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Prof. Doster rules out direct Türkiye-Israel war despite Syria tensions

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Assessing the escalating friction across the Middle East, Marmara University Faculty Member Prof. Dr. Barış Doster shared comprehensive geopolitical evaluations in an interview conducted by international relations scholar Dr. Elif İlhamoğlu on the Harici digital broadcast programme. The discussion focused on Israel’s recent strikes on the Abu al-Zuhur airbase in northern Syria, proposals for tripartite security mechanisms, regional defence agreements, and the confrontation involving the US, Israel, and Iran.

“Türkiye and Israel will not clash directly”

Opening the broadcast, Dr. Elif İlhamoğlu Akkoç recalled that Israel’s air assault targeting the Abu al-Zuhur military airbase in Idlib, northern Syria, had generated extensive international condemnation. The strikes drew severe reactions across Türkiye and Gulf states, as well as critical statements from US Special Envoy for Syria and Ambassador to Ankara Tom Barrack. The airbase, situated approximately 70 kilometres east of the Turkish border, had reportedly remained out of operational service since 2013. Following the attack, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged responsibility while explicitly citing Türkiye’s military footprint in Syria among the justifications for the operation, bringing Ankara and West Jerusalem into renewed indirect confrontation.

Asked whether this indirect friction could transform into an active military conflict, Prof. Dr. Barış Doster dismissed the prospect of direct hostilities between Ankara and West Jerusalem. Doster stated: “I do not anticipate any physical contact, hot conflict, or direct military confrontation between the two countries. When one evaluates the historical ties, political bonds, diplomatic relations, and commercial links between both states, alongside their separate, overarching strategic engagements with the US, Türkiye and Israel will not clash directly.”

Emphasising the underlying dynamics of this bilateral dynamic, Doster explained that competition would persist through unconventional channels: “This rivalry will continue sharply across various regional theatres through indirect instruments and proxy forces. We are all well aware of the support Israel has extended to the PKK, PYD, and YPG terror groups for years, which it continues to maintain today.”

“Israel wants to see Syria divided into four parts”

Addressing Israel’s broader regional operations, Prof. Dr. Barış Doster noted that West Jerusalem’s aggressive posture is backed by major Western powers. Doster remarked: “Israel, which is committing genocide, ethnic cleansing, and barbaric acts in Gaza while showing absolute disregard for international law, the laws of war, and the legal frameworks governing armed conflict, enjoys the unlimited, unconditional, and frictionless backing of the US and Europe’s leading trio: France, Germany, and the UK. This audacity and aggressiveness are not new. We know what happened in Gaza; we know what happened in Palestine; and we are familiar with the actions taken alongside the US against Iran in the recent past.”

Underlining the limitations of international rhetoric, Doster stated: “We must and do register the strongest possible reaction against these moves. Yet we should not express astonishment. Israeli tanks have previously advanced to within 20 kilometres of Damascus. United Nations resolutions have repeatedly affirmed that the Golan Heights constitute sovereign Syrian territory. Nonetheless, Israel acts as an occupying and annexing force. During his initial presidential term, Donald Trump formally recognised this annexation. Following Israel’s declaration of Jerusalem as its capital, Washington relocated its diplomatic mission there, defying objections from Türkiye and the broader Islamic world. Past American presidents had avoided putting that relocation into practical effect, but Trump brushed those reservations aside. During all these developments, did a single deterrent measure or concrete sanction emerge from the Islamic or Arab worlds beyond verbal condemnation? No. Therefore, while vocal opposition is imperative, we must recognise that verbal condemnations lack deterrence against Israel.”

Doster linked the recent strikes in northern Syria directly to West Jerusalem’s long-term strategic objectives for the Syrian state: “From the beginning, Israel has explicitly sought a Syria partitioned into four distinct entities: Kurds, Arabs, Alawites, and Druze. Israel serves as the primary patron and backer of two of these groups: the Kurds and the Druze. When the PKK, PYD, and YPG terrorist apparatus was heavily battered on the ground by the Damascus administration in recent months, it was rescued directly by the US and Israel. While Washington and West Jerusalem did not grant the group everything it sought, they prevented its complete liquidation. They confined it to a smaller geographic pocket, preserved its political, military, administrative, and resource footprint, and kept it in reserve for future operational needs. Thus, responding to Israeli aggression is necessary, but being surprised by it is entirely unwarranted.”

