Opinion
Facing the mainstream, big picture, and normalcy of China-Israel relations
On July 9, the spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Israel made a statement on its official WeChat account, addressing the recent erroneous words and actions involving Taiwan by a member of Israel’s Yesh Atid party. The spokesperson pointed out that a certain member of Yesh Atid visited China’s Taiwan and met with the so-called “vice president” and “foreign minister.” After returning to Israel, the individual interacted and praised the relevant personnel from Taiwan on social media platforms, extensively discussed his visit in Israeli media, and openly referred to Taiwan as a “country.” These words and actions “seriously violate the One-China Principle, severely undermine the political foundation of China-Israel relations, and gravely poison the atmosphere of friendly and pragmatic cooperation between China and Israel. The Chinese Embassy in Israel firmly opposes and strongly condemns this, has lodged stern representations with the Israeli side, and demanded the immediate correction of the wrongful practices and elimination of the adverse impact.”
It is understood that at the end of April this year, Boaz Toporovsky, a member of the opposition Yesh Atid party, led a parliamentary delegation to visit Taiwan. At the end of May, a higher-level delegation composed of several other parties also visited Taiwan. The Taiwanese authorities’ top two leaders successively met with both Israeli parliamentary groups. Toporovsky is a descendant of Eastern European Jewish immigrants born in Israel. Possibly due to his role as the head of the “Taiwan-Israel Friendship Parliamentary Group,” he already visited Taiwan in 2024. After his recent return from Taiwan, Toporovsky continued to interact with relevant Taiwanese figures on social media, supported the pro-Taiwan independence forces, created obstacles for China-Israel relations, and drew attention from media outlets like Israel Today and The Jerusalem Post.
The Chinese Embassy in Israel rarely makes statements on Taiwan-related matters, and the use of the “three serious violations” to describe Toporovsky’s erroneous words and actions is very rare in the 33 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Israel, clearly showing that he has crossed the red line of the One-China Principle and caused friction and noise in China-Israel relations. Observers have also noted that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not summon the newly appointed Israeli ambassador to China for negotiations, indicating that the erroneous words and actions of individual Israeli lawmakers do not represent the official position of Israel. Therefore, it is appropriate and suitable for the Chinese Embassy in Israel to issue condemnation and warnings.
In fact, Toporovsky’s manipulation does not reflect the big picture, mainstream, or normalcy of China-Israel friendly relations and should not be exaggerated. However, in diplomacy, there are no small matters, and the One-China Principle is a core issue concerning China’s vital interests. At a time when the world is focused on the long-delayed sixth Middle East war, this discord and deviation in the friendly and pragmatic cooperation between China and Israel should not be taken lightly. It reflects the complex internal political spectrum of Israel and highlights the spillover effects of this war — that Israel, facing international pressure and media isolation, is eager for external sympathy and support. Some politicians are even willing to lose the watermelon for a sesame seed. In short, the Taiwan-related crisis in China-Israel relations is an overblown “storm in a teacup,” but if allowed to escalate, it will inevitably become a new variable that harms China-Israel relations.
Firstly, since its founding, regardless of which party is in power and regardless of left or right stance, Israeli leaders have always adhered to the One-China position with foresight and strategic vision. During the long Cold War period, even though China’s diplomacy overwhelmingly supported the Arab world, Israel — as an “international orphan” — never established any form of diplomatic relations with the Taiwanese authorities despite close exchanges. When China and Israel established diplomatic relations 33 years ago, the two sides had no historical baggage, especially not the difficult negotiations and painful choices that other countries faced when cutting ties with Taiwan to establish relations with China.
The reason lies in the fact that successive Israeli leaders have always clearly understood who the real legitimate representative of all Chinese people is, and the Israeli people have always appreciated the tolerance and generosity shown by the Chinese people toward Jews throughout history. At the same time, although China has long put pressure on Israel regarding the Middle East issue, it has also consistently opposed the Arab bloc’s radical ideas of “eliminating Israel,” advocated distinguishing between Israel’s expansionist policies and the Israeli people, and respected Israel’s legitimate security concerns.
