germany. To put it simply, steps such as the European Union’s future militarization plans, internal reforms, and gradual disengagement from America can only happen under German leadership.

The UK is no longer in the European Union and does not have the massive budget that Germany will have if it abandons its debt brake [a fiscal rule limiting structural government deficits] in the coming years. France, on the other hand, is in economic decline. Therefore, the burden of European leadership rests on Germany’s shoulders, and Europe must now redefine its own direction. This is now Merz’s responsibility. The real question is: To what extent will he and his new team be able to achieve this? Personally, I have my doubts, but objectively speaking, it is clear that Merz needs to set a direction in three fundamental areas.

The first goal is to completely redefine Germany’s relationship with America. However, this is not as easy as it sounds. For decades, Germany focused more on transatlantic thought—that is, an America-centric approach—than on Europe. Breaking away from America in cultural, civilizational, military, and economic contexts is almost impossible. However, if Europe wants to establish a more autonomous structure and realize the currently targeted vision of becoming a great power, it must do so. Meaning, Europe should become an independent great power alongside America, not subordinate to it. But this will not be easy, as resources may not be sufficient for this goal.

Ideologically, Germany is not ready for this either. When talking about reshaping the transatlantic relationship, it is necessary to emphasize this fact: Germany neither wants to nor can it distance itself from America. Because at the level of civilization, culture, politics, military and security policies—and even historically—it is completely intertwined with America. A large part of the elites in Germany were educated in America; they studied at American universities. Therefore, the prevailing approach in German politics is the expectation that Trump will fail within two years, Democrats will gain a majority in Congress, then two years later Trump will lose power, and a young Biden or a new Obama-like Democratic leader will replace him. This leader will then continue the transatlantic relationship that has existed since 1945. In fact, Germany’s hope and strategy is to invest in this scenario.

That’s why I say Germany’s strategy is contradictory: on the one hand, it aims to be more autonomous, but on the other, it is psychologically unprepared for it. Germany is still waiting, hoping to endure for another two years for Trump to leave the stage, and then hoping everything will return to how it was. Because Germany’s desire is to return to the old “normal,” the old status quo. In reality, Germany is not at all ready to assume a leadership role in Europe. Indeed, the main question is: Will Europe accept this new leadership claim by Germany under Merz? I am quite skeptical about this. The German or European elites have a desire for European leadership under Merz, but this desire may not be realistic.

The second major problem is Russia. Decisive decisions need to be made on this issue now, but the decisions currently being made are heading in completely the wrong direction. Everything is moving towards the possibility of a war with Russia. Here too, Germans and Europeans are largely living in a fantasy world. They believe they have always won for the last 35 years, that Europe is still strong, and that they can defeat Russia. However, I approach this with skepticism. Because Russia is still a great power and is on its way to becoming a great power again. In my opinion, Germany’s policy should not be directed towards such radical militarization, and it should not spend 500 billion euros on defense. Of course, deterrence can be relied upon, that is true. But at the same time—and this is completely lacking—diplomacy must be pursued, one must sit down with Russia at the table, and a compromise must be sought through negotiation. I believe this: A Europe positioned against Russia will never be stable. This should be the fundamental principle. We need a Europe that includes Russia. Constant conflict with Russia further weakens Europe; it divides Europe, just as it did during the Cold War. We need to see this.

The third decisive issue—after the US and Russia—is Germany’s relations with other states, especially with the Global South in general. Germany wants to redefine its foreign policy in this area. However, this will be very difficult as long as Germany only talks about “value-oriented foreign policy” and does not approach the world with a realistic, realpolitik perspective. The Global South, in particular, sides more with Russia than with Europe. At the same time, these countries are striving to form their own power bases and alliances against the West and America. New Eurasian-centered alliances are emerging before our eyes between Russia and China, and Russia and India. Central Asian countries are integrating into Russia’s security pact on the one hand, and China’s “New Silk Road” [Belt and Road Initiative] strategy on the other.

Yes, I believe the German federal government is not in a good position regarding these three main problems, because it has not yet fully grasped these realities. Germans and German politics are still in the euphoria of the victories of the last 35 years, believing that Europe has always won, is morally superior to others, that value-oriented foreign policy must necessarily apply to other countries and continents, and ultimately that America—especially Trump—will be ideologically defeated and everything will return to how it was. But things will not develop this way.

The European Union has launched an ambitious initiative targeting Central Asian countries, which have long fostered close military, economic, and political ties with China and Russia.

The EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on April 3-4, between the EU and five Central Asian countries, was the first of its kind and underscored Brussels’ interest in the region. With its “Global Gateway” project, the EU is attempting to create an alternative trade corridor to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while its share of direct foreign investment in the region has risen to 40%.

One of the summit’s most significant outcomes was European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s pledge of 10 billion euros in investment for the “Middle Corridor” passing through the region. Another issue that made headlines in Türkiye was the decision by member countries of the “Organization of Turkic States” to accredit ambassadors to the Republic of Cyprus, which the UN recognizes as the legitimate government of Cyprus. The joint statement referencing UN resolutions that do not recognize the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus caused controversy in Türkiye.

EU’s Central Asia move due to resource scarcity

Speaking to Harici, Alexander Rahr, head of the Berlin-based Eurasian Society, said that the EU’s recent move toward Central Asia is driven by the EU’s need for raw materials, raw material producers, and external resources. The German author noted that the EU has very few of the raw materials needed to strengthen its industry and industrial base, and therefore the EU is becoming increasingly dependent on external resources and raw materials.

“The EU has lost Russia, its main supplier and producer of raw materials; natural gas, oil and coal, and other minerals,” Rahr said, reminding that the continent is also in conflict with America, and a long-term trade war is expected between America and Europe, according to a number of experts. According to Rahr, it is therefore dangerous for the EU to rely only on the US or countries very closely linked to the US.

Rahr also stated that the EU is moving away from China. According to him, Brussels foresees a major crisis in China, a possible war with Taiwan one day.

Therefore, according to the German expert, the EU has very few options and is now eyeing Central Asia. These states are not too far from Europe and also contain a large amount of raw materials and minerals that the EU needs. Rahr continued:

“So the issue is clear: the EU needs a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries as a supplement to the lost Russian market and as a solution to problems with China.

The EU’s problem is that the Central Asian countries are very well connected to Russia and the Russian market. Russia’s influence in the region is much greater than that of the EU. The view that the EU will break Central Asian countries away from Russian influence is extremely naive. I think this is far too ambitious for the EU. They are also too late and the EU does not have the political instruments to do this.”

‘Brussels’ policy is disturbing because it focuses on values, not cooperation’

Rahr also emphasized that there are other large, active, hegemonic powers in the region. One of these is China: with its Silk Road strategy, it connects Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Russia partly to Europe and has a great deal of authority, political power, and influence in the region.

Türkiye is also in the region. It is very active in cooperation with Central Asian countries in this field.

Rahr therefore thinks that the EU is “too late” and also points out that the EU has other problems:

“Brussels’ foreign relations and economic policies focus on human rights, liberal values, and feminist foreign policy. All of these play an important role for the EU in building cooperation with countries outside Europe. But this is very disturbing for many countries that are not part of European culture. These countries do not want to be lectured or pressured by the EU. I think this is one of the obstacles to cooperation between the EU and Central Asian countries in the future.”

‘Eurasian countries will not break their ties with Russia just because the EU wants them to’

The German author also said that if Europe tries to encourage Türkiye, Central Asian countries, and even China to get rid of Russia’s influence, to break the ties they have established with Russia for decades, and to force countries such as Türkiye and Kazakhstan to participate in anti-Russia sanctions, he thinks that it is too late in this respect as well.

According to him, these countries, Central Asian countries, especially China, India, that is, “Eurasian countries,” have established a suitable relationship with Russia during these sanction wars. Therefore, he does not expect countries outside the EU to destroy their relations with Russia.

According to him, on the contrary, they benefit from these relations with Russia: “Of course, they also want to establish relations with the EU, why not? The EU is a very attractive market and has money for investment. But these countries also know the limits and political goals of the EU.”

‘Brussels will lose if it tries to break the region’s ties with China and Russia’

Rahr, who admits that trade relations between Germany and Central Asian countries are less important than, for example, these countries’ trade with China, says that China’s Silk Road strategy has developed very rapidly in this region.

Rahr noted that the EU, and especially Germany, can enter the region with European Silk Road strategies and ideas, “They can build special and very important corridors. This is logical and should be supported because a corridor built by Europeans may balance the political power carried by China’s Silk Road strategy,” he said.

Rahr thinks that the EU’s problem is “ideology.” According to him, Brussels will lose if it tries to spoil these countries’ relations with China or Russia:

“In my opinion, the EU will only win if it enters this region with an inclusive approach. Cooperation with all the main actors in the region and the construction of necessary corridors. Asia and Türkiye also benefit from this approach. But this must be a completely inclusive approach and must also combine investment with the globalization of markets, inter-market cooperation, and a common security approach for the region. A new Cold War should not be waged, as is currently the case in Ukraine.”

