Opinion
The Triangular Nuclear Game and Dilemma Between Iran, Israel and the U.S.
According to U.S. media reports, White House envoy Steve Witkoff is planning to meet Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Oslo next week to restart nuclear talks. Despite approving the decision to suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran affirmed its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Safeguards Agreement on 3 July. On the same day, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions on multiple commercial networks that assist in Iran’s oil trade. As for Israel, it had already made it clear that it could launch further attacks on Iran at any time if it attempted to cross the nuclear threshold.
The smoke of the “Twelve-Day War” has not yet fully dissipated, yet the triangular nuclear game among Iran, the United States, and Israel has resumed, returning to the long-standing path of geopolitical maneuvering familiar to the international community, as if nothing major had just happened in the Middle East. In essence, all three countries continue to follow the same entrenched logic in addressing the Iranian nuclear issue, leaving this dangerous geopolitical game mired in stalemate.
The fundamental issue behind Iran’s nuclear dilemma lies in its missed opportunity to actually possess nuclear weapons, thus leaving it trapped in a “strategic prison” where it cannot cross the nuclear threshold. On June 17, renowned American realist theorist John Mearsheimer stated, “I’ve always believed that if I were Iran’s national security advisor, they would already have nuclear weapons.” Mearsheimer cited North Korea and Israel as examples of achieving national security through actual nuclear possession, while Libya and Iraq, which lacked nuclear weapons, had their regimes overthrown by the United States and others—thus calling Iran “extremely foolish.”
Objectively speaking, Iran began nuclear research in the 1950s under the Pahlavi dynasty with U.S. assistance but missed the best opportunity to enter the nuclear club alongside its quasi-ally Israel. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has faced unprecedented international isolation and engaged in an eight-year war with Iraq, lacking the capacity and conditions to advance nuclear research or accelerate nuclear armament—even while repeatedly suffering from chemical weapons attacks by Iraq.
Subjectively, the new Iranian regime repeatedly emphasized that Islamic teachings forbid weapons of mass destruction, becoming entangled in a moral or procedural justice dilemma amid the complex Middle Eastern power game—repeating the strategic blunder of China’s ancient ruler Duke Xiang of Song, who famously refused to “attack the enemy mid-river.” Ultimately, Iran—while dreaming of exporting the Islamic Revolution and asserting Persian nationalist dominance in the Middle East—underestimated the strategic value of nuclear weapons as “a poor nation’s deterrent,” missing yet another strategic opportunity to cross the nuclear threshold at the end of the Cold War. Even when India and Pakistan successively became nuclear powers in 1998, Iran still hesitated at the gates of the nuclear club. In 2002, George W. Bush introduced the “Axis of Evil” theory and openly declared a plan to overthrow Iran’s government, while launching wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran’s nuclear ambitions were exposed and a nuclear crisis ensued. But with the timing, geography, and international consensus no longer in Iran’s favor, it was too late to turn back.
Of course, the concurrent North Korean nuclear crisis in East Asia and the resulting persistent tensions may have further paralyzed Iran into strategic hesitation. It continued to adopt a vague nuclear policy—reluctant or afraid to take the critical step toward actual nuclear capability, while simultaneously obstructing IAEA inspections. This indecisive stance has subjected Iran to round after round of collective international sanctions and unilateral U.S. sanctions, while also revealing to nuclear-armed Israel Iran’s strategic timidity—prompting Israel to reinforce its “zero tolerance” stance toward an Iranian nuclear capability. The Arab states’ collective anxiety over a potential Iranian bomb has also intensified, making Iran’s nuclear trajectory one of the region’s top concerns.
In 2015, the Obama administration tacitly accepted Iran’s sphere of influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in exchange for Iran’s agreement to sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. This legally weak document merely delayed Iran’s nuclear development or made it more difficult. However, Iran still failed to recognize the strategic importance of nuclear capability for its national security. Moreover, unwilling to resolve its structural contradictions with Israel or even the United States, Iran ultimately sowed the seeds of its own tragic fate—exposing itself to military strikes from both Israel and the U.S.
After the outbreak of the Sixth Middle East War, the long-standing asymmetric conflict or proxy war between Iran and Israel gradually escalated into direct confrontation. In the two clashes with Israel in April and October last year, Iran, unwilling to escalate tensions, responded with “symbolic counterattacks,” fully exposing its nature as a “paper tiger.” This, in turn, stimulated Israel’s adventurous tendencies and ultimately led to the outbreak of the “Twelve-Day War.” Once Israel extended its air superiority over the Eastern Mediterranean to reach Iranian territory, the Trump administration—initially uninterested in being drawn into another Middle East war—took advantage of the chaos and joined the military campaign against Iran. Iran’s “negotiated retaliation” against U.S. military targets once again demonstrated its typical style of bluffing but faltering at the critical moment.
