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NATO 2.9: The multipolar paradox of the Atlantic front

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As computer engineers well know, denoting software as 1.0, 2.0, or 3.0 signifies the release of a major new version. It must entail changes and enhancements of a substantial enough scale compared to its predecessor to earn that “.0” suffix. If users find these updates underwhelming, a common refrain emerges: “They really should have called this 2.9!”

This is precisely the impression left by the “NATO 3.0” order that the alliance attempted to forge at the Ankara summit. The US-centric world we grew accustomed to in the 2.0 era is gone, yet this new equation lacks the substance to be deemed a true 3.0. NATO 3.0 was a concept popularized by Elbridge Colby, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy, envisioning a security architecture in which Europe assumes greater responsibility. The foundations of this architecture were to be laid at the Ankara summit. This distinct framing signaled that the alliance was not merely seeking to hobble along with minor “patches” but was gearing up for a fundamental overhaul to shake off its decades-long inertia. Yet, this new design harbored an inherent paradox: if the son of the household earns his own livelihood, why should he continue to obey his father? Why, once European nations scale up their defense spending, should they align their enmities and alliances strictly with Washington’s dictates? In the absence of the American hegemony that sustained the alliance for 77 years, what is left to take its place?

A disintegrating family

Tunç Akkoç, the Editor-in-Chief of Harici, and I covered the summit on-site. On the first day, we heard “warm” and “amiable” messages, particularly from Secretary General Mark Rutte. Everyone spoke of being a family, of being a cohesive whole. Beyond good wishes and platitudes, NATO, for the first time, focused on quantity rather than quality. Dozens of military-industrial agreements aimed not just at sophisticated technologies, but at establishing production lines capable of generating sheer numerical advantage. Affordable, replenishable combat assets were the center of attention.

The messaging and the atmosphere at the panels could have been said to project a positive outlook for the future of NATO—had Trump not arrived, that is.

Fresh off the plane, the US President first reiterated his designs on Greenland, and then picked a fight with Spain. He characterized them as “an impossible country, not worth talking to” and threatened to suspend trade. As Trump hurled these aggressive remarks, Rutte, sitting right beside him, scrambled to perform damage control, looking much like the child of a collapsing family who thinks, “If I only project enough cheer, maybe I can keep everyone together.” At the press conference, I asked Rutte:

“You find Trump justified regarding operations against Iran; if conflict erupts once more and President Trump calls on the Europeans for support, will you endorse this?”

Rutte gave a lengthy but ultimately unsatisfying answer. The curious part was that he partially agreed with Trump regarding Europe’s complacency. This behavior was not unique to Rutte. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz took a similar path, stating, “It seems Trump had to tell us bluntly to increase weapons production; Trump was right about this.” Seeing that past attempts to criticize Trump—particularly over Iran—failed to yield the desired outcome, Merz apparently resorted to the proven strategy of appeasement.

Yet, this appeasement was not enough. The final communique released at the end of the summit laid bare a stark reality: NATO could no longer define its adversaries as it once did. The language concerning Russia was milder than in previous years, while Iran was subject to a vague assertion that it “cannot possess nuclear weapons,” and China was not even mentioned. In the text, the US made no commitments against Russia, nor did the EU make any promises to Trump regarding Iran or China. While support for Ukraine was earmarked at $70 billion annually, whether the US would play any role in this was left entirely ambiguous.

Let us be honest: in the near term, neither does Trump have any intention of bringing Ukraine aid packages to Congress, nor does Europe plan to provide any serious military backing regarding Iran. Both sides prefer to tell one another, “Go get ’em, tiger, you’ve got this.” But why? Why does Europe refrain from striking Iran, whom it previously designated an enemy? Why does it avoid taking a stand against China, once deemed a threat? Why does the US want to distance itself from the Ukrainian quagmire, a theater in which it was involved for years through NGOs and military assistance?

NATO’s multipolar paradox

By its very nature, NATO is an alliance that must speak with a single voice during major geopolitical crises. This was relatively easy during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. There was only one center of power. Alternatives were unthinkable. Ideological confrontations drew sharp boundaries. Today, however, it is impossible for the US to dictate common objectives and shared adversaries. Nations engage with one another unburdened by ideological affinities. Aided by globalization, they decentralize their industries and establish trade routes that are too valuable to abandon.

