We sat down with the German philosopher Michael Quante—known to readers through his work The Uncompromising Marx (German: Der unversöhnte Marx), published in recent years by Yordam Kitap—to discuss his book, the intersecting crises currently gripping Germany, and the interpretive tools philosophy can offer to make sense of a world in turmoil.

Michael Quante completed his doctorate on the philosophy of Hegel at the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, where he currently serves as a faculty member in the Department of Philosophy. He is the Director of the Centrum für Bioethik (Center for Bioethics) and a board member of the Centre for Advanced Studies in Bioethics. Furthermore, Quante has held editorial positions at Ethical Theory and Moral Practice and Hegel-Studien. He has authored numerous books and articles, with a particular focus on German Idealism (Hegel and Marx), action theory, ethics, and biomedical ethics.

Ferhan Bayır: We are living in strange times! People can easily imagine that capitalism will bring about the end of the world, yet they cannot imagine the end of capitalism. Why does the political anxiety lurking in the subconscious of the masses fail to elevate itself into a political consciousness?

Michael Quante:

My diagnosis is somewhat different. I believe we are currently experiencing a profound crisis of democracy, particularly within Western democratic societies, and bearing witness to the erosion of the Enlightenment. We are in an era of Counter-Enlightenment. This is inextricably bound up with nationalism, identity politics, and cultural antagonisms. However, capitalism is perfectly capable of coexisting with these reactionary currents; the profit mechanisms—driven by vast financial resources that serve not the public, but rather the interests of corporations and select cliques—remain entirely insulated from this friction. This is not a crisis of capitalism; it is a crisis of the free, emancipatory social order. Capitalism does not require a free social order in order to function. I do not believe capitalism is weakening at present. Rather, I think capitalism is currently revealing its ugly face on a global scale.

F.B.: On the other hand, given that Marx has been at the very center of contemporary debates since the 2008 crisis, how do you interpret the glaring absence of discussions regarding alternative systems to capitalism? Is it not a paradox to live in an era where Marx is constantly debated, yet which remains entirely devoid of utopia?

Quante:

Marx has been discovered—or rediscovered—as a contemporary thinker precisely because of these crises. Yet, what is visibly lacking today is the existence of a vast, unified political movement organized upon the foundation of Marx’s critique of capitalism. We see interest at an intellectual level, and isolated political factions where Marx continues to live on. But the idea of mobilizing politically on a societal or global scale simply does not exist.

Add to this the increasingly complex communication and information networks generated by new media. This dynamic causes debates to endlessly circulate within small, hermetic bubbles, inside their own echo chambers. These discussions do not enable people to cultivate a global consciousness regarding fundamental problems and conflicts. Accompanied by a concurrent nationalist turn, the people affected by these very processes are pitted against one another; they fail to organize themselves as part of a larger, cohesive movement.

Marx’s intellectual relevance remains visible to certain segments of society. Many love to quote Marx; but very few actually read him. He is treated almost like a Church Father. However, the project of organizing and synthesizing social processes through a cohesive philosophical-political worldview is no longer functional.

“Marx relies on revolution, whereas Hegel relies on reform. They are diametrically opposed at the level of tactics and strategy.”

F.B.: Your book is described as an attempt to reconstruct Marxist philosophy within the Hegelian tradition, framing it as both a critical and an anthropological approach. Especially after the Second World War, numerous thinkers in Germany and France attempted to reunite Marx and Hegel. In what specific ways does your interpretation of the relationship between Hegel and Marx diverge from these earlier approaches?

Quante:

What I am attempting to do situates itself firmly within the tradition of Western Marxism. That is correct. Where my approach consistently advances the discourse is by placing the tradition of philosophical anthropology forcefully at the center. It involves uniting Marx’s early conception of the human being with his critique of capitalism, while simultaneously integrating certain theorems and thought patterns from contemporary systematic philosophy into this framework. I believe this precise combination is what was previously absent.

We had Analytical Marxism, in which the Hegelian tradition played absolutely no role. There was Hegelian Marxism, which gravitated toward the early writings. Then there was Structuralism, which concerned itself predominantly with the late Marx. And, of course, there was the purportedly scientific worldview embedded within Orthodox Marxist thought. My objective is to synthesize the finest elements of all these traditions. I am pursuing two distinct aims here.

The first is to genuinely understand Marx better; in this regard, I operate as a Marx scholar. The second is to understand the present better through the conceptual tools of Marx’s philosophy. These are two entirely different objectives. In this book, I offer both. In other books I have written on Marx, I function much more strictly as a scholar. But the message I wish to convey in this book is this: examine this thinker carefully; we can learn a great deal from him in order to better comprehend the world.

I always say this: you will not find ready-made prescriptive solutions in Marx; you must develop them yourself. Marx is not a Church Father; he is a critical philosopher.

F.B.: How should we interpret the fact that whenever Marx becomes the central figure of debate, interest in Hegel simultaneously surges? Is Hegel an unavoidable waystation for deepening Marx’s ideas? Or, as Althusser suggested, is the return to Hegel an attempt to tame Marx’s radicalism?

Quante:

These are two different questions. Let me state this first: I am also a Hegel scholar, and I follow a parallel path with Hegel as I do with Marx. On the one hand, as a Hegel scholar, I am developing an interpretation that includes new dimensions distinct from traditional readings. On the other hand, I deploy Hegelian concepts in systematic debates, arguing that Hegel, too, is a thinker with whom one can think and work contemporaneously. So, for me, these are two foundational reference points—thinkers I both research and utilize as conceptual arsenals for doing my own philosophy.

The second question pertains to the relationship between Hegel and Marx. In Marxism-Leninism, Hegel is viewed merely as a precursor figure; to foreground him too much is to deviate from the official interpretation of Marx. Conversely, in orthodox Hegel scholarship, Marx is often dismissed as someone who fundamentally misinterpreted Hegel’s core philosophical insights. In both paradigms, Hegel and Marx are positioned as diametrically opposed poles. I find this unconvincing, because there are profoundly strong Hegelian elements embedded within Marx’s thought. The relationship between them is far more complex.

