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The architect of NATO 3.0: Elbridge Colby

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The architect of the new NATO concept (“NATO 3.0”), which is expected to be catalyzed by the Ankara summit, is Elbridge Colby, who serves as a Pentagon undersecretary.

Last February, at the NATO defense ministers’ meeting, he delivered a pivotal speech in place of Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth. The low profile of the US representation was deemed indicative of the Trump administration’s diminishing valuation of NATO; yet Colby, arriving as a “theorist”—and indeed, as the champion of a decisive shift in US military presence from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific—had come to assign new homework to his allies.

Also known as the unofficial author of the United States’ latest National Security Strategy, Colby acknowledged in his speech that the post-Cold War “unipolar moment” had vanished, declaring the return of power politics and large-scale military force to the world stage: what was now required was realism and adaptability.

The undersecretary got straight to the heart of the matter, declaring that in light of this new reality, the US was prioritizing “the most serious threats to American interests,” specifically “the defense of the US homeland” and interests in the “Western Hemisphere,” while also reinforcing the principle of “deterrence by denial” in the Western Pacific (Colby also asserted that the Indo-Pacific region was “now the central arena of geopolitics”; we will return to Colby’s views on Asia below).

Accompanying all these priorities—or rather, the role assigned to American “allies” in this new US strategy—was to prepare “for the possibility that potential adversaries could act coordinately or opportunistically on multiple fronts simultaneously.”

The defense of Europe against the Soviet Union and communism during the Cold War (“NATO 1.0”); the shift of NATO operations outside the Continent after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with Europe fully outsourcing its “defense” to the US (“NATO 2.0”); and now, “burden-sharing” in the era of “multipolarity” so that the US can focus on the Asia-Pacific against the rise of China (“NATO 3.0”)… This is the essence of Colby’s message: “The core strategic reality set forth by the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS),” the undersecretary stated, “is that Europe must assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense.”

Under this framework, the US would henceforth prioritize only those theaters and challenges where American power could play a decisive role. For Colby, this did not portend a withdrawal from Europe. “On the contrary,” Colby argued, “this is an affirmation of strategic pragmatism and an acknowledgment of our allies’ undeniable capacity to step up and lead in Europe’s defense in a way that makes us all stronger and safer.”

Consequently, a strategy that “assumes the United States can indefinitely serve” as Europe’s “primary conventional defender” while simultaneously “bearing the decisive burden” everywhere else in the world was “neither sustainable nor wise.”

What, then, was to be done? Colby acknowledged the importance of the level of defense spending, stating that there was no substitute for it. Yet, in his view, what ultimately mattered was what these resources yielded: combat-ready forces, readily deployable munitions, resilient logistics, and integrated command structures operating at scale under austere conditions.

Herein lies the crux of the matter. Analogous to the “innovative” transformation within the Pentagon, Colby proposed that European NATO members also undergo a military transformation: prioritizing combat effectiveness over bureaucratic and regulatory inertia.

This meant “making hard choices regarding force structure, readiness, stockpiles, and industrial capacity” that reflected “the realities of modern conflict” rather than “peacetime politics.”

Divergence Within the Pentagon

Colby’s strong position within the Pentagon, having advocated for years to leave Europe and the Middle East to allies and focus on Asia, also delineates the fault lines in American politics.

The 12-day war with Iran last summer had further inflamed this issue. Accordingly, US Central Command (CENTCOM) stood on one side, while the “Asianists” led by Colby stood on the other. While CENTCOM Commander Michael “Erik” Kurilla advocated allocating more resources to defend Israel as Iranian retaliations escalated, Colby, championing a US military focus on China and the Indo-Pacific, opposed shifting military assets from Asia to the Middle East.

The reason for Colby’s opposition was the concern that deployments, such as the relocation of a Patriot missile battery from South Korea to the Middle East in April 2025, could compromise US readiness in future conflicts with China or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

In an interview with POLITICO last July, Colby emphasized his personal view that defending NATO’s eastern flank should only involve allocating forces in an amount that would not detract from the United States’ ability to defend Taiwan.