‘The Cyprus issue has been politically resolved in my opinion’

Finally, touching on the Cyprus issue, Rahr argues that the problem on the island has been politically resolved. “Everyone understands that Cyprus consists of two parts, the north connected to Cyprus and Türkiye,” Rahr claimed.

Rahr, who stated that “morality and international law” are very important for the West and that the issue is not completely resolved according to the Western approach, concludes his words as follows:

“In my opinion, if you look at the issue from a realistic and political point of view, there is a status quo in Cyprus. Many referendums were held on the island and the majority of the Cypriot population accepted the current status quo as it is. It seems impossible to change the real situation in Cyprus.

A realistic view should prevail here as well. You will always find some experts who question the ongoing processes in Cyprus and representatives of a larger international perspective.”

In recent days, I had the opportunity to set out from Shanghai—one of China’s most vibrant and intellectually rich cities—and revisit Hangzhou and Beijing. These cities are home to China’s most prestigious universities and provide an ideal setting for gauging the pulse of academic circles. With Donald Trump’s re-election in the United States reigniting trade wars through heightened tariffs, the growing turbulence in the international system, and China’s position in this emerging world order, I engaged in extensive conversations with Chinese academics. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, these scholars offered candid insights into China’s foreign policy and the global balance of power. The questions are mine, while the responses come directly from these academics.

From Shanghai to Beijing: China’s academic community speaks

China’s role in the international system has been a frequent topic of debate in both the West and the East in recent years. The escalating trade wars spurred by Trump’s tariffs and a world order shaken by conflicts like Ukraine-Russia and Palestine-Israel have once again placed China under the global spotlight. During my discussions with leading academics from universities in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Beijing, I sought to understand how China views this chaotic landscape and where it positions itself within it.

‘China keeps its distance from conflicts, but it’s a strategic choice’

The first striking aspect of China’s foreign policy is its cautious stance toward conflicts beyond its borders. According to the academics, China justifies this approach with its principles of “non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs” and “non-involvement in disputes between third parties.” However, I posed a pointed question: “Isn’t the root cause of these wars the power vacuum in the international system? If the U.S. were as strong as it once was, would conflicts like Russia-Ukraine or Palestine-Israel be as widespread? Doesn’t China bear some responsibility for the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world order? If so, how logical is it for China, as a partial architect of this turbulence, to stand on the sidelines?”

One academic responded decisively: “Yes, it benefits China. The U.S. is no longer as powerful as it once was and is steadily weakening. Constantly engaged in wars, the U.S. is losing both prestige in the international community and economic ground. This situation works against the U.S. and in China’s favor.” I countered with an objection: “But doesn’t it seem like China is losing ground too? Russia and Iran paid heavy prices in Syria over the years, yet China couldn’t even economically support Syria’s reconstruction. Had it done so, might the Assad regime have survived? With Russia tied up in Ukraine and Iran clashing with Israel, Assad was left unsupported and fell. Moreover, groups like the Turkistan Islamic Party have gained strength in Syria and may soon have the capacity to establish a state. Can anyone guarantee that these groups won’t one day target China’s Xinjiang region?”

The academic acknowledged my concern: “Yes, what you say is partly true. Assad had lost the support of his people, and a leader who loses that support will inevitably fall, one way or another. But for China, the real threat isn’t the jihadist groups themselves—it’s the powers backing them. If China is ever forced to fight—and that would truly be a last resort—it would confront not the terrorist organizations, but the forces behind them. China doesn’t approve of Russia’s approach in Ukraine and is pursuing a different path.”

‘Russia made a mistake, China doesn’t favor proxy wars’

Curious about this “different path,” I pressed further: “What do you mean?” The academic’s response was striking: “Russia, with the largest landmass in the world, claimed its goal in Ukraine was to counter groups attempting ethnic cleansing of Russians—which was a legitimate concern. But it did what it swore it wouldn’t: it annexed the territory of a sovereign state. China, on the other hand, hasn’t launched a military operation even in Taiwan, which is internationally recognized as part of our territory. That’s because the people of Taiwan are our people; we seek peaceful reunification, and it will happen eventually. If an operation over Taiwan occurs, it won’t be between China and the island—it will be between China and the powers that support it behind.  China doesn’t engage in proxy wars.”

