Prof. Doster rules out direct Türkiye-Israel war despite Syria tensions

Assessing the escalating friction across the Middle East, Marmara University Faculty Member Prof. Dr. Barış Doster shared comprehensive geopolitical evaluations in an interview conducted by international relations scholar Dr. Elif İlhamoğlu on the Harici digital broadcast programme. The discussion focused on Israel’s recent strikes on the Abu al-Zuhur airbase in northern Syria, proposals for tripartite security mechanisms, regional defence agreements, and the confrontation involving the US, Israel, and Iran.

“Türkiye and Israel will not clash directly”

Opening the broadcast, Dr. Elif İlhamoğlu Akkoç recalled that Israel’s air assault targeting the Abu al-Zuhur military airbase in Idlib, northern Syria, had generated extensive international condemnation. The strikes drew severe reactions across Türkiye and Gulf states, as well as critical statements from US Special Envoy for Syria and Ambassador to Ankara Tom Barrack. The airbase, situated approximately 70 kilometres east of the Turkish border, had reportedly remained out of operational service since 2013. Following the attack, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged responsibility while explicitly citing Türkiye’s military footprint in Syria among the justifications for the operation, bringing Ankara and West Jerusalem into renewed indirect confrontation.

Asked whether this indirect friction could transform into an active military conflict, Prof. Dr. Barış Doster dismissed the prospect of direct hostilities between Ankara and West Jerusalem. Doster stated: “I do not anticipate any physical contact, hot conflict, or direct military confrontation between the two countries. When one evaluates the historical ties, political bonds, diplomatic relations, and commercial links between both states, alongside their separate, overarching strategic engagements with the US, Türkiye and Israel will not clash directly.”

Emphasising the underlying dynamics of this bilateral dynamic, Doster explained that competition would persist through unconventional channels: “This rivalry will continue sharply across various regional theatres through indirect instruments and proxy forces. We are all well aware of the support Israel has extended to the PKK, PYD, and YPG terror groups for years, which it continues to maintain today.”

“Israel wants to see Syria divided into four parts”

Addressing Israel’s broader regional operations, Prof. Dr. Barış Doster noted that West Jerusalem’s aggressive posture is backed by major Western powers. Doster remarked: “Israel, which is committing genocide, ethnic cleansing, and barbaric acts in Gaza while showing absolute disregard for international law, the laws of war, and the legal frameworks governing armed conflict, enjoys the unlimited, unconditional, and frictionless backing of the US and Europe’s leading trio: France, Germany, and the UK. This audacity and aggressiveness are not new. We know what happened in Gaza; we know what happened in Palestine; and we are familiar with the actions taken alongside the US against Iran in the recent past.”

Underlining the limitations of international rhetoric, Doster stated: “We must and do register the strongest possible reaction against these moves. Yet we should not express astonishment. Israeli tanks have previously advanced to within 20 kilometres of Damascus. United Nations resolutions have repeatedly affirmed that the Golan Heights constitute sovereign Syrian territory. Nonetheless, Israel acts as an occupying and annexing force. During his initial presidential term, Donald Trump formally recognised this annexation. Following Israel’s declaration of Jerusalem as its capital, Washington relocated its diplomatic mission there, defying objections from Türkiye and the broader Islamic world. Past American presidents had avoided putting that relocation into practical effect, but Trump brushed those reservations aside. During all these developments, did a single deterrent measure or concrete sanction emerge from the Islamic or Arab worlds beyond verbal condemnation? No. Therefore, while vocal opposition is imperative, we must recognise that verbal condemnations lack deterrence against Israel.”

Doster linked the recent strikes in northern Syria directly to West Jerusalem’s long-term strategic objectives for the Syrian state: “From the beginning, Israel has explicitly sought a Syria partitioned into four distinct entities: Kurds, Arabs, Alawites, and Druze. Israel serves as the primary patron and backer of two of these groups: the Kurds and the Druze. When the PKK, PYD, and YPG terrorist apparatus was heavily battered on the ground by the Damascus administration in recent months, it was rescued directly by the US and Israel. While Washington and West Jerusalem did not grant the group everything it sought, they prevented its complete liquidation. They confined it to a smaller geographic pocket, preserved its political, military, administrative, and resource footprint, and kept it in reserve for future operational needs. Thus, responding to Israeli aggression is necessary, but being surprised by it is entirely unwarranted.”

“How can you establish a red telephone line with Israel?”

Responding to remarks by US envoy Tom Barrack—who argued after the Idlib strikes that a permanent security dialogue and cooperation mechanism should be established among Türkiye, Syria, and Israel—Prof. Dr. Barış Doster characterised such an architecture as entirely unviable under current geopolitical conditions. Doster asserted: “Such a mechanism is unequivocally impossible. First, Israel openly seeks the partition of Syria. Second, the degree of control and long-term durability of the Damascus administration remains uncertain. Although the current Syrian leadership receives support from Arab capitals and Ankara, American officials themselves concede that lasting stability in Damascus is far from guaranteed, even raising the prospect of coup attempts against Ahmed al-Sharaa.”

Evaluating the regional power balance in Damascus, Doster continued: “The influence of the US and Israel over Syria has peaked over the past two years. Ahmed al-Sharaa does not claim rights over the Golan Heights and has offered assurances to Washington that Damascus will not present a security threat to Israel, promising to restrain any attempts by Iran, Hamas, or Lebanese Hezbollah to do so. Concurrently, the historical clout of Iran and Russia in Syria has plummeted toward near-total marginalisation, with Moscow’s functional influence waning even within its military bases. Under circumstances where Israel does not take the Syrian administration seriously and actively seeks its partition, how can you establish a red telephone line or a trilateral security architecture? Furthermore, as long as profound political competition persists and Israeli military violence continues, establishing a functional crisis hotline or security mechanism between Türkiye and Israel is equally unattainable.”