Colby also identified “key capabilities”—including long-range fires, logistics, command and control, and what is known as C4ISR, alongside logistics, munitions, and air defense—as areas where the United States must focus on Asia rather than Europe.

Viewing Europe “Through a China Lens”

Having previously argued that US commitments to Ukraine were overextended, Colby underscored that the most concrete challenge to his country and its interests came economically and militarily from China.

Stating that he also viewed Ukraine “through a China lens,” the strategist maintained that he was not advocating for an abrupt cutoff of all aid to Kyiv, and that while Russia’s actions were “evil,” the assistance provided by the US did not align with the concrete interests of the American people.

When asked what he would advise the US President to do if he were currently serving as an advisor, Colby responded:

“I would say: ‘I don’t want to talk about Ukraine right now. We will talk about Taiwan, China, and Asia first, and once we resolve that problem satisfactorily, we will spend time, political capital, and resources on Ukraine.’”

At the time, the Financial Times (FT) reported that Colby had told British officials that the Trump administration expected the British military to intensify its focus on the Euro-Atlantic region.

In a 2024 interview, Colby argued that the Republican voting base consists of working-class and middle-class Americans, asserting that Washington’s foreign policy fails to serve this constituency.

Noting that a maximalist foreign policy brought “disaster,” the undersecretary stated that Americans were weary of “endless wars.”

The China Obsession

Some figures in his close circle say that Colby is concerned with China “to the point of obsession.”

According to a report in Semafor last year, Colby is so focused on Asia that “he clashes with everyone else doing foreign policy, including Trump loyalists.”

According to Colby, the primary point to which the United States must direct its military and economic resources is Taiwan. Asserting that China is the “New Soviet Union,” Colby points out that NATO currently operates with a “post-Cold War” mindset where the US does everything, whereas what they actually need is a “Cold War mindset” of burden-sharing.

Stating that the US must resolutely resist any Chinese military intervention against Taiwan, Colby notes that this response should include strikes against selected targets on the Chinese mainland.

“Once a war begins, we must not drift to the marginal edge of a conventional conflict,” Colby says, emphasizing the need to prepare for a conventional war in every possible way.

In Colby’s view, a war over Taiwan is now closer due to the reduction of the US military presence in the Taiwan Strait. According to him, the US strongly resembles Britain’s bottleneck situation in the late 1930s: you can appear weak and avoid war, but all your vital interests will be compromised; if you appear strong and arm yourself, the likelihood of your adversary responding militarily increases.

Asia Strategy: Ensuring China Cannot Win

On the other hand, it is worth noting that the framework of Colby’s anti-China stance is built upon a foundation of strategic caution.

Delivering a speech at the Sejong Institute in South Korea last January, Colby outlined the cornerstones of his administration’s Asia policy.

As alluded to above, defining the Indo-Pacific region as “one of the main engines of global growth, the hub of global manufacturing—including South Korea—and the geopolitical axis of the 21st century,” Colby stated, “Consequently, as these documents clearly establish, the long-term security, prosperity, and liberties of Americans will be decisively shaped by developments in this region.”

Yet, acknowledging that “satisfactory stability” in Asia could not be achieved or maintained through “flowery rhetoric, assumed norms, or apparent goodwill,” Colby argued that this stability could only be preserved by “a durable and favorable balance of power that prevents any single state from dominating the region:”

“In this regard, the goal of America’s defense policy in Asia must be clear and reasonable to all. This goal is not conflict with China or any other nation. The objective is to establish a reasonable balance that is acceptable to Americans, our allies, and indeed the entire region. This is not a formalistic and rigid regional order, but an adaptable and evolving one. It is an order defined not by hegemony, but by a favorable balance where sovereignty is respected and peace is maintained—defined not by comforting illusions, but by clarity, strength, and resolve.”