Secondly, Israel is a multi-party and immigrant country, long influenced by American and Western values. Different parties often hold varying or even conflicting foreign policy positions; conflict between the government and parliament, and fierce battles between ruling and opposition parties are the norm. Small parties hijacking large parties or ruling coalitions is a distinctive feature of Israel’s democratic politics. Therefore, even during smooth periods in China-Israel relations, oddities like interfering in China’s internal affairs or crossing China’s red lines are inevitable. For example, in 1999, Israeli Speaker of the Knesset Avraham Burg, on the eve of receiving the Chairman of China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee, still met with the Dalai Lama despite Chinese warnings and negotiations. As for Israel’s entirely liberalized media, it has never lacked voices criticizing China, although such voices are not the mainstream or dominant tone of Israeli public opinion.
Thirdly, Israel is the only country in the Western bloc that has genuinely withstood bipartisan pressure from the United States while maintaining a stable and friendly China policy. I have previously written an article analyzing this: despite enormous American interference with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Israel has continued to actively, flexibly, and pragmatically participate in building the Belt and Road with China, including never abandoning the dual-use Haifa Port project with the Chinese side. In 2022, China had already become Israel’s second-largest trading partner and the largest source of imported goods. Even though over the past year, Chinese and Israeli diplomats have frequently clashed in multilateral settings, both sides have exercised maximum restraint, keeping conflicts sporadic and controllable without affecting comprehensive cooperation and strategic mutual trust.
Fourthly, China-Israel relations are indeed being impacted by the “Sixth Middle East War.” Mutual public sentiment between the two countries has significantly declined, roughly hitting the lowest point since diplomatic ties were established. Objectively speaking, Israel has suffered a national humiliation and catastrophe akin to a “9/11”-style event, fallen into a “seven-front battlefield” situation, and has yet to end its “state of war.” Thus, the entire nation and society are in an unprecedented state of crisis. From politicians to the public, emotions are extremely tense, fragile, and sensitive. Overreactions and distortion in foreign responses are inevitable, including repeated transgressions in China-related matters. As the saying goes, “abnormal phenomena hide deeper issues.”
China adheres to international law, upholds fairness in the Middle East conflict, stands on the side of historical justice, and — based on its responsibilities and obligations as a major power — continues to criticize the Israeli government’s belligerence and inhumane actions, exerting an unprecedented level of pressure on Israeli society since normalization of bilateral relations. Additionally, China’s traditional media and online public opinion, driven by international justice and sympathy for the weak, have formed a public discourse unfavorable to Israel. This atmosphere has led to a rise in anti-China sentiment in Israeli society and has created fertile ground for some politicians to manipulate the Taiwan issue. In recent years, Israeli parties and politicians have clearly grown closer to Taiwan, suggesting a kind of mutual warming in troubled times.
Fifthly, although the Netanyahu government has become increasingly hardline and right-leaning on Middle East issues, it has always maintained a fundamentally friendly stance and policy line toward China. Not only has Netanyahu himself never publicly complained under China’s intense public opinion and diplomatic pressure, but other right-wing and far-right cabinet members have also rarely openly attacked China. Therefore, anti-China or pro-Taiwan remarks and actions by individual Israeli lawmakers or even officials should not be attributed to the Israeli government, nor should they be regarded as national policy or state behavior.
Sixthly, this storm is neither a deliberate pressure tactic jointly orchestrated by Israeli political circles — playing “good cop, bad cop” with China — nor a sign that the Yesh Atid party has collectively reversed its position. Those familiar with Israeli politics know that Yesh Atid is a centrist party with only 12 years of history and a longtime rival of Netanyahu’s Likud group. In 2021, it once united with seven other factions, including the United Right Alliance, to form the “eight-party ruling coalition,” which overthrew Netanyahu’s 12-year rule. After the coalition disintegrated in 2022, Yesh Atid initiated a no-confidence motion in parliament, triggering new elections. In June this year, as the opposition, Yesh Atid proposed another motion aiming to topple Netanyahu’s ruling coalition.
