Opinion
The dangerous escalation and expansion of Israel’s ‘targeted killing’ policy
Between 17 and 19 September, a series of large-scale pager and radio explosions in Lebanon killed around 100 people and injured thousands more. The dead included civilians and children. Since most of the victims of these unprecedented attacks were Hezbollah members, and since the incidents took place mainly in Hezbollah-controlled areas, such as the southern suburbs of Beirut, South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, both Hezbollah and the Lebanese government were almost unanimous in their view that these attacks were an organised Israeli telecommunications attack.
Following the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Lebanese conflicts, Hezbollah leaders warned that Israeli intelligence had infiltrated Lebanese smartphone networks. Hezbollah members then began using older, low-tech communication devices, often to avoid detection of their location. According to the Associated Press, non-military institutions such as Hezbollah-affiliated schools, hospitals and aid organisations were among those using such equipment.
Although Israel has traditionally maintained a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ stance, the escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has led most observers to conclude that the technologically powerful Israel has infiltrated the supply chain of communications equipment and detonated pre-planted micro-bombs, taking its policy of ‘targeted killing’ to the level of war. This is seen as a move to retaliate against and deter Hezbollah.
If this is the case, it means that Israel is innovating, expanding and increasing the severity of its ‘targeted killing’ policy, which has been in place for years. By turning consumer products, especially communications devices, into weapons of mass destruction, it is further violating the laws of war, international law and humanitarian principles, and setting a bad precedent by opening a new Pandora’s box for international conflict.
Why is ‘targeted killing’ so common?
As a small country with a small population, Israel has historically favoured pre-emptive strikes and quick results. As protracted conflicts have cost Israel dearly in human and material terms, the government has been forced to use as much or more force than the other side to end conflicts. For years, Israelis lived in disarray, suffered discrimination and massacres, and the country was in a constant state of war. The consciousness of fear and crisis has become an inescapable psychological shadow, even an important feature of the national character. Decades of tense confrontation and the threat of violence have led most Israelis to regard security as the supreme value and to an extreme egocentric mentality: ‘I would rather betray the world than let the world betray me’. These factors constitute the revenge motivation behind Israel’s long-standing policy of ‘targeted killings’ and the social basis for its acceptance by most Israelis.
The policy of targeted killings reflects the consistency and relative rationality of the Israeli government’s strategy against its enemies. Internally, it can comfort victims of attacks and prevent potential threats; externally, it can ease international pressure under the pretext of ‘fighting terrorism’. In this way, it can prevent a full-scale escalation or expansion of the conflict, avoid large-scale humanitarian disasters, reduce public criticism and weaken anti-Israeli sentiment by dividing and fragmenting the enemy front. It also has the effect of deterring, dispersing and crippling the organisational structure of enemy extremist groups.
Why is ‘targeted killing’ often successful?
Israel’s methods of targeted killing are varied. They include air-to-ground missile strikes, sniper rifles, tank attacks, and the placement of remote-controlled bombs in cars, telephone booths, concrete barriers and even mobile phones. Despite occasional failures, Israel’s military intelligence units are generally able to act in a stable, precise and effective manner, seeking to minimise collateral damage. The international community is now convinced that Israel has enabled the mass and targeted detonation of micro-explosives pre-planted in pagers, radios and even solar panels. This shows that the policy of ‘targeted killing’ has not stopped over time, but has evolved.
The fact that the policy of ‘targeted killings’ is so widespread and often successful is mainly due to the following factors:
First, Israel has overwhelming overall power. Having been in a state of war for a long time, Israel’s military and intelligence services are always on high alert. Not only is it the military superpower of the entire Middle East, it is also world class in terms of equipment, technology, communications, quality of troops, quality of training and combat experience. When it comes to ‘execution’ targets, it is like using a sledgehammer to kill a sparrow. The ‘execution’ operations themselves are not only diverse, but also have a very high technological content.
Secondly, Israel’s military or intelligence services prepare in advance by planting bombs on the equipment used by the targets and detonating them by remote control if necessary. Placing remote-controlled bombs in payphones, mobile phones, telephone booths, road barriers and even fake gifts and detonating them at the appropriate time is a common method of Israeli bombing.
Thirdly, killing and bombing from a distance with tanks, helicopters, drones, rocket launchers or sniper rifles, taking advantage of asymmetry in equipment capabilities.
Fourth, approaching the target disguised as enemy civilians and carrying out the attack.