Underscoring that this strategy was about “protecting the interests of America and its allies through stability rooted in credible deterrence and strategic balance,” the undersecretary maintained that the US was not seeking to subjugate, stifle, or humiliate China:

“What we seek—and as the President has consistently articulated—is a genuinely stable balance that works for Americans and our allies, where no single state can impose its hegemony: a favorable balance of power.”

Stating that they were not pursuing regime change in Beijing nor seeking to dominate China, Colby said, “We acknowledge and respect China’s proud history.” What the American strategist proposed was “deterrence by denial along the first island chain” in the Indo-Pacific.

According to Colby, the US was focusing on establishing a military posture along the first island chain in the Western Pacific that would ensure “aggression is impossible, escalation is unattractive, and war is truly irrational.”

This entailed a “resilient, distributed, and modernized force posture” in Japan, the Philippines, the Korean Peninsula, and elsewhere in the region—optimized to “deny swift or decisive gains” through military force, “resilient rather than fragile,” and a posture that “unites us in the pursuit of peace and stability.”

Colby continued:

“This kind of stable peace must be backed by deterrence and therefore secured by hard-power capacity, capability, and will—certainly ours, but also that of our allies.”

Consequently, it should be self-evident that Colby envisions a role for Asian allies similar to the one he and the US deem appropriate for their European counterparts. Quite apart from the invitation of Asian partners to the Ankara summit where the “NATO 3.0” concept is to be declared, Colby himself, referencing the Europeans’ commitment to allocate 3.5% of GDP for core military functions, noted in this speech: “But I must emphasize that these principles apply as much to Asia as they do to Europe.”

“Burden-Sharing” or “Burden-Shifting”?

In a recent interview with the CFR, Colby spoke very candidly about NATO 3.0: as the United States will be drawn into more conflicts, a “recalibration” within the alliance is required.

Pointing to the sheer scale of the military budget in the United States, Colby explicitly speaks of a “national mobilization”; he demands the expansion of the defense industrial base and calls for large-scale production.

The role falling to Europeans and Asians is to purchase American arms and conform to US military standards; Colby is candid on this front as well. Industrial production synchronization is the bedrock of this enterprise, and it appears that writings by figures such as Mark Rutte and Ursula von der Leyen ahead of the Ankara summit, coupled with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s “from Texas to California” emphasis in his address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, demonstrate that the message has been received and some ground has already been covered.

This indicates that a significant threshold may have been crossed in providing industrial “fodder” to European NATO countries, which otherwise hold diverging interests on China.

Diplomacy

Barrack urges tripartite deconfliction after Israeli Syria strikes

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US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack said that efforts are underway to establish a deconfliction mechanism between Israel, Türkiye, and Syria.

Yesterday, Israeli aircraft carried out eight strikes on Abu al-Duhur Air Base in Idlib, causing material damage.

Barrack, who also serves as the US Ambassador to Türkiye, stated that Türkiye was not warned in advance about the Israeli strikes, saying, “Türkiye therefore observed aircraft heading north toward its own territory and thus could reasonably prepare its own response,” referring to a possible Turkish military reaction.

In a telephone interview with Reuters, Barrack said, “Fortunately, cooler heads were able to prevent the situation from deteriorating further.”

Türkiye condemned Israel’s strikes on Abu al-Duhur air base in northwestern Syria, but made no further comment on the matter, including on a potential deconfliction mechanism.

A deconfliction mechanism is a communication channel established between military or political actors to prevent misunderstandings or accidental clashes.

Barrack said Israel’s strikes on the Syrian air base “reflected a perception, whether right or wrong, that Türkiye might increase its presence at that base in the near future,” and continued:

“This situation underscores the need for a deconfliction mechanism involving Israel, Syria, and Türkiye. We are actively working to establish this mechanism in order to prevent future miscommunications. The priority right now is to de-escalate tensions and prepare the ground for a more measured approach.”

