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Recognition diplomacy for TRNC begins with Turkic states

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Having struggled for recognition as an independent state for 39 years, the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) has crossed a significant threshold by becoming an observer member of the OTS (Organization of the Turkic States). “It is of great importance that a strong coalition is formed by intensive cooperation with the Turkic World and that the policy toward the recognition of the TRNC is actively put into practice,” says Prof. Hüseyin Işıksal.

Following the 2017 breakdown of the Crans Montana negotiations, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which has existed as an independent state despite all embargoes for 39 years, has based its policy on sovereign equality and equal international status. The TRNC’s unnamed recognition policy since 2017 was concretized by the address of President Tayyip Erdoğan to the UN Security Council (UN). With the TRNC’s admittance as an observer member of the OTS, a significant milestone was reached in the struggle being carried out in this context. Then, critical steps were taken. Following Gambia Vice President Badara Joof’s visit to the island to meet with TRNC President Ersin Tatar, a joint meeting between the ruling parties of Turkiye, Azerbaijan, and TRNC was held in Cyprus. Even though there is still a long way before Cyprus to go to be recognized as an independent state, patient and determined struggle is not alien to the Turkish Cypriots.

At a press conference on 19 December titled “Three States One Nation”, AK Party Deputy Chairman Numan Kurtulmuş (right), New Azerbaijan Party Deputy Chairman Tahir Budagov (left) and TRNC National Unity Party Secretary General Oğuzhan Hasipoğlu. PHOTO: Ali Ruhluel/AA

‘Doing the same thing and expecting different results is pointless’

International Relations and Diplomacy Special Advisor to the President of the TRNC, and Member of the Negotiation Committee, Prof. Hüseyin Işıksal talks to Harici about the roadmap to be followed by the TRNC in the diplomacy of recognition as well as the role that this new strategy will play in the ongoing conflict over the Eastern Mediterranean.

  • Do the efforts to be recognized as an independent state indicate that a new UN negotiation process based on the “one state” model of Turkiye and the TRNC is off the table? Or will the new recognition initiative be carried out in tandem with the UN negotiation process?

In the presidential candidacy declaration titled “A New Era, A New Vision” in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus elections held in October 2020, Ersin Tatar stated that any viable solution for Cyprus should be predicated on the presence of two sovereign and equal states. He appealed for the Turkish Cypriot people’s support, saying that a solution based on federation was exhausted at the time. By freely voting for Mr. Tatar as President, the Turkish Cypriot people have indicated their support for this vision-based approach.

The facts on the ground in Cyprus demonstrate that the Turkish and Greek people, who share a troubled history with power asymmetry and have different races, languages, religions, cultures, and lifestyles, would not be able to coexist peacefully under a federal solution. This reveals that a federal solution would be short-lived even if this is attempted through the use of a coerced treaty. In the words of Albert Einstein, ‘insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.’ The insistence on a federal solution by the Greek Cypriot side will waste time and perpetuate the status quo, which harms all parties. It is now apparent which model cannot be applied in Cyprus.

In this context, the negotiation committee headed by TRNC President Ersin Tatar, of which I am a part, presented new solution proposals to the United Nations at the 5+UN informal negotiations held in Geneva on 27-29 April 2021. Accordingly, the committee proposed that a fair, realistic, and sustainable agreement honoring the Turkish Cypriot people’s long-devoted struggle for existence and statehood can only be reached by a collaboration of two states with sovereign equity and equal international status. The Turkish Cypriot side has always stated that formal negotiations can only begin on condition that the Turkish Cypriot people’s vested sovereign equity and equal international status have been confirmed. As things stand, compromising our statehood in no way will we confidently continue along this path open to reconciliation and cooperation.

‘No letup in the pace of struggle’

  • The TRNC has taken a significant step forward with its admittance to the OTS as an observer member. How will the following step be carried out? Is there a roadmap for this new recognition diplomacy?

President Tayyip Erdoğan’s historic call at the 77th General Assembly of the United Nations address to all world leaders for the formal recognition of the TRNC is crucial. It marks a new landmark in the history of the Turkish Cypriot people. By making this call, Mr. Erdogan has done more than merely protect the Turkish Cypriots and their legitimate independence; he has also become their voice at the United Nations, where they are not allowed to be represented.

Soon after this call, at the 9th Organization of the Turkic States Leaders’ Summit held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, our state was unanimously admitted as an observer member for the first time under its constitutional name, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is a historical step toward international recognition. From this moment forward, we will no longer be subjected to procedures that would keep us in the status of minority.