That being said, there are also fundamental differences between them. One of the most critical is this: Hegel believed that bourgeois society—and by extension, capitalism—could be integrated into a socially rational order. Marx, however, believed it had to be abolished. We are looking at a very deep schism here. From a political standpoint, this corresponds to the divide between a social market economy and left-socialist visions. Thus, these two philosophers effectively become the namesakes for two entirely divergent social models.

Another issue concerns political activism. Marx relies on revolution, whereas Hegel relies on reform. They are diametrically opposed at the level of tactics and strategy as well. For this reason, they have always represented two distinct projects within the Left; at times, they have even symbolized the demarcation between the “Left” and the “non-Left,” which is to say, the antagonism between a bourgeois theory of society and a leftist theory of society. But it is time to move past these impasses.

Today, an intelligent left-wing politics cannot be derived exclusively from Marx, nor exclusively from Hegel. They are merely sources of inspiration. To formulate a responsible politics, we require other thinkers, other scientific disciplines, and other orientations. All these internal debates within the Left morph into an endless war waged over the legacy of great thinkers. Consequently, rather than building solidarity through collective political action, this dynamic spawns countless splintered factions. I believe we must abandon this habit and ask the essential question: With which philosophical arguments can we organize a good, socially and normatively sound politics?

“For Marx, capitalism is wrong because it is based on a false conception of life, not because it is a flawed system of distribution.”

F.B.: You make a striking assertion in your book: “Marx’s critique of political economy is not a theory of justice.” Could you elaborate on this view?

Quante:

Yes, this is very closely linked to the distinction between social democracy and socialist visions—a divide present in Hegel and Marx, and generally across the Left. Marx read the first party program of the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] in 1875 and ruthlessly critiqued it. In his critique of social democracy, he argues that they view the problem of justice under capitalism purely as a matter of wealth distribution, and thus, they seek the solution solely in redistribution. For Marx, this analysis is not nearly deep enough. The true pathology of capitalism is human alienation. This alienation afflicts both the capitalist elite and the impoverished worker in equal measure. He demands not a redistribution within the existing social order, but the total transformation of the social order itself.

Thus, the divergence that can be read through Hegel and Marx resurfaces within Marxism itself. In the Analytical Marxist tradition—partly under the influence of John Rawls—there is an attempt to reconstruct Marx’s critique of capitalism as a theory of justice. However, this cannot be seriously maintained unless one deliberately ignores the anthropological dimensions of Marx’s thought and his critique of Hegel.

Because, for Marx, capitalism is wrong because it is based on a false conception of life, not because it is a flawed system of distribution. He would not have opposed the idea of a different redistribution between rich and poor; but he would have insisted that this is merely treating a symptom. Even if everyone were rendered perfectly equal within capitalism, alienation would persist. Marx’s core critique of social democracy is precisely that they lose sight of this radical anthropological utopia.

F.B.: We live in an era rife with innumerable injustices. We face distributional injustice fueled by profound economic inequality; on the other hand, we are witnessing an epoch of legal injustices where fundamental rights and freedoms are suspended, even in countries with deep-rooted constitutional traditions. At a time when we need a theory of justice more than ever, how can Marx help us?

Quante:

Marx can, of course, help with questions of justice; because his critique of political economy clarifies why capital accumulates, why it monopolizes, and why political intervention has lost its efficacy due to the private ownership of capital. Real power no longer resides in political institutions. All of this can be reconstructed perfectly well using Marx’s analysis.

However, there is another dimension to Marx: the capitalist world order devastates nature and strips humanity of its capacity to grasp its own life as a meaningful whole. The devastation of nature is essentially the “green Marx”; this is the ecological problem. It is no longer merely a matter of distributive justice; it is also about utilizing resources without irreparably damaging the natural world.

The problem of meaning, meanwhile, is addressed by the theory of alienation. It is worth noting here: earlier, we mentioned identity politics, esoteric trends, and the resurgence of nationalist and religious interpretations of the world. These are all symptoms of a deficiency. They arise because it has become increasingly difficult for people to conceptualize their lives as meaningful and successful within their everyday social practices.

This is not merely an issue of material resources. If you look at quality-of-life research, whether a person considers their life “successful” or “meaningful” does not directly correlate with wealth. Much deeper anthropological questions come into play here. In Marx, it is possible to glean insights into these questions from other parts of his corpus, and these extend far beyond distribution and its optimization. Ultimately, it boils down to how humanity wishes to relate to its own existence and to nature, and the categories through which it defines the “good life.”

F.B.: So, you disagree with the view held by some thinkers that Marx lacks an ethical philosophy. How do you interpret the moral dimension of Marx’s critique of capitalism?

Quante:

First of all, we must acknowledge this: during Marx’s time, there was a highly heterogeneous intellectual current in Europe criticizing the ascending bourgeois society. This movement critiqued capitalism using strictly moral concepts. Marx found this approach unconvincing for a variety of reasons. According to him, the critique of capitalism must be grounded not in normative interpretations, but in the rigorous analysis of economic structures. This is the precise meaning of the famous eleventh thesis: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”

That being said, the critique of capitalism that Marx develops through economic analysis also harbors an implicit ethical dimension. That is to say, his critique fundamentally carries an ethical orientation. Marx does not believe that capitalism can be critiqued in purely economic terms; for him, the economic critique ultimately rests on the following question: Can human beings lead a good and meaningful life within these institutions or not? This is an ethical question, not an economic one. Yet, Marx utilizes this not as his starting point, but as the implicit guiding principle of his economic critique.