“How can you establish a red telephone line with Israel?”

Responding to remarks by US envoy Tom Barrack—who argued after the Idlib strikes that a permanent security dialogue and cooperation mechanism should be established among Türkiye, Syria, and Israel—Prof. Dr. Barış Doster characterised such an architecture as entirely unviable under current geopolitical conditions. Doster asserted: “Such a mechanism is unequivocally impossible. First, Israel openly seeks the partition of Syria. Second, the degree of control and long-term durability of the Damascus administration remains uncertain. Although the current Syrian leadership receives support from Arab capitals and Ankara, American officials themselves concede that lasting stability in Damascus is far from guaranteed, even raising the prospect of coup attempts against Ahmed al-Sharaa.”

Evaluating the regional power balance in Damascus, Doster continued: “The influence of the US and Israel over Syria has peaked over the past two years. Ahmed al-Sharaa does not claim rights over the Golan Heights and has offered assurances to Washington that Damascus will not present a security threat to Israel, promising to restrain any attempts by Iran, Hamas, or Lebanese Hezbollah to do so. Concurrently, the historical clout of Iran and Russia in Syria has plummeted toward near-total marginalisation, with Moscow’s functional influence waning even within its military bases. Under circumstances where Israel does not take the Syrian administration seriously and actively seeks its partition, how can you establish a red telephone line or a trilateral security architecture? Furthermore, as long as profound political competition persists and Israeli military violence continues, establishing a functional crisis hotline or security mechanism between Türkiye and Israel is equally unattainable.”

Addressing Tom Barrack’s earlier diplomatic proposals promoting an energy and security corridor connecting the Caspian Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean via Türkiye and Israel, Doster dismissed the initiative as strategically unrealistic: “We will not allow Tom Barrack to insult our intelligence. A corridor of that nature is envisioned primarily between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Israel. Ankara and Baku share exceptional historical, cultural, economic, and strategic links under the framework of ‘one nation, two states’. However, having completed my doctoral dissertation on the Caucasus, Eurasia, and the Turkic world, I state emphatically that relations between Israel and Azerbaijan are no less deep, intensive, or comprehensive than relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan.”

Doster observed that broader systemic opposition would block such an axis: “Regardless of how strong Baku’s ties with Tel Aviv and Ankara are, establishing this line is exceptionally difficult. At the regional level, actors such as Iran will fundamentally object. Globally, because such an axis seeks to sever China’s long-standing, capital-intensive Belt and Road initiative, Beijing will actively oppose it behind the lines. Finally, Moscow will vigorously resist any configuration that expands American strategic hegemony across the Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean.”

“When needs change, alliances change”

Evaluating the trilateral Mecca Agreement concluded between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan—which contains collective defence clauses compared by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to NATO’s Article 5—Prof. Dr. Barış Doster analysed the functional foundations of the pact. Doster remarked: “As I frequently observe, when needs change, alliances change, and every alliance inevitably generates an opposing counter-alliance.”

Interrogating the strategic rationale of the pact, Doster asked: “Against whom was this alliance formed? Was it created against the Houthis? Was it directed at India, Pakistan’s primary adversary? Was it designed to counter the US, or perhaps Qatar, given Riyadh’s fluctuating ties with Doha and Abu Dhabi? In reality, this alliance is positioned squarely against Iran. An alliance that implicitly targets Iran raises critical questions regarding its durability and its potential to deepen fragmentation across the Islamic world. The pact brings together Sunni Arab leadership represented by Saudi Arabia alongside two major non-Arab powers, Türkiye and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia possesses vast capital reserves and leads the Arab world alongside Egypt; Türkiye represents the pre-eminent military power in the Turkic sphere; and Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state maintaining operational energy cooperation and historically balanced ties with Tehran despite its existential rivalry with India over Kashmir.”