In early April 2022, Yair Lapid — the party leader of Yesh Atid, then foreign minister and incoming prime minister — explicitly emphasized during a phone call with Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi that “Israel and China understand and appreciate each other. Israel regards China as a friend and has always adhered to the One-China policy since the establishment of diplomatic ties. This position has never changed and has become an important foundation of Israel-China relations…” Now, a lawmaker under Lapid is manipulating the Taiwan issue. Is this because he and the Yesh Atid party are unable to restrain their members? Or have they changed their attitude and turned their backs on China? Or are they intentionally expressing dissatisfaction with China’s Middle East policy? I am unwilling to maliciously speculate that the entire Yesh Atid party — especially its leader Lapid — has changed its attitude and policy toward China. I prefer to believe that this is just a case of the so-called “Taiwan-Israel Friendship Group” chairman jumping up and down to gain attention.
Perhaps because of these factors, China has adopted a relatively low-key, restrained, and calm approach, avoiding overreaction and disruption by a few bad apples in the Yesh Atid party, and striving to maintain the overall direction and fundamentals of China-Israel strategic mutual trust, friendship, and pragmatic cooperation.
It should be pointed out and guarded against: while Toporovsky was hyping up the Taiwan issue, certain malicious media outlets also released so-called reports of China exporting advanced fighter jets and air defense systems to Iran. This not only created tension and confrontation between Israel and Iran right after a ceasefire agreement was reached, but also tried to sow discord in China-Israel strategic mutual trust, worsen Israeli public opinion toward China, and damage bilateral relations and cooperation. These actions are ill-intentioned, fearing that the Middle East will become stable and that China’s Middle East diplomacy will proceed steadily and successfully.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric UAV attacks in Russia
Today, the nature of asymmetric threats is undergoing a profound transformation, with their focus shifting increasingly toward economic centers. By mid-2026, the nature of asymmetric warfare within the borders of the Russian Federation entered a qualitatively new and critical phase.
An analysis of the Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes carried out in July 2026 reveals a deliberate shift in targeting. Moving beyond military installations and fuel-energy infrastructure, these attacks directly targeted civilian logistics networks and critical nodes of the macroeconomic infrastructure.
The primary objective of this strategic shift is to deplete the country’s internal resources, induce insurmountable disruptions in supply chains, and exert intense psychological pressure on the civilian population.
Large-scale, coordinated strikes on the distribution centers of Wildberries—Russia’s largest e-commerce platform and part of the RVB joint venture (formed by the 2024 merger of Wildberries and Russ)—became the symbol of this new phase of home-front vulnerability. The geographic scope of these attacks, spanning an unprecedented area from the Northwestern Federal District to Southern Russia and Crimea, exposed critical gaps in national industrial risk insurance mechanisms. Furthermore, this situation sparked severe legal disputes between platform economy giants and small businesses, compelling immediate intervention from both corporate executives and senior state officials.
Tracing the multi-layered consequences of the kinetic impacts resulting from these July attacks on the state’s digital and physical economy will shape the new architecture of civilian sector security.
The zenith of the logistical terror waged by Ukraine was recorded on the night of July 24, 2026, marking the most technically complex UAV attack inflicted on Russian Federation territory since the beginning of the year. According to data from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, domestic air defense systems detected and destroyed 571 fixed-wing Ukrainian UAVs that night.
Two points have become exceptionally critical here: saturating radar fields and the military “swarm” effect. In short, this event is the clearest indication that the enemy has transitioned to a tactic of overwhelming radar systems. At the same time, the “swarm” effect generated across a vast geographic expanse aims to rapidly deplete the ammunition of anti-aircraft missile systems and expose air defense positions deep behind the front lines.
The breadth of the targeted geography attests to the unprecedented scale of the operation. UAVs were neutralized over the Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga, Kursk, Leningrad, Novgorod, Oryol, Pskov, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tver, Tula, and Vladimir regions, as well as over Moscow, Krasnodar, the Republic of Crimea, and the waters of the Azov and Black Seas.
Such a dense dispersion of targets across a vast territory points to an attempt to paralyze transportation and logistics arteries within Russia’s European landmass.
In parallel with the mass deployment of UAVs, missile strikes were also conducted against civilian industrial enterprises. During the same period, a missile attack on a local enterprise in the Fileyka district of Kirov resulted in outright catastrophe, leaving 6 people dead and 32 employees injured with varying degrees of severity.
