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Russophobia in European thought

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During the initial fiery days of the war between Russia and Ukraine, the Western public’s reaction against the Russian government suddenly erupted into total hatred toward Russian culture.

Western civilization has witnessed spectacles of disgrace from putting Russian literary masterpieces off the library shelves to requesting Russian classical compositions be banned from philharmonic orchestras.

It is common for the mainstream media in the West to provoke its people against any country to rally the public behind their authority during times of crisis and war.

Surprisingly, how did the political stance towards Putin turn into an unconscious outburst of ire that radically denies Russian culture?

Undoubtedly, today’s unchecked “Russophobia” in most Western societies has been significantly influenced by Western intellectuals, particularly the European left.

Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy were published and read as widely as surpassing all French classics. During the most virulent anti-communist propaganda campaigns, the European left did not become this unguarded.

Although buttressing their neoliberal power, the European left’s falling into line against Russia today initially recalls the “political treachery” of the Second International, the roots of its Russophobia go far further back.

From Enlightenment to Marxism

Russophobia is evident in the republican, democratic, and socialist as well as conservative thought in Continental Europe.

From the last quarter of the 18th century to the late 19th century, Russia symbolized “autocracy, barbarism, despotism” for almost all progressives in Continental Europe.

To put the Russophobia of the Western intellectual on a sound historical basis, it is necessary to look at the changes in attitudes and values experienced before and after this century and why and how the existing judgments have changed.

It is essential to see why and how the existing judgments have changed, as well as shifts in attitudes and values that took place before and after this century, to contextualize the Russophobia of the Western intellectual within a sound historical frame.

First of all, the attitude of the Western intellectuals towards Russia directly relies on the relationship of these thinkers with their own political systems.

In the periods when the monarchies in Continental Europe hindered social freedom and impeded progress, Russia was an alternative land for the ideas of Enlightenment to flourish. However, Russia was perceived as the biggest threat to reviving freedom in Continental Europe throughout times of social movements and revolutions.

All these fluctuating changes in the Russophobic approach of progressive thinkers in Continental Europe can be traced most clearly from Diderot to Marx.

In a sense, a cyclical liaison is traced between Diderot’s early ideas and Marx’s later ideas.

The journey of the Enlightenment into the Russian steppes

Leibniz, a German philosopher, was the first to express and even translate into political action that Russia would be the state where the Enlightenment’s ideals of development and freedom could be realized.

Not standing the endless conflicts of German rulers and tiny principalities in Prussia on where the darkness of feudalism was felt, Leibniz believed that the most suitable place for the social projects of the Enlightenment was Tsarist Russia, with its large geography and firm administration.

Saying, “It would be more applicable to render these proposals realized in a great country like Russia than in any of the competing German principalities,” Leibniz became an adviser to Peter the Great and joined his entourage during the Tsar’s tour in Europe. [1]

French Enlightenment thinkers also turned to Russia to realize their projects of an egalitarian and free society. Presenting herself as a disciple of the Enlightenment as a part of her European policy, Tsarina Catherine extended her patronage to French thinkers targeted by monarchies and the church.

Diderot adopted a similar stance as Leibniz, declaring “it was impossible to reform existing legislation in France because it was too strongly bound up with traditional property relations, whereas in Russia (…) How happy is the nation where nothing has as yet been done!”.[2] He himself visited Russia in 1773 upon the invitation of Catherine.

After the Pugachev uprising that broke out while Diderot was in Petersburg, Catherine suspended the reforms and abruptly abandoned Enlightenment thought. This led to the first notable rupture in the view of Enlightenment thinkers toward Russia.

Diderot’s observations about Russia following his visit, such as “no individual freedoms in Russia,” “lack of public life,” and “despotism that shackles natural rights,” would become the primary rhetoric of progressives in Europe.

Especially in the face of the French Revolution and the following Jacobin period’s radical policies, through the conservative policies, Russia tried to ward Tsarism off the emerging revolutionary waves. These policies cemented these Russia-biased opinions in European intellectual circles.

Undoubtedly, the victorious parade of the “barbarian” Scythian warriors in the streets of Paris after chasing Napoleon from Moscow to France contributed to the image of Russia as the biggest enemy of freedom in Europe and the entrenchment of “Russophobia.” [3]

In both the Restoration Era and revolutions in 1830 and 1848 after the fall of Napoleon, Russia’s rise to political prominence as the most significant power that helped the European monarchies survive reinforced the anti-Russian sentiments among progressive circles.

Russia became not only the epitome of “despotism” but also the “greatest enemy” of democracy and revolution and the stronghold of counter-revolution in the eyes of European intellectuals.

Marx vis-à-vis Russia

The position of European socialists against Tsarist Russia was defined by failure of the 1848 Revolution as a result of the Russian military and political support provided to the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In the writings of Marx and Engels, particularly between the early 1850s and the end of the 1870s, Russia received more criticism than nearly any other European monarchy.