Compared to many globally recognized states, fulfilling all the conditions of statehood with its full-fledged institutions and organizations, the TRNC is much more socio-economically and politically advanced. The TRNC is slowly yet gradually gaining acceptance from the international community. These days when we celebrate the 39th anniversary of our Republic, we will not rest on our laurels and continue our noble struggle with the tremendous momentum that this positive development encourages. It is of great importance to form a solid cooperation under the leadership of Turkiye with the Turkic world sharing the same values with the TRNC and to vigorously implement the policy for the recognition of the TRNC. The decision of the Organization of Turkic States to admit the TRNC as an observer member will also help to eliminate the unfair imbalance of status in Cyprus and ensure a just reconciliation based on sovereign equality on the island.

‘Geopolitical equation may shift in the Eastern Mediterranean’

  • Is the current polarization in the Eastern Mediterranean to be affected by Turkiye’s “normalization” measures towards Egypt? How do you see the situation developing in that part of the world?

If Turkiye’s “normalization” efforts toward Egypt pan out, we can expect the geopolitical equation in the Eastern Mediterranean to shift dramatically. Recently discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean have opened up new possibilities for regional collaboration. However, the maximalist demands and ambitions of the Cypriot Greek and Greek sides have had a disastrous economic impact on other coastal European and Mediterranean states. Should the maritime zone issues in the Eastern Mediterranean be settled fairly, the region will face even more significant political challenges. Such a great upheaval will benefit no party.

The main challenge here is that Turkiye, which has the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean and is barely 70 km away from the island of Cyprus, is being attempted to be left out of the political equation in the region. Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration’s (GCA) primary foreign policy move is to immediately appeal to and forge an alliance with a country whenever it has a problem, no matter how negligible, with Turkiye. Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration mainly intend to confine Turkiye to the Gulf of Antalya by reducing Turkiye’s Exclusive Economic Zone by 3.5 times with the so-called Sevilla map they have created. All regional states, particularly Israel and Egypt, will benefit significantly if they sign maritime authorization agreements with Turkiye. I believe that the ‘containment’ strategy of the Greek-Cypriot Greek duo will fail, and the geopolitical equation in the Eastern Mediterranean may entirely change with the new strategic relations Turkiye has established with the regional countries.

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India’s Russian oil imports hit record high as Middle East tensions disrupt markets

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India is increasing imports of Russian oil and coal as supply chain disruptions and rising prices linked to tensions involving Iran reshape global energy flows.

According to a Reuters report citing data from analytics firm Kpler, shipments from Russia to India reached record levels in June.

Kpler estimates that Russian oil deliveries to India will rise to a record 2.55 million barrels per day in June.

That would surpass both the 2.13 million barrels per day recorded in May and the previous high of 2.16 million barrels per day registered in May 2023.

Russia’s share of India’s total oil imports in June is expected to come in at just under 50%. Before the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East, the figure averaged 23% during the three months preceding February 28.

India’s shift toward Russian crude followed the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and a temporary suspension of sanctions on purchases by the administration of US President Donald Trump in an effort to increase market supply.

However, the sanctions waiver expired on June 17 and was not extended by the US Treasury Department.

Reuters noted that this could lead to a decline in purchases of Russian crude, although the outcome will depend on the willingness of Indian refiners and government officials to return to sourcing shipments from Middle Eastern suppliers.

According to Kpler forecasts, imports from Saudi Arabia are expected to remain at 349,000 barrels per day in June. That compares with an average of 832,000 barrels per day during the three months before the conflict.

A similar trend is visible in coal imports. Imports of Russian coal across all grades are expected to reach 3.16 million tonnes in June, compared with 3.27 million tonnes in May.

Both figures would rank as the second and third highest on record, respectively, behind the peak of 3.76 million tonnes registered in May last year.

Russia is also expected to overtake Australia in June to become the second-largest supplier of coal to India, the world’s second-largest coal importer after China.

According to Reuters, Russia is likely to maintain its role as one of India’s key coal suppliers. Future purchases of Russian oil, however, will depend on whether Washington moves to tighten sanctions against Moscow.

New Delhi says oil shipments will not be affected by sanctions

Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said in mid-June that the country had increased purchases of Russian oil since 2022 at Washington’s request in order to help contain global energy prices.