Following the incident, Regional Governor Aleksandr Sokolov stated that the situation required not only the evacuation of the wounded, but also large-scale interventions such as restoring water and power supplies and auditing the security of neighboring settlements. This combined approach—employing inexpensive kamikaze drones to degrade air defenses followed immediately by missile strikes on unprotected industrial zones—presents an entirely new threat paradigm for the civilian economy.
Systematic and sequential attacks directed at the facilities of a single commercial entity completely eliminate the possibility of coincidence. The strategic, macroeconomic, and psychological factors turning civilian commercial warehouses into critical vulnerabilities for an entire state rest upon four pillars:
- Role as the central circulatory system of domestic trade: Wildberries plays a critical role in the architecture of the modern Russian economy, connecting millions of consumers with tens of thousands of SMEs. Damage to distribution centers severe supply chains, triggering localized shortages of essential consumer goods and regional inflationary spikes. The primary goal is to destabilize the domestic market and create an artificial supply vacuum.
- Immense facility footprints and defense complexity: Spanning hundreds of thousands of square meters across the nation, these hangars constitute massive targets with high radar contrast. Unlike military bases, these commercial warehouses cannot possess their own air defense systems; placing every such facility under an air defense umbrella is physically impossible without compromising frontline systems.
- Social and psychological impact: In the eyes of the public, logistics centers symbolize daily economic stability. Black plumes of smoke visible from miles away, massive fires, and civilian casualties represent a hybrid terror tactic designed to transport an atmosphere of fear deep into peaceful cities and shake the internal socio-political climate.
- Magnified radius of economic impact: Inventory consumed by flames in these warehouses generally consists of stock purchased by merchants on credit. The destruction of commodity inventories holds the potential to cause mass vendor bankruptcies, bank loan defaults, and cascading layoffs across small businesses.
The events of July 2026 mark an irreversible shift in the threat landscape facing Russian commerce and macroeconomics. Attacks directed at Wildberries hubs in regions such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Tambov exposed the utter vulnerability of civilian logistics infrastructure.
Deploying relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles, the enemy is capable of inflicting tens of billions of rubles in direct damage, paralyzing the supply of essential goods, and triggering an acute social crisis in which hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs face the threat of bankruptcy. According to Russian experts, the total cost of a single fire—similar to the Kotovsk incident on July 18—can range between 50 and 100 billion Rubles ($630 million – $1.2 billion USD).
Despite its massive capital reserves, corporate business was caught unprepared for military threats. The medium-term survival of the e-commerce economy depends on the state and the private sector uniting to engineer unprecedented systemic solutions. Establishing compensation funds and introducing mandatory risk-distribution mechanisms are critical steps that must be taken.
Logistics hubs will remain open targets unless a “state program for subsidized reinsurance of military risks” is established for the critical nodes of the civilian economy. In the future, it will not suffice for large enterprises merely to pour capital into the physical protection of infrastructure; they must also deeply decentralize their logistics networks to prevent the concentration of goods and capital at single points of failure.
Opinion
Egypt Under Fire: What Does the Damietta Strike Mean for Global Energy Markets?
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
For the first time since successive waves of escalation between Washington and Tehran began in recent months, an Egyptian liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility has become a direct target.
In the early hours of Wednesday, 29 July 2026, at least one drone struck the floating storage unit Energos Winter, owned and operated by a U.S. company and sailing under the Marshall Islands flag, while it was moored at the Mediterranean port of Damietta. The impact ignited a fire that spread to a neighboring LNG carrier, GasLog Salem. Egyptian authorities confirmed that the blaze was brought under control without any reported casualties, while no group had claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing.

A Broader Context That Cannot Be Ignored
The incident did not occur in a vacuum. It came only hours after the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had conducted joint strikes with Saudi forces targeting armed factions in Iraq accused of launching drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities. Tehran responded by warning against a “miscalculation,” at a time when the Middle East is still grappling with the repercussions of an earlier round of escalation that erupted on 8 July, when U.S. forces carried out strikes inside Iranian territory following an attack on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated with attacks targeting U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman.