This response hinted at a red line in China’s approach to conflicts. “So, does that mean China will ignore global conflicts until they reach its borders?” I asked. The academic clarified: “No, of course we’ll raise our voice. We’ll stand against imperialism and with the oppressed. But we won’t be drawn into direct conflict as the U.S. wants. We do not want to jump into the trap that set by the U.S..We’re not ready for that now, but we’re preparing. Look at history: Britain won both world wars but lost all its strength. The U.S., entering both wars late, emerged fresh and energetic, securing victory and becoming the architect of the new world order. China is gathering its energy and strength today. Meanwhile, the U.S. is repeating Britain’s mistake—constantly fighting and wearing itself out.”

‘Waiting for the right moment is China’s strategy’

But isn’t there a limit to this “energy-gathering” strategy? “What happens if you lose all strategic points to the U.S. in the meantime?” I asked. The academic offered a historical perspective: “As Chinese, we, like the Turks, prefer to move forward with historical references. During international crises, we focus on resolving our internal issues and border disputes—it’s a form of preparation for the larger battle. Take the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, for example. While the world was fixated on the U.S. and the Soviet Union, we settled our issue with India in one month. No one even noticed. Of course, no Chinese can figure out why the India launched a war with China first. Similarly, in 1979, amidst the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Second Oil Crisis, we are forced to start the Counterattack in Self-Defense on the Sino-Vietnamese Border, we entered Vietnam, achieved our goals swiftly, and withdrew. Timing is important for China.”

In short, while its adversaries fight, China builds its strength, preparing to defend itself when the moment is right. So when might that moment come? “At what point would China shift from rhetoric to action?” I asked. The answer was clear: “Maybe Iran, or maybe the direct attack from U.S.. Iran is so important for the safety of Central Asia and China. We oppose intervention in a sovereign state. Just as the U.S. supported Ukraine against Russia, we would support Iran anyway.”

‘Until 2030, a period of conflict and cooperation’

The academics also shared a long-term vision for China’s relationship with the U.S. “Until 2030, China will adopt a strategy of engaging the U.S. without entering direct conflict,” they said. They describe this period as one of “conflict and cooperation”, but maybe the most intense and dangerous period compared with the next 10-20 years. The reasoning lies in China’s domestic priorities: “Our western provinces are still underdeveloped. Until China completes its overall development, it won’t risk a direct confrontation. Militarily, we don’t want to be part of a conflict, nor do we think we’re ready for one. But after 2030, the gap between China and the U.S. will be reduced to a large degree and the balance will be in China’s favor. By then, we believe the U.S. won’t dare risk a direct conflict either. If they do venture into such ‘madness,’ China will be ready.”

‘China won’t kneel to Trump’s tariffs’

When the topic turned to Trump’s tariffs, the academic was resolute: “We’ll see it through to the end. In 2018, we didn’t immediately retaliate to the U.S.’s tariffs on China, but things are different now. We didn’t start this trade war, and we won’t bow to the U.S.”

Russia-U.S. agreement and new alliances

I also asked about the possibility of a Russia-U.S. deal: “It was said that China and Russia’s partnership had no limits—does that still hold?” The academic replied: “But there is a bottom line for the relations. China has never seen Russia as an enemy. We understand the security rationale behind its intervention in Ukraine, but we’ve always supported a sovereign state’s territorial integrity. If Russia strikes a deal with the U.S., that’s their choice. According to the official documents, China has no allies. The only ally China has maybe the North Korea because of the Korean War.”

Finally, I touched on recent developments: “Last month, Russia blamed European states for world wars, avoiding mention of the U.S. Trump suggests he could reach an agreement with Russia. Meanwhile, tariffs seem to be bringing China and Europe closer. Just last week, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited China, emphasizing cooperation. Could we see a China-EU alliance pitted against a U.S.-Russia bloc in the near future?” The academic didn’t rule it out: “There are no eternal friendships or enmities. It’s possible. And with potential land and rail links between China and the EU, the strategic importance of Central Asia and Turkey grows. Turkey’s geopolitical position and ties with Central Asia could make it a key partner for China.”

Conclusion: China’s strategic patience and future plans

This interview with Chinese academics reveals Beijing’s patient, strategic, and long-term approach to the turbulence in the international system. By steering clear of conflicts and building its strength, China aims to avoid direct confrontation until 2030, even 2035, 2049 while completing its development. The academics predict that, post-2030, China’s advantage over the U.S. will grow, preparing it for any potential conflict. A critical key country like Iran or a strategic issue like Taiwan could prompt China to act sooner. In the face of Trump’s trade wars, China stands firm: it won’t back down. Meanwhile, emerging partnerships like Russia-U.S. and China-EU, potentially involving Turkey, hint at a global realignment. Time will tell what role China ultimately plays in this chaotic world.