Doster elaborated on the structural vulnerabilities of the arrangement: “To attain institutional permanence, an alliance must be grounded in shared political values, compatible state regimes, uniform threat perceptions, and unified strategic interests. None of these elements align across these three states. While Riyadh views Tehran as an existential threat, Ankara maintains a historical, calibrated rivalry with Iran and does not define it as a mortal enemy. Similarly, Islamabad does not perceive Tehran as an existential peril. Therefore, whether this pact represents a premature birth or a stillborn initiative remains an open debate, but its anti-Iranian orientation is unmistakable.”

Noting the geopolitical reactions to the pact, Doster observed: “This formation inherently pleases Washington, which has already extended its formal congratulations. Despite Türkiye’s participation, it also serves Israeli strategic interests by containing Iran, even if West Jerusalem approaches Ankara’s inclusion with tactical caution. Despite the media commentary surrounding the Mecca Agreement, history shows that such ad-hoc initiatives rarely achieve enduring operational deterrence. The 57-member Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the 22-member Arab League—originally founded in response to Israeli expansionism in Palestine—have demonstrated virtually no concrete effectiveness. Without a clearly defined architecture of shared threats and mutual strategic goals, this pact will be perceived across the region exclusively as an anti-Shia, anti-Persian alignment. Even if Iran’s regional resistance axis has experienced severe attrition, Tehran’s demographic and geopolitical weight ensures that a exclusionary pact of this nature cannot achieve long-term viability.”

Commenting on proposals to incorporate Egypt or Iran into the mechanism, Doster described the inclusion of Tehran as strategically impossible: “Inviting Iran into this pact would be equivalent to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation offering membership to the US, or Washington inviting Russia to join NATO. Regarding Egypt, Saudi Arabia’s strategic agenda includes structural competition with Cairo. Despite Egypt’s severe economic vulnerabilities, its historical, political, and cultural gravitas within the Arab world means that Riyadh will not endorse Egyptian entry, as it would dilute Saudi primacy within the bloc regardless of Turkish diplomatic lobbying.”

“The US and Israel will not launch a wide air campaign”

Turning to the confrontation between the US, Israel, and Iran following the expiration of ceasefire understandings, Prof. Dr. Barış Doster assessed the military balance and the leadership posture of Donald Trump. Doster remarked: “By completely discarding classical diplomatic protocols, Trump has proven himself an unpredictable and unreliable political actor. One need only recall the assurances given during the NATO summit regarding CAATSA sanctions, the delivery of F-35 fighter aircraft, and engine procurement for Türkiye’s national combat aircraft KAAN. When dealing with an actor whose positions shift constantly, long-range diplomatic projections become exceedingly difficult.”

Analysing the battlefield dynamic between Washington, West Jerusalem, and Tehran, Doster concluded: “Despite sustaining severe losses across its administrative, military, and command cadres due to American and Israeli strikes, Iran currently maintains psychological ascendancy within its domestic public and broader international opinion. It is evident that the US administration has failed to secure its primary objectives through coercive rhetoric. Moving forward, the US and Israel will not launch a wide air campaign characterised by relentless, high-intensity strategic bombing. A ground offensive remains entirely out of the question, as I have maintained from the outset. While localised, low-intensity air strikes against specific Iranian targets may occur, a protracted, maximum-scale aerial assault conducted jointly by the US and Israel remains improbable.”

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Anthropic uncovers Claude use by Iranian, Houthi, and Russian units

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11/09/2026

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Artificial intelligence company Anthropic has disclosed attempted “abuses” of its Claude AI model ranging from conventional weapons to biological research by state-linked entities, foreign intelligence services, and cybercrime networks, publishing the findings in a detailed threat intelligence report.

A significant portion of the report comprised the development of guided missile software by the Houthis in northern Yemen and the conversion of the model into a military reconnaissance tool by Iran-linked actors seeking to target US naval assets in the Middle East.

