On December 8, the Syrian opposition factions, namely the “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)” coalition and the “Syrian National Army,” announced that they had captured and taken control of Damascus. On the same day, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who had been in exile in Russia, announced his resignation and ordered the former government to peacefully transfer power to opposition forces. No one expected that the Assad regime, which had endured the trials of a decade-long civil war, would crumble under the opposition’s offensive in just 12 days, collapsing with unprecedented speed and bringing an end to the Assad family’s half-century-long rule in Syria.
A review of this “Syrian War 2.0,” which broke out at the end of November, reveals that the Assad regime was not only quickly defeated by the opposition forces but also lost to Israel, Türkiye, and was ultimately abandoned by its long-term supporters, Russia and Iran. At the core, however, the regime’s own incompetence was its downfall. In short, a combination of complex and multifaceted factors led to the historic collapse of Assad’s regime.
On November 27, opposition factions based in the Idlib province launched a surprise offensive. In just two days, they breached the government’s defenses, entered Aleppo province, and seized control of the provincial capital, Aleppo city, which Damascus had held for eight years. A week later, the rebels expanded their offensive, moving southward and easily capturing Hama and Homs in central and western Syria before finally taking Damascus.
In just 12 days, the Syrian military failed to mount any large-scale, organized defense of the regime. Neither Russia nor Iran took significant action to assist the Assad regime against the relatively weak rebel coalition. The Lebanese Hezbollah sent only 2,000 fighters to express support when Damascus was about to fall, but they were soon forced to withdraw. Meanwhile, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces outright refused to intervene. In short, the support Assad received during the “Syrian War 1.0” was entirely absent. The “Axis of Resistance” or the “Shia Crescent” disintegrated completely on the western flank of the Eastern Mediterranean, and both Russia and Iran lost their strategic assets and spheres of influence in the region.
At this critical juncture for the state and the regime, from Aleppo to Hama, Homs, and Damascus, there was no sign of fierce or effective resistance from the Syrian military or armed civilians. Instead, there was a total collapse of military morale and public support, an internal failure unlike the determined defense seen four years ago. Notably, the opposition forces were not overwhelmingly powerful nor internationally legitimized.
The anti-government forces were primarily led by the HTS coalition, with the Türkiye-supported “Syrian National Army,” based in Afrin along Syria’s northwestern border, coordinating the attack. The HTS coalition is formerly known as the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, the “Al-Nusra Front.” Due to its terrorist roots and current activities, the organization has been designated a terrorist group by the United Nations, the United States, and Türkiye.
The “Syrian National Army,” on the other hand, is a Turkish-backed proxy force aimed at countering Kurdish separatist groups in the Afrin region, preventing them from linking up with Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria. This supports Türkiye’s control over the so-called “safe zone” in northern Syria, disrupts the vertical connectivity of cross-border Kurdish networks, and suppresses Kurdish insurgency and separatist movements within Türkiye.
The sudden collapse of Syrian government forces under attack from northwestern rebel forces was unexpected. However, a closer examination of the region’s geopolitical dynamics reveals that this outcome was inevitable.
Firstly, various opposition factions had laid low, recuperating and significantly improving their combat capabilities. Since the ceasefire brokered by Russia and Türkiye in March 2020, the opposition factions entrenched in northwestern Syria had bided their time for four years, waiting for a chance to rise again. Once they sensed weaknesses in government forces or a relaxation of defenses, they were bound to break the ceasefire, expand their control, and wage war to sustain their growth and aim for ultimate power.
Secondly, the four-year ceasefire had caused the Syrian government to neglect the strategic threat posed by the northwest, particularly failing to fortify Aleppo, its largest city and a critical stronghold. Russian forces stationed in Syria and Iranian military advisors also became complacent, failing to monitor the rebels’ recovery, assess the threat of a counteroffensive, or prepare for war. Following the outbreak of this conflict, Russia immediately dismissed its military commander in Syria, Sergei Kisel, replacing him with General Alexander Chaiko—a move reflecting accountability for negligence.
Thirdly, the year-long “Sixth Middle East War” further complicated the region’s already intricate geopolitical landscape. Israel’s “Second Lebanon War” severely weakened Hezbollah forces and further undermined Iran’s military presence in Syria, creating an ideal opportunity for rebel forces to launch their comeback from the northwest. According to Russia’s Gazeta, Aleppo’s defense had been primarily entrusted to the Syrian Republican Guard’s 32nd Division, local militias, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. However, many of these forces had recently been redeployed to combat revived ISIS sleeper cells in the Syrian desert, leaving the northwestern defenses hollow. Frequent Israeli bombings in the Aleppo suburbs further weakened the remaining forces, causing the defenses to collapse entirely.
Fourthly, just before Israel reached a ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, it carried out targeted bombings of the Syria-Lebanon border crossings, severing Hezbollah’s land routes between Syria and Iran. This not only dismantled the western flank of the “Shia Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance” but also emboldened Syrian rebel forces to exploit the power vacuum.
Fifthly, on a broader strategic level, the protracted war in Ukraine and the increasingly volatile standoff between Russia and NATO distracted Moscow from Syria, a relatively minor chessboard. Similarly, Iran, entangled in its year-long conflict with Israel and juggling a “seven-front” resistance axis, failed to focus on Syria or anticipate the sudden resurgence of rebel forces.