In his article “Democratic Pan-Slavism,” dated February 1849, Engels writes that “hatred of the Russians was and still is the primary revolutionary passion among the Germans (…) we know where the enemies of the revolution are concentrated in Russia and the Slav regions of Austria”.[4] In a sense, his anti-Tsarism reached to the point of ethnocultural antagonism.

Similarly, Marx condemned the presence of the Russian rural commune (obschina) as the economic and political foundation of Tsarist despotism in an article published in the New York Tribune in February 1853.

After the Crimean War outbreak, Marx and Engels’s anti-Russianism had turned into an explicit political stance. Marx’s Russophobic articles appeared during the Crimean War in the Free Press, owned by a British conservative, David Urquhart.

More strikingly, in his Tribune article on April 12, 1853, Engels supported the British government against Russia: “Russia is decidedly a conquering nation (…) But let Russia get possession of Turkey, and her strength is increased nearly half (…) In this instance the interests of the revolutionary democracy and of England go hand in hand. Neither can permit the Tsar to make Constantinople into one of his capitals.” [5]

Marx and Engels undoubtedly employed a tactical policy to deepen the imperial rift between England and Russia with the hope of an upcoming revolution in Europe.

In this sense, there is a substantial ideological rift between the stance of Marx and Engels and the support to imperialisms of the Second International, which gave up the revolution.

Notwithstanding, the European socialist parties capitalized on these anti-Russian sentiments.

Russia reborn for Marx

Two things happened that fundamentally altered the progressives’ view towards Russia in Continental Europe. In 1871, with the Paris Commune, not only did the 20-year repression of Napoleon III come to an end, but the international mechanisms that had been suppressing the working class and socialist movement in Continental Europe also changed. The Battle of Sedan following the Commune also shattered the conservative consensus in Europe.

On the other hand, in the early 1870s, the populists in Russia turned to villages, whereas Russian intellectuals started a revolutionary movement against Tsarism. At this moment in history, the developments in both Continental Europe and Russia would radically change the views of European socialists, notably Marx and Engels, on Russia.

In his essays, Chernisevki brings up the idea of implementing the methods of the modern economy to transform Russian rural communes into the foundation of socialist communal structures and writes about the possibility of transitioning to socialism without experiencing capitalist destruction. Especially, Marx was interested in these ideas.

Having been researching Russia for a long time, Marx had also changed his views on Russia drastically. In his thoughts, rural communes no longer represent the foundation of despotism but the bedrock of socialism. Russia also symbolized the country where the European revolution could be first sparked, not the stronghold of the counter-revolution.

In 1881, Zasulich of the Russian revolutionary movement sent a letter to Marx posing his thoughts about the future of Russia.

For a long time, Marx worked on four drafts in which he examined the possibility of Russia’s transition to socialism without reaching the phase of capitalism. Due to his unending diligence, Marx never actually sent these drafts to Zasulich. In a short letter, Marx only wrote that he asserted the “historical inevitability” of capitalism solely for Western Europe.[6]

Working on Marx’s draft, the Italian historian Venturi says, “in brief, Marx finally embraced Chernisevsky’s theories.” [7]

Nevertheless, Zasulich and Plekhanov concealed Marx’s letter for evident political reasons, and it was published only in 1924.

In a sense, blanketing Marx’s insights about the possible future revolution in Russia paved the way for European socialism to eventually side with its imperialism.

The centenary shame of Western left

After the break between the European socialist movements and the Russian revolutionaries on the eve of the First World War -despite a brief rapprochement in the Popular Front experience-the ideological tension of the Soviets with the European socialists, particularly during the Spanish Civil War, continued.

In the background of this intellectual conflict throughout the Cold War, it is straightforward to observe the traces of the ossified anti-Russian presuppositions of the European left.

It is open to debate to what extent the course of history would have been different if Marx’s drafts on Russia had been out on time.

What is unquestionable is the current reckless hatred of Russia displayed by the European left.

At the end of this period which witnessed the removal of Dostoevsky from many literature departments’ curricula, Germany might go so far as to ban Leibniz’s works. The West is characteristically known for denying its progressive tradition in times of crisis.

Following this period in which the hegemony of Western imperialism would collapse, and new international political balances would begin to be established, the tradition of Western thought giving Asia its historical role is to rise again within a more proper context.

[1] For Leibniz’s thoughts on Russia and China, see Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz, İş Bankası Yayınları, 2013.

[2] Andrzej Walicki, Rus Düşünce Tarihi, İletişim Yayınları, 2009, p. 30.

[3] On the historical relations between Russia and France, see Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, La Russie et La France, Fayard, 2021.

[4] For writings and discussions of Marx and Engels on Russia in the 1850s, see Kevin B. Anderson, Marx Sınırlarında, Yordam Kitap, 2018, p. 98.

[5] Anderson, p. 91.

[6] For Marx’s final Works and his relations with Russian Narodniks, see Marcello Musto, Karl Marx’ın Son Yılları, Yordam Kitap, 2021, p. 132.

[7] For an extensive study on Russian populism, see Franco Venturi, Histoire du Populisme Russe, au XIX. siècle tome 1-2, Gallimard, 1972.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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