Covering the period between December 2025 and August 2026, the report shared details of activities detected across seven primary areas: cyberattacks, influence operations, mass surveillance, conventional weapons development, biological risks, and unauthorised model distillation.

The company announced that it had terminated all accounts violating its rules and shared the resulting data with relevant international counterparts.

According to findings by Anthropic’s Threat Intelligence unit, a weapons cell based in northern Yemen, where the Houthis operate, substituted human software engineers with the Claude Code system across three distinct missile development programmes.

These efforts comprised a tactical rocket equipped with a terminal guidance system powered by a commercial smartphone processor, a multi-stage ballistic missile with a target range exceeding 2,000 kilometres, and missile designs carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle.

The cell utilised the artificial intelligence to adapt open-source autopilot software to the smartphone processor, optimize flight control algorithms, and compile firmware.

Structuring their Claude accounts like a virtual engineering team, the Houthis assigned one account to write code, another to conduct research, and a third to review and audit the written code.

The report noted that the group conducted an actual test launch with a guided rocket in the Yemeni theatre.

Immediately following the failure of the live-fire test, the actors were documented returning to the Claude platform within hours to upload telemetry data and diagnose the cause of the malfunction.

The cell was observed successfully compiling offline simulation tools capable of operating independently even if access to Claude were severed.

Iran tracked US warships and personnel

Another military case detailed in the report involved attempts by Iran-linked cyber actors to target US naval forces in the Middle East.

These actors were found to have scraped open-source military data to draft operational targeting manuals directed against American warships and personnel.

Iran extracted name rosters of American military personnel from the captions of publicly accessible military photographs, monitored vessel and aircraft transponder data, authored code to scan commercial satellite imagery, and mapped vulnerabilities in maritime satellite communication terminals.

Other networks linked to the Tehran government were determined to have developed domestic and regional surveillance systems. A Qom-based unit produced a malicious web browser extension disguised as a prayer-time application to harvest credentials from social network users, funneling the data into a central case management system designated “Arman”.

Additionally, official Iranian institutions reportedly cloned authors’ voices using AI and operated multilingual disinformation networks to lay the groundwork for the supreme leadership succession.

Russia also used it for an autonomous kamikaze drone swarm

The report stated that an independent Russia-based software team developed fully autonomous kamikaze uncrewed aerial vehicle swarm software dubbed “DronDoc” or “Serafim”.

Affiliated with a university connected to the Russian Academy of Sciences, the team was said to have trained the artificial intelligence to distinguish between friendly and hostile elements using footage retrieved from the Ukrainian battlefield.

The developed system was designed with the capability to select targets, execute live human classification, and issue detonation commands without requiring human intervention, with simulations run directly against coordinates in the Donetsk region.

Meanwhile, the Russian-origin “Midnight Blizzard” group targeted the Ukrainian drone supply chain and staged attacks aimed at foreign officials and drone engineers by compromising hotel Wi-Fi networks.

A procurement manager stationed at a design bureau in Moscow was also discovered drafting plans via Claude to circumvent European sanctions. The individual was recorded assembling fraudulent tender and logistics correspondence to transport German-made magnetometers, space-grade photovoltaic sheets, and military aviation oxygen systems into Russia through intermediary firms based in China and Hong Kong.

Biological threats and pathogen engineering

The report disclosed five concrete cases regarding the deployment of artificial intelligence in hazardous biological research. Virologists attached to a military research institute were documented using AI for gain-of-function research aimed at enhancing the transmissibility and immune-evasion capabilities of the mosquito-borne Chikungunya virus.

Similarly, experimental designs were prepared to adapt the H5 avian influenza variant, which carries a 50% mortality rate in humans, to mammals and confer airborne transmission capabilities, while immune-evasion mechanisms of pathogens from the smallpox virus family were modelled.

The identities of paralytic neurotoxins subject to export control lists and haemorrhagic fever virus proteins featured on the World Health Organization’s priority epidemic list were deliberately masked and submitted to the AI for analysis.

In addition, a consultant working on behalf of the Malian State Intelligence Service designed a mass surveillance platform designated “Lakana 360” with the assistance of Claude.