Jaishankar criticised US restrictions on Russian commodities and urged policymakers not to present such measures as matters of grand principle.

Sujata Sharma, a representative of India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, also said in May that shipments from Russia were continuing and would do so regardless of US decisions concerning sanctions waivers.

Indian refiners reduced imports from Russia in 2025 and turned to suppliers in Saudi Arabia and Iraq amid pressure from the United States and threats of a 25% tariff on Indian goods.

However, Reuters data show that following the outbreak of war in the Middle East and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Indian companies began increasing purchases of Russian crude again in early March.

Russia’s ambassador to New Delhi, Denis Alipov, said at the end of April that Moscow was prepared to supply as much raw material as India was willing to accept.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later confirmed that Moscow remained committed to its agreements on energy shipments to India.

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EU, US and China intensify competition over Africa’s strategic minerals through Lobito Corridor

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Africa is becoming an increasingly intense arena of competition among China, the US and the European Union over access to strategic raw materials.

According to an analysis by German Foreign Policy, the Lobito Corridor, a rail link connecting the copper belt of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola, is playing a pivotal role in that contest.

The infrastructure project is regarded as one of the flagship initiatives of the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and is also viewed by Washington, which is investing in the region, as a means of reducing dependence on China.

In the future, copper, cobalt, lithium and other raw materials essential for the production of batteries, electric vehicles, digital technologies and military equipment will be transported westward via this route.

The initiative builds on infrastructure originally constructed during the colonial era to facilitate the export of African raw materials.

Critics argue that the expansion of the Lobito Corridor perpetuates existing patterns of resource extraction under new conditions.

Global Gateway as a counter to the Belt and Road

The European Commission approved the Global Gateway programme in September 2021.

Under the programme, nearly €300 billion is to be invested in infrastructure projects across Africa, Asia, Oceania, Southeast Europe, and South and Central America by 2027.

The programme is widely viewed as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

One of its central objectives is to diversify Europe’s imports of critical raw materials, particularly by reducing dependence on supplies from China.

During a visit to China in late May 2026, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche of the CDU underscored the importance of secure access to critical raw materials and rare earth elements. This is the area in which Germany remains most dependent on China.

Colonial-era infrastructure remains intact

One of the clearest examples is the 1,300-kilometre Lobito Corridor, which runs from the edge of the Zambia-Southern Congo copper belt to the port of Lobito in Angola.

The core infrastructure of this trade corridor was established through the Benguela Railway, which was built as early as 1902 at the height of European colonial expansion. The railway extended eastward from the port city of Lobito through what is now Angola, providing access to the mineral-rich regions of southern Congo and Zambia.

In 1931, following completion of the initial railway line, the British mining and railway company Tanganyika Concessions transferred its 99-year concession rights to Portugal’s colony of Angola.

The concession expired in 2001, after which the infrastructure, previously controlled by Portuguese authorities, was transferred to the Angolan government.

By 2030, annual copper shipments through the route are expected to reach one million metric tonnes.

Both the EU and the US are relying heavily on the Lobito Corridor in an effort to counter China’s dominant position in Africa’s raw materials sector.

Estimates indicate that roughly two-thirds of global cobalt production originates in the Congo, where Chinese companies are particularly active in mining operations.

China also accounts for approximately 75% of global cobalt processing capacity.

The colonial-era rail line leading to Lobito is intended to redirect exports of copper, cobalt and other raw materials, which have until now largely been shipped eastward via Tanzania, toward western markets, enabling processing in Europe or North America rather than China.

Europe seeks to reduce dependence on China for the green transition

In addition to copper and cobalt, the region holds substantial deposits of lithium, coltan, nickel and rare earth elements, giving it significant economic importance.

These materials are used in electric vehicle batteries, stationary energy storage systems and alloys required for military aircraft production.

Until now, the EU has sourced much of these materials from China. Strategic investment in a new logistics hub in Luau, Angola, located along the Lobito Corridor, is intended to reduce that dependence.

The railway line along the corridor is already operated by a European consortium.

The consortium includes Swiss commodities trader Trafigura, Portuguese construction group Mota-Engil and Belgian rail company Vecturis.

However, the majority of the mines remain under Chinese control. In the Congo, 24 of the country’s 33 cobalt-exporting companies are Chinese-backed.

The Lobito Corridor is being developed through an EU-US partnership

EU efforts to secure influence over the Lobito Corridor are advancing in parallel with similar initiatives by the United States.