Addressing Tom Barrack’s earlier diplomatic proposals promoting an energy and security corridor connecting the Caspian Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean via Türkiye and Israel, Doster dismissed the initiative as strategically unrealistic: “We will not allow Tom Barrack to insult our intelligence. A corridor of that nature is envisioned primarily between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Israel. Ankara and Baku share exceptional historical, cultural, economic, and strategic links under the framework of ‘one nation, two states’. However, having completed my doctoral dissertation on the Caucasus, Eurasia, and the Turkic world, I state emphatically that relations between Israel and Azerbaijan are no less deep, intensive, or comprehensive than relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan.”

Doster observed that broader systemic opposition would block such an axis: “Regardless of how strong Baku’s ties with Tel Aviv and Ankara are, establishing this line is exceptionally difficult. At the regional level, actors such as Iran will fundamentally object. Globally, because such an axis seeks to sever China’s long-standing, capital-intensive Belt and Road initiative, Beijing will actively oppose it behind the lines. Finally, Moscow will vigorously resist any configuration that expands American strategic hegemony across the Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean.”

“When needs change, alliances change”

Evaluating the trilateral Mecca Agreement concluded between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan—which contains collective defence clauses compared by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to NATO’s Article 5—Prof. Dr. Barış Doster analysed the functional foundations of the pact. Doster remarked: “As I frequently observe, when needs change, alliances change, and every alliance inevitably generates an opposing counter-alliance.”

Interrogating the strategic rationale of the pact, Doster asked: “Against whom was this alliance formed? Was it created against the Houthis? Was it directed at India, Pakistan’s primary adversary? Was it designed to counter the US, or perhaps Qatar, given Riyadh’s fluctuating ties with Doha and Abu Dhabi? In reality, this alliance is positioned squarely against Iran. An alliance that implicitly targets Iran raises critical questions regarding its durability and its potential to deepen fragmentation across the Islamic world. The pact brings together Sunni Arab leadership represented by Saudi Arabia alongside two major non-Arab powers, Türkiye and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia possesses vast capital reserves and leads the Arab world alongside Egypt; Türkiye represents the pre-eminent military power in the Turkic sphere; and Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state maintaining operational energy cooperation and historically balanced ties with Tehran despite its existential rivalry with India over Kashmir.”

Doster elaborated on the structural vulnerabilities of the arrangement: “To attain institutional permanence, an alliance must be grounded in shared political values, compatible state regimes, uniform threat perceptions, and unified strategic interests. None of these elements align across these three states. While Riyadh views Tehran as an existential threat, Ankara maintains a historical, calibrated rivalry with Iran and does not define it as a mortal enemy. Similarly, Islamabad does not perceive Tehran as an existential peril. Therefore, whether this pact represents a premature birth or a stillborn initiative remains an open debate, but its anti-Iranian orientation is unmistakable.”

Noting the geopolitical reactions to the pact, Doster observed: “This formation inherently pleases Washington, which has already extended its formal congratulations. Despite Türkiye’s participation, it also serves Israeli strategic interests by containing Iran, even if West Jerusalem approaches Ankara’s inclusion with tactical caution. Despite the media commentary surrounding the Mecca Agreement, history shows that such ad-hoc initiatives rarely achieve enduring operational deterrence. The 57-member Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the 22-member Arab League—originally founded in response to Israeli expansionism in Palestine—have demonstrated virtually no concrete effectiveness. Without a clearly defined architecture of shared threats and mutual strategic goals, this pact will be perceived across the region exclusively as an anti-Shia, anti-Persian alignment. Even if Iran’s regional resistance axis has experienced severe attrition, Tehran’s demographic and geopolitical weight ensures that a exclusionary pact of this nature cannot achieve long-term viability.”

Commenting on proposals to incorporate Egypt or Iran into the mechanism, Doster described the inclusion of Tehran as strategically impossible: “Inviting Iran into this pact would be equivalent to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation offering membership to the US, or Washington inviting Russia to join NATO. Regarding Egypt, Saudi Arabia’s strategic agenda includes structural competition with Cairo. Despite Egypt’s severe economic vulnerabilities, its historical, political, and cultural gravitas within the Arab world means that Riyadh will not endorse Egyptian entry, as it would dilute Saudi primacy within the bloc regardless of Turkish diplomatic lobbying.”

“The US and Israel will not launch a wide air campaign”

Turning to the confrontation between the US, Israel, and Iran following the expiration of ceasefire understandings, Prof. Dr. Barış Doster assessed the military balance and the leadership posture of Donald Trump. Doster remarked: “By completely discarding classical diplomatic protocols, Trump has proven himself an unpredictable and unreliable political actor. One need only recall the assurances given during the NATO summit regarding CAATSA sanctions, the delivery of F-35 fighter aircraft, and engine procurement for Türkiye’s national combat aircraft KAAN. When dealing with an actor whose positions shift constantly, long-range diplomatic projections become exceedingly difficult.”

Analysing the battlefield dynamic between Washington, West Jerusalem, and Tehran, Doster concluded: “Despite sustaining severe losses across its administrative, military, and command cadres due to American and Israeli strikes, Iran currently maintains psychological ascendancy within its domestic public and broader international opinion. It is evident that the US administration has failed to secure its primary objectives through coercive rhetoric. Moving forward, the US and Israel will not launch a wide air campaign characterised by relentless, high-intensity strategic bombing. A ground offensive remains entirely out of the question, as I have maintained from the outset. While localised, low-intensity air strikes against specific Iranian targets may occur, a protracted, maximum-scale aerial assault conducted jointly by the US and Israel remains improbable.”