The system was designed to monitor approximately 25 million SIM cards registered across three mobile operators in the country without requiring court orders, intercept audio recordings, and cross-reference records with biometric databases.

Separately, leading Chinese artificial intelligence firms including Alibaba, Moonshot, DeepSeek, Zhipu, and Xiaomi were alleged to have initiated hundreds of millions of unauthorised sessions to extract the logical reasoning chains of Claude models. Moonshot and DeepSeek platforms reportedly routed their own users’ queries secretly through Claude, in the process exposing Chinese police surveillance feeds from hundreds of cameras covering military facilities in Chengdu, internal credentials of Chinese state-owned enterprises, and live database access codes connected to the Russian Defence Ministry to third parties.

Türkiye detail in the report

The report also detailed cases involving the abuse of the Claude AI model, incorporating findings concerning an Istanbul-based technology firm.

In case GTG-84005 of the intelligence report, an operation aimed at commercial election manipulation targeting voters in Malaysia was intercepted.

According to the findings, the operation operated under the guise of a startup providing cyber intelligence and counter-disinformation tools. Anthropic determined that Istanbul-based BBS Bilisim Teknolojileri was behind the infrastructure.

According to documents, the company marketed the architecture as a paid influence operation service styled as a “military-grade, AI-powered, real-time political operations ecosystem”.

Managing roughly 1,000 synthetic X accounts, the system processed demographic and electoral data across 222 parliamentary constituencies in Malaysia, calibrating targeting around sensitive social fault lines including ethnicity, religion, and the monarchy.

The network also circulated content from Russian and Chinese state media masquerading as independent Malaysian news via an artificial media outlet designated “Malaysia Pulse”, while manufacturing fraudulent intelligence dossiers targeting an opposition politician and civil society organisations.

Anthropic reported that the network received a request to generate 1 million artificial impressions in support of the Malaysian Prime Minister and sought to secure a contract with the country’s national communications regulatory authority.

While no evidence emerged that the undertaking succeeded, the associated user accounts were closed and operational digital indicators were shared.

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EU pursues closer ties with Israel on space and air defence

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09/09/2026

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The EU is turning to Israel to bolster its new initiatives in high-tech air defence and space capabilities.

Shimrit Maman, head of the Israel Space Agency, travelled to Brussels this week and met on Tuesday with European Commissioner for Startups, Research and Innovation Ekaterina Zaharieva to discuss key sectors, including artificial intelligence and robotics.

The visit took place ahead of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s first major speech on space, scheduled for Thursday at a summit in Paris.

In the speech, Von der Leyen is expected to warn against mounting hostilities and emphasise the necessity of strengthening Europe’s presence in space.

“It’s very hard to do everything by yourself,” Maman told Politico, adding that the militarization of space is “already happening, it’s just we are not aware of the extent,” and noting that allies are showing growing interest in “dual-use” technologies intended for both civilian and defence purposes:

“One thing we’re working on is early-warning systems. For example, during the last wave [of missile attacks] with Iran, we saw this very clearly. How we were getting the alerts to all the civilians in Israel, and that made the casualties so low. This is part of the system. We’re working on a very holistic view, where you can alert in advance, the system alerts the citizens.”

Following several years of effective disengagement caused by political tensions surrounding the invasion of Gaza, the EU has recently begun forging closer military and technological ties with Israel through a series of agreements.

Competition from Washington and strategic rivalry with Moscow and Beijing have nevertheless underlined the requirement for allies possessing sophisticated industrial capacity.

In 2024, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen backed calls by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis to create an EU-funded air defence shield.

Three senior officials involved in the discussions said, however, that the plans stalled after officials in the Commission and several national capitals concluded that the project would require reliance on Israeli air defence technology, which was considered too sensitive one year into the Gaza conflict.

Yet Israel’s Rafael, which is expanding its European operations significantly, has now confirmed that it will open a factory to manufacture the Iron Dome air defence system at a former Volkswagen plant in Germany.

One week ago, Greece signed a 3 billion euro agreement with the Israel Ministry of Defense.