In early 2022, the US signed a memorandum of understanding with the EU and other G7 members to mobilise more than $600 billion for infrastructure projects worldwide over the following five years as part of the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).

The Lobito Corridor is one of five key trade, transit and development corridors in Southern Africa designed to improve transport efficiency.

During the administration of President Joe Biden, financing for the Lobito Corridor was launched under the G7’s PGII framework as a flagship project in cooperation with the Global Gateway initiative.

The EU also regards the expansion of the Lobito Corridor as a critical project and has committed more than €2 billion in funding.

That support could increase further. The next EU budget cycle beginning in 2028 envisages nearly doubling spending on development and external assistance, from €108 billion to €200 billion.

EU officials present the strategy as an effort to offer a more comprehensive approach to infrastructure financing than China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

‘America First’ in Africa

The US has pledged hundreds of millions of dollars for the expansion of the Lobito Corridor.

In the final quarter of 2025 alone, it provided $553 million in loans for the project’s expansion.

An additional $200 million in support came from the Development Bank of Southern Africa.

Unlike the Biden administration, which frequently described the initiative as development assistance, the second Trump administration openly characterises the project as an effort to weaken China’s influence, strengthen US control over critical raw materials and diversify supply chains.

For example, Frank Garcia, a former naval officer appointed in late May as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, praised the Trump administration’s continuing engagement on the continent.

Highlighting the Lobito Corridor in particular, Garcia said the project aligns key US interests in Africa with the “America First” approach.

Germany in Africa for the energy transition

Last autumn, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier travelled several kilometres on the newly restored railway line along the Lobito Corridor and described it as “a strategic infrastructure project of enormous economic importance.”

The German politician added: “Of course, this infrastructure connection also creates investment opportunities for European and German companies along its route.”

Portuguese construction company MCA is currently building solar energy parks in 60 municipalities across Angola at a cost of just under €1.29 billion.

The client is Angola’s Energy Ministry, while the German government is supporting the project through export credit guarantees.

Should Angola fail to meet its payment obligations, Germany would step in. A total of 95% of the project value is guaranteed by the Federal Republic of Germany.

In return, Angola agreed to allow German companies to participate in the project. For example, the battery storage system is being supplied by SMA Solar Technology, based in Niestetal near Kassel.

German solar technology provider Gantner Instruments Environment Solutions is supplying the digital control system.

Critics of the Lobito Corridor expansion warn that the project will primarily benefit the EU and the US.

In their view, the initiative promotes the export of African raw materials rather than strengthening intra-African trade.

Although the EU presents these measures as a development project aligned with African interests, critics argue that they ultimately represent a continuation of Western exploitation of African resources.

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EU presses Türkiye for non-Russian gas supplies under future energy contracts

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The European Union is insisting that natural gas delivered to member states via Türkiye under new supply agreements must not be of Russian origin.

German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche said after an official visit to Ankara that “Türkiye understands that the EU attaches great importance to ending the supply of raw materials originating from Russia and accepts this reality.”

Reiche added that Turkish officials had made it clear that replacing supplies from Russia could not be achieved overnight, either economically or in terms of available alternative sources.

As of June 17, a ban on pipeline natural gas imports from Russia under short-term contracts signed more than a year ago entered into force across the European Union.

The measure was approved by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament at the end of last year. In January 2025, EU member states also voted to phase out Russian gas completely by 2027. Under that decision, member states are required to verify the origin of gas supplies before authorizing deliveries.

Meanwhile, Swiss-based company Nord Stream 2 AG, the operator of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, has launched legal action challenging the regulation imposing the ban on Russian gas imports.

Türkiye, for its part, is continuing negotiations with Gazprom on natural gas supplies for the period after 2026, as existing contracts are approaching expiration.

Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar previously said the parties had yet to reach agreement on potential shipment volumes and the duration of any new contracts.

In December 2025, Ankara extended by one year two agreements with Gazprom covering gas deliveries through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines.

Türkiye is seeking to reduce Russia’s share of its gas supply mix. Russia’s share of Türkiye’s natural gas imports has already fallen below 40%.

As part of its energy diversification strategy, Ankara plans to replace part of Russian gas imports with supplies from the United States and Central Asia.

Bayraktar previously said that despite US calls to abandon Russian energy resources, Türkiye would continue purchasing natural gas from Russia.

“We cannot tell our citizens there is no gas available. We have agreements with Russia. Winter is approaching. We need gas from Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan,” Bayraktar said.

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