Sixthly, the “Astana Process” countries—Russia, Iran, and Türkiye—agreed to abandon Assad’s regime in pursuit of a negotiated settlement for a “post-Assad Syria.” Following the outbreak of this conflict, both Russia and Iran refrained from intervening decisively to rescue Assad, opting instead to align with Türkiye and restart the “Astana Process,” effectively sealing Assad’s fate.
After the resumption of hostilities, Syria, Russia, and Iran uniformly accused Israel and the United States of orchestrating the rebels’ counteroffensive. Türkiye, which had been deeply involved in the Syrian civil war, remained silent for several days before officially announcing its support for overthrowing the Assad regime. In reality, the rapid progression of the “Syrian War 2.0” and the roles of the various actors supporting the rebels reflect a complex web of interests and calculations.
Firstly, the United States was not the instigator or driving force behind the rebels. From the beginning of the conflict, the United States emphasized that it had no involvement in the offensive and publicly pressured Türkiye. According to Israel’s Jerusalem Post, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and urged Ankara to restrain the “Syrian National Army” offensive and ensure stability in Syria. Although the U.S. dislikes the Assad regime, which aligns closely with Russia and is part of the “Axis of Resistance” with Iran, it does not wish to see Syria plunge into new chaos, allowing radical and terrorist forces to grow again, which could force the U.S. into another counterterrorism war in the Middle East. On December 2, AFP quoted a U.S. State Department spokesperson as saying that the United States would not, under any circumstances, support the HTS, a terrorist organization. Reuters reported that while calling on all sides to stabilize Syria, the U.S. government was also considering lifting sanctions on Syria to drive a wedge between it and Iran.
Secondly, Türkiye was one of the main drivers of the rebels’ large-scale offensive. Without Türkiye’s support or tacit approval, the “Syrian National Army” would not have been able to coordinate with forces like HTS. Türkiye has long insisted that the Syrian government must engage in dialogue with the opposition and form an inclusive government, while also pushing for the normalization of relations between Damascus and Ankara. However, the Syrian government categorizes the armed groups in the northwest as terrorist organizations and refuses dialogue under the premise that Türkiye continues to occupy Syrian territory in the north. Analysts argue that Türkiye viewed this new wave of conflict as an opportunity to pressure Damascus into submission, or even overthrow it, to further dominate the post-Assad era and shape the geopolitical landscape of the new Middle East.
Thirdly, Israel has played a significant role in weakening the “Axis of Resistance” and exacerbating the conflict. During the “Syrian War 1.0,” extremist and terrorist organizations had exploited the hostile relationship between Syria and Israel, as well as the Syrian army’s reluctance to use heavy weapons near the Israeli ceasefire line. Analysts believe that the use of heavy weaponry, drones, and advanced electronic warfare by the rebels in this round of fighting indicates the involvement of Israeli intelligence agencies. Both sides share a common enemy in the Syrian government and its allied “Resistance Front.” Although Israel officially denies involvement in the attacks, the implicit understanding between the two parties is evident. With the resurgence of the Syrian conflict, Israel has succeeded in further diverting the attention and resources of the “Resistance Axis,” reducing pressure on Israel from the northeast and Iran. On December 8, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu excitedly proclaimed that the collapse of the Assad regime was a “direct result of Israel’s actions against Iran and Hezbollah” and declared, “This has triggered a chain reaction across the Middle East.”
Fourthly, Ukraine has also been accused of involvement in the conflict. On December 3, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations accused Ukrainian intelligence agencies of assisting Syrian rebels, including providing weapons, training, and operational guidance targeting Russian forces in Syria. On December 4, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated these accusations, alleging that Ukrainian authorities were directly involved in the Syrian rebels’ offensive. Ukraine has remained silent on these allegations, and no third-party evidence has confirmed Ukrainian intelligence’s involvement. However, theoretically, forcing Russia to open a second front in the Middle East could alleviate Ukraine’s military pressure in the east of Ukraine.
As a pivotal state in the “Shia Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance,” Syria’s evolving conflict has profound implications. Hezbollah, which previously deployed troops to aid Damascus during the regime’s defensive battles, and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces have both declared their unwillingness to send forces across borders to assist this time. Although Iran has repeatedly stated its readiness to deploy troops upon the Syrian government’s request, no concrete action has been taken. Russia has also declared its continued support for the Syrian government. However, beyond deploying its existing forces and equipment in Syria to fend off rebel advances and conducting missile drills in the Eastern Mediterranean for deterrence, Russia lacks the willingness or capacity to mount a large-scale military intervention as it did during the “Syrian War 1.0.”
The collapse of the Assad regime is not a victory for the Syrian people but rather the result of a combination of the government’s incompetence and external interference. Regime change in Damascus does not signify the beginning of long-term peace and stability in Syria; rather, it may mark the start of a new round of power struggles. Western, central, and southern Syria are now under the control of the HTS and the “Syrian National Army”; northern Syria is dominated by Türkiye’s “safe zone”; eastern and northeastern Syria are controlled by U.S.-backed Kurdish forces; and the southwestern Golan Heights, encompassing over 1,200 square kilometers, have long been under Israeli occupation. Over the past week, Israel has further expanded its defensive perimeter, capturing several key positions on the Syrian side… This “partitioned” Syria faces continued vulnerability to external manipulation and an even more uncertain future.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