If Mearsheimer’s warnings and sarcasm are considered mere theoretical musings, the sudden outbreak and rapid de-escalation of the India-Pakistan conflict right before the “Twelve-Day War” clearly showed the world the fundamental security value of nuclear weapons for national survival—and their effectiveness in preventing the escalation and expansion of conflicts. Had Iran possessed nuclear capabilities equivalent to Israel’s in deterrence and destruction, Israel would likely have reconsidered the heavy price of a large-scale attack on Iran, and the U.S. might not have dared to exploit the situation.
Iran has missed multiple real opportunities to become a nuclear-armed state. Its semi-transparent nuclear policy created a gray zone that allowed Israel, the U.S., and even Iran itself to extract strategic benefits from brinkmanship, ultimately turning the nuclear crisis into a bizarre chess game in which all three players have their own agendas, justifications, and gains.
Israel is clearly determined to prevent any neighboring country—especially Iran, which refuses to recognize Israel, seeks regional hegemony, and constantly uses the Palestinian issue to exert pressure—from acquiring nuclear weapons. If Iran were to become nuclear-armed, it would inevitably break Israel’s absolute monopoly on nuclear power in the Middle East, resulting in a state of mutual nuclear deterrence—Israel’s worst nightmare. Worse, if Iran’s nuclearization prompted frightened Arab states to follow suit, Israel would find itself surrounded by nuclear-armed neighbors, creating an even greater and longer-lasting nightmare.
This is a binary, existential decision: 0 or 1, life or death. Therefore, Israel is willing to go to war to permanently block Iran at the gate of the nuclear club, relying on U.S. backing and firefighting. Israel has effectively hijacked American national security and Middle East diplomacy, and cleverly leveraged Iran’s ethnic, sectarian, and status-based conflicts with Arab countries. By continuously amplifying the narrative of an Iranian nuclear threat, Israel gradually built a unified front to prevent Iran from going nuclear. This ultimately led to the signing of the Abraham Accords, further isolating Iran in the regional power game, leaving it aligned only with a few non-state actors.
The United States, meanwhile, driven by its interest in preserving Israel’s strategic security, controlling the Persian Gulf oil lifeline, establishing air and naval bases in Arab states, and treating oil-rich Arab countries as a kind of “ATM,” has intermittently released conflicting messages—sometimes warning that Iran is “about to become nuclear,” sometimes suggesting it is “still not there.” By tightening and loosening U.S.-Iran relations at will, Washington has kept Iran sleepwalking in a state of nuclear ambiguity. Iran, in turn, has grown complacent over temporary U.S. concessions, investing the resulting petrodollars into regional expansion and proxy wars—only to ultimately become deeply entangled in a nuclear crisis web of its own making, from which it can no longer free itself.
Iran is clearly the “victim” of long-term pressure from Israel and the United States. However, in over 40 years of foreign policy struggle, Iran also seems to have benefited from its nuclear ambiguity policy: by publicly emphasizing its sovereign right to peacefully use nuclear energy, projecting a strong image of defending national and ethnic dignity, evoking the tragic consciousness and martyrdom complex of the Persian nation and the Shiite “dual minority” identity, cleverly binding the regime’s legitimacy with the rationality of state behavior, and linking public resentment against foreign oppression and interference with an aggressive foreign policy. Through its long-standing nuclear ambiguity and brinkmanship strategy, Iran has not only used external pressure and hostility to maintain the political base and legitimacy of the Islamic regime, but also skillfully avoided repeated waves of public pressure for domestic reform, external openness, livelihood improvements, and a better international image—using it even as a pressure-release valve to divert and mitigate the internal political and social contradictions that continue to intensify.
By this point, the Iranian nuclear crisis has become a tool that all three parties—Iran, Israel, and the United States—need. It has turned into a geopolitical bargaining chip that anyone can exploit for advantage or avoid for protection, and a deadlocked game that no one seems able to escape from in the short term.
For Israel and the United States, the Iranian nuclear crisis and the current Iranian regime are two sides of the same coin—offering a paradox that provokes both old and new questions: Is changing Iran’s current regime truly something Israel and the U.S. want to see happen? Wouldn’t a relatively isolated Iran, one that maintains its current ideological mindset, political system, and worldview, be more beneficial to Israel’s regional maneuvering in the Middle East, to America’s dominance and interference, and to the joint use of a seemingly powerful Iranian “scarecrow” to intimidate the many “little sparrows” of the Arab world?
Now let’s imagine the opposite scenario: if Iran gave up exporting the Islamic Revolution, abandoned the Palestine card and made peace with Israel, dissolved the “Shiite Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance,” normalized relations with the U.S., and respected the political systems and foreign policies of neighboring Arab monarchies—would Israel still have any justification to continue occupying the territories of Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria? Could it still maintain its aggressively expansionist “Greater Israel” policy? Could it continue to violate neighboring airspaces with impunity? And would the U.S. still be able to persuade Arab countries to host numerous military bases, lavishly buy American weapons, and huddle beneath the protective wings of American power?
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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