Alongside Hegel, Marx is a fierce critic of the moral philosophy of his era (particularly that of Kant and Fichte). Through Hegel, he is far closer to the Aristotelian ethical tradition. This is an ethics of the good life, not an ethics of duty and justice. Therefore, a shift in orientation occurs. In this sense, Marx, much like Hegel, creates a synthesis between the Kantian idea of autonomy and the Aristotelian idea of the polis.

For this reason, I prefer to speak of an “ethical Marx” rather than a “moral Marx”; the critique of morality in both Hegel and Marx is exceedingly harsh. What is meant by “morality” here is the Kantian and Fichtean conception of goodwill—formal, a priori, independent of experience, and profoundly non-anthropological.

But that is a separate topic entirely.

FB: Another pillar of this debate extends into contemporary politics. How do you respond to the commentary that, over the last fifty years, left-wing parties have neglected political morality and ceded numerous issues of freedom to the far right? Particularly during the pandemic, how do you interpret the fact that left-wing parties were largely demanding state restrictions, while right-wing parties objected to these measures in the name of individual liberty?

Quante:

Let me answer by returning to a comment you made at the very beginning. I am discussing the philosophy of Marx here, not Marxist philosophy. There is a slogan I frequently use at conferences: “We must rescue Marx from the rubble of Marxism.” Because, beginning with Engels, Marx’s thought was flattened into a single, unidirectional trajectory.

Distinct branches formed within Marxism. One of them is the line that dictates: “We no longer do philosophy, we do science; we do not preach morality, we elucidate economic laws.” According to this logic, anyone who fails to adhere to this is not a Marxist, but a petty-bourgeois intellectual. Such an approach rejects moral and ethical debate outright, deeming it sufficient to speak exclusively of economic interests. This is not Marx; it is a specific positivist strain entrenched within Marxism-Leninism.

Alongside this, there is the Trotskyist and Luxemburgist tradition, which relies on the spontaneous organization of the masses, possessing a rather anarchistic character. In stark contrast, the Bolshevik tradition centers on centralized, state-driven planned political intervention. Consequently, while some leftist factions view the state as the sole potent instrument of political agency, the anarchist left argues that the state is fundamentally an apparatus of bourgeois domination. Thus, a schism forms within the Left between the “pro-state” and “anti-state” camps.

The less left-wing parties address the question of a meaningful life, the wider the vacuum they leave behind. This void is subsequently filled by religion, nationalism, and various esoteric movements, which offer people the sense of meaning sorely lacking in their everyday lives. At this juncture, the Left must urgently generate a comprehensive educational and cultural politics.

Let me share another slogan I use frequently: “We must not surrender the concept of Heimat [homeland/belonging] to the Right.” Because we, posing as Marxist economists, refuse to speak about such matters. This is a colossal cultural-political error. Thinkers like Gramsci or Walter Benjamin understood this. However, the classical Left remains fractured into internal factions, each fiercely battling the other over trivial fragments.

From Engels onward, the political ideal within Marxism frequently devolved into a top-down authoritarian model. This is entirely incompatible with the reality that Marx was, at heart, a philosopher.

“We initiated world wars twice driven by imperialist motivations, and twice we devastated Germany and Europe.”

F.B.: At the beginning of your book, you mention that core capitalist countries are no longer able to export their problems to peripheral countries. Today, Germany is also mired in a deep economic and social crisis. What path will Germany take? How can it solve these problems?

Quante:

What is happening in Germany right now is a severe crisis; indeed, we are facing a democratic crisis reminiscent of the interwar period. There are immense uncertainties. Geopolitical power balances are shifting. Many people have lost faith in political institutions. There are people who are disoriented and plagued by anxiety.

In the face of fears regarding downward social mobility and general unease, people rarely respond with universal left-wing values; instead, they default to exclusionary, nationalist reactions. That is the core problem. Germany is experiencing struggles economically and as a society, but this is the problem of a country ranked among the top five economies worldwide; it is not a scenario of total collapse. The true measure requires a comparison with the Global South.

The fundamental issue here is that the people in Germany no longer actively defend democratic institutions and the values of an open society. They have begun to view them not as principles to be fiercely protected, but as things that can be casually risked. Furthermore, there is severe income inequality in Germany; however, the standard of living for the vast majority would still be considered remarkably high when juxtaposed with the nations of the Global South.

Therefore, the crisis in Germany is not fundamentally an economic collapse, but rather a fading identification with democracy and a lingering hope of returning to the “good old days.” People want to believe that everything can become great again without them having to change themselves. This is deeply irrational.

In addition to this, there are, of course, ecological problems; but these are global, not national, issues. They are not uniquely German. A specifically German peculiarity is that the country is now forced to take the issue of geopolitical military alliances seriously. My generation believed this could be safely ignored; however, it must now be painfully re-debated.

Amidst this uncertainty, many people are searching for quick and simple answers. Yet, we must seriously consider this question: Do we wish to defend ourselves against aggressors? If Europe intends to preserve the European way of life, it must decide whether or not it will defend itself.

Germany’s post-war society, sheltered under the protective umbrella of NATO, assumed it no longer needed to contemplate these matters, styling itself as a pacifist society. This posture is no longer sustainable.

On the domestic social plane, conflicts must be resolved: there are acute issues of income distribution and justice. However, these do not constitute a class war; such metaphors are misguided. Moreover, none of this can be solved purely at the nation-state level. In Europe, social policies remain confined to the national level, which is a total failure of scale. There is an urgent need for European-wide social policy. By the same token, international justice and global health policies are imperative.

The world has become a far more aggressive and troubled place today. Consequently, German society is engulfed in a state of disorientation. The grand narratives that held true for so long—the welfare state, the compromise between capital and labor, the vow that “never again will war emanate from German soil,” the export-driven model, and the open society—are currently collapsing. This leaves people grappling with a profound question: What are the values truly worth living for?