The air base, located approximately 70 km east of the Turkish border, has not served as a military airfield since 2013.

Syria and Israel have held several rounds of talks on de-escalation and border issues since forces under the command of Ahmed Shara overthrew Bashar al-Assad, but no agreement has been reached.

Barrack said, “An incident of the kind that occurred this morning demonstrates that these efforts must be intensified and the process broadened.”

The envoy stated that the US is already facilitating an information-sharing and dialogue mechanism between the parties:

“What is required is a more robust structure to which more resources are allocated. Investing in such mechanisms is far less costly than relying on kinetic means of communication, which can cost hundreds of millions of dollars.”

An Israeli official told Fox News on Tuesday that Israel had shared “extremely sensitive intelligence” with the US prior to the strike, but provided no further details.

The official said, “Shara understands that he cannot act like the previous Syrian regime that held proxy forces. He may not have understood or known what was happening.”

In a statement immediately following the strike, Barrack had said that the Shara administration “does not maintain proxy forces” in Syria.

The office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later issued a statement claiming responsibility for the strikes.

Arguing that Israel and Syria had agreed “on maintaining the status quo on security matters,” Netanyahu claimed Syria came to the brink of violating this by permitting the deployment of Turkish troops to an air base near Aleppo:

“Israel repeatedly warned Syria that such a deployment would pose a threat to Israel’s security. Syria, however, chose to ignore these warnings.”

The office stated that Tel Aviv warned Syria that such a deployment would threaten Israel’s security, adding that it “would welcome a return to the status quo.”

According to Axios, the Syrian government had been aware of Israel’s concerns regarding the base for some time. According to a source familiar with the matter, the Syrian government had sent messages to the Israelis explaining the reasons for rebuilding the runway and emphasising that they had no hostile intentions.

US and Israeli officials stated that the Israelis informed the White House that the purpose of the strike was to deter Türkiye from deploying advanced weapons systems to the air base and to prevent a broader military build-up in the area.

A Turkish official denied Israel’s claims, saying, “There was no Turkish presence at the air base. Israel is inventing pretexts to bomb neighbouring countries and destabilise the region.”

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the strike conducted by Israel, stating that Israel had “violated Syria’s territorial integrity and unity by targeting the country’s infrastructure and military capacity.”

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How mini-middle powers leverage geography, resources, and diplomacy?

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As an international order emerges in which “middle powers” seek to come to the fore alongside the relative decline of the US, “mini-middle powers” may also be coming to light.

An assessment published in the Financial Times (FT) points to countries that cannot set the broader international agenda but are nevertheless capable of making a difference.

Arguing that these states can be defined as “mini-middle powers”, the article provides the following definition: states that generally possess limited power, but exert real influence in a few areas such as energy, transport routes, regional security, mediation, finance, technology, geography, or access to actors that major powers find difficult to reach.

Noting that the crucial factor is not merely possessing one of these advantages, but being able to leverage it, the FT counts Azerbaijan, Qatar, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Oman among these mini-middle powers.

The assessment points out that Qatar and Oman are mini-middle powers in diplomatic terms: Qatar has converted its natural gas wealth, financial clout, and access to hard-to-reach actors into an extraordinary diplomatic role.

Oman, meanwhile, relies on “common sense, its strategic location, and its ability to keep channels open between adversaries.”

For both countries, mediation is not merely a diplomatic role, but also a source of influence.

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, on the other hand, possess influence rooted in geography and infrastructure. Azerbaijan exports energy, sits astride east-west trade routes, and holds significant weight in South Caucasus politics and security.

Kazakhstan’s oil, uranium, and position between Russia and China give the country an influence that extends beyond its region.

Uzbekistan’s demographic weight as Central Asia’s most populous country, combined with its central position, provides it with growing influence in regional trade and diplomacy.