Against this tense backdrop, Damietta appears to represent yet another link in the chain of regional escalation—but an exceptional one. For decades, Egypt has sought to keep itself removed from direct military polarization in the region, unlike several Gulf states that have increasingly become arenas of open confrontation.
At the same time, this interpretation does not entirely rule out the possibility of an indirect Israeli role, driven by hostility toward Egypt’s growing diplomatic influence in the Palestinian and Gaza files. Cairo has remained committed to advancing the two-state solution and to implementing the second and third phases of the peace roadmap agreed upon following the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit last October. The Israeli government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, has sought to obstruct these efforts. Netanyahu, who is the subject of arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court, is widely accused of bearing responsibility for committing genocide that, according to Palestinian authorities, have resulted in the deaths of approximately 73,000 Palestinian civilians since 7 October 2023.
Why Egypt?
Over the past two years, Egypt has steadily strengthened its position as a regional hub for liquefying and re-exporting natural gas. This growing role has been supported by its two LNG plants at Idku and Damietta, in addition to a network of pipelines linking the country with Israel and Cyprus.
This infrastructure—unmatched elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of combined liquefaction capacity and direct access to European and global markets—has transformed Damietta and Idku into critical gateways for Eastern Mediterranean gas, including increasing volumes of Israeli/Stolen Palestinian natural gas liquefied and re-exported through Egyptian facilities.
According to local reports, the Energos Winter alone was supplying approximately 450 million cubic feet of gas per day to Egypt’s national grid and was preparing to receive four additional cargoes during August.
This expanding role gives any attack on Egypt’s gas infrastructure significance far beyond the immediate incident itself. It threatens not only Egypt’s domestic energy supplies but also a supply chain upon which Europe has increasingly relied as part of its strategy to diversify away from Russian natural gas.
Who Was Behind the Attack? Open Scenarios
At the time of writing, no organization had officially claimed responsibility, leaving several possible interpretations.
The first scenario cautions against prematurely attributing responsibility to Iran or its regional allies. It argues that the ambiguity surrounding the incident—and the absence of any claim of responsibility—may itself be deliberate, allowing whichever actor carried out the attack to undermine Egyptian stability without incurring immediate political costs.
This possibility includes actors competing over Eastern Mediterranean energy routes, as well as local or transnational groups pursuing agendas unrelated to the U.S.-Iran confrontation. Egyptian officials themselves have adopted a notably cautious approach. Egypt’s Minister of Information warned against “rushing to accuse any party,” while a former official suggested that “certain actors are seeking to drag Egypt into the conflict,” implying that the attack may have been designed precisely to draw Cairo into a confrontation it has consistently sought to avoid.
A second scenario, Israeli Involvement or the Involvement of Israel’s Allies
This, in itself, remains a serious hypothesis that is reportedly being discussed in undisclosed investigative circles. The prevailing analyses, supported by pro-Israeli and pro-American narratives, have largely centered on suspicions directed at Iran or Iran-aligned actors within the context of the ongoing conflict, rather than at Tel Aviv. This is partly because Israel maintains an energy partnership with Egypt, making any attack on an Egyptian export terminal potentially detrimental to its own natural gas interests.
Nevertheless, this hypothesis—like all others—must ultimately be assessed in light of the findings of the official investigations, which are still underway. It is worth recalling, however, that repeated warnings have been voiced regarding the visits of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington, as such visits have often been followed by heightened regional instability, as was argued after developments last December. According to this line of analysis, Netanyahu seeks to prolong the conflict with Iran in order to strengthen his domestic political position, secure his continuation in office, and advance Israel’s long-term strategic objective of neutralizing Iran and carrying out “Greater Israel.”
Within this framework, some analysts argue that there are broader efforts to weaken both Egypt and Türkey. They cite remarks attributed to a former Mossad operative during appearances on Israeli television, alleging that such a strategy would also serve to divert international attention away from the Gaza file and the question of Palestinian statehood—an issue on which Egypt has intensified its diplomatic efforts in recent days. According to this interpretation, creating indirect pressure on Egypt—the region’s most stable and secure state—could be viewed as a means of drawing Cairo into a wider regional confrontation.