There are no clear answers to this question, and so people gravitate toward the simplistic answers peddled by the Right; these answers are inhumane, but they are seductive to those unwilling to engage in complex thought. The allure lies in the promise: “You don’t need to change anything; we can restore everything to the way it was.” But the “old days” were not good. That is sheer romanticism.

F.B.: Several historians and thinkers describe Germany as a country that has long been adrift in uncertainty, continuously searching for itself and struggling to find its identity. As a German philosopher, how do you define Germany?

Quante:

We initiated world wars twice, driven by imperialist motivations, and twice we devastated Germany and Europe. This forms a profound part of the biographical identity of my generation—those born after ’45 and those slightly older than me: the absolute conviction that Germany must never do such a thing again, and must never become so powerful that it turns aggressive once more.

At the same time, thanks to NATO and the “Economic Miracle,” the bloody wars were externalized to the Global South and waged largely by the Americans themselves. Especially with the advent of ecological crises, financial meltdowns, and similar processes from the 2000s onward, massive waves of migration occurred.

What these migrations signify is this: populations with absolutely no prospects in the Global South are arriving in Europe on boats, putting immense strain on our systems, and creating a sense of disruption. In 2015, this sparked a massive wave of humanitarian goodwill in Germany; three years later, however, that attitude had soured.

We must view this through a broader lens. For far too long, we lived under the illusion that others were quietly solving the “uncomfortable” problems for us, allowing us to posture as “democrats who do everything morally right.” Now, we are discovering that democracy is an exceedingly fragile construct. Democracy does not begin in the parliament; it begins in educational processes—it starts in kindergarten.

This is why I always say: if Marx were alive today, before addressing the proletariat, he would visit kindergartens and schools. Because we are losing our youth in the first ten years of their lives. We are failing to instill the right attitudes in them. The framework for this is found not in Marx’s critique of capitalism, but in his philosophical anthropology.

F.B.: In a speech critiquing the EU, Alain Badiou stated, “Personally, I have long advocated for the unification of France and Germany… A single country, a single federal state, two sovereign languages. It is perfectly possible… thus, philosophy would become truly French-German philosophy, and perhaps experience its most glorious era.” Is there any real possibility of this coming to pass, or is it merely nostalgic yearning?

Quante:

Twenty years ago, I co-authored an interdisciplinary book with nine colleagues. In it, we argued that Europe must transcend being merely a free-movement market and establish a genuine European welfare state. We asserted that without a common social state and robust European-level social institutions, Europe would eventually fracture under the weight of national egoisms.

I am also in total agreement with Jürgen Habermas: if we wish to lead a free and emancipatory life, Europe must evolve into federal components; we cannot settle for a European Parliament structured solely around strategic alliances driven by national egoism. National sovereignty must be transferred to the European level.

The critical question here is: What values and norms does Europe actually represent? This is not at all clear; in fact, it is remarkably ambiguous. There is no shared consensus on values. There is only a common enemy. And that is a profound problem. Suddenly, we find ourselves with multiple “enemies”: Russia, China, and the United States. This situation breeds massive disorientation and a paralyzing fear of downward mobility. In such circumstances, people become significantly more aggressive. That is the predicament.

The only antidote to this is education and enlightenment.

F.B.: Finally, one last question on a highly contemporary issue. In your book, you underscore alienation as a foundational concept in Marx. To overcome the alienation induced by capitalist exchange relations, you invoke Marx’s concept of human recognition (Anerkennung). In the face of today’s artificial intelligence technologies, has the struggle for human recognition become even more arduous? Or does it also present new possibilities for transcending alienation?

Quante:

At present, there is no such thing as “artificial intelligence.” There are only highly complex computational programs; they are not intelligent.

Every major technology carries certain potentials, and these must be controlled. Technology is never entirely neutral; it harbors inherent risks, and it can be wielded both for human emancipation and for subjugation. This represents the external, instrumental dimension of technology.

I believe we should not underestimate the current capabilities of artificial intelligence, but we must equally refrain from demonizing it. That is philosophically flawed. Moreover, the following question is paramount: Should the means of production for such globally networked information technologies remain in private hands, or should they be placed under societal control?

That is a profoundly Marxist question. If we possess globally networked information technologies, they must fall under public sovereignty, not be left in the hands of technocrats or socially detached specialists.

Technology is highly beneficial for certain purposes; it liberates us from burdens. But if misused, it can be extraordinarily dangerous. This holds true even for a hammer—it applies to the simplest of tools. Everything depends entirely upon how it is used.

Foreign affairs writer Lily Lynch discusses the shifting political landscape of Central Europe and the Balkans in this interview with Harici. Lynch, whose work frequently appears in the New Statesman, New Left Review, and The Baffler, addresses a range of topics from Hungary’s recent elections to Serbia’s complex foreign policy maneuvers. A recipient of a 2025 LA Press Club award, she examines the “clarifying effect” of the Ukraine war on regional leadership and the evolving nature of right-wing populism across the continent. The conversation offers a detailed analysis of the challenges facing the European right and the persistent geopolitical tensions in the region.

I would like to begin with Hungary, specifically with the recent electoral victory of the right-wing populist Tisza Party, much like Viktor Orbán and Fidesz, and of its leader, Péter Magyar. What does this victory signify for Hungary’s future? The deep corruption and abuses of power involving Orbán’s circle had also received coverage in the international press. The fact that the country’s three major parties at the top of the electoral list are all right-wing paints a rather bleak picture.

I think that Magyar’s victory demonstrates several things. One is that right-wing ideas are still broadly popular in Hungary. The fact that Magyar is not so different from Orban on issues like immigration demonstrates that. So right-wing politics were not defeated in this election; instead, it is clear now that they are very much entrenched in Hungary and do reflect the sentiments of the public.