The Middle Corridor demonstrates how this functions. While Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan sit at the centre of this Asia-Europe route, Uzbekistan is also strengthening its links with the corridor.

Although this route is more arduous than the northern route passing through Russia, it offers an alternative to governments and businesses.

The three countries are also developing a Caspian green energy corridor that could transport renewable energy generated in Central Asia through Azerbaijan and connect to the planned Black Sea electricity cable extending to Europe.

According to the FT, discussions regarding the South Caucasus and Central Asia are still too often treated as a rivalry between Russia, China, and the West.

Yet this approach overlooks how many countries in the region function. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan maintain multidirectional relations because relying on a single side presents risks for geographic, commercial, and security reasons.

Consequently, while attempting to maintain room for manoeuvre among them, these countries cooperate with Russia, China, Türkiye, the EU, and the US.

Qatar and Oman, despite having close security ties with Washington, also keep channels open with adversaries of the US.

In December 2024, after Russian air defence systems shot down an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane, Baku’s response was unusually sharp given the power imbalance.

While Baku demanded that Moscow accept responsibility, punish those at fault, and pay compensation, it also sought to maintain overall relations without disruption.

Russia subsequently acknowledged the contribution of its air defence systems to the crash and agreed to pay compensation.

The influence of these “mini-middle powers” becomes strongest when other countries require the resources under their control.

Azerbaijan’s oil and natural gas gain even greater importance when buyers seek alternative supply sources.

The Middle Corridor benefited from the disruption of trade passing through Russia; however, governments along the route are aware that should Western commercial relations with Russia resume, some freight could shift back north.

For Qatar and Oman, mediation becomes even more valuable when the parties themselves no longer speak directly to one another.

The FT article concludes:

“These countries will not set the terms of the next international order. But those who wish to shape that order will often remain dependent on their routes, resources, or diplomatic access. Major powers will find it difficult to succeed without their cooperation.”

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The two terrorists: Britain jails tweets while the West crowns al-Qaeda’s man in Damascus

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Thomas Karat, behavioral analyst

Two men, one word. Next Monday, at Kingston Crown Court in London, a 72-year-old grandfather goes on trial for terrorism; the evidence is a tweet of seven words, and the maximum sentence is 14 years. Nine months ago, a man who founded al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch and carried a $10 million American bounty on his head became the first Syrian head of state ever received at the White House. Tony Greenstein and Ahmed al-Sharaa have never met. Between them they define what the word “terrorist” now means — and for American readers there is a further twist: the seven words that may cost the pensioner his freedom are fully protected speech in the United States, which is why Washington has developed other methods for its own dissidents.

Take the pensioner first, and take his record in full, because the prosecution will. Greenstein was expelled from the Labour Party in 2018; he lost a libel action against the Campaign Against Antisemitism, which had called him a “notorious antisemite,” the court finding the phrase protected as honest opinion; he accepted a suspended sentence over a Palestine Action attack on an Elbit arms factory. He is abrasive, litigious and unrepentant — a Jewish socialist from Brighton, a carer, the son of an Orthodox rabbi who marched against Mosley’s Blackshirts. None of that is the charge. The charge is that in November 2023, goaded by an anonymous account demanding he declare himself, he posted: “I support Hamas against the Israeli army.” Five weeks later, at 6:30 in the morning, counter-terrorism officers took his computers and phones, held him for nine hours, and released him under conditions that banned him from posting about the war at all. “This is Orwellian,” he told the arresting officers. He undersold it.

