The architect of NATO 3.0: Elbridge Colby

The architect of the new NATO concept (“NATO 3.0”), which is expected to be catalyzed by the Ankara summit, is Elbridge Colby, who serves as a Pentagon undersecretary.

Last February, at the NATO defense ministers’ meeting, he delivered a pivotal speech in place of Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth. The low profile of the US representation was deemed indicative of the Trump administration’s diminishing valuation of NATO; yet Colby, arriving as a “theorist”—and indeed, as the champion of a decisive shift in US military presence from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific—had come to assign new homework to his allies.

Also known as the unofficial author of the United States’ latest National Security Strategy, Colby acknowledged in his speech that the post-Cold War “unipolar moment” had vanished, declaring the return of power politics and large-scale military force to the world stage: what was now required was realism and adaptability.

The undersecretary got straight to the heart of the matter, declaring that in light of this new reality, the US was prioritizing “the most serious threats to American interests,” specifically “the defense of the US homeland” and interests in the “Western Hemisphere,” while also reinforcing the principle of “deterrence by denial” in the Western Pacific (Colby also asserted that the Indo-Pacific region was “now the central arena of geopolitics”; we will return to Colby’s views on Asia below).

Accompanying all these priorities—or rather, the role assigned to American “allies” in this new US strategy—was to prepare “for the possibility that potential adversaries could act coordinately or opportunistically on multiple fronts simultaneously.”

The defense of Europe against the Soviet Union and communism during the Cold War (“NATO 1.0”); the shift of NATO operations outside the Continent after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with Europe fully outsourcing its “defense” to the US (“NATO 2.0”); and now, “burden-sharing” in the era of “multipolarity” so that the US can focus on the Asia-Pacific against the rise of China (“NATO 3.0”)… This is the essence of Colby’s message: “The core strategic reality set forth by the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS),” the undersecretary stated, “is that Europe must assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense.”

Under this framework, the US would henceforth prioritize only those theaters and challenges where American power could play a decisive role. For Colby, this did not portend a withdrawal from Europe. “On the contrary,” Colby argued, “this is an affirmation of strategic pragmatism and an acknowledgment of our allies’ undeniable capacity to step up and lead in Europe’s defense in a way that makes us all stronger and safer.”

Consequently, a strategy that “assumes the United States can indefinitely serve” as Europe’s “primary conventional defender” while simultaneously “bearing the decisive burden” everywhere else in the world was “neither sustainable nor wise.”

What, then, was to be done? Colby acknowledged the importance of the level of defense spending, stating that there was no substitute for it. Yet, in his view, what ultimately mattered was what these resources yielded: combat-ready forces, readily deployable munitions, resilient logistics, and integrated command structures operating at scale under austere conditions.

Herein lies the crux of the matter. Analogous to the “innovative” transformation within the Pentagon, Colby proposed that European NATO members also undergo a military transformation: prioritizing combat effectiveness over bureaucratic and regulatory inertia.

This meant “making hard choices regarding force structure, readiness, stockpiles, and industrial capacity” that reflected “the realities of modern conflict” rather than “peacetime politics.”

Divergence Within the Pentagon

Colby’s strong position within the Pentagon, having advocated for years to leave Europe and the Middle East to allies and focus on Asia, also delineates the fault lines in American politics.

The 12-day war with Iran last summer had further inflamed this issue. Accordingly, US Central Command (CENTCOM) stood on one side, while the “Asianists” led by Colby stood on the other. While CENTCOM Commander Michael “Erik” Kurilla advocated allocating more resources to defend Israel as Iranian retaliations escalated, Colby, championing a US military focus on China and the Indo-Pacific, opposed shifting military assets from Asia to the Middle East.

The reason for Colby’s opposition was the concern that deployments, such as the relocation of a Patriot missile battery from South Korea to the Middle East in April 2025, could compromise US readiness in future conflicts with China or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

In an interview with POLITICO last July, Colby emphasized his personal view that defending NATO’s eastern flank should only involve allocating forces in an amount that would not detract from the United States’ ability to defend Taiwan.

Colby also identified “key capabilities”—including long-range fires, logistics, command and control, and what is known as C4ISR, alongside logistics, munitions, and air defense—as areas where the United States must focus on Asia rather than Europe.

Viewing Europe “Through a China Lens”

Having previously argued that US commitments to Ukraine were overextended, Colby underscored that the most concrete challenge to his country and its interests came economically and militarily from China.

Stating that he also viewed Ukraine “through a China lens,” the strategist maintained that he was not advocating for an abrupt cutoff of all aid to Kyiv, and that while Russia’s actions were “evil,” the assistance provided by the US did not align with the concrete interests of the American people.

When asked what he would advise the US President to do if he were currently serving as an advisor, Colby responded:

“I would say: ‘I don’t want to talk about Ukraine right now. We will talk about Taiwan, China, and Asia first, and once we resolve that problem satisfactorily, we will spend time, political capital, and resources on Ukraine.’”

At the time, the Financial Times (FT) reported that Colby had told British officials that the Trump administration expected the British military to intensify its focus on the Euro-Atlantic region.

