The European Commission is seeking a radical overhaul of decision-making in the EU enlargement process in order to bypass national veto rights.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will present a plan next week for the biggest change to the EU’s internal operations in decades, making a major announcement on how to prepare for a larger bloc of more than 30 members.

In doing so, von der Leyen will not make any changes to the Lisbon EU Treaty.

Two internal draft documents from the long-delayed enlargement strategy, examined by Rapporteur, propose using legal passerelle clauses to eliminate the requirement for unanimity among the 27 member states at multiple intermediate stages of candidate countries’ accession paths.

One of the documents, which will form the basis of the Commission president’s plan next week, states that the EU must become capable of acting with less consensus:

“Consensus strengthens political ownership and democratic legitimacy. But it can delay or prevent timely decisions in areas where the Union needs most to act.”

This measure: which itself requires unanimity: could significantly accelerate the accession processes of countries such as Ukraine, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, which have been struggling with blockades by a small number of EU members.

It is also likely to face resistance from existing member states wary of losing their veto power.

Nevertheless, the draft provides for an “emergency brake” that a government could trigger if it considers that “vital national interests” are under threat.

The Commission proposes applying the lower threshold of qualified majority voting: 15 countries representing two-thirds of the bloc’s population: across a wider spectrum of policy, including sanctions, human rights, defence and security, and tax evasion.

“As the Union enlarges, the risk of decisions being delayed or blocked will inevitably increase,” the internal document states.

To this end, the Commission will “prepare a work programme for the use of passerelle clauses.”

“Passerelle clauses” are transition provisions in the EU treaties that permit voting rules in specific policy areas to be changed permanently from unanimity, where all countries can exercise a national veto, to qualified majority voting.

However, with no indication that the EU will abandon the requirement for unanimity at the very beginning and at the end of a candidate country’s accession process, radical changes to EU decision-making will encounter obstacles.

Another contentious proposal would mean that only two-thirds of EU countries could appoint a European Commissioner once the bloc expands.

Under the current 27-member bloc, nine countries would be forced to relinquish their right to send a representative to Brussels.

This prospect is expected to unsettle smaller member states, which have historically argued that their influence in Brussels diminishes as the bloc expands.

Ireland, having lost a referendum in 2008, secured a legal guarantee that “the Commission shall continue to include one national of each member state”, but Dublin would have to surrender this safeguard.

According to the draft documents, new members could be placed on probation for a decade or more. During this period, they would face stricter oversight from Brussels.

Penalties that could be imposed during this probationary period include the suspension of voting rights in the Council and financial sanctions under newly created “financial” and “institutional safeguard” provisions.

New member states would be required to sign a legally binding “interim commitment” not to block decisions agreed upon by the rest of the EU.

In addition, standard transitional safeguards regarding participation in core EU policy areas, ranging from justice and home affairs to agriculture, would be retained.

New member states would also be subject to time-limited “financial safeguard” provisions allowing the Commission to penalise them in the event of backsliding on democratic and judicial standards.

Prior to accession, new members would also be required to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which investigates fraud involving EU funds.

German companies are seeking to stockpile critical raw materials against the possibility that trade talks between the EU and China next month will end without agreement.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič will travel to Beijing on 8-9 October to seek a breakthrough in negotiations aimed at reducing the EU’s record trade deficit with China.

Šefčovič warned that Brussels would restrict access for Chinese goods if no agreement is reached.

The risk that Beijing could retaliate by introducing new export restrictions on rare earth elements and other critical raw materials has unsettled the business community.

According to an announcement from Washington, China agreed on Wednesday to extend the suspension of a series of additional rare earth export controls for a further two months, carrying it into January.

“We are essentially trying to project power we do not possess. When doing business with certain partners, you have to assess your own position realistically,” said Matthias Rüth, chief executive of Frankfurt-based trading house Tradium, who has worked with rare earths and other technology metals for more than 25 years.

A German industry official, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, said companies were “very worried” and warned that manufacturing could grind to a halt:

“Companies are panicking right now and stockpiling. Some started quite early and now have several months of supplies in their inventories. But for the majority, that is not the case.”

Another industry official, who also spoke on condition of anonymity, concurred with those remarks, adding: “Tightening export controls would hit the sector hard. The situation is extremely tense.”

Export controls imposed by China in April last year on seven rare earth elements triggered acute shortages, forcing carmakers in Europe to halt several production lines while factories across other sectors lowered capacity utilization rates.

Beijing announced a further expansion of its controls on rare earth elements last October.

Those measures included restrictions on additional elements and on the technology used in their processing.

The measures were suspended for one year as part of a trade truce agreed with Washington.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on Wednesday, ahead of summit talks between President Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, that the moratorium had been extended to 10 January.

The EU is seeking to narrow a daily trade deficit of 1 billion euros with Asia’s largest economy, but to achieve that it must persuade Beijing either to import more EU goods or to curb its own exports.

In theory, this would be welcome news for Germany, the bloc’s manufacturing powerhouse, which competes with China across the automotive, machinery, and chemicals sectors.

Companies across Germany’s industrial heartlands continue to announce plant closures, citing both international competition and elevated energy costs.

Yet executives emphasize that their businesses remain inextricably tied to Chinese supply chains, including for the rare earth elements used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, data centres, and weapons systems.

Around 60% of rare earth mining and 90% of refining operations take place in China.

According to a report by the International Energy Agency, Europe and the US are the regions most exposed to Chinese export restrictions, facing potential direct losses exceeding 1.5 trillion dollars if Beijing’s rare earth export controls are fully enforced.

