The Triangular Nuclear Game and Dilemma Between Iran, Israel and the U.S.

According to U.S. media reports, White House envoy Steve Witkoff is planning to meet Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Oslo next week to restart nuclear talks. Despite approving the decision to suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran affirmed its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Safeguards Agreement on 3 July. On the same day, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions on multiple commercial networks that assist in Iran’s oil trade. As for Israel, it had already made it clear that it could launch further attacks on Iran at any time if it attempted to cross the nuclear threshold.

The smoke of the “Twelve-Day War” has not yet fully dissipated, yet the triangular nuclear game among Iran, the United States, and Israel has resumed, returning to the long-standing path of geopolitical maneuvering familiar to the international community, as if nothing major had just happened in the Middle East. In essence, all three countries continue to follow the same entrenched logic in addressing the Iranian nuclear issue, leaving this dangerous geopolitical game mired in stalemate.

The fundamental issue behind Iran’s nuclear dilemma lies in its missed opportunity to actually possess nuclear weapons, thus leaving it trapped in a “strategic prison” where it cannot cross the nuclear threshold. On June 17, renowned American realist theorist John Mearsheimer stated, “I’ve always believed that if I were Iran’s national security advisor, they would already have nuclear weapons.” Mearsheimer cited North Korea and Israel as examples of achieving national security through actual nuclear possession, while Libya and Iraq, which lacked nuclear weapons, had their regimes overthrown by the United States and others—thus calling Iran “extremely foolish.”

Objectively speaking, Iran began nuclear research in the 1950s under the Pahlavi dynasty with U.S. assistance but missed the best opportunity to enter the nuclear club alongside its quasi-ally Israel. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has faced unprecedented international isolation and engaged in an eight-year war with Iraq, lacking the capacity and conditions to advance nuclear research or accelerate nuclear armament—even while repeatedly suffering from chemical weapons attacks by Iraq.

Subjectively, the new Iranian regime repeatedly emphasized that Islamic teachings forbid weapons of mass destruction, becoming entangled in a moral or procedural justice dilemma amid the complex Middle Eastern power game—repeating the strategic blunder of China’s ancient ruler Duke Xiang of Song, who famously refused to “attack the enemy mid-river.” Ultimately, Iran—while dreaming of exporting the Islamic Revolution and asserting Persian nationalist dominance in the Middle East—underestimated the strategic value of nuclear weapons as “a poor nation’s deterrent,” missing yet another strategic opportunity to cross the nuclear threshold at the end of the Cold War. Even when India and Pakistan successively became nuclear powers in 1998, Iran still hesitated at the gates of the nuclear club. In 2002, George W. Bush introduced the “Axis of Evil” theory and openly declared a plan to overthrow Iran’s government, while launching wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran’s nuclear ambitions were exposed and a nuclear crisis ensued. But with the timing, geography, and international consensus no longer in Iran’s favor, it was too late to turn back.

Of course, the concurrent North Korean nuclear crisis in East Asia and the resulting persistent tensions may have further paralyzed Iran into strategic hesitation. It continued to adopt a vague nuclear policy—reluctant or afraid to take the critical step toward actual nuclear capability, while simultaneously obstructing IAEA inspections. This indecisive stance has subjected Iran to round after round of collective international sanctions and unilateral U.S. sanctions, while also revealing to nuclear-armed Israel Iran’s strategic timidity—prompting Israel to reinforce its “zero tolerance” stance toward an Iranian nuclear capability. The Arab states’ collective anxiety over a potential Iranian bomb has also intensified, making Iran’s nuclear trajectory one of the region’s top concerns.

In 2015, the Obama administration tacitly accepted Iran’s sphere of influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in exchange for Iran’s agreement to sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. This legally weak document merely delayed Iran’s nuclear development or made it more difficult. However, Iran still failed to recognize the strategic importance of nuclear capability for its national security. Moreover, unwilling to resolve its structural contradictions with Israel or even the United States, Iran ultimately sowed the seeds of its own tragic fate—exposing itself to military strikes from both Israel and the U.S.

After the outbreak of the Sixth Middle East War, the long-standing asymmetric conflict or proxy war between Iran and Israel gradually escalated into direct confrontation. In the two clashes with Israel in April and October last year, Iran, unwilling to escalate tensions, responded with “symbolic counterattacks,” fully exposing its nature as a “paper tiger.” This, in turn, stimulated Israel’s adventurous tendencies and ultimately led to the outbreak of the “Twelve-Day War.” Once Israel extended its air superiority over the Eastern Mediterranean to reach Iranian territory, the Trump administration—initially uninterested in being drawn into another Middle East war—took advantage of the chaos and joined the military campaign against Iran. Iran’s “negotiated retaliation” against U.S. military targets once again demonstrated its typical style of bluffing but faltering at the critical moment.