The deal provides for the establishment of a new multi-layered air defence network designed to shoot down drones, hostile jets, and rockets.

“We see everything integrating into this multi-layer defence approach,” Maman said, highlighting satellite imagery and artificial intelligence modelling as primary focal points for joint development efforts:

“I’m not only seeing defence as ballistic missiles from Iran… think about a fire, a flash flood or even a long drought… we have a proven track record, and we’re getting really good results.”

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UK reassures US that new Israeli settlement sanctions are symbolic

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08/09/2026

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The UK has reportedly engaged in behind-the-scenes talks to avoid a backlash from the US over anti-Israel sanctions scheduled for announcement today.

According to a report by Bloomberg, Andy Burnham’s government is expected to ban trade with Israeli settlements in the West Bank today.

Burnham is seeking to pursue a firmer stance on an issue of high importance to the governing Labour Party, though one that risks angering US President Donald Trump.

Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband will unveil a new sanctions regime targeting Israel but limited to Jewish settlements in the West Bank, according to sources familiar with the matter.

Burnham and Trump spoke by telephone on Monday, the Prime Minister’s Office said. A statement noted that the two leaders discussed a two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinian territories.

The discussion suggests that Burnham used the call to notify Trump that sanctions against Israel were imminent.

The proposals under review included a new sanctions regime with measures to block the exchange of goods and services with Israeli settlements.

Miliband also evaluated expanding existing human rights sanctions to encompass the blocking of aid, which has drawn criticism for exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

The Foreign Secretary further considered explicitly endorsing the International Court of Justice’s non-binding 2024 opinion that declared Israel’s occupation of territory currently recognised by the UK as the State of Palestine to be unlawful.

Even so, UK officials fear the announcement could cause an early setback in Burnham’s relationship with Trump.

To defuse a backlash from the Trump administration, British diplomats privately informed the US that the sanctions are largely symbolic and will have no tangible impact on the UK’s broader trade or security ties with Israel, according to sources familiar with the discussions.

The proposals were drawn up after Israel decided to issue tenders for the construction of 1,200 settlement housing units in an area of the West Bank.

Disputes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians have intensified in recent months as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a difficult battle to retain his seat in a general election scheduled for 27 October.

Burnham joined the leaders of Canada and five European governments, including France, Germany, and Italy, in signing a statement that condemned the housing plan as “unacceptable” and urged Netanyahu to withdraw the tender.

In a separate statement, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz condemned a call by Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir for “nightly assassinations” in Gaza.

Burnham is eager to demonstrate early to the Labour Party that he is adopting a more critical approach toward Israel than his predecessor, Keir Starmer.

Although Starmer hardened his stance against Israel during his two years in office, including by formally recognising the State of Palestine, his initial refusal to demand that Netanyahu halt military operations in Gaza divided the party.

This division led to a decline in Labour’s poll ratings and boosted electoral gains for the Green Party across the country.

Burnham’s return to Parliament last month led to Starmer’s resignation. Burnham apologised for Labour’s handling of Israel’s military operation in Gaza under his predecessor, stating that the party “did not adopt the right stance”.

Last month, Burnham’s new Defence Secretary, Wes Streeting, who faced intense competition from a Muslim independent candidate in his northeast London constituency at the last general election, stated that Israel had fallen “short” of international standards.

US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee told the BBC’s “Newsday” programme that there would “undoubtedly” be a US response.

Accusing the Labour Party of “discriminating against the Israeli government”, Huckabee said: “It is like throwing a rock and not knowing where it lands. The UK is a sovereign country and can do as it pleases, but so is the US.”

Republican Florida Congressman Randy Fine also warned that British firms would be barred from doing business with local governments in the state if sanctions were imposed.

In a post on X, Fine said: “Florida has made its stance clear. Any company—or country—that boycotts Israel will be boycotted by Florida.”

Labour MPs and Jewish groups have warned the government that any sanctions against the settlements could amount to a “de facto boycott” of Israeli goods and compromise the safety of British Jews.

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