Now the other man, whose record requires no libel lawyer to establish, because the United States government wrote it down. Ahmed al-Sharaa — then Abu Mohammad al-Jolani — joined al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2003, was captured by American forces and imprisoned for five years, then crossed into Syria to found al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch, pledging allegiance on video to Ayman al-Zawahiri. The State Department’s own wanted notice recorded that under his leadership the group “carried out multiple terrorist attacks throughout Syria, often targeting civilians” — and itemized them: roughly 300 Kurdish civilians abducted from a checkpoint; 20 residents of the Druze village of Qalb Lawzeh massacred in Idlib; suicide bombings claimed in Damascus, Homs and Quneitra. In 2014 he called for retaliatory attacks on the American-led coalition itself. For this the UN froze his assets and banned his travel, and the $10 million bounty placed him among the five most wanted jihadist leaders on earth, on the same short list as Baghdadi and Zawahiri. That is the conduct the word “terrorist” was coined for: emptied villages, detonated city centers, a decade of American soldiers and Syrian civilians in the ground.

While the state prepared its case against the tweeter, it laid siege to the man. Eleven months to charge him; a trial date pushed back the better part of a year; thirty-two months, in the end, between the dawn raid and the jury. And one by one, his banks left him. In a statement published two weeks before trial, Greenstein described being cut off by five institutions since his arrest: Nationwide after a quarter-century, HSBC and First Direct — closing, among others, the account kept for the care of his autistic son — then Santander, which froze his personal accounts and those of a registered charity he serves as treasurer, then a savings bank that shut out his family entirely. None gave a reason; none has to, since banks warned about a customer are forbidden by law to tip him off. Nor is his suspicion of state involvement far-fetched: the government’s own Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation warned in 2023 that proscription enforcement would push banks toward jettisoning clients — “de-risking,” the trade calls it. When Coutts closed one account belonging to Nigel Farage, the affair drew condemnation from the prime minister and toppled a chief executive. A pensioner debanked six times en route to a terror trial has drawn silence. A defendant is presumed innocent; his accounts are not.

And while the pensioner’s accounts froze, the warlord’s thawed. Damascus fell on December 8, 2024; twelve days later an American delegation sat with al-Sharaa and announced the $10 million bounty was being dropped — the file unchanged, the graves at Qalb Lawzeh exactly where they had been. Britain’s prime minister said deproscription was “far too early” to consider; his government then spent 2025 considering it at speed. In March 2025, as government-aligned militias swept the Alawite coast, Amnesty documented the deliberate sectarian killing of civilians and demanded a war-crimes investigation; al-Sharaa’s own fact-finding committee would eventually confirm 1,426 dead, most of them civilians. Two months after those massacres, Trump received him in Riyadh and reviewed him for the cameras: “Young, attractive guy, tough guy, strong past.” In June came an executive order lifting sanctions to “give Syrians a chance at greatness”; in July, Washington revoked the terrorist designation of the organization he built. Britain’s Foreign Secretary flew to Damascus that same July to shake his hand — while HTS was still proscribed under the Terrorism Act as an alias of al-Qaeda, the identical legal status Hamas holds in Greenstein’s indictment. Only in October did Parliament tidy up, erasing the proscription on the stated ground that it “serves the national interest.” By November al-Sharaa was in the Oval Office, enrolling Syria in the anti-ISIS coalition while the Treasury halted most remaining sanctions. No jury weighed the graves. No dawn raid preceded the handshakes. The men who wrote the wanted poster simply took it down — and wrote into Hansard, in their own words, what proscription is: an instrument of the national interest, adjustable by ministerial order.

Hold the two files side by side and the statute confesses. Under Section 12 of the Terrorism Act, as amended in 2019, a person commits an offense by expressing an opinion supportive of a proscribed organization, reckless as to whether anyone is encouraged — an offense Parliament created precisely because the courts had ruled the old law could not touch opinions. By its literal terms, a Foreign Secretary renewing relations with the commander of a then-proscribed organization sits closer to the offense than anything Greenstein typed; nobody suggests prosecuting him, and that is the point. In the United States such a statute could not exist at all: even Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court’s furthest reach into “material support,” held that “any independent advocacy in which plaintiffs wish to engage is not prohibited.”

Britain criminalized exactly what America’s highest court fenced off, and then demonstrated, through Damascus, that the criminal category is edited by hand. The Terrorism Act carries a clause no draftsman wrote: it binds the powerless and dissolves on contact with the useful.