Bloomberg reported that Chinese exports of rare earth magnets to the US fell by roughly 20% in August compared with the previous month.

Siobhan McGarry, the European Commission’s spokesperson for industrial policy, argued that the EU has reduced its vulnerability to supply disruptions since last year’s rare earths crisis:

“If something happens tomorrow; such as export restrictions; we now have much greater awareness of where our alternative sources of supply lie. We have considerably more partnerships with other countries that require the same materials. That does not mean an export restriction would have no impact, but I believe we are now far better prepared.”

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a new initiative to procure and stockpile critical minerals during her annual State of the EU address last week.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, who was in Strasbourg for the event, said his resource-rich country aimed to cooperate on critical minerals while deepening its alliance with the EU.

Despite strains with traditional allies, the US is also pursuing cooperation. In February, the Trump administration proposed a trilateral partnership among the US, the EU, and Japan under an international trade platform to break China’s dominance over key raw materials. Washington is preparing a draft text that it plans to submit to partners in the coming months.

Brussels has set 2030 targets to extract 10% of the EU’s annual consumption of strategic raw materials within its own territory and to process 40% domestically.

It has also designated 60 strategic projects, enabling them to secure faster permitting and financing.

Signs of progress have begun to emerge. Last year, a facility owned by chemicals group Solvay started producing neodymium and praseodymium, which are used in permanent magnets.

It is scheduled to begin separating dysprosium and terbium later this autumn.

Performance Materials, an Estonian company, began shipments of permanent magnets this month.

In Germany, an industry initiative led by carmaker BMW aims to establish a critical minerals trading hub to pool demand and execute joint purchases, hoping thereby to gain greater market leverage.

The Commission is also working on new rules to encourage, or even mandate, that industry diversify material sourcing beyond China, and to create a market for European critical mineral production. Šefčovič plans to present the proposal in early December.

Despite the tense environment, German policymakers are urging Europe to remain calm.

Tobias Winkler, a Bavarian lawmaker from the CSU, the sister party of Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s CDU, who focuses on the geopolitics of critical raw materials, said:

“It is important to negotiate professionally as equal partners and to place the available instruments on the table. China is also unlikely to have an interest in a trade conflict, especially if it places additional burdens on its already struggling domestic economy.”

Winkler observed that meaningfully reducing Europe’s dependencies would take years, adding: “Until then, we will need other measures to preserve market stability and ensure security of supply.”

Military spending in Poland, having more than doubled over the past five years to reach $53 billion, is triggering severe budget deficits and fiscal risks across the national economy.

According to a report by the British newspaper The Guardian, based on interviews with officials, arms manufacturers, and economists, the Warsaw administration aims to drive growth by channelling its defence budget into domestic production, yet the accelerating arms drive is straining public finances.

The country’s defence spending has risen from 2.2% to 4.8% of gross domestic product (GDP) within the past five years.

Reaching $53 billion by 2026, this figure has elevated Poland to the position of the fourth-largest military spender in the European Union (EU), behind Germany, France, and Italy.

The Warsaw administration is attempting to bring manufacturing onto domestic soil to diminish import reliance. A new facility built by missile systems manufacturer MBDA in Czosnow, north of the capital Warsaw, stands among the tangible examples of this initiative.

Speaking about the factory, which has risen on land that was a cornfield until two years ago, MBDA Polska managing director and former British marine Jim Price said: “Everyone had to move twice as fast to meet Poland’s needs.”

Poland also secured the largest financing share under the European Union’s concessional defence loan programme SAFE, receiving approximately 44 billion euros.

The government plans to direct nearly 90% of these resources to domestic companies led by the state-owned defence industry group Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa.

Despite this, a significant portion of Poland’s defence budget continues to flow abroad. Warsaw is purchasing Patriot air defence systems, Abrams tanks, and F-35 fighter aircraft from the US.

Foreign companies, meanwhile, are integrating into Polish industry through joint production projects. The British company Babcock is participating in the construction of Miecznik frigates at the Gdynia shipyard, while BAE Systems is setting up an artillery production facility near Katowice.

Artillery shell production is also being expanded rapidly. Poland, which was able to manufacture only 5,000 units of 155 mm artillery shells annually in 2023, aims to raise this figure to 30,000 in 2026, and to 200,000 within the following two years.

Prime Minister Donald Tusk, assessing the existing capacity, said: “More than this is expended in a single day on the Russia-Ukraine front.” The Warsaw administration plans to establish three more factories to expand ammunition output.

However, the rapid increase in military expenditure is rattling the budgetary balance. In the draft budget for next year, the budget deficit is projected to reach 7.1% of GDP. This ratio could make Poland the country with the highest budget deficit in the EU.

The European Commission’s May forecast indicated that the deficit would stand at 6.3% in 2027.

The Commission expects the country’s public debt to climb from 59.7% in 2025 to 68.3% in 2027, driven in part by defence investments.

International credit rating agency Moody’s downgraded Poland’s credit rating from A2 to A3 in September, citing persistently high deficits, a growing interest burden, and rising public debt.

The agency pointed out that defence, healthcare, public investments, and social commitments prevent the narrowing of the budget deficit.

ING economist Leszek Kąsek assessed the current situation: “This path is not sustainable. It is necessary to question whether Poland can maintain its growth rate and whether politicians are prepared to correct the course.”

Financing the military has turned into political friction between President Karol Nawrocki and the Tusk government.

Nawrocki vetoed legislation linked to the SAFE loans. Nawrocki’s supporters proposed that rearmament should be financed by selling part of the gold reserves.

Finance Minister Andrzej Domański described this proposal as a “fantasy” and announced that the government will continue its struggle to access European loans.