A third scenario links the incident directly to the broader U.S.-Iran escalation. According to the article, The New York Times, citing two Iranian sources, reported that the attack may have been intended as a signal that global shipping and energy supplies could face deeper disruptions should Tehran or its allies choose to escalate further. The sources, however, did not identify the perpetrators or specify the launch point of the drone.
The Messages Behind the Attack
Regardless of who carried out the operation, the choice of target sends several important signals. An attack on what the article describes as the first American-owned energy asset on Egyptian soil would convey a message to Washington that not only its military installations in the Gulf, but also its economic footprint across the region, has become increasingly vulnerable.
For Egypt, which has consistently pursued a policy of strategic restraint and regional neutrality, the incident serves as a reminder that its geographic position—adjacent to some of the world’s most important energy and maritime corridors—no longer guarantees insulation from the conflicts unfolding around it.
For global markets, the attack suggests that the geographic scope of potential disruption is expanding beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf into the Eastern Mediterranean, increasing insurance premiums for shipping and critical energy infrastructure in a region long regarded as comparatively secure.
Egypt’s Official Response
The Egyptian government handled the incident with considerable caution and procedural professionalism, treating it primarily as a crisis-management operation rather than a political event.
The Cabinet confirmed that the fire had been caused by a drone attack without attributing responsibility to any specific party, emphasizing that investigations were continuing “to take all necessary measures to safeguard Egypt’s interests and national security.”
Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly described the response as a test of the state’s crisis-management capabilities, praising emergency teams for successfully moving the burning vessels away from the port, thereby preventing what could have become a far larger disaster.
President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi addressed the incident publicly for the first time during a telephone conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. During the call, he confirmed that the competent authorities were conducting a comprehensive investigation, warned of the dangers posed by the escalating regional situation, and stressed the importance of cooperation between Egypt and the international community to contain the crisis while adhering to peaceful solutions.
This measured diplomatic approach—avoiding direct accusations while emphasizing de-escalation—reflects Cairo’s determination not to be drawn into a broader regional confrontation despite having come under direct attack on its own territory.
Several Gulf states also expressed their full solidarity with Egypt and voiced support for its efforts to safeguard its national security and sovereignty.
The Impact on Global Energy Markets
The Damietta incident occurred at a time when global energy markets were already under considerable strain. Brent crude had been hovering around US$90 per barrel following the escalation of 8 July, while the European Title Transfer Facility (TTF) benchmark for natural gas had climbed above US$700 per 1,000 cubic meters for the first time since March.
Any additional disruption affecting an Egyptian LNG export terminal risks reinforcing this upward trend. Europe has increasingly relied on Egyptian liquefied natural gas as part of its broader strategy to diversify supplies away from Russian pipeline gas. Consequently, even a temporary interruption to Egypt’s export infrastructure could heighten market concerns over supply security.
The incident also adds to the geopolitical risk premium already factored into insurance costs for vessels operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. Higher perceived risks could translate into increased shipping and insurance costs for LNG carriers throughout the region, even if subsequent investigations conclude that the attack was an isolated event unlikely to be repeated.
What Should Be Done to Prevent Similar Incidents?
First, Egypt should further strengthen its short-range air defense capabilities and counter-drone systems around strategic energy installations along its Mediterranean coastline. This includes deploying advanced early-warning radar networks and cost-effective interception systems capable of neutralizing small unmanned aerial vehicles before they reach critical infrastructure.
Second, broader regional intelligence-sharing mechanisms should be expanded among Egypt and neighboring states—including Cyprus, Greece, and Türkiye—in recognition of the increasingly interconnected nature of Eastern Mediterranean gas infrastructure and the shared strategic importance of safeguarding regional energy corridors.
Third, given that the targeted floating storage unit is owned by a U.S. company, Washington should contribute to financing and modernizing the protection of such critical infrastructure rather than limiting its response to statements indicating that it is merely “monitoring the situation,” as the article characterizes the U.S. reaction.
Finally—and perhaps most importantly—reducing the broader cycle of regional escalation between Washington and Tehran remains the only sustainable guarantee against similar incidents in the future. Any purely technical or localized security measures can mitigate immediate risks but cannot eliminate them so long as the underlying geopolitical drivers of confrontation remain unresolved.