Another important factor in the success of ‘targeted killing’ is that a large number of informants act as collaborators, providing sensitive information or equipment such as mobile phones and cars to Israel’s military intelligence units. Israel’s methods of recruiting informants include blackmail, bribery and work permits. This forces some Palestinians, Lebanese or Iranians who are weak-willed and in financial difficulties to betray their national interests. According to some intelligence reports, the ‘targeted killing’ of Hamas leader Haniyeh in Tehran by Israeli intelligence was carried out by a bought insider who tracked, positioned and planted explosives beforehand.
At one point, the Israeli government referred to the extrajudicial killing as ‘liquidation’; it later changed the term to ‘targeted killing’. Even this definition is not sufficiently clear, but for the most part it has been described as ‘active defence’ and rejected by the international and local left-wing media as ‘assassination’. But whatever the name, it was clear that such acts did not change some facts that fit the basic characteristics of assassination: the unlawful killing of an accused person without legal process, the ending of a life without direct confrontation and at a moment when the target has no chance to defend himself, and usually either denial or silence about these acts.
More than 20 years ago, the Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (ICHROT), a group of Israeli parliamentarians, lawyers and journalists, stated in a report that assassination had been part of Israel’s policy of killing prominent Palestinian figures for more than 30 years, and was not a new practice that emerged after the Al-Aqsa Intifada. This was indeed the case.
When Brigadier General Benny Gantz, the Israeli army commander in the West Bank at the time, was asked if there was a ‘cleansing policy’, he replied: ‘You said cleansing, not me. We will do whatever is necessary and we will not stop similar operations as long as there is a threat. In an interview with the Israeli newspaper al-Hayat, Rami Golzin, one of the founders of the special forces, admitted: ‘We are carrying out purges. If we had not liquidated Abu Jihad (in 1988) or other targets that needed to be liquidated, our buses would have been blown up and 17 of our sons would have been killed’.
Initially, Israeli military intelligence announced that it had ‘liquidated’ certain individuals after the assassination operations had ended. Later, however, they adopted a policy of silence, neither confirming nor denying these activities. One practice that did not change, however, was the practice of listing the ‘crimes’ of the assassination targets. Israeli military intelligence stated that the assassinations were carried out to prevent terrorist attacks by the targets. This was a typical ‘execute first, judge later’ approach.
Human rights violations and condemnation
ICHROT stressed that Israel’s assassination policy violates the right to life of the targets and contravenes fundamental principles of international and Israeli law. The most critical aspect of this policy is that an organisation or an individual can take the decision to kill another person without legal justification and carry it out without judicial approval. In addition, the ‘accused’ is often unaware of the charges against him or her and, even if accused, has no opportunity to defend himself or herself.
The organisation said that Israel’s assassination policy was intended to retaliate for Palestinian ‘terrorist attacks’ against Israeli targets or to punish those who organised them. However, these operations were often based on dubious and flawed intelligence, leading the Israeli army to act too easily, abusing its power and harming innocent people. On numerous occasions, Israeli ‘targeted killings’ have resulted in the deaths of large numbers of civilians, including innocent family members of those targeted for assassination.
Another major problem was that the policy of ‘targeted killings’ made military operations unlimited. If it is possible to kill Palestinians or Lebanese suspected of attacking Israelis, what about potential attackers? What about people of any nationality, especially citizens of Middle Eastern countries, who only verbally express support for attacks on Israeli targets? According to Israeli logic, they are all potential terrorists.
Prof Ma is Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He specialises in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle East politics. He worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.
Opinion
Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France
The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.
In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.
Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.
Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.
The shadow of 17 October 1961
It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.
Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.
This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.
To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?
Looters on the streets, where are the police?
Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.
While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.
It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.
To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?
The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.
A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges
The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.
The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.
The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.
These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.
The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.
In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.
An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands
Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.
Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.
To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.
Opinion
What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?
By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.
The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.
There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.
For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.
Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.
Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.
There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.
For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.
Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?
Let us give another example from the Turkic world.
On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?
We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?
Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.
In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?
In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?
Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?
How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?
Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?
How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?
Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?
These questions can certainly be multiplied.
Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.
Opinion
The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East
In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.
In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.
Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.
Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.
A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East
On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.
These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.
If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.
Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.
The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.
Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.
For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.
The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again
The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.
Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.
The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.
Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.
Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.
Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.
Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.
In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.
In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.
Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.
A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.
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