The 30th anniversary of the Kardak Crisis between Türkiye and Greece

How did the crisis begin, and how did it conclude?

In the 459th page of his autobiography titled My Life, released in June 2024—approximately three years after departing from the White House—Bill Clinton (William Jefferson Clinton), the 42nd President of the United States, recounted the 1996 Kardak Crisis, which brought Türkiye and Greece to the precipice of war, with the following words:

“Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin arrived at the White House on January 30th for his sixth meeting with Al Gore. After concluding the commission’s work, Chernomyrdin visited me to provide an update on developments in Russia and Yeltsin’s prospects for re-election. Shortly before meeting with Chernomyrdin, I spoke with Turkish President Süleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller. Both informed me that Türkiye and Greece were on the brink of an armed conflict and implored my assistance to prevent it. They were prepared to go to war over two tiny islets in the Aegean Sea, which the Greeks called Imia and the Turks called Kardak. Although both nations laid claim to these islets, it appeared that they had passed into Greek possession following a 1947 treaty between Greece and Italy. Nevertheless, Türkiye did not recognize the Greek claims. Despite frequent visits by Turks to the islets, they remained uninhabited. The crisis was ignited when some Turkish journalists tore down the Greek flag there and hoisted the Turkish flag in its place. It seemed inconceivable that two major nations, embroiled in a genuine dispute over Cyprus, would engage in combat over a few square meters of rock inhabited only by goats. Yet, I could discern that Çiller was truly apprehensive about such a possibility. Interrupting the meeting with Chernomyrdin, I first called Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, and then re-established contact with Demirel and Çiller. After several telephone consultations, as both sides agreed to hold their fire, Dick Holbrooke—who had already begun working on the Cyprus issue—spent a sleepless night persuading the parties to resolve the matter through diplomacy. Whether or not I succeeded in brokering peace in the Middle East, Bosnia, or Northern Ireland, I could not help but chuckle at the thought that I had at least saved the lives of a few Aegean goats.”

The Kardak Crisis, which Clinton recalled and narrated with a touch of irony, was in truth a product of Greece’s ambition to transform the Aegean Sea into a “Greek Lake.” Greece, a perennial source of friction in the Aegean—also known as the Sea of Islands—precipitated the Kardak crisis in an attempt to impose its own theses upon Türkiye. The Kardak Rocks consist of two uninhabited outcrops situated 325 meters apart in the South Aegean, a mere 3.6 miles from the Turkish mainland. The distance to the nearest Greek island, Kalymnos, is 5.4 miles, while the distance between Türkiye and Kalymnos stands at 9 miles.

At the onset of the crisis, Türkiye was governed by a DYP–CHP coalition. However, following the general elections of December 24, 1995, both parties had suffered setbacks. The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) emerged as the victor, while the DYP fell to third place. The CHP narrowly surpassed the 10% electoral threshold to enter the Grand National Assembly as the fifth party. Since a new government had yet to be formed, Tansu Çiller, Chairperson of the DYP, remained Prime Minister, and Deniz Baykal, Chairperson of the CHP, continued as Foreign Minister. Süleyman Demirel served as President. In Greece, a new government under Prime Minister Kostas Simitis had recently been established.

The genesis of the crisis and Greece’s disregard for international law

On December 25, 1995, a Turkish merchant vessel named Figen Akat, carrying cargo from Çanakkale to Israel, ran aground on the Kardak Rocks. Following the accident, Greek Coast Guard boats arrived at the scene, asserting that the incident had occurred within Greek territorial waters and that the salvage operation must therefore be conducted by a Greek vessel. The ship’s captain, conversely, maintained they were in Turkish waters and reported that they had immediately requested assistance from the Turkish Coast Guard Command. These two rocks, which had been largely overlooked until that day, suddenly birthed a new crisis between Ankara and Athens, compounding existing disputes.

Prime Minister Tansu Çiller adopted a nationalist rhetoric to bolster her hand and secure an influential position in the impending coalition negotiations. Aiming to galvanize public support, she declared, “That flag shall come down, and those troops shall depart.” President Süleyman Demirel, however, was more circumspect, counseling composure and moderation. He feared that if war broke out with Greece over these rocks, it would be difficult to justify to the Turkish nation, who would inevitably ask their leaders, “Was there no way to resolve this short of war?”

A nationalist fervor was also surging in Greece. The Greek media fueled public sentiment with highly nationalistic broadcasts. Greece was performing its usual maneuver, using the Kardak Rocks as a pretext to seek absolute hegemony over the Aegean Sea. According to Athens’ calculations, if Türkiye conceded that the rocks belonged to Greece, Athens would then claim sovereignty over all other disputed islands, islets, and rocks. Türkiye, on the other hand, maintained that any landmasses remaining from the Ottoman Empire whose sovereignty had not been explicitly transferred by treaty were—by natural, logical, historical, and legal necessity—Turkish territory. This is because the Republic of Türkiye was recognized in the Treaty of Lausanne, its founding document, as the successor state to the Ottoman Empire.

