Dr. Matti Pesu, former researcher of Finland Defense Ministry answered our questions: “The risk of escalation into a full-scale war between NATO and Russia remains low.”
Matti Pesu is a Senior Research Fellow in the Finnish foreign policy, Northern European security, and NATO research programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA). From May 2022 to April 2023, he led a research project analyzing Finland’s nascent NATO policy and the country’s evolving role in Euro-Atlantic security.
He has published extensively on Finnish foreign, security, and defence policy, defence cooperation, Baltic Sea security, and Euro-Atlantic security.
Dr. Matti Pesu answered journalist Dr. Esra Karahindiba’s questions on Russia-Ukraine war and the position of the Baltic states.
Strengthening NATO’s eastern flank has become a key agenda item for the Alliance, especially after Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine. Finally, the US decision to deploy hypersonic missiles in Germany on a long-term basis has provoked retaliation from Moscow. What do you think about the latest risks of escalation?
The risk of escalation into a full-scale war between NATO and Russia remains low, as neither party desires military conflict. The US decision to deploy a new weapon system is a measured response to Russia’s previous deployment of medium-range missiles in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, bolstering deterrence and reassuring allies about the U.S. commitment to their security.
As is well known, the danger for NATO is that the destabilisation of the Suwalki corridor could cut off all theBaltic states from Poland, which is NATO’s only route toLithuania, Latvia and Estonia. What is your comment on the allegations that Moscow will invade Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland from Ukraine? Indeed, no serious comments about it from Putin or his cabinet.
Russia has in fact avoided actions that would significantly increase the risk of a direct military conflict with NATO. However, should Ukraine collapse, it could serve as a potential springboard for Russian aggression against neighboring NATO allies. This scenario would deteriorate regional security, which is one of the reasons why the Baltic states and Poland are such strong supporters of Ukraine.
In recent months, Russia has stepped up military cooperation with Belarus and started joint nuclear exercises. How realistic are the risks of a “nuclear war” in this context?
The risk of nuclear war remains very low. However, Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Belarus is part of its strategy to intimidate and dissuade Ukraine’s Western supporters from providing more robust military assistance.
Finland has given up its long term non-aligned position by joining NATO. Do you think this will deter Russia from any actions against Finland given the fact that experts discuss NATO will not sacrifice the rest of Western Europe for small Baltic countries?
Throughout the history of NATO, experts and policymakers have debated the reliability of US and allied security guarantees, which is an inherent aspect of “extended deterrence.” Despite these discussions, the US and otherNATO allies are consistently demonstrating their commitment to collective defense. They regularly conduct exercises in Finland, develop executable operational plans to defend the country, and signal their willingness to pre-position military equipment on Finnish soil. These actions strongly indicate the allies‘ dedication to mutual defense.
Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó has accused the Baltic countries of launching a “campaign of lies” against Hungary. He emphasized that the decision regarding security checks does not compromise Hungary’s stringent security measures. To address these allegations, State Secretary for Security Policy Péter Sztáray provided firsthand information to the embassies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, saying “hoping to end the misinformation campaign“. What does Finland think about Hungary’s position? How is the relations after Hungary’s approval of NATO bid of Finlands membership developing recently?
The relationship between Hungary and the majority of its EU and NATO partners has recently hit rock bottom. Also Finnish politicians have been highly critical of Hungary’s recent actions, including Prime Minister Orban’s trip to Moscow and the decision to grant visas to Russians. Hungary’s obstructionist stance on Finland’s and particularly Sweden’sNATO membership has outraged many Finns. It is difficult to see what Hungary gained from its actions apart from a tarnished reputation.
What is your response to the discussions assuming that to stay in dialogue with Russia is a safer way than making it an enemy?
From the end of the Second World War until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, maintaining dialogue with Moscow was a fundamental aspect of Finnish foreign policy. The intensity of this dialogue varied over time. However, due to recent Russian aggression, there is now little to discuss, as Finnish and broader Western views on the war in Ukraine and European security diverge significantly withMoscow’s position. This situation is a direct consequence of Russia’s own counterproductive actions. For a frontline nation like Finland, it is a matter of existential interest that Russia’s aggression fails and that the West remains united in condemning such actions.
After Finland’s participation to NATO mainly with the support from Türkiye, what has changed in Helsinki-Ankara relations up to now?
The intensity of Finnish-Turkish diplomacy increased significantly during Finland’s NATO membership process, leading to the formation of working groups on issues such as terrorism. However, to my knowledge, these working groups have not been very active and have not attracted significant public attention recently. Unsurprisingly, the intensity of the bilateral relationship has decreased. There is a prevailing sentiment in Finland that Türkiye’s instrumentalization of Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership processes for its own purposes jeopardized the national security of both countries. That said, it is also recognized that Finland andTürkiye – both having significant land forces – may share considerable interests within the alliance.
What are Finland’s main foreign policy and security agenda now?
The current agenda focuses on establishing Finland within NATO and ensuring its integration into NATO’s planning, command structure, and force structure. Helsinki is also intensifying its relationships with key allies such as the US, UK, Norway, and Sweden. Additionally, supporting Ukraine remains a high priority.