At the same time, I think there’s a particular brand of right-wing populism that is starting to cause some fatigue. This is a sort of clownish, personality-driven Trumpian populism that is wedded to Zionism, and which Orban embodied as well. I think Magyar’s success hints at a desire for a more sober and serious right-wing politics, decoupled from MAGA populism, and perhaps somewhat less revisionist: a politics that are anti-immigration and conservative but also more content with the status quo.

The electoral result also suggests that Trump’s brand has grown increasingly toxic, and that Orban’s choice to embrace Trump–going so far as having JD Vance campaign for him ahead of the election–hurt more than it helped. Trump is becoming a burden for the right, particularly in Europe. After Trump’s threats towards Greenland, no one in Europe can say they support Trump and also support respect for sovereignty. Of course, this is exactly what Orban once preached, as he fashioned himself a sovereigntist. In the end, it appeared that he only opposed encroachments from Brussels, but gave Trump’s America a pass.

At the same time, Orban’s deliberate stoking of the culture war ended up producing diminishing returns for him. Without decent economic performance, and with so much perceived corruption, his culture war crusades on issues such as gender simply were not enough to keep him afloat. In addition, Orban’s re-traditionalization efforts failed. The pro-natality policies he put in place were expensive but did little to boost the birth rate. Church attendance under Orban was even lower than it was during the socialist period, when religion was frowned upon by the authorities.

It may also be useful to touch on Serbia. The government led by Aleksandar Vučić appears to be pursuing what is often described as a “multi-vector foreign policy.” On the one hand, there is the prospect of EU membership; on the other, there are Serbia’s historically rooted ties with Russia. Yet in the course of the war in Ukraine, how should we interpret the statements coming from Moscow, particularly the strong reaction led by the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) to alleged arms deliveries to Kyiv via third parties? How sustainable is this condition of being a “swing state”?

There was a time when Vučić managed Serbia’s complex geopolitical position relatively well. At the height of the Vučić era, which was already a decade ago now, Serbia had relations with Russia, China, Turkey, the US, and many countries of the Global South that are members of the Non-aligned Movement–all while remaining a candidate for EU membership. But February 2022 changed everything for him. A major war in Europe–no longer confined to Donbass–meant that he was suddenly under much more pressure to harmonize Serbia’s policy with that of other European countries. In practice this meant things like imposing sanctions on Russia, and by voting in lockstep with EU and NATO member countries on resolutions on Ukraine in UN General Assembly votes.

It is true of course that Vucic was permitting indirect Serbian arms sales to Ukraine, which bought him a lot of credibility in Western capitals. With the Russians, meanwhile, he made excuses: He claimed that he was under a tremendous amount of pressure, and basically could not tell the West “no”. For a while I think the Russians accepted this, if grudgingly. But then as the arms sales to Ukraine didn’t stop after Vucic said they would, there were strong reactions in Russia.

I don’t think any of these actors, with the possible exception of China, trust Vucic anymore. For a long time, Vucic was all things to all people. A great example was in a UNGA vote Serbia voted in favor of a resolution on Ukraine, then Vucic immediately issued a statement saying that it had been “a mistake” and that they’d meant to vote against it. This was a deliberate strategy of ambiguity: which message to believe? The actual vote or Vucic’s statement to the press. He was masterful at this, for years: give one message to Washington, one to Moscow, and one to Brussels. I think you can sustain that kind of ambiguity for a time, and perhaps even a long time, but war has a clarifying effect. At a certain point, you just have to choose.

Vucic has also been one of the losers of the second Trump administration. This is the exact opposite of what he had hoped: he expected Serbia to be a natural ally to Trump. Instead, Vucic has been rebuffed by the administration, and repeatedly. Vucic stayed faithful to his mutli-vector foreign policy with the expectation that Trump would come to power and immediately end the war in Ukraine. I think he really believed that would happen–that Trump would end the war in Ukraine immediately. If that happened, Vucic’s job would have been a lot easier: there would be far less pressure on him from the EU, for one. So long story short, two recent developments have imperiled his multi-vector approach. First, the full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022, and second, Trump winning a second term, and subsequent ambivalent relations with the White House.

It may also be worthwhile here to address the issue of Kosovo, which, as is well known, has in recent years become a fault line that periodically simmers and boils over. In the December elections in Kosovo, Albin Kurti once again returned to the office of prime minister. Would it be possible for you to share some information on this, or perhaps your observations and/or firsthand impressions? It seems likely that this is a place we will be discussing in the years ahead.

Albin Kurti has staked his career in part on his opposition to the creation of something called “the Association of Serbian Municipalities” of “Community of Serbian Municipalities” in northern Kosovo. Northern Kosovo is home to a Serbian-majority population who absolutely do not recognize Kurti’s government as legitimate and largely answer to Belgrade, though they often feel left on their own by the Serbian government as well. According to the 2013 Brussels Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, the government of Kosovo has to create something called the Association/Community of Serbian Municipalities, a sort of thin layer of sovereignty or self-government that is nonetheless subordinate to Prishtina. Meanwhile, Serbia would extract itself from the north, ceding control of it to the government of Kosovo.

This has always been hugely controversial in Kosovo, as some believe it will create the conditions for eventual Serbian secession. Kurti remaining in office effectively means that there will be little progress made on this front. This is something that has made Western capitals very frustrated with Kurti, and he was under EU sanctions until last year.

However tense the current status quo is, I disagree with those who say a return to full-scale war is imminent or inevitable. There are something like 4,500 peacekeeping troops in Kosovo as a part of KFOR, NATO’s Kosovo peacekeeping force. That said, I am sure there will be the occasional flare up of localized violence. This currently happens every 1-2 years. But I highly doubt that these spasms of violence will lead to a full-scale war. Despite all the acrimonious feelings and distrust, there is little appetite for another big war in the Balkans by any side.

Finally, I am curious about your assessment, in broader terms, of what has given rise to the right-wing populist wave across Europe and/or how it is likely to shape Europe’s future overall. The supposedly “anti-establishment” profile, as in the case of Giorgia Meloni, either ends up directly submitting to the establishment, that is, to the Brussels bureaucracy, or produces state structures of astonishing corruption. This is a genuinely compelling issue, and I would be very interested in your views.