The state’s own ledgers show which of the two uses is the real one. Across fourteen years to mid-2025, the Ministry of Justice records 55 people prosecuted under the Act’s membership and support sections — four a year, through the entire era of ISIS. Then the subject changed from bombs to opinions. In the twelve months to September 2025 the Home Office counted 1,886 terrorism arrests — up 660 percent — and 86 percent of them were for supporting Palestine Action, a group proscribed for spray-painting warplanes weeks after HTS’s rehabilitation began. The share of arrests producing a charge collapsed from 47 percent to 17: five of six people seized under terror law are never meant to face trial, because the arrest is the product. The UN human rights chief called the ban “disproportionate and unnecessary”; more than 2,700 arrests followed anyway, 522 in a single day, pensioners and priests led off over cardboard signs. When the High Court ruled the ban unlawful in February, police paused, then resumed — “We must enforce the law as it is at the time,” a commissioner explained, arresting 18 more on the steps of Scotland Yard — and the Supreme Court will rule in November on whether any of it was ever legal. The government’s own reviewer confirms that terror prosecutions now run at record levels, “dominated by documentary offences and proscription related charges.” An apparatus built against the authors of Qalb Lawzeh is processing placards — while the author of Qalb Lawzeh signs coalition documents in the Oval Office.

The American half of the mirror completes itself. The administration that lifted the bounty cannot, thanks to the First Amendment, prosecute its own citizens’ words — so it deports the speakers instead. Mahmoud Khalil, a green-card holder, was seized by plainclothes ICE agents over his campus advocacy, held 104 days in Louisiana, made to miss the birth of his first child, never charged with a crime — detained on the Secretary of State’s certification that his presence compromised American foreign policy. Rümeysa Öztürk was taken off a street by masked agents and jailed 45 days over an op-ed; a judge found the whole policy unconstitutional, her case was thrown out, and she left for Türkiye anyway, while Khalil’s protections were stripped on appeal and his fate rides on the Supreme Court.

Hold that against Damascus: the same State Department that certified a student op-ed a threat to American foreign policy spent the year unwinding the terrorist status of a man it once ranked beside Baghdadi. The department’s terror lists and its visa lists are, it turns out, the same list, kept for the same purpose — sorting the useful from the inconvenient.

The inconvenient include the press. Richard Medhurst, an independent journalist covering Gaza, became the first reporter arrested under the statute now aimed at Greenstein — 14 months under investigation, no charge, his files handed to Austria so the ordeal could continue abroad. Ten officers raided the home of Asa Winstanley of The Electronic Intifada over his posts; a court found the warrants improperly obtained and ordered his devices returned. No conviction anywhere; months of seized equipment and fear everywhere — a fair description of the function. Even in Kingston, the instinct holds: by Greenstein’s account, prosecutors have fought to keep his published writings out of the jury bundle, the judge citing an old rule that “courts are not sounding boards for anybody’s political views” — in a trial where the defendant’s political views are the offense.

So the ledger closes where it opened, with two men and one word. One commanded an organization that committed atrocities at scale, and the two governments that hunted him have concluded, in Hansard’s own language, that his rehabilitation serves the national interest. The other posted seven words, and those same two governments — one with its Terrorism Act, one with its immigration code — have spent three years demonstrating what happens to the powerless who say the wrong thing about the wrong war. Greenstein has argued that his verdict will set the price for everyone arrested behind him: acquittal imperils the campaign, conviction licenses it. Perhaps. But the deeper verdict is already in, delivered in Riyadh and sealed in the Oval Office: terrorism, as governed practice, is a description of usefulness. Al-Sharaa became useful, and the word released him. Greenstein and 2,700 placard-carriers remain inconvenient, and the word descends on them with dawn raids and frozen accounts. The trial at Kingston is listed for five days. The word on trial has already been acquitted of meaning anything at all.

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