While Türkiye and Greece exchanged diplomatic notes, tons of cement from the grounded vessel were being spilled into the sea, necessitating an urgent salvage operation. Turkish and Greek warships anchored in the vicinity of the rocks. A Greek salvage boat approached the vessel and towed it free; however, when the towline became entangled in the ship’s swivel, a Turkish crew member promptly severed it. Once freed, the vessel quickly entered Turkish territorial waters and was towed to Güllük Harbor.

Following the ship’s salvage, the tension regarding the sovereignty of the Kardak Rocks escalated further. In a note to Türkiye, Greece claimed the rocks had been ceded to them; Türkiye rejected this, pointing to land registry records that proved the rocks were Turkish territory.

On January 26, a month after the grounding, the Mayor of Kalymnos landed on the rocks accompanied by a priest, local youths, and journalists to hoist the Greek flag. In response, two reporters from the Hürriyet newspaper landed on the rocks on January 27, lowered the Greek flag, and raised the Turkish flag.

The landing of Greek troops on the Kardak Rocks

As tensions mounted, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs meticulously avoided escalation, prioritizing diplomacy. In contrast, Greece intensified the friction; on January 28, Greek soldiers landed on the rocks, planted their flag, and stationed themselves on East Kardak (the larger of the two). Not content with this, Greece dispatched warships to encircle the rocks.

Rather than retaliating immediately, Türkiye issued a diplomatic note to the Greek Ambassador in Ankara, who was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 29. The note stated that the 1932 Turkish–Italian Protocol and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty contained no explicit provisions regarding the sovereignty of these formations. Türkiye declared its readiness to negotiate with Greece regarding the islands, islets, and rocks whose sovereignty had not been transferred to Greece by treaty (collectively referred to as EGAYDAAK). The note demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Greek troops stationed on the Kardak Rocks. Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, however, accused Türkiye, stating, “We declare that Greece’s response to this or any other aggressive nationalism will be immediate, severe, and resolute. We shall not hesitate to utilize all means at our disposal against Türkiye. Turkish vessels must exit Greek territorial waters.” Similarly, Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos told Parliament on January 30 that they would not lower the Greek flag on Kardak, nor would they make the rocks a subject of negotiation with Türkiye. Meanwhile, the United States, in constant contact with both Ankara and Athens, conveyed the message that whoever fired the first shot would find themselves in opposition to the U.S.

In the face of Greece’s preference for deepening the crisis and its bellicose rhetoric, Türkiye pursued a policy that was both composed and firm, ensuring it did not appear timid to either its domestic public or the international community. The government instructed the military to be prepared for a military option should diplomatic efforts fail. While the prospect of armed conflict heightened tensions, Türkiye was also concerned that a Greek fait accompli could lead to the annexation of another 150 islands in the region. The “dogfights” between the two countries’ aircraft and the close maneuvering of warships raised the specter of a regional conflict, even if a total war was not imminent.

At this juncture, Türkiye decided to implement a formula proposed by İnal Batu, then Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Batu’s proposal was as follows: On the smaller of the Kardak Rocks (also known as the İkizce Rocks), namely West Kardak, there was a Greek flag but no Greek troops. If Turkish Underwater Offence (SAT) teams could conduct a midnight infiltration through the Greek fleet—which consisted of 24 vessels of various sizes—land on this smaller rock, and hoist the Turkish flag, a strategic parity would be established between Türkiye and Greece, making a return to the pre-crisis status quo ante more feasible.

İnal Batu’s proposal was accepted, and Türkiye committed to this arduous and high-risk operation. The possibility of the infiltration team being detected or engaging in an armed clash was real, and Türkiye accepted this risk. Ultimately, the infiltration operation, carried out by two boats in groups of five at midnight on January 30, was successfully completed 1.5 hours later when the Turkish commandos landed on the second rock (West Kardak) and raised the Turkish flag. The success of the Turkish team sparked heated debates in the Greek Parliament; when no answer could be found as to how a 10-man team in two boats managed to pass undetected through the Greek warships and land on the rocks, the Greek Chief of the General Staff resigned.

Conclusion

Ultimately, influenced by pressure from both the United States and European nations, both countries agreed to withdraw their troops from the rocks and lower their flags. On January 31, Greek troops departed first, followed by Turkish troops. The issue was resolved through diplomatic channels without a single shot being fired. However, it must not be forgotten that the crisis—as President Clinton noted—did not stem from two small rocks where goats grazed, but was a matter of territory and sovereignty in the Aegean Sea, and that the crisis was, as usual, initiated by Greece.

Türkiye’s achievement in successfully executing a difficult military operation while simultaneously utilizing diplomatic channels to their fullest extent is of significant importance. By landing troops and planting a flag on the uninhabited rock, Türkiye demonstrated its political resolve and proved its military capability. Furthermore, by opting for a move designed to de-escalate rather than intensify the tension, Türkiye provided the Greek side with an opportunity to retreat without bruising the honor of Athens.

References

Hürriyet and Milliyet newspapers of the period.

Aydın Şıhmantepe, “An Analysis of the Kardak Crisis Process in Terms of Crisis Management Principles” (pp. 136–139), Journal of Security Strategies, April 2013, Issue: 17, Year: 9, pp. 127–155.

Turkish Foreign Policy Crisis Studies, 1996 Kardak Crisis, http://tdpkrizleri.org.tr/index.php/1996-kardak-crisis