My answer about what has given rise to the right-wing populist wave is not at all original. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that this wave was preceded by the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which led to an overall crisis in faith in institutions, experts, and in liberalism. This was fertile ground for a populist backlash against “elites”. Of course, these anti-establishment politicians ride to power on promises to “drain the swamp” or fight the powers that be, and then turn around and adopt very conventional policies once in office. Or, in Orban’s case, they may actually break with established consensus, but turn out even more corrupt than the liberal “elites” they rail against. There is always a rhetoric-policy gap in politics, but it’s especially pronounced on the populist right.

In this extensive interview with Harici Medya at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, Swiss journalist, Editor-in-chief of Die Weltwoche Roger Köppel provides a piercing diagnostic of the fracturing global order. Analyzing the downfall of the so-called “rule-based international system” through the cold lens of realism, Köppel articulates the inherent fragility of modern alliances when confronted by the supremacy of national interests. From the volatile Iran-Israel axis to the internal schisms within NATO, and from China’s emergence as a strategic alternative to the complex interplay between theology and power, each pivotal issue is reshaped by Köppel’s distinct and uncompromising perspective.

The dialogue further explores the friction between the Vatican and the American populist right, interrogating the resurgence of religion as a potent geopolitical instrument. Placing significant emphasis on Türkiye’s central role as a mediator within this “biblical” theater of conflict, Köppel champions the necessity of authentic diplomacy over moralizing rhetoric. Ultimately, this conversation offers a profound intellectual roadmap for navigating the sanctuary of pragmatism in an era redefined by the maneuvers of “great predator countries.”

I’d like to start with the ongoing talks about Iran. There is this current discussions between United States and Iran that they had an agreement about the Strait of Hormuz, but then things soured quite a bit and now Iran claims that they’re going to close the strait again because the American side also is not opening the blockade. So in a more general sense, what do you think about this ceasefire? How do you think it’s going to evolve in the upcoming days?

If I knew, I would have great qualified knowledge. Probably I could be a very rich man because I could foresee the stock market development. Unfortunately, we are in a very difficult situation where national interest, security concerns and even religious convictions are in the field of battle. And I can just hope that at the end of the day, goodwill prevails and that all sides find a way to settle this terrible situation. But how it can be achieved… I’m a Swiss. It’s very, very difficult to give here any kind of advice. I think I can understand all sides. I can understand the security concerns of Israel. I have a lot of sympathy with that. I can understand the American position, which was, since President Reagan, rather clear concerning Iran. And then you have Iran, this amazing civilization, which at least in European eyes, is also on a way, which can be—let’s be very cautious here—which can be considered a threat for other countries, building up ballistic arsenals, experimenting with nuclear explosives. It’s a very, very demanding issue. But somehow I’m still optimistic. I believe that they find a solution. But at the moment, it’s very hard to see how.

The United States and Europe had some sort of conflict between each other when it came to the Iran war. Donald Trump had certain expectations from its European allies, which already had a strained relationship after the Greenland debacle. When it comes to why Europe did not send any help, how do you describe that? Do you think Trump was right? Do you think Europe was right? What is the situation between the two parts of NATO?

I think what we see in the relationship between the EU and the United States is a symptom of the topic that has been discussed at this conference here in Antalya, which is the crumbling, which is the downfall of the so-called international order. And you can see it even on the level of military alliances such as NATO, that these alliances, they mean nothing in today’s world. We are in a world where national interest rules. And I believe that always national interest has ruled. But sometimes there was a lot of hypocrisy and the big talk about international order, rule-based order. But at the end of the day, it was only and always national interest. And we see it now with NATO: when it’s in the national interest that the Europeans can talk and use NATO, they say, “We are NATO members.” If the biggest NATO power, United States, says “Now you have to help us,” the Europeans say “No.” So I don’t want to judge this. I don’t want to say who is right and who is wrong. But I would like to say that this just indicates to us that these international rule-based systems, alliances such as NATO, they give no security today, they give no order today. The only thing that matters are national interest and the capacity of national leaders to sit together and find solutions for conflicts. And this is why this forum here in Antalya is very important. Because in such a world of national interest, where conflicts can pop up any second, any minute, it’s very important to bring back diplomacy, to talk, to create platforms such as these in order to interact. I think this is great that we have on one day the Ukrainian Foreign Minister and on the other day the Russian Foreign Minister. I wish we had more such forums also in Europe. And this is my critique of the European Union. We are too much… The European Union is too much moralizing, telling everybody who is the bad guy, who is the good guy, and is not engaging enough in finding common ground, common solutions via diplomacy.

When you look into the relationship between Europe and Russia or Europe and China, especially with the NATO meetings previously, before the second Trump administration, it was always claimed that these countries are adversaries to the Western order in general. But now, especially strained relations between Europe and the United States, we are seeing many members of the European Union trying to find alternatives to their security arrangements with the United States, which can be considered with China. Especially now we are seeing the Spanish Prime Minister going to China. Emmanuel Macron said something similar. And there were Keir Starmer’s meeting with Xi Jinping in China. So in general, do you see China being an alternative to United States? Do you think that Europe will change its course towards East?