European nations, which point to their eager deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq to counter Trump’s criticisms, now avoid operations around the Strait of Hormuz that could prolong conflict, fearing a catastrophic shock to oil markets. (Though what European militaries could achieve that the US could not remains highly debatable). Moreover, Trump’s stubborn fixation on Greenland had previously driven Europeans straight to Beijing. How, then, could European capitals brand China as a threat today?

A similar divergence of opinion applies to the United States itself. Believing that Russia’s military capabilities have been sufficiently degraded in Ukraine, the American establishment hopes to placate Russia—both to lower the risk of nuclear confrontation and to prevent Moscow from offering Beijing a cheap source of energy. Under these circumstances, why would the US target Russia in the summit’s communique?

Furthermore, there is no real consensus even within Europe itself. From the recent tensions erupting between Poland and Ukraine, to Péter Magyar—who, despite succeeding Orbán, has brought no radical shift on Russia—dissenting voices persist across the continent. When we factor in the rise of Germany’s AfD, the UK’s Reform Party, and Le Pen in France, whose electoral future remains uncertain, they may soon look back on today’s fractured Europe with nostalgia.

Ultimately, a Europe that begins to act independently of the US (even if this is what Washington desires) will naturally prioritize its own national interests. Inevitable clashes of interest will lead to independent coalitions within NATO. Hatchets buried for a century will slowly be unearthed. In other words, for NATO to survive, it needs a Europe that assumes responsibility; yet, this very responsibility may trigger conflicts of interest that could spell the end of NATO. This is the intractable paradox of NATO 3.0. In an alliance like NATO, “co-presidency” simply does not work.

Why 2.9?

In the grip of such a paradox, European nations have yet to clearly chart their own course. They envision a NATO where they produce more and take on greater responsibility, yet they remain unable to map out their own path. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also attended the Ankara summit. Having previously declared that “Türkiye must avoid Russian and Chinese influence,” von der Leyen gave evasive answers when questioned about defense agreements signed with Türkiye. She, too, is currently unable to define Europe’s strategic trajectory. She cannot prevent European industries, struggling to keep pace with military demand in the shadow of the war in Ukraine, from partnering with Turkish firms. Nor can she stop member states from engaging with China whenever they receive a dressing-down from the US. In such a landscape, what “3.0” can we possibly speak of? In the new order, will Europe stand with the US? Will it gravitate toward China? Or will it stand alone?

There was only one sentiment that felt palpable at the Ankara summit: panic. The panic of a United States unable to pivot to the Pacific as the war in Iran—which was supposed to end swiftly—drags on, and the panic of a Europe terrified of being left stranded once stripped of American patronage.

Meanwhile, amid this crisis, Türkiye has both resolved the YPG issue and made major strides in resolving the F-35 dispute. New defense industry agreements and initiatives will ensure Türkiye is advantageously positioned when this crisis eventually subsides. For we do not know whether Europe, once it finally charts its course, will include Türkiye within its threat matrix. The measures we implement and the binding agreements we forge today will allow us to see tomorrow more clearly. In the meantime, NATO will continue to roll out minor patches to sustain its existence. It is too early for 3.0; versions 2.9.1 and 2.9.2 are still on the way.

Opinion

Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.

Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.

For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.

In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.

This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.

The Problem of Proxy Wars

During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”

Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.

The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.

However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.

The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.

In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”

The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.

At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.

These distinctions matter.

Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.

Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?

The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.

Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.

Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.

The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.

The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?

That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.

The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.

There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.

The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.

The Economics of Fear

The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?

Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.

One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.

A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.

This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.

More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.

The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.

When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.

America After Iran

In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.

The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.

The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.

The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.

This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.

The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.

The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.

America Is Changing From Within

The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.

The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.

Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.

They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.

This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.

A Dinner for Dialogue

One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.

We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.

The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.

Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.

Very often, it begins around a single table.

Istanbul’s Larger Message

The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.

The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.

This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.

The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.

It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.

Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.

For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.

The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.

For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.

It was not an attempt to erase differences.

It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.

At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.

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A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West

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Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.

It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.

Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.

Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?

It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.

As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.

In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.

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Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria

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At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.

This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.

US moves in the Mediterranean

Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.

Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.

The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.

Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.

Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.

Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?

Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.

So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?

Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.

Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?

In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.

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