If Mearsheimer’s warnings and sarcasm are considered mere theoretical musings, the sudden outbreak and rapid de-escalation of the India-Pakistan conflict right before the “Twelve-Day War” clearly showed the world the fundamental security value of nuclear weapons for national survival—and their effectiveness in preventing the escalation and expansion of conflicts. Had Iran possessed nuclear capabilities equivalent to Israel’s in deterrence and destruction, Israel would likely have reconsidered the heavy price of a large-scale attack on Iran, and the U.S. might not have dared to exploit the situation.

Iran has missed multiple real opportunities to become a nuclear-armed state. Its semi-transparent nuclear policy created a gray zone that allowed Israel, the U.S., and even Iran itself to extract strategic benefits from brinkmanship, ultimately turning the nuclear crisis into a bizarre chess game in which all three players have their own agendas, justifications, and gains.

Israel is clearly determined to prevent any neighboring country—especially Iran, which refuses to recognize Israel, seeks regional hegemony, and constantly uses the Palestinian issue to exert pressure—from acquiring nuclear weapons. If Iran were to become nuclear-armed, it would inevitably break Israel’s absolute monopoly on nuclear power in the Middle East, resulting in a state of mutual nuclear deterrence—Israel’s worst nightmare. Worse, if Iran’s nuclearization prompted frightened Arab states to follow suit, Israel would find itself surrounded by nuclear-armed neighbors, creating an even greater and longer-lasting nightmare.

This is a binary, existential decision: 0 or 1, life or death. Therefore, Israel is willing to go to war to permanently block Iran at the gate of the nuclear club, relying on U.S. backing and firefighting. Israel has effectively hijacked American national security and Middle East diplomacy, and cleverly leveraged Iran’s ethnic, sectarian, and status-based conflicts with Arab countries. By continuously amplifying the narrative of an Iranian nuclear threat, Israel gradually built a unified front to prevent Iran from going nuclear. This ultimately led to the signing of the Abraham Accords, further isolating Iran in the regional power game, leaving it aligned only with a few non-state actors.

The United States, meanwhile, driven by its interest in preserving Israel’s strategic security, controlling the Persian Gulf oil lifeline, establishing air and naval bases in Arab states, and treating oil-rich Arab countries as a kind of “ATM,” has intermittently released conflicting messages—sometimes warning that Iran is “about to become nuclear,” sometimes suggesting it is “still not there.” By tightening and loosening U.S.-Iran relations at will, Washington has kept Iran sleepwalking in a state of nuclear ambiguity. Iran, in turn, has grown complacent over temporary U.S. concessions, investing the resulting petrodollars into regional expansion and proxy wars—only to ultimately become deeply entangled in a nuclear crisis web of its own making, from which it can no longer free itself.

Iran is clearly the “victim” of long-term pressure from Israel and the United States. However, in over 40 years of foreign policy struggle, Iran also seems to have benefited from its nuclear ambiguity policy: by publicly emphasizing its sovereign right to peacefully use nuclear energy, projecting a strong image of defending national and ethnic dignity, evoking the tragic consciousness and martyrdom complex of the Persian nation and the Shiite “dual minority” identity, cleverly binding the regime’s legitimacy with the rationality of state behavior, and linking public resentment against foreign oppression and interference with an aggressive foreign policy. Through its long-standing nuclear ambiguity and brinkmanship strategy, Iran has not only used external pressure and hostility to maintain the political base and legitimacy of the Islamic regime, but also skillfully avoided repeated waves of public pressure for domestic reform, external openness, livelihood improvements, and a better international image—using it even as a pressure-release valve to divert and mitigate the internal political and social contradictions that continue to intensify.

By this point, the Iranian nuclear crisis has become a tool that all three parties—Iran, Israel, and the United States—need. It has turned into a geopolitical bargaining chip that anyone can exploit for advantage or avoid for protection, and a deadlocked game that no one seems able to escape from in the short term.

For Israel and the United States, the Iranian nuclear crisis and the current Iranian regime are two sides of the same coin—offering a paradox that provokes both old and new questions: Is changing Iran’s current regime truly something Israel and the U.S. want to see happen? Wouldn’t a relatively isolated Iran, one that maintains its current ideological mindset, political system, and worldview, be more beneficial to Israel’s regional maneuvering in the Middle East, to America’s dominance and interference, and to the joint use of a seemingly powerful Iranian “scarecrow” to intimidate the many “little sparrows” of the Arab world?

Now let’s imagine the opposite scenario: if Iran gave up exporting the Islamic Revolution, abandoned the Palestine card and made peace with Israel, dissolved the “Shiite Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance,” normalized relations with the U.S., and respected the political systems and foreign policies of neighboring Arab monarchies—would Israel still have any justification to continue occupying the territories of Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria? Could it still maintain its aggressively expansionist “Greater Israel” policy? Could it continue to violate neighboring airspaces with impunity? And would the U.S. still be able to persuade Arab countries to host numerous military bases, lavishly buy American weapons, and huddle beneath the protective wings of American power?

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.