Well, I’m from Switzerland, from a neutral country. And we try not to make enemies. We are too small; we have to be able to defend ourselves. And Switzerland is very much open to the world. We work with everybody. And even our neutrality has a bit suffered in the last years because the European Union has pushed Switzerland a lot in order to participate in the sanctions against Russia, even delivering weapons to Ukraine. Fortunately, we did never that. We were strictly neutral in the juristic sense. But with the sanctions, we have lost a bit our absolute impartiality. So Switzerland is totally open to the world. And I think many European countries should follow this path and should not talk themselves into these kind of confrontational views of the world. Of course, I mean, there might be other interests. If you look at the Baltic states, with their history with the Soviet Union, with Russia, it’s complicated. Poland has another tradition; they have to find out for themselves. But generally speaking, I would say in today’s world, we have to invest in great bilateral relationships. The European countries should cooperate with the United States, of course, with China, with Russia. I mean, Russia is a neighbor of Europe, but Europe, what is Europe? Europe is a group of small and middle countries with different histories and also different national interests. And somehow the EU is a structure which is too heavy-handed for this multiplicity of interests. So I would strongly argue from a Swiss perspective: make peace with Russia as soon as you can. Make no war, no conflict with China. Stop this moralizing attitude and patronizing of others. Just try to be a small bunch of countries who is not in big power politics anymore. Let the others be big powers. We can be big economic powers, big scientific powers, big powers of diplomacy and understanding and leave the rest to the big predator countries that are also on this planet. Of course, the big powers have big problems. We are smaller countries with smaller problems.

There’s a sentiment, there was a sentiment in the first Trump administration that if the European countries hang on tight for as long as possible, there will be eventually a leader that is willing to work together with Europe once again, which was Joe Biden in that. And when Joe Biden was elected, the Ukraine war started. And then we saw a reconsolidation of European countries under NATO umbrella in general. But now we are seeing the strain in the relationship is so hard that things may not go back as much as it can. But still, in the many international meetings, we are seeing figures like Gavin Newsom from California, which could be potentially the next president of the United States. And he was saying, “You need to once again hang on tight until 2028.” Do you think that if a Democrat president or a president that is someone that’s more close to American establishment… Do you think if someone like that gets into the presidency in United States, the concept of “collective West” will come back and Europe and United States will go back to their relationship like it was before?

Well, I hope not that we will go back in the time before Trump in that sense, because Donald Trump made—the American President made—something which was to me overdue: he said we have to talk with Russia again. We have to engage in diplomacy. Under Biden, there was no diplomacy. And if Gavin Newsom wants to be the second Biden—no diplomacy with Russia, the collective West meaning “we, the West, the best against the rest”—then I don’t think that this is a philosophy with which you can win the future. Of course, the United States is a big country; you could say a Godzilla country. And a Godzilla country has a lot of problems. They have a lot of alliances in the region of China, with Taiwan, with Japan, entanglements. It’s not easy. Of course, you have global interests. You have to see what you can do. And I think the reality, the dominating trend in the reality is—and I think Trump has realized this—the time of unilateral dominance of the United States of America is over. That was the case after the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1990. Then the Russians were lying on the ground. China was still very weak after Mao Zedong. I mean, they were starting to recover. Now we have a different world. We have China, which is basically number one economically. We have India, which is growing very fast. Russia has recovered. Russia doesn’t swallow a NATO enlargement to the east, you know, neglecting all the security concerns of Russia. I have great understanding. The Russians say “No, we don’t want this.” The Americans would never tolerate Russians or Chinese with their military structures in Canada or in Mexico. I mean, they wouldn’t wait as President Putin for eight years; they would intervene in eight hours if something like that happens. So Trump has realized America is not strong enough to be the dominant hegemon of the world. So he starts to focus, to concentrate on his prime spheres of influence, which is South America, which is the Middle East with all the oil. He has a rivalry with China. But I think Trump is, ultimately, he’s a pragmatist. Probably he was being overconfident with Iran. I can understand that. He didn’t want… I mean, he doesn’t want… He’s not interested in the interests of the United States and of Israel if Iran gets nuclear weapons. So they had to do something. But you know, they probably overestimated themselves. We will see. I don’t know, but we’re seeing this kind of multipolar world is in the making, and therefore, we need a lot of diplomacy and pragmatism. I think Trump is a pragmatist. I didn’t think that Biden was a pragmatist. I don’t think that Gavin Newsom seems like a pragmatist. I don’t know. So I hope that we see leaders, whoever it might be, who will not go back to the old times with no diplomacy, no talking, with this kind of Western supremacy attitude. This is not good. It’s not good for the West. It’s not good for the rest of the world. It’s not good for everybody.

In the first question, you mentioned a little bit of the religious conflicts. From what I understand, at least, you were talking about the Trump and Pope little fight maybe. So this situation in the last week has really gone out of control. The statements coming from both sides were pretty harsh. Donald Trump and especially a Catholic, J.D. Vance, was telling the Pope that he should be careful when he’s talking about theological matters, which was pretty interesting on its own. But when you look into this, do you think it is happening because Donald Trump saw someone that is critical of himself and he just didn’t want to take that, or you see a more sectarian conflict on the background of the situation? Because we have many figures like Peter Thiel of Palantir having meetings in Rome, talking about the Pope, talking about the Antichrist. And there was Steve Bannon who was mentioning we should overthrow Pope Francis and overthrow Vatican. There are plenty of figures in the American populist right that have a problem with Vatican. So in general, what do you say? Do you think that this is a sectarian issue?