Conclusion
The Damietta incident serves as a stark reminder that geographic neutrality alone is no longer sufficient to shield a country that has become a pivotal node in the global energy network.
References:
1- https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39ez3klwmro
4- https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/29/world/middleeast/ships-drone-strike-egypt.html
Opinion
Rising populist parties in Europe and liberalism
Leon Trotsky, one of the foremost leaders of the October Revolution, defined fascism as the totalitarian organization of society by monopoly capital. Magnates of large-scale monopoly capital are acutely aware that their profits cannot be safeguarded in the absence of authoritarian political power. Thus, fascism finds its bedrock of support among capitalist forces, the grand bourgeoisie, monopoly capital circles, and major landowners. We are all too familiar with the calamities fascism wrought upon the world in the era preceding the Second World War.
The post–World War II era is often commemorated as the golden age of capitalism—a period characterized by robust growth rates and low unemployment. Real wages climbed, social rights expanded, demands for a welfare state remained vibrant, and the pursuit of a social state yielded tangible results. This era ultimately met its demise in the 1970s, undone by shifts in the regime of accumulation and structural economic crises.
Today, across Europe, political parties that could virtually be characterized as the direct successors to pre-WWII fascist movements are consolidating their electoral gains. Germany, France, and Italy serve as quintessential examples. These parties weaponize poverty, unemployment, and anti-foreigner, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and anti-Middle Eastern sentiments, while capitalizing on the incompetence of traditional center-right and center-left parties and taking a deeply Eurosceptic, critical stance toward the European Union. They employ caustic rhetoric against the political elites who have dominated governance for decades. Receiving endorsement from both US President Trump and Russian leader Putin, they draw substantial support simultaneously from working-class constituencies—traditionally the bedrock of the left—and from grand capital circles. While monopoly capital quietly pats these populist movements on the back, it simultaneously winks at liberal-democratic and increasingly indistinguishable social-democratic parties that champion unbridled capitalism and aggressive liberalism. Beyond France and Germany, examples abound from Italy to the United Kingdom…
The interests of grand capital, which back populist regimes and advocate authoritarian governance, also champion localization. For the erosion of the national, the public, and the collective—alongside the attenuation of the central state and the elevation of the local—works decisively to the advantage of big capital.
Why?
Because of this:
Under liberalism, the state does not regulate the market; rather, the market regulates, directs, and subdues both the state and society. In a liberal order, the state is expected to act on behalf of capital and in favor of the market—intervening in politics, society, and the law, and enacting statutory frameworks strictly to this end. The state is tasked with engineering legal and institutional arrangements for the market’s account and benefit. Society is reduced to a market-society, wherein the citizen is reimagined as a consumer, a client, and an entrepreneur. Since competition is elevated as the supreme imperative, citizens themselves must become entrepreneurial and competitive—a posture the state actively promotes and incentivizes.
According to liberals, the state bears no obligation to shield its citizens from the pitiless mechanics of the market or the ferocity of unchecked capitalism. On the contrary, the state demands and encourages that citizens establish themselves as entrepreneurial actors within the market arena. Consequently, the state aligns itself with capital, operating at its beck and call. Hence, liberalism harbors an innate preference for unorganized, non-unionized, cheap labor. Wages are suppressed; agricultural subsidies are gutted to a minimum; and strikes are banned on the flimsiest of pretexts.
Because liberalism insists that the state be sculpted, organized, and driven according to market demands—allowing the market to command and direct the state—the liberal vision of the nexus between politics and economics, as well as politics and law, is deeply fractured. In their worldview, law must operate exclusively to the advantage of capital, acting as the vigilant sentinel for the inviolability of property rights. It must dismantle every obstacle standing in the way of free trade, unbridled competition, and the free market, while swiftly and severely penalizing any force that dares to impede them. To conform to the expectations and demands of capital: this is the primary imperative required of the law.
In sum, through its championing of identity politics, its reduction of the citizen to a mere client, and its liquidation of the state’s social character in order to place public power at the disposal of capital, liberalism stands fundamentally opposed to the social, the public, and the national. This is a truth that must be firmly impressed upon left-liberals, nationalist-liberals, and conservative-liberals alike.
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