In a 2024 interview, Colby argued that the Republican voting base consists of working-class and middle-class Americans, asserting that Washington’s foreign policy fails to serve this constituency.

Noting that a maximalist foreign policy brought “disaster,” the undersecretary stated that Americans were weary of “endless wars.”

The China Obsession

Some figures in his close circle say that Colby is concerned with China “to the point of obsession.”

According to a report in Semafor last year, Colby is so focused on Asia that “he clashes with everyone else doing foreign policy, including Trump loyalists.”

According to Colby, the primary point to which the United States must direct its military and economic resources is Taiwan. Asserting that China is the “New Soviet Union,” Colby points out that NATO currently operates with a “post-Cold War” mindset where the US does everything, whereas what they actually need is a “Cold War mindset” of burden-sharing.

Stating that the US must resolutely resist any Chinese military intervention against Taiwan, Colby notes that this response should include strikes against selected targets on the Chinese mainland.

“Once a war begins, we must not drift to the marginal edge of a conventional conflict,” Colby says, emphasizing the need to prepare for a conventional war in every possible way.

In Colby’s view, a war over Taiwan is now closer due to the reduction of the US military presence in the Taiwan Strait. According to him, the US strongly resembles Britain’s bottleneck situation in the late 1930s: you can appear weak and avoid war, but all your vital interests will be compromised; if you appear strong and arm yourself, the likelihood of your adversary responding militarily increases.

Asia Strategy: Ensuring China Cannot Win

On the other hand, it is worth noting that the framework of Colby’s anti-China stance is built upon a foundation of strategic caution.

Delivering a speech at the Sejong Institute in South Korea last January, Colby outlined the cornerstones of his administration’s Asia policy.

As alluded to above, defining the Indo-Pacific region as “one of the main engines of global growth, the hub of global manufacturing—including South Korea—and the geopolitical axis of the 21st century,” Colby stated, “Consequently, as these documents clearly establish, the long-term security, prosperity, and liberties of Americans will be decisively shaped by developments in this region.”

Yet, acknowledging that “satisfactory stability” in Asia could not be achieved or maintained through “flowery rhetoric, assumed norms, or apparent goodwill,” Colby argued that this stability could only be preserved by “a durable and favorable balance of power that prevents any single state from dominating the region:”

“In this regard, the goal of America’s defense policy in Asia must be clear and reasonable to all. This goal is not conflict with China or any other nation. The objective is to establish a reasonable balance that is acceptable to Americans, our allies, and indeed the entire region. This is not a formalistic and rigid regional order, but an adaptable and evolving one. It is an order defined not by hegemony, but by a favorable balance where sovereignty is respected and peace is maintained—defined not by comforting illusions, but by clarity, strength, and resolve.”

Underscoring that this strategy was about “protecting the interests of America and its allies through stability rooted in credible deterrence and strategic balance,” the undersecretary maintained that the US was not seeking to subjugate, stifle, or humiliate China:

“What we seek—and as the President has consistently articulated—is a genuinely stable balance that works for Americans and our allies, where no single state can impose its hegemony: a favorable balance of power.”

Stating that they were not pursuing regime change in Beijing nor seeking to dominate China, Colby said, “We acknowledge and respect China’s proud history.” What the American strategist proposed was “deterrence by denial along the first island chain” in the Indo-Pacific.

According to Colby, the US was focusing on establishing a military posture along the first island chain in the Western Pacific that would ensure “aggression is impossible, escalation is unattractive, and war is truly irrational.”

This entailed a “resilient, distributed, and modernized force posture” in Japan, the Philippines, the Korean Peninsula, and elsewhere in the region—optimized to “deny swift or decisive gains” through military force, “resilient rather than fragile,” and a posture that “unites us in the pursuit of peace and stability.”

Colby continued:

“This kind of stable peace must be backed by deterrence and therefore secured by hard-power capacity, capability, and will—certainly ours, but also that of our allies.”

Consequently, it should be self-evident that Colby envisions a role for Asian allies similar to the one he and the US deem appropriate for their European counterparts. Quite apart from the invitation of Asian partners to the Ankara summit where the “NATO 3.0” concept is to be declared, Colby himself, referencing the Europeans’ commitment to allocate 3.5% of GDP for core military functions, noted in this speech: “But I must emphasize that these principles apply as much to Asia as they do to Europe.”

“Burden-Sharing” or “Burden-Shifting”?

In a recent interview with the CFR, Colby spoke very candidly about NATO 3.0: as the United States will be drawn into more conflicts, a “recalibration” within the alliance is required.

Pointing to the sheer scale of the military budget in the United States, Colby explicitly speaks of a “national mobilization”; he demands the expansion of the defense industrial base and calls for large-scale production.

The role falling to Europeans and Asians is to purchase American arms and conform to US military standards; Colby is candid on this front as well. Industrial production synchronization is the bedrock of this enterprise, and it appears that writings by figures such as Mark Rutte and Ursula von der Leyen ahead of the Ankara summit, coupled with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s “from Texas to California” emphasis in his address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, demonstrate that the message has been received and some ground has already been covered.

This indicates that a significant threshold may have been crossed in providing industrial “fodder” to European NATO countries, which otherwise hold diverging interests on China.