In my first answer, I actually alluded to another biblical conflict, which is the conflict between the Israelites and the Ishmaelites, you know, going back to the great prophet Abraham and those great peoples which emerged from that great father, grandfather of civilization: the Israelites and the Ishmaelites. And Iran, you know, being one of the great empires, of course, also during the Islamic rule of the world. And then, of course, then you got the Jews, God’s chosen people. And I would say that religion is also a big part of Middle Eastern politics. But it’s great, it’s good you mentioned this dimension also in Western politics. Well, I would suggest, I mean, not to take Trump literally, but to take Trump seriously. And not every utterance of people from his camp or from other camps has to be taken totally seriously. I’m a Protestant, but I’m theologically interested. I saw with certain bewilderment these, you could say this wrestling, this verbal wrestling between the Vatican and then we saw these absurd pictures of Donald Trump, the American president, like posing as some kind of Jesus. But we have seen some similar stuff. I mean, there are people who think that Trump is losing his mind. Well, I don’t hope that’s a sign of that. I don’t know. That’s what the Americans have to find out for themselves. But I would say this is, for me, just an absurd indicator of probable—and I hope I’m wrong—nervousness on the side of the American leadership which realizes that things in the Middle East are not going according to plan. And I think that the American President has put himself under no less stress because he said he wants to finish the war in Ukraine. It’s still going on. He has his vision for Israel, he has his vision for the Middle East, he has his Abraham Accords, which is a great achievement. But now they are somehow not, you know, really, really in the spotlight anymore. You see this war in Iran, he doesn’t seem to find an end, an emergency exit. So probably these verbal entanglements are a symptom of stress. But on the other side, we have seen so many things Trump has said and strange stuff, you know, and I wouldn’t take it too seriously. Of course, the Pope, it’s his duty to criticize, to criticize war-making powers. I mean, this is his duty. And he is also… he’s right when he says it’s a crime to use God for politics, which is not only true for Christians; it’s also true for other religions today. Some powers use God to make politics. That’s always dangerous. And I think this is the ultimate sacrilege. As a Protestant, the people who speak about God meaning themselves… that’s a very dangerous species. We should be careful of these guys. So the Pope is right in saying this. And Trump, of course, he wants to present his point. I wouldn’t give too much attention to that. Peter Thiel… I have been to these lectures in Rome. I have listened to them. Yes, of course. I was there and it was confidential, so I shouldn’t say anything. But I’m smiling when I’m reading the newspapers about these lectures, what he was supposed to have said. My father was a Catholic too. Peter Thiel’s notion of the Vatican is not that the Vatican is the Antichrist. That’s not his position. I made an interview with him in my newspaper and he was explaining what he meant with Antichrist. He said the Antichrist is a worldwide bureaucracy which is grabbing power and putting sand into the eyes of the people, saying, “We save you from the apocalypse, we save you from Armageddon, from the climate catastrophe. We will bring eternal peace.” So Peter Thiel is not against the Vatican. Peter Thiel is not against whatever. You know, he’s concerned about the global bureaucratic state, which he identifies from his studies with that what the Bible called the Antichrist. But there are a lot of theologians who would not accept this description. They have a more narrow definition of the Antichrist. But it was a very interesting lecture and it was on a very high intellectual level. And I think not many politicians who criticize Peter Thiel are capable of having such a lecture themselves. So it was very interesting for me to listen to that.

Okay, one last question. It’s going to be about Türkiye. More specifically, the latest affairs that we’re seeing all around the region is bringing out a new situation where Türkiye and Israel are the new rivals in the region itself. Iran seems to be taking a little bit of a backside. And now that this is recognized by both sides, by both Türkiye and Israel, the rhetoric is getting stronger. Yesterday Mr. Tom Barrack was here and he was asked this very question and he said that it’s only rhetoric, it’s nothing more. These countries do not have to fight, are not on a path to fight. But he’s of course a side note in this situation and he obviously doesn’t want to see these two countries to get into a quarrel like that. But what do you say about this? Do you think in the near future of Middle East you expect a conflict between Israel and Türkiye?

Well, if I listen to certain statements of involved statesmen, there is not much diplomacy there. It’s very confrontational. We have listened yesterday to the Turkish President. Erdogan was very clear in his views. Also the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, a very thoughtful person, but still with strong words. And I fear that now we are here in a still very serious conflict between Israel and probably Türkiye. I hope as a Swiss, that Türkiye—which under President Erdogan has in a… I’m not talking about interior politics; I don’t want to interfere, this Turks have to sort out themselves what they see appropriate. From outside, I see a very strong head of state, the President, in a smart way, who has positioned Türkiye as a key player of international diplomacy. And I hope that Türkiye can use this weight, this respect it has gained, in order to find a way also to accommodate the legitimate security concerns of Israel. Then I can understand Israel in this sense that Israel has had a lot of wars in the last eight years. It didn’t start these wars. Israel has been built out of a terrible catastrophe which is in the responsibility of the Europeans, especially the Germans, which is the Holocaust. They have created this state of Israel after the Second World War, which was not accepted by some of the nations in the Middle East. And so there were wars; Israel won these wars, they gained territory, they gave this territory back in the philosophy “land for peace.” So they gave the land, they didn’t get the peace. And there is now a new, you can say, more hardline political agenda which says, “Well, after the massacre of Hamas, we switch. We don’t believe in land for peace. Now land is peace.” It’s a bit, you could say, the Russian perspective. Russia was attacked many times. They said, “We need a cordon sanitaire in order to protect ourselves. We start to think in square kilometers.” Problem is, Israel, they start to think the same way. But at the core are legitimate security concerns. I don’t think that Israel is an imperialist power who wants to have an empire reaching from Pakistan to Portugal or, you know, a huge territorial player. But I think there are legitimate security concerns. And Türkiye, as this great moderator, has this great diplomatic force in the center of the world, of this world. I just hope that President Erdogan will find a way in order to bring Israel to the table. Now with Syria, which is very close to Türkiye, they have a great understanding, as far as I could see here, with other powers and the track record of President Erdogan, I think he’s in a unique position to bring here peace. But how this should be, I don’t know. In Switzerland, we say in the Middle East, “This is a biblical conflict.” It’s so hard to find a solution. We are glad that we are not living in this conflict field. We are living in the center of Europe. We had many wars there as well. But thanks God, they are behind us. Let’s hope they are not returning.

If it’s a biblical conflict, then we are all doomed. It’s not a thing.

No, then we are not doomed if it’s a biblical conflict, because then we can say we are all children of God and God didn’t create this world in order that human beings make war all the time. So we just have to find our… There must be a solution. We just haven’t found it yet.

Well, someone said we should be careful when talking about theology, so I should just stop here.

I agree